JUDGMENT P.C. Agrawal, J. 1. This is a civil revision under section 23-E of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act (Act for short). By the impugned order Rent Controlling Authority (R.C.A. for short) has dismissed an application for eviction filed by the predecessor of the petitioner. Smt. Surajbai (a widow who died during the pendency of application and the petitioner was taken on record as a legal representative) for bona fide requirement for non-residential purpose of the petitioner under section 23-A(b) of the Act. 2. As per application disputed shop was let out to one Chain Singh (since dead legal representatives brought on record) and Subahu Kumar (R-3) on 4-11-1985 on monthly rent of Rs. 350/-. Disputed shop is bona fide required for business of the petitioner who had a shop on rent from one Mehoob Khan who had obtained a decree from the Civil Court for his eviction and ejected him. As per application petitioner would start his cycle repairing shop in the disputed shop. No other reasonably suitable shop is there within the town for this purpose. No alternative suitable shop has come in possession of the petitioner under the Will. 3. After obtaining leave to contest respondents claimed that actual landlord has been the petitioner only not his mother Suraj Bai. Only received rent note in favour of late Smt. Suraj Bai the original applicant was got executed to avoid tax liability. Only an Otla was let out to Subahu Kumar (R-3) who has got constructed a shop and got installed electric fittings etc. in the same. Need of petitioner was denied. Petitioner had voluntarily vacated his rented shop under a compromise. In such shop the petitioner used to play Carom. He never run a Cycle repairing shop in such rented shop. He has not been serious and sincere in starting a new business. Under Will executed by late Smt. Suraj Bai, the petitioner had got a big house in his possession in part of which he may open his Cycle shop he so wants. After death of Smt. Suraj Bai a widow entitled to apply for summary eviction under section 23-A of the Act her son the petitioner could not have taken the benefit of summary procedure under Chapter-III-A of the Act as he was not a landlord falling within the definition of special category of landlords. 4. After death of Smt. Suraj Bai a widow entitled to apply for summary eviction under section 23-A of the Act her son the petitioner could not have taken the benefit of summary procedure under Chapter-III-A of the Act as he was not a landlord falling within the definition of special category of landlords. 4. R.C.A. held that the petitioner could continue with the application as a legal representative of deceased Smt. Suraj Bai but held that ground for eviction was not proved and dismissed the application. 5. Initially, the application was filed by Smt. Suraj Bai a widow falling (under section 23-J(III) of the Act) in the Special category of landlords entitled to use the special summary procedure for eviction of tenants under section 23-A of the Act. A summons was issued to the respondents by the R.C.A. under section 23-B of the Act. Respondents obtained leave to contest under section 23-C of the Act and had submitted their written statements on 4-9-1990. The original applicant Smt. Suraj Bai was examined on 14-6-1993. On 27-12-1993 original applicant Smt. Suraj Bai died. On 14-2-1994 petitioner was impleaded in place of original applicant. Certainly, the petitioner did not fall within the special definition of landlord under section 23-J of the Act. Now the question is could the petitioner still continue the proceedings under section 23-A of the Act. 6. The present had been an application by the widow for requirement of residential purpose of her major son, the petitioner. Such an application was competent under section 23-A(a) of the Act. In view of Narain vs. Smt. Ansuya Bai, 1990 MPLR 517, Shibraj Jat vs. Ashalata Yadav, 1989 MPLJ 202 , Harbans Singh vs. Smt. Margrat G. Bhingardive, 1990 MPLJ 112 (FB), Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai, 2001(2) MPLJ 349 : 2002(11) MPLR 1. The earlier view as expressed in Phoolrani vs. Naubatrai, AIR 1973 SC 2120 that a suit for eviction on ground of personal requirement of a relative could not have been continued by the L.Rs. did not find favour in Shantilal vs. Chimanlal, AIR 1994 SC 2398, Raghunathji Panhale vs. Chaganlal Sunderji and Company, 1999(8) SCC 1 . Such an application was permissible under express language of section 23-A of the Act. After death of original applicant personal requirement of her son had not come to an end and the application had not abated as the cause of action continues. 7. Such an application was permissible under express language of section 23-A of the Act. After death of original applicant personal requirement of her son had not come to an end and the application had not abated as the cause of action continues. 7. Certainly an application for eviction filed by one co-landlord was competent unless objected to by other co-owners Narain vs. Smt. Ansuya Bai, 1990 MPLR 517. Palsingh vs. Sri Sundersingh, 1989 MPRCJ 72, Ghanshyam Gupta vs. Shivaldas, 1988 MPLJ 260 . Certainly, any civil suit by the widow a landlord falling in the special category of the landlords under section 23-J of the Act for eviction for personal requirement for herself and for her major son or unmarried daughter could not have been filed before Civil Court Ashok Kumar Gupta vs. Vijay Kumar Agrawal, AIR 2002 SC 310, Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai, 2001(2) MPLJ 349 : 2002(11) MPLR 1. Certainly the widow landlady had no choice but to approach the R.C.A. 8. Even after the death of widow the requirement of her major sons subsisted. Requirement of major son of a widow was actually the requirement of the widow. After death of the widow such major son of the widow is be entitled to continue the application, in view of Order 22 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interest of the widow after her death would be represented by her such major son. The R.C.A. has to follow a summary procedure for enquiry akin to that prescribed under Chapter 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has to apply the procedure for formalities prescribed for decisions of small causes under section 23-D(2) of the Act. Section 17 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act 1887 make applicable, the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure for such summary inquiry. Order 22 of the said Code is also applicable to such summary enquiry. As such legal representative could continue the application. It was not a mere personal action which could await with the death of the applicant. The application can definitely be continued by such son of the widow as her legal representatives. Thus, the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent that the R.C.A. was at error in continuing the application even after the death of the widow has not been sound and has to be repelled. 9. The application can definitely be continued by such son of the widow as her legal representatives. Thus, the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondent that the R.C.A. was at error in continuing the application even after the death of the widow has not been sound and has to be repelled. 9. Learned Advocate for respondents has cited Smt. Jarina vs. Hazzanbai, (2001)(1) MPLR 326 in which the widow had died during the pendency of revision but the learned Single Judge has held that the application could not continue. Such a view was taken without adverting to Narain vs. Smt. Ansuyiya Bai, 1990 MPLJ 517 and Narayan vs. Basant Rao, 1991 (1) M.P.LR. 166, in both these cases decided earlier a different view was taken by Hon'ble Shri R.C. Lahoti, J (as he then was). There it was held that in case the decision of R.C.A. was not illegal, improper or incorrect, the eviction order could not be interfered with due to death of special category landlord during the pendency of the revision. The view taken in Girishchand Chaturvedi vs. Pushpa Bhopatkar, 1999 (11) MPLJ SN 11 by Hon'ble Shri R.C. Garg, J. was also the same. With due respect, it is submitted that the learned Single Judge in such Jarina (supra) had not taken note of the fact that death during pendency of revision, could only the effect the viability of the revision and that provisions of Order 22 of the Code do not apply to revisions. Santosh Kumar Jaiswal vs. Joseph, 1995 MPLJ 273, in which the widow had died during the pendency of the proceedings was also decided by Civil Judge without adverting to these views. In Gangadhar vs. Shantaram Lokhare, 1994 JLJ 408 , the question had not arisen at all as the widow was substituted by another special category landlord who was a retired Government servant. Clearly authorities relied upon by the respondents do not held them. 10. It was not a case where the widow had approached the Court with her son as a co-plaintiff. In that situation only a choice of forum was available to them, only then they could either file a suit in Civil Court or could approach the R.C.A. but not in a case where the widow was the sole applicant. 10. It was not a case where the widow had approached the Court with her son as a co-plaintiff. In that situation only a choice of forum was available to them, only then they could either file a suit in Civil Court or could approach the R.C.A. but not in a case where the widow was the sole applicant. To discontinue the proceedings of death of applicant could not the effect of depriving the widow of valuable right to leave her property to her heirs. 11. It is well settled that the landlord has to prove both the limbs of the ground of eviction under sections 12(1) or (f) and sections 23(a) or (b) of the Act. Such requirement must be proved objectively. Mere desire or fancy of landlord is not sufficient. Mattulal vs. Radhelal, AIR 1975 SC 1596, Ram Doss vs. Ishwar Chander, AIR 1988 SC 1422 , Deena Nath vs. Pooran Lal, (2001)5 SCC 705 . 12. On evidence of record, view taken by the learned R.C.A. that the petitioner was not able to prove his requirement had been perverse and arbitrary. Indarmal (AW-1) had been able to prove his requirement, the original applicant Smt. Suraj Bai had also supported her application, though, she could not be cross-examined, as she died before such cross-examination could be done. Indarmal (AW-1) had experience of having a cycle repairing shop. Though, it was not bound to prove previous experience. His rented shop was got vacated by his landlord. The fact that Indarmal (AW-1) had compromised in eviction suit by his landlord is of no consequence at all. It is well settled that rented shop could be sought to be an alternative accommodation. A landlord can always insist to have his business in his own shop. In 1981 only an Otla had existed which was let out to Chainsingh and Subahu Kumar (R-3). Shop was built by Sabahu Kumar (R-3). Later, Ex. P/2 clearly show that cost of building had already been settled and paid by Indarmal (AW-1) before 1-11-1985. On 4-11-1985 a rent note was executed by late Chainsingh and Subahu Kumar (R-3) in favour of Smt. Suraj Bai. Monthly rent was settled to Rs. 350/- Rent receipt to Ex. P/3 to Ex. P/6 clearly show that rent paid was Rs. 350/- per month. The defence version that either Rs. On 4-11-1985 a rent note was executed by late Chainsingh and Subahu Kumar (R-3) in favour of Smt. Suraj Bai. Monthly rent was settled to Rs. 350/- Rent receipt to Ex. P/3 to Ex. P/6 clearly show that rent paid was Rs. 350/- per month. The defence version that either Rs. 9,000/- the remainder of cost of construction was left outstanding to be paid by Indarmal (AW-2) or the monthly rent was only Rs. 150/- had no substance. The allegation that rent note Ex. P/2 was got executed to get facility in taxation dispute also had no substance. As in the year 1981, only an Otla existed in place of disputed shop and Indarmal (the petitioner) had a rented shop in his possession letting out of the Otla to late Chainsingh does not show that Indarmal (the petitioner) did not require the shop. The allegation that Indarmal (the petitioner) used to play Carom in his tenanted shop and was not serious and sincere in his business does not negative the need of Indarmal (the petitioner). There has been definite evidence on record that there are other cycle repairing shops in front of the disputed shop and the vicinity the comment of R.C.A. that demand of disputed shop for cycle repairing is surprising or not believable has been merely extravagant. Certainly, Indarmal (the petitioner) used to working continuously accounting for certain Firms. There is evidence on record that with the advent of computers various establishments are leaning towards maintenance of their accounts by computers and thus such proportion loosing its dividend and attraction. Parasmal (NAW-2) who also used to write accounts for others has also left such work and shifted to Megh Nagar as the work of writing accounts has not renowned attractive now. In these facts and circumstances the need of Indarmal (the petitioner) could not be said to be either flimsy or fanciful or a mere desire. His need for disputed shop had been a felt need under which should have been respected by the R.C.A. 13. Indarmal (AW-1) has admitted that his mother had executed a will Ex. P/9 in his favour. Certainly one house situate in Ghas Bazar and other house in Porwado Ke Vaas was left behind. Smt. Suraj Bai had applied for eviction on 11-1-1988. During her life time it was not claimed by the respondents that she was in possession of any alternative accommodation. P/9 in his favour. Certainly one house situate in Ghas Bazar and other house in Porwado Ke Vaas was left behind. Smt. Suraj Bai had applied for eviction on 11-1-1988. During her life time it was not claimed by the respondents that she was in possession of any alternative accommodation. After her death on 7-9-2001 respondents applied for amendment in their written statement and claimed that certain rooms in front ground floor were lying vacant in the house in Porwando Ke Vaas. It was not pleaded that such rooms were meant for non residential purpose. During evidence as lead on 22-5-2002 Subahu Kumar (NAW-1) claimed that one shop in ground floor with a shuttered door was lying vacant. Photograph Ex. P. 14 was also produced. Rakesh Narayan (NAW-3) the nephew of Subahu Kumar (R-3) has also tried to support such a theory. However, none of them has been definite that house in which such shop is situate, at Porwado Ke Vaas has been in actual possession of Indarmal (the petitioner). As per corporation record this house is entered in the name of Smt. Sushila Bai widow of Bansilal, the other son of Smt, Suraj Bai whose business Chanda Cutpiece by name is situated in the contiguous shop. Certainly Indarmal (AW-1) has denied that he has been in possession of such shop or that such shop is suitable for his purpose. By such a indefinite evidence the requirement of Indarmal (AW-1) could not have been negatived. 14. It is well settled that scope of interference under section 23-E of the Act is wider. The High Court has to satisfy itself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of the order or legality of the procedure. Such a power is not restricted or limited as the power of revision is under section 115 of the Code B. Johnson vs. C.S. Naidu, 1985 MPLJ 675 : 1985 JLJ 795, Harishanker vs. Rao Girdhari Choudhary, AIR 1963 SC 698 , Ramdas vs. Ishwar Chander, AIR 1988 SC 1422 . Certainly, findings of the facts can be interfered with if the same are perverse or arbitrary. 15. Finding as to bona fide requirement of landlord is basically a finding of fact. But where the R.C.A. has applied a wrong approach or has not adverted to the statutory requirement of the provision interference is possible. Certainly, findings of the facts can be interfered with if the same are perverse or arbitrary. 15. Finding as to bona fide requirement of landlord is basically a finding of fact. But where the R.C.A. has applied a wrong approach or has not adverted to the statutory requirement of the provision interference is possible. Certainly, the conclusion of the R.C.A. had been perverse and arbitrary and have to be set-aside. The petitioner was able to prove his bona fide requirement. 16. Revision merits to be allowed with costs. Application for eviction is allowed. The respondents shall handover vacant possession of the disputed shop just after elapse of two months of this order. The petitioner shall pay the double amount of annual rent under section 23-G(1-A) to the respondents. Advocate's fee as per schedule.