B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 13. 9. 1988 passed in Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1987 passed by VIII Additional District Judge, Azamgarh. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-respondent Jagat Narain singh filed. Suit No. 145 of 1986 for specific performance of contract of sale for decree directing the appellants to execute the sale deed of l/6th portion of the disputed agricultural land plots" nos. 141 and 533 in favour of the plaintiff on payment of Rs. 3, ,000/- as balance of sale consideration. There is a very little dispute regarding the facts of the case. Appellant no. 1 Nandan Singh who has since died was the owner of the said plots. He agreed to sell the same for Rs. 48,000/- in favour of the plaintiff and appellants 2 to 6. A registered agreement to sale was executed on 19. 10. 1983 and a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was paid at the time of the agreement and it was agreed that balance amount of Rs. 18,000/-shall be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. It is alleged by the plaintiff that out of Rs. 30,000/- he paid Rs. 5,000/- of his share and Rs. 25,000/- was paid by the appellants 2 to 6. ( 3 ) THE further allegation is that after this agreement the appellant No. 1 executed a sale deed of the entire land in favour of appellants 2 to 6 on 25. 11. 1985. That the plaintiff could not know regarding that sale deed. That the plaintiff is ready and willing to purchase l/6th share of the property on payment of Rs. 3. 000/- being his share of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 18,000/ -. That he asked the appellants to execute the sale deed but they failed to execute the same, hence the suit was filed. ( 4 ) THE defendants contested the suit. They have not denied the agreement nor has denied that sale deed has been executed by appellant No. l in favour of appellants 2 to 6. The main plea was that the suit is barred by section 168- A of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. ( 4 ) THE defendants contested the suit. They have not denied the agreement nor has denied that sale deed has been executed by appellant No. l in favour of appellants 2 to 6. The main plea was that the suit is barred by section 168- A of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. That there was no agreement that each of the purchasers will have l/6th share in the property in dispute and therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to get the sale deed executed of 1/6th share. ( 5 ) THE trial court framed necessary issues and held that the suit is barred by Section 168-A of U. P. Z. A and LR. Act. That the plaintiff i not entitled to get the sale deed executed of l/6th share of land. The trial court accordingly dismissed the suit. However, the first appellate court has reversed all the findings of the trial court and decreed the suit for specific performance of contract of sale and a direction has been given to the appellants to execute the sale deed of l/6th share of the aforesaid plot in favour of the respondents. Aggrieved by it the present appeal has been preferred. ( 6 ) I have heard Shri U. K. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Jagannath singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent. This second appeal was admitted on the substantial question Nos. 1 and 5 as mentioned in the memo of appeal which are as follows: "question No. 1. Has the learned Judge committed patent illegality in misinterpreting the provision of Section 168a of Act I, 1951 and the view of this honble Court in the case of Smt. Bhuri v. Balwant Singh and other reported in 1980 A. W. C. 258 and in reversing the finding of the trial court holding that the suit was barred under section 168a of the Act? question No. V : Could suit for specific performance of a contract of sale be decreed without reversing the finding of the trial court that the plaintiff has failed to aver and prove the allegations of willingness and readiness as required under section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief act ? after hearing the learned counsel for the parties i find that no other substantial question of law arise for decision in this appeal except on which it was admitted. after hearing the learned counsel for the parties i find that no other substantial question of law arise for decision in this appeal except on which it was admitted. FINDINGS substantial question No. 1. It is admitted position that l/6th share of the disputed plots is a fragment according to the definition given in Clause 8 (a) of Section-3 of U. P:z. A. and lr. Act. The trial court has held that l/6th share is a fragment and therefore, its transfer is not permissible under the law. The first appellate court has relied on the decision of this court in Smt. Bhuri v. Batwant Singh. ( 7 ) A perusal of this decision show that, the first appellate court has wrongly interpreted this judgment. It has been provided in this case that the transfer of the entire holding by the tenure holder in favour of several persons is not hit by Section 168a, even though the share of the each purchaser may below the fragment. This decision has no application in the present case. This decision pre-supposes one sale deed in favour of several persons by the tenure holder of his entire holding. In view of this decision the transfer of the land by one sale deed by appellant No. 1 in favour of the appellants 2 to 6 is not hit by Section 168-A and it would have been valid if plaintiff might has also joined as purchaser with appellants 2 to 6. Therefore, the tenure holder that is appellant no. 1 could have executed the sate deed of his entire land in favour of the appellants 2 to 6 and respondent by one sale deed. However, from this decision it does not follow that different sale deeds of l/6th share of appellant no. 1 could be executed in favour of each of the appellants 2 to 6 and the respondent. Had separate sale deed would have been executed they would have certainly hit by Section 168-a. Therefore, the transfer of 1/6th share by the appellants in favour of the respondent is also hit by Section 168-A of U. P. ZAandlr. Act. ( 8 ) IN view of this position of tew the decision of the first appellate court is totally against the provisions 6f law and is fit to be set aside. The findings on this point of the trial court is correct. Act. ( 8 ) IN view of this position of tew the decision of the first appellate court is totally against the provisions 6f law and is fit to be set aside. The findings on this point of the trial court is correct. The first appellate court has committed gross error of law in recording a finding that the transfer is not hit by Section 168-A of the U. P. Z. A. andlr. Act. The point No. 1 is decided accordingly. ( 9 ) IN view of my decision in point No. 1 alone the appeal is fit to be allowed and the suit is fit to be dismissed. However, arguments have also been advanced on substantial question no. 5. Therefore, I think it proper to record finding on this point also. ( 10 ) SUBSTANTIAL Question No. 5. On this point the learned counsel for the appellant has referred to a recent decision of this Court in smt. Ram Dhani and Ors. v. Nek Ram Singh and Ors. In this case Section 16 (c) of Specific relief Act was considered and it was observed that the proof of readiness and willingness is mandatory. It has further been observed that though the plea set up in the plaint has not been traversed even then the Court is obliged to frame an issue and the plaintiff is bound to produce evidence to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in the absence of any issue on the point the suit cannot be decreed and therefore, the matter was remanded to the lower appellate court. ( 11 ) SINCE this is a question of vital importance and is raised, in every appeal arising out of Suit for specific performance of contract of sale therefore, I would like to express my views on this point. ( 12 ) THE Judgment in the case of Smt. Ram Dhani (supra) is very a detailed judgment and it appears that all the relevant decisions on this point have been considered by the learned Judge deciding this case. It was observed that in the Specific Relief Act, 1887 there was no Statutory duty upon the plaintiff of either pleading or giving proof of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. However, this matter was firstly considered in the case of Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon. It was observed that in the Specific Relief Act, 1887 there was no Statutory duty upon the plaintiff of either pleading or giving proof of his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. However, this matter was firstly considered in the case of Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon. In this case it was observed that it is mandatory for the plaintiff to plead that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in case this plea is traversed the plaintiff had further to give proof of his continued readiness and willingness from the date of the contact upto the date of hearing of the suit. This decision is prior to the enforcement of Specific Relief Act which was enforced in the year 1963 in which Section 16 (C) was enacted and statutory recognition was given to the view expressed in this decision by the Privy Council. The learned Judge has further observed that this requirement, has been held to be the mandatory in the case of mahmood Khan v. Ayub Khan and Sura)singh and another v. Sohan Lal. In the case of Mahmood Khan (supra) it was also observed that even If the plea of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff has not-been denied and no issue was framed on the point even then the plaintiff should prove the same. Further in this case of Suraj Singh (supra) it was held by this Court that even if the plea of readiness and willingness was taken in the plaint and was not traversed in the written statement even then the twin requirements of pleading and proof of readiness and willingness are mandatory. ( 13 ) THEN the learned-Judge has referred to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai and others v. Palaniswami Nadar wherein it was held that the plaintiff should plead his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and if the fact was traversed, he is required to prove the continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of hearing of this case to perform the contract on his part. ( 14 ) I have considered various decisions on the point and is of the view that the decision of the Privy Council and the Honble supreme Court have been un-necessarily stretched in various decisions of this Court and the process of stretching is still in progress, and the Courts have ruled that the plea as required by Section 16 (C) of the Specific Relief act should be taken in the plaint and issue on the point should be framed and the plaintiff should prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract from the date of the contract upto the date of hearing. In my opinion, there is no reason for taking such a view in a case where the plea has not been specifically denied in the written statement. Of course if the plea is denied in the written statement the issue would be framed on the point and finding has to be recorded after the evidence of the parties. But take a case such as present one, wherein I find that in para-7 of the plaint, the respondent has pleaded that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 1 also find that there is a general denial in para-1 of the written statement of paragraphs 4,5. 6,7,8 and 9 of the plaint. In additional pleas there is no specific denial of this fact. Therefore, according to the provisions of Order VIII Rules 3 to 5 c. P. C. it shall be deemed to be admitted. The result therefore, is that if there is deemed admission of this fact whether the court is obliged to frame an issue on the point. Issues are framed under Rule 1 of Order XIV C. P. C. Clauses 1 to 3 of above rule are as follows:-" (1) Issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by the one party and denied by the other. (2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. (3) Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. (2) Material propositions are those propositions of law or fact which a plaintiff must allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to constitute his defence. (3) Each material proposition affirmed by one party and denied by the other shall form the subject of a distinct issue. " ( 15 ) IN view of this proposition of law an issue can be framed only if a material proposition of fact which is alleged in the plaint is denied in the written statement. Unless there is denial the issue cannot be framed on any point. An issue cannot be framed because it is a legal requirement of Section 16 (C) of the specific Relief Act, as there is no consequential amendment in Order XIV C. P. C. and the court can frame issue in accordance with the above provision only. ( 16 ) I therefore, find that if no issue is framed on the question of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, the plaintiff can not be permitted to adduce evidence on this point nor he is bound to give proof of the same. Section 16 (c)of Specific Relief Act is of no help regarding the question of proof which is governed by the provisions of Indian Evidence Act and c. P. C, The question of proof should therefore be considered in the light of Indian Evidence act and C. P. C. only. ( 17 ) IN view of the above I am of the view that if there is no denial of the allegation in the plaint regarding readiness and willingness no issue need be framed even in compliance of Section 16 (C) of the Specific Relief Act. If it is so the courts below are also not required to give finding on this point. The allegation shall be deemed to be proved by admission under the provisions of Order VIII Rules 3,4 and 5 of the C. P. C. ( 18 ) IN the present case I find that in para-7 of the plaint there is specific allegation regarding the readiness and willingness. There is no specific denial of the said statement in the written statement. Therefore, neither there is any requirement of the issue being framed on this point or a finding need be recorded. There is no specific denial of the said statement in the written statement. Therefore, neither there is any requirement of the issue being framed on this point or a finding need be recorded. ( 19 ) IN view of my finding on point No. 1 the appeal is fit to be allowed. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the first appellate court are quashed and that of the trial court are restored. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, considering the circumstances of the case 1 leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Appeal allowed