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2003 DIGILAW 1202 (ALL)

Syed Mahfooz Hussain v. State of U. P.

2003-05-19

MARKANDEY KATJU, R.S.TRIPATHI

body2003
( 1 ) THIS judgment will govern all similar petitions listed before us today. ( 2 ) HEARD learned counsel for the parties. ( 3 ) BY means of this petition the petitioner has challenged the Constitutional validity of the first proviso to Section 56 (1-A) of the indian STAMP ACT, 1899, which was inserted by the Indian Stamp (U. P. Second Amendment)Act, 2001 (U. P. Act No. 38 of 2001) copy of which is Annexure-II to the writ petition. ( 4 ) THE facts of this case are that by a sale deed dated 1-8-2001 Annexure-2 to the writ petition one Deepak Kumar transferred the land in question to the petitioner. The sub-Registrar, Karchhana, District allahabad made a reference to the District magistrate, Allahabad vide Annexure-3 to the writ petition stating that the Stamp duty on the document was Rs. 1,17,900/- but the petitioner had paid only Rs. 23,400/-hence the deficiency in the stamp duty was rs. 94,500/ -. The petitioner filed an objection dated 8-5-2002 before the respondent no. 2 vide Annexure-4 to the writ petition alleging that there was no deficiency. The respondent No. 2 however, by order dated 30-11 -2002 Annexure-7 held that there was deficiency of Rs. 94,500/- which should be recovered as land revenue. Against that order the petitioner filed a revision under Section 56 (1) of the STAMP ACT, 1899 before the Commissioner, Allahabad with a Stay application. True copy of the Revision and the Stay application are Annexures-8 and 9 to the writ petition. However, the Commissioner, allahabad by order dated 25-3-2003 admitted the Revision and held that if petitioner deposits 1/3rd of the amount in question then the Stay application will be considered. True copy of the said order dated 25-3-2003 is Annexure-10 to the writ petition. It is evident that the said order has been passed in view of the impugned first proviso to Section 56 (1-A) of the STAMP ACT, 1899. True copy of the said order dated 25-3-2003 is Annexure-10 to the writ petition. It is evident that the said order has been passed in view of the impugned first proviso to Section 56 (1-A) of the STAMP ACT, 1899. ( 5 ) SECTION 56 (1-A) stated : " (1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provisions of this Act, any person including the Government aggrieved by an order of the Collector under chapter-IV, Chapter-V or under Clause (a)of the first proviso to Section 26 may, within sixty days from the date receipt of such order, prefer an appeal against such order to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, who shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard consider the case and pass such order thereon as he thinks just and proper and the order so passed shall be final : provided that no application for stay recovery of any disputed amount of stamp duty including interest thereon or penalty shall be entertained unless the applicant has furnished satisfactory proof of the payment of not less than one-third of such disputed amount : provided further that where the Chief controlling Revenue Authority passes an order for the stay of recovery of any stamp duty, interest thereon or penalty or for the stay of the operation of any order appealed against and such order results in the stay of recovery of any stamp duty, interest thereon or penalty, such stay order shall not remain in force for more than thirty days unless the appellant furnishes adequate security to the satisfaction of the Collector concerned for the payment of the outstanding amount. " ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first proviso to the impugned Section 56 (1-A) has created undue hardship and is an unreasonable restriction and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 7 ) IN our opinion there is no merit in this petition. ( 8 ) IT may be mentioned that as held by a division Bench of this Court in M/s. Naveen gun House v. Union of India, 2003 (2) AWC 894 : (2003 All LJ 1512) stamp duty is a tax and the power to levy stamp duty is in the concurrent list of the Constitution i. e. Entry 44 of the List III of the VII Schedule. Hence the State Legislature has power to pass the impugned Act. Hence the State Legislature has power to pass the impugned Act. ( 9 ) IS well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the Statute vide Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Keshav Chand, AIR 1950 SC 265 (vide para 20 ). If the language is plain and admits of only one meaning it has to be given effect to even if it leads to hardship or possible injustice vide D. D. Joshi v. Union of India, air 1983 SC 420 : 1983 Lab IC 530. ( 10 ) IN Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 (685) it was observed by the Supreme Court that if there is any hardship it is for the Parliament to amend the law, but the Court cannot be called upon to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear the Court has to give effect to it, however inequitable or unjust the result may be. As is said, dura lex sed lex which means the law is hard but it is the law. In our opinion even if the impugned amendment is causing hardship to some people it is not for this court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpretated in its plain and literal sense as that is the first principle of interpretation. In our opinion the impugned amendment to the STAMP ACT, 1899 is clear and unambiguous. It clearly states that no stay of recovery of any disputed amount of stamp duty including interest or penalty can be entertained unless the appellant has deposited 1/3rd of the deposited amount. ( 11 ) IN Abel v. Lee, 1871 LR 6 CP 365, willes, J. observed "i utterly repudiate a notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right and reasonable. ( 11 ) IN Abel v. Lee, 1871 LR 6 CP 365, willes, J. observed "i utterly repudiate a notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right and reasonable. " in Miller v. Salomans, 7 Ex 475, Polak, J. observed, "if the meaning of the language be plain and clear we have nothing to do but to obey it-to administer it as we find it, and to take a different course is to abandon the office of the Judge and to assume the province of legislation. " The same view has been taken by our Supreme Court in suddappa v. Special Land Acquisition Offleer, 2002 (1) SCC 142 : AIR 2001 SC 2951 . ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that we should read into the impugned Section 56 (1-A) a provision empowering the appellate authority to waive or stay even the 1/3rd amount which has to be deposited, in certain circumstances when there is hardship etc. In our opinion a Court cannot supply a casus omissus. As held by the supreme Court in Dadi Jagannadhan v. Jammulu Ramulu, 2001 (7) SCC 71 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2699 } the Court cannot correct a deficiency in the Statute. An interpretation which has the effect of adding certain words and clauses to an enactment should be avoided vide Fakhruddin v. State of U. P. , 1976 ALR 274 (FB ). ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first proviso to the impugned Section 56 (1-A) has created undue hardship and is an unreasonable restriction and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 7 ) IN our opinion there is no merit in this petition. ( 8 ) IT may be mentioned that as held by a division Bench of this Court in M/s. Naveen gun House v. Union of India, 2003 (2) AWC 894 : (2003 All LJ 1512) stamp duty is a tax and the power to levy stamp duty is in the concurrent list of the Constitution i. e. Entry 44 of the List III of the VII Schedule. Hence the State Legislature has power to pass the impugned Act. Hence the State Legislature has power to pass the impugned Act. ( 9 ) IS well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning of the language employed by the Legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the Statute vide Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Keshav Chand, AIR 1950 SC 265 (vide para 20 ). If the language is plain and admits of only one meaning it has to be given effect to even if it leads to hardship or possible injustice vide D. D. Joshi v. Union of India, air 1983 SC 420 : 1983 Lab IC 530. ( 10 ) IN Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 (685) it was observed by the Supreme Court that if there is any hardship it is for the Parliament to amend the law, but the Court cannot be called upon to discard the cardinal rule of interpretation for mitigating a hardship. If the language of an Act is sufficiently clear the Court has to give effect to it, however inequitable or unjust the result may be. As is said, dura lex sed lex which means the law is hard but it is the law. In our opinion even if the impugned amendment is causing hardship to some people it is not for this court to amend the law. A legal enactment must be interpretated in its plain and literal sense as that is the first principle of interpretation. In our opinion the impugned amendment to the STAMP ACT, 1899 is clear and unambiguous. It clearly states that no stay of recovery of any disputed amount of stamp duty including interest or penalty can be entertained unless the appellant has deposited 1/3rd of the deposited amount. ( 11 ) IN Abel v. Lee, 1871 LR 6 CP 365, willes, J. observed "i utterly repudiate a notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right and reasonable. ( 11 ) IN Abel v. Lee, 1871 LR 6 CP 365, willes, J. observed "i utterly repudiate a notion that it is competent to a Judge to modify the language of an Act of Parliament in order to bring it in accordance with his views as to what is right and reasonable. " in Miller v. Salomans, 7 Ex 475, Polak, J. observed, "if the meaning of the language be plain and clear we have nothing to do but to obey it-to administer it as we find it, and to take a different course is to abandon the office of the Judge and to assume the province of legislation. " The same view has been taken by our Supreme Court in suddappa v. Special Land Acquisition Offleer, 2002 (1) SCC 142 : AIR 2001 SC 2951 . ( 12 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submitted that we should read into the impugned Section 56 (1-A) a provision empowering the appellate authority to waive or stay even the 1/3rd amount which has to be deposited, in certain circumstances when there is hardship etc. In our opinion a Court cannot supply a casus omissus. As held by the supreme Court in Dadi Jagannadhan v. Jammulu Ramulu, 2001 (7) SCC 71 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2699 } the Court cannot correct a deficiency in the Statute. An interpretation which has the effect of adding certain words and clauses to an enactment should be avoided vide Fakhruddin v. State of U. P. , 1976 ALR 274 (FB ). ( 19 ) IN paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit it is stated that the object of the impugned enactment was to prevent evasion of stamp duty. It had been experienced that there was very slow realization of stamp duty and as such the new provision was added. We find nothing unconstitutional in this. Tax laws are often amended to prevent evasion of tax. ( 20 ) MOREOVER, it may be pointed out that the impugned amendment has not deleted section 56 (1) which stated that the power of the Collector is subject to the control of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. Hence if in a rare and exceptional case the collector has imposed exorbitant stamp duty arbitrarily the Chief Controlling Revenue authority, on an application, can modify the same. Hence if in a rare and exceptional case the collector has imposed exorbitant stamp duty arbitrarily the Chief Controlling Revenue authority, on an application, can modify the same. However, this should be done only in rare and exceptional cases, otherwise the provision for appeal under Section 56 (1-A)will become redundant. ( 21 ) SINCE the language of the impugned first proviso to S. 56 (1-A) is plain and unambiguous we cannot interpret it otherwise. We find no unconstitutionality in the impugned enactment. Obviously it was made so that Government dues may be recovered quickly. As held by the Supreme Court in asst. Collector, Central Excise v. Dunlop india Ltd. , 1985 (1) SCC 260 : ( AIR 1985 SC 330 ) the Government requires Revenue for various purposes and it cannot run on Bank guarantees. Thus there is no Constitutional infirmity in the impugned provision. The petition is therefore dismissed. Other similar petitions listed before us today are also dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of appeal under Section 56 (1-A), or under section 56 (1) in rare and exceptional cases. Petition dismissed. . .