JUDGMENT V.M. Jain, J. - This appeal has been filed by the State of Haryana against the order dated 13.3.1992 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, acquitting the accused-respondent of the charge under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter, referred to as the Act). 2. The facts in brief are that on 29.10.1985 Food Inspector Sant Lal along with Dr. S.S. Srivastava had intercepted the accused, who was having about 20 litres of unindicated milk in two cans for public sale. After disclosing his identity, Sant Lal, Food Inspector had purchased 660 mls. of milk from accused Dev Raj for Rs. 2.50 after serving notice upon him and after stirring the milk. Thereafter, the Food Inspector divided the milk into three equal parts and the same were bottled etc. in accordance with rules. One sealed bottle along with memo in form VII was sent to the Public Analyst in a sealed box through railway parcel. The Public Analyst in his report found the milk to be adulterated inasmuch as it was found that milk fat was 5.5% and milk solids not fat was 8.3% and in this manner milk fat was deficient by 8% and milk solids not fat was also deficient by 8%. Thereupon, the Food Inspector filed complaint before the Chief Justice Magistrate, against the accused. 3. Notice of accusation was served upon the accused for the aforesaid offence. Thereafter, Food Inspector produced the evidence in support of his case. The statement of accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code was recorded in which he denied the prosecution allegations against him and stated that he was innocent and had been falsely implicated in this case. In his defence, he examined DW-1 Shri Baldev Raj Dutt, Finger Print Expert and DW-2 Dariyao Singh, Assistant. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, after hearing both sides and perusing the record, acquitted the accused-respondent of the charge framed against him. Aggrieved against the same, the State of Haryana filed the present appeal in this Court against the acquittal of the accused-respondent. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, after hearing both sides and perusing the record, acquitted the accused-respondent of the charge framed against him. Aggrieved against the same, the State of Haryana filed the present appeal in this Court against the acquittal of the accused-respondent. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record carefully. The only ground on which the learned Magistrate had acquitted the accused- respondent was that Sant Lal, Food Inspector had no authority to take the sample on the day when the sample was taken by him and as such all the proceedings taken by him were illegal and void. It was found that as per the statement of DW-2 Dariyao Singh, Sant Lal was appointed as Govt. Food Inspector on adhoc basis on 21.7.1980 and his appointment was approved by the S.S. Board Haryana upto 30.6.1981 and after 30.6.1981 the appointment of Sant Lal as Govt. Food Inspector was not approved by the S.S. Board and as such after 30.6.1981, Sant Lal had no authority to function as Govt. Food Inspector and therefore, on 29.10.1985 he had no authority to take the sample and hence all the proceedings including taking of samples etc. were illegal and void. Resultantly, the accused was acquitted of the charge framed against him. 4. When the case came up for hearing before me on 13.8.2003, I had directed the concerned Officer from the office of the Director Health Services, Haryana to be present in Court on 27.8.2003 along with relevant record concerning the appointment of Sant Lal as Food Inspector. In pursuance thereof, Shri Gurmail Singh, Assistant from the office of Director General of Health Services, Haryana appeared in the Court along with the relevant file. Learned counsel appearing for the State also produced before me the covering letter received by him from the Director General, Health Services, Haryana along with photocopies of the various documents from the aforesaid file. 5. DW2-Dariyao Singh, Assistant from the office of Director Health Services, Haryana had deposed that Sant Lal, Sanitary Inspector was appointed as Govt. Food Inspector on 26.7.1980 on adhoc basis and that he was given all the powers by the State Government vide notification dated 31.7.1980 and that the S.S. Board, Haryana had approved the said appointment upto 30.6.1981 and for the subsequent period no approval was received. Food Inspector on 26.7.1980 on adhoc basis and that he was given all the powers by the State Government vide notification dated 31.7.1980 and that the S.S. Board, Haryana had approved the said appointment upto 30.6.1981 and for the subsequent period no approval was received. During cross-examination on behalf of the Food Inspector, he admitted that the Notification dated 31.7.1980 had not been rescinded upto 30.5.1989 and that said Sant Lal continued in service and he retired on 1.5.1989 by seeking voluntary retirement and he had been receiving the salary of Govt. Food Inspector till the date of his retirement. From the said statement of DW-2 Dariyao Singh, it could not be said that Sant Lal Food Inspector was not having the powers of a Food Inspector on the day when the sample in the present case was taken by him on 29.10.1985, specially when he continued in service till 1989 and sought voluntary retirement and had been receiving salary during the said period. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the learned Magistrate had erred in law in acquitting the accused of the charge framed against him only on the ground that Sant Lal, Food Inspector had not powers to take the sample etc. on the day when the sample was taken from the accused-respondent, namely, Dev Raj in this case. This is especially so, when from the official record, which has been produced before me today it is clear that vide notification dated 31.7.1980, Sh. Sant Lal, Sanitary Inspector was given the powers of Food Inspector for the whole of the State of Haryana and those powers, he continued to exercise till he retired from service in May, 1989. It may also be mentioned here at this stage that vide order dated 18.4.1984, Sant Lal Food Inspector was reverted to the post of Tehsil Sanitary Inspector against which order he filed CWP No. 2001 of 1984 in this Court and vide order dated 7.5.1984 while issuing notice of motion, the order staying his reversion till further orders was passed and finally the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 15.9.1993 when the Deputy Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Haryana made a statement that the case of the petitioner shall be considered for regularization in view of the instructions issued by the Govt. from time to time. from time to time. Accordingly, in view of the statement of the learned State Counsel, a direction was issued to the respondent to consider the case of the petitioner (Sant Lal) for regularization in service. It was also noticed that reversion of the petitioner had been stayed by an interim order and therefore, he was continuing in service on the post of Govt. Food Inspector ever since 1980 and it was ordered that he would continue to hold the post till his case for regularisation was considered and decided either way. The Officer order dated 1.2.1994 passed by the Director General, Health Services, Haryana is also available on the file of Sant Lal, wherein it has been mentioned that in compliance with the Judgment of this Court delivered on 15.9.1993 in CWP No. 2201 of 1984, the services of Sh. Sant Lal Anand Govt. Food Inspector, who retired on 2.5.1989 are regularised w.e.f. 15.9.1982. 6. In view of the above material available on the record, in my opinion, it could not be said that Sant Lal Food Inspector was not authorised to take the sample from the accused on 29.10.1985. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, accused-respondent Dev Raj, could not be acquitted on this ground. Even though accused-respondent was acquitted of the charge framed against him by the learned Magistrate, only on the ground that the Food Inspector had no powers to take the samples and it has been found that the learned Magistrate had erred in law in acquitting the accused on this ground, yet in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to convict the accused-respondent in this case in view of the other infirmities available in the prosecution case. 7. A perusal of the Trial Court record would show that accused-respondent was summoned for the offence under Section 7 read with Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act. When the accused appeared before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 7.2.1986, the learned Magistrate found that the case is to be tried in a summary manner, in view of the provisions contained in Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the aforesaid Act. Vide order dated 28.3.1986, notice of accusation for the offence under Section 7(1) punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act was served upon the respondent to which notice he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Thereafter on 3.4.1987, statement of PW-Sant Lal Anand was recorded. Vide order dated 28.3.1986, notice of accusation for the offence under Section 7(1) punishable under Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Act was served upon the respondent to which notice he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Thereafter on 3.4.1987, statement of PW-Sant Lal Anand was recorded. Thereafter, statements of two other witnesses were recorded in this case on 18.11.1988 and the Food Inspector had closed his evidence. Thereafter, the statement of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code was recorded. Thereafter, statement of one defence witness was recorded on 10.8.1990 and the statement of another defence witness was recorded on 13.3.1992. It was thereafter that the learned Magistrate, vide order dated 13.3.1992, had acquitted the accused-respondent in this case. 8. As referred to above under Section 16-A of the Act, all offences under Sections 16(1) of the Act shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and the provisions of Sections 262 to 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to such trials. It has also been provided that it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. It has further been provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties record an order to that effect and thereafter, proceed to hear or re-hear the case in the manner provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the present case, as referred to above, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, had served the notice of accusation upon the accused respondent considering the case was to be tried in a summary way, as required under Section 16-A of the Act. Thus, this case has to be treated as a case which was tried by learned Magistrate, in a summary manner. 9. The next question that comes up for consideration is as to whether the learned Magistrate, who had acquitted the accused on a technical ground, was competent to consider the evidence led by the complainant in this case. Thus, this case has to be treated as a case which was tried by learned Magistrate, in a summary manner. 9. The next question that comes up for consideration is as to whether the learned Magistrate, who had acquitted the accused on a technical ground, was competent to consider the evidence led by the complainant in this case. Under Section 326(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is provided that whenever any Judge or Magistrate after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein and is succeeded by another Judge or Magistrate, who exercises such jurisdiction, the Judge or Magistrate so succeeding may act on the evidence so recorded by his predecessor or partly recorded by his predecessor and partly recorded by him. Under Section 326(3) Criminal Procedure Code, it is provided that nothing in this Section applies to summary trials. Thus, from a plain reading of Sections 326(1) and 326(3) Criminal Procedure Code, it would be clear that even though it would permissible for a Judge or a Magistrate to consider the evidence recorded by another Judge or Magistrate in the case in any other case, but it would not be so permissible to the summary trials. This would mean that the Magistrate who has decided a case which is being tried in a summary trial is required to consider only that evidence which has been recorded by him during the course of trial. He would not be entitled to consider the evidence which has been recorded by his predecessor(s). In the present case, as referred to above, the charge was framed by one officer on 28.3.1986. The statement of PW-1 Sant Lal Anand, Food Inspector was recorded on 3.4.1987 by another officer. The statements of two other witnesses i.e., PW-2 Dr. Mrs. Usha and PW-3 Dr. S.S. Srivastava, were recorded on 18.11.1988 by another officer. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code, was recorded by a different officer on 20.4.1990, who had also recorded the statements of two defence witnesses and had finally decided this case. The statements of two other witnesses i.e., PW-2 Dr. Mrs. Usha and PW-3 Dr. S.S. Srivastava, were recorded on 18.11.1988 by another officer. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code, was recorded by a different officer on 20.4.1990, who had also recorded the statements of two defence witnesses and had finally decided this case. Thus, it would be clear that the only statements recorded by the officer, who had finally decided the case, were the statements of the two defence witnesses besides recording the statement of accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code The statement of all the three witnesses of the complainant had not been recorded by this officer. In this view of the matter, the evidence produced by the complainant could not be relied upon by the learned Magistrate, who decided the case. Thus, it would be clear that the statements of PW-1 Sant Lal Anand, PW-2 Dr. Mrs. Usha and PW-3 Dr. S.S. Srivastava, could not be made the basis for holding the accused guilty in this case. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the accused respondent could not be held guilty on the basis of the statements made by the aforesaid witnesses since the said evidence could not be taken into consideration while considering the question as to whether the accused was guilty the question as to whether the accused was guilty in this case. Furthermore, taking into consideration that the sample was allegedly taken on 29.10.1985 i.e. about 18 years back, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to remand this case to the trial court for re-recording the evidence and to decide the case afresh, especially when the accused is not at fault in any manner, whatsoever. For the reasons recorded above, the acquittal of the respondent has to be upheld, though on a different ground. Resultantly, finding no merit in this appeal the same is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.