ORDER Tapen Sen, J. 1. The petitioner (Management of North Eastern Railways) have filed the instant writ application challenging the award passed on 29.03.2001 by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 at Dhanbad in reference Case No. 91 of 1993. Heard Mr. Pradip Modi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M.M. Prasad, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 6. 2. Mr. Pradeep Modi, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined the writ application only insofar as it relates to the second part thereof and which relates to the question as to whether the action of the Management of Sonepur Railway Division in terminating the services of S/Shri Ram Pukar, Dular Chandra Sharma, Jairam Sharma, Md. Yunus and Jang Bahadur, all casual workers with effect from 16.02.1989 was justified or not and if not, to what relief they were entitled to. 3. By reason of the award dated 29.03.2001, the learned Tribunal answered the aforementioned reference in favour of the casual Mazdoors named above and held that the action of the Management in terminating their services was not justified and therefore they were entitled to reinstatement but without back wages from the date of termination till the date of reference, i.e. 22.08.1993. The Management was however directed to pay back wages with effect from 23.08.1993, i.e., from the date of the reference. 4. The petitioners are aggrieved by the aforementioned portion of the award. 5. According to the petitioners, the North Eastern Railway has its Headquarters at Gorakhpur and a Division at Sonepur. It employs casual labourers from time to time for executing various nature of works as per requirement. 6. The persons named in the reference are respondent Nos. 2 to 6. However, Md. Yunus (respondent No. 5) died on 20.04.2001 leaving behind his widow Smt. Oliken Khatoon. Accordingly, an application for substitution was filed and by order dated 20.01.2003, the Substitution Petition was allowed. Thereafter notices were ordered to be issued and on 06.08.2003, the Registrar General of this Court took Into consideration the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that notices had already been served upon the substituted heirs of the deceased respondent No. 5 and accordingly, it was held that it would be deemed that notices were served upon her. Thereafter the Registrar General directed the Office to proceed further in the matter. 7. Thereafter the Registrar General directed the Office to proceed further in the matter. 7. The dispute in relation to the subject matter of the award has been dealt with from paragraph 6 of the award. However, from the pleadings made in the writ application, it is evident that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were engaged as casual labourers during the period 1973 to 1979. According to the petitioners, none of the respondents worked for more than 240 (two hundred and forty) days, and therefore, they did not become entitled even to a temporary status of a railway employee. At paragraph 8, the petitioners have stated that these respondents stopped working on their own from 1979 onwards and they raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Tribunal and it was registered as Reference Case No. 91 of 1993. The petitioner appeared before the Tribunal and filed its Written Statement specifically stating that the reference was barred by limitation and it would create serious administrative inconvenience if it was allowed. 8. The petitioners have further stated at paragraph 11 that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 did not produce any evidence either oral or documentary and Mr. Pradip Modi states that such evidence should have been produced to establish that they had worked continuously for more that 240 (two hundred and forty) days. Without there being any evidence on record, the Tribunal directed the petitioners to reinstate them in service and to pay them back wages from the date of the reference. Mr. Pradip Modi, learned counsel for the petitioner has further stated that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were admittedly terminated on 16.02.1979 and the reference was made in the year 1993 and on that ground alone they were not entitled to any relief. 9. However, upon perusal of paragraph 7 of the award it is evident that the Tribunal clearly records that the Management did not give any reason for termination of the services of the concerned workmen nor did they dispute that they were casual labourers working under the Divisional Railway Engineer, Sonepur. It has further been recorded at paragraph 7 that the Management took shelter only on the point of limitation and submitted that since the dispute had been raised after a great delay, therefore the concerned workmen were not entitled to any relief. It has further been recorded at paragraph 7 that the Management took shelter only on the point of limitation and submitted that since the dispute had been raised after a great delay, therefore the concerned workmen were not entitled to any relief. At paragraph 8 also, the Tribunal has clearly recorded that "from the pleadings of the parties", it was apparent that the Management was "defenceless" regarding its action in terminating the services of the concerned persons with effect from 16.02.1979 and that they had only taken the plea of limitation. 10. In the view of the matter, there is no scope for the Writ Court to entertain the arguments of Mr. Modi which have been made before this Court for the first time. 11. Mr. Modi has argued that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 miserably failed to prove that they worked continuously for one year. He has further argued that, so far as casual labourers are concerned, a scheme was framed by the labourers way- back in the year 1984 for absorption of casual labourers employed on Railway Projects in continuous service for more than a year. That scheme envisaged absorption of such workmen on completion of 360 days of continuous employment and the scheme was made applicable to those who were in service as on 01.01.1984. Mr. Modi submits that the aforementioned scheme was approved by the Honble Supreme Court of India in the case of Inder Pal Yadav and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1985) 2 SCC 648 . According to him, this scheme was accepted by the Supreme Court of India subject to modification in the date from 01.01.1984 to 01.01.1981. The aforementioned judgment cannot be said applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case because it is the admitted case of the parties that the services of the concerned persons were terminated with effect from 16.02.1979, i.e. prior to both 01.01.1984 and 01.01.1981. 12. Mr. Modi then argued and submitted that the aforementioned judgment of Inder Pal Yadav (supra) was further explained by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Dakshin Railway Employees Union, Trivandrum v. General Manager, Southern Railway and Ors., reported in 1987 PLJR 41 (SC) and by reason of that judgment, the scheme was made applicable even to such persons who were retrenched prior to 01.01.1981 provided they submitted their claims before 31.03.1987. 13. 13. This judgment will also not apply in the facts of this case because this argument was not made before the Labour Court. It has been held by the Honble Supreme Court of India that the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 does not sit as an Appellate Court in relation to awards passed by Labour Courts or Tribunals and therefore such an argument of Mr. Modi cannot be allowed to be agitated before this Court, because from a perusal of the award it is clear that such arguments were not raised before the Tribunal. This Court cannot re-appraise evidence nor can it go into the facts nor can allow the petitioners to raise a new point at this stage. Reference in support of the aforementioned contention may be made to the following judgments :-- (i) In the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers Union and Anr., the Supreme Court has held that the High Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction under Article 226 and that insufficiency of evidence or that an argument to the effect that another view was possible cannot be a ground for interference with findings of the Industrial Tribunal. Consequently in the absence of the scheme having been produced before the Tribunal as was accepted by the parties and in the absence of such arguments having been made, this Court cannot come to a conclusion that had such a scheme been produced, another view was possible. (ii) Similar view was taken by the Honble Supreme Court of India in the case of Bank of India another v. Degala Suryanarayana, reported in, AIR 1999 SC 2407 . In the instant case, there is not even an iota of a suggestion to the effect that the aforementioned arguments were also canvassed or argued or taken before the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot permit the petitioners to raise a point which was never argued before the Tribunal and thereby become oblivious of the fact that this Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over awards passed by a Tribunal and presided over by a Judicial Officer, unless the same is perverse, malafide or patently illegal. It has further been held in the case of Indian Overseas Bank etc. It has further been held in the case of Indian Overseas Bank etc. (supra) that the findings of facts recorded by a fact finding authority such as a Tribunal are ordinarily considered to have become final and they cannot be disturbed, for the mere reason of an opinion of the Writ Court that they have been passed on materials or evidences not sufficient or credible or that another view was possible. In the instant case there are no materials to show that the aforementioned arguments were advanced and therefore, it is all the more difficult for the petitioners to support their arguments to the effect that the Labour Court should have taken into consideration the scheme etc. So far as the question as to whether the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 had miserably failed to prove that they had been working for more than one year continuously prior to their termination, the observation of the learned Tribunal at paragraph 7 to the effect that the management did not dispute that they were casual labourers becomes significant and therefore, this argument of Mr. Modi is also fit to be rejected. 14. The other judgment cited by Mr. Pradip Modi is the case of Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1993 SC 2276 . Mr. Modi submits that by lapse of time, the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 have lost both their right as also their remedies. In support of the aforementioned argument, Mr. Modi relies upon paragraph 6 of the said judgment passed in the case of Ratan Chandra etc. (supra), but that judgment also does not support the case of the petitioners, because the observations of the Honble Supreme Court is in relation to a delay created in the matter of a Writ Application whereas in this case the aspect relating to delay has been adequately taken care of by the Tribunal itself at paragraph 8 of the award wherein he has correctly applied the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court referred to therein and has also correctly held that insofar as Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is concerned, there is no limitation prescribed. The learned Labour Court correctly applied the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Singh v. Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board and Ors., reported in 1989 (82) FLR 169, holding that if there was delay, the Tribunal or Labour Court should pass an award in such a manner that instead of giving full back wages only 50% thereof can be granted from the date of termination till reinstatement and such an order cannot be said to be illegal. In the instant case the Tribunal has granted back wages only from the date of the reference till the award. 15. The other judgment relied upon by the learned Tribunal in support of the said contention was the case of Ajaib Singh and Sirhind Co-operative Marketing and Processing Services Society Ltd. and Anr., reported in 1999 (82) FLR 137. Moreover the petitioners have not been able to make out any case in support of their contention that delay was fatal because if they were actually aggrieved by the delay, they could have challenged the reference itself on that ground alone by filing a writ application. They did not do so and instead faced the reference. In that view of the matter, this argument of Mr. Pradip Modi also does not hold good. 16. Mr. Pradip Modi then drew attention of this Court to paragraph 17 of the writ application and submitted that the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 are governed by the Railway Establishment Code and therefore they should have approached the Central Administrative Tribunal for ventilating their grievances and the Industrial Tribunal was therefore not the proper forum and so, the award passed by the respondent No. 1 was without jurisdiction. In this context a judgment of the Honble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha of the Patna High Court in the case of the Management of Doordarshan Kendra v. Presiding Officer etc. and Ors., reported in 1993 (2) PLJR 414 (a) judgment of the then Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court clearly answers the aforementioned argument of Mr. Modi. In the said judgment it has been held that Doordarshan, AIR, Railway Administration etc. are Commercial Departments of the Central Government and as such they come within the purview of the definition of the word "industry" as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. Modi. In the said judgment it has been held that Doordarshan, AIR, Railway Administration etc. are Commercial Departments of the Central Government and as such they come within the purview of the definition of the word "industry" as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. At paragraph 15 of the said judgment it has been so held and at paragraph 29 it has further been held that both Administrative Tribunals Act and the Industrial Disputes Act are self-contained codes and the jurisdiction of the Industrial Courts is not curtailed by reason of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. At paragraph 30 it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Industrial Courts are concurrent. 17. Finally, Mr. Modi submitted that in any event if this Court finds and holds in favour of the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 then in view of the ratio decided by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Rolston John v. Central Government etc. reported in AIR 1994 SC 131 , and in the case of Mahesh Narsayya Chintal v. Executive Engineer etc., reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 255, only a lump sump compensation should be paid as otherwise it would create a huge financial burden upon the Railways and that too when the respondent Nos. 2 to 6 had not worked. 18. In the process of modifying the award to the extent argued by Mr. Pradip Modi, this Court will have to hold that there is an irregularity or perversity or illegality in the award itself. In view of the points argued before the Tribunal and in view of the findings given by the said Court in paragraphs 6 to 8, this Court is satisfied that the award of the Tribunal is neither perverse nor irregular nor illegal nor unjustified. To that extent therefore, this Court is not satisfied with the argument of Mr. Pradip Modi that the award should be modified and that only compensation should be paid. For all the reasons stated therefore, this Court holds that there is no merit in this writ application. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall however, be no order as to costs. As a consequence of this order, the interim order granted on 26.11.2001 is hereby vacated.