A. K. SIKRI, J. ( 1 ) IN all these writ petitions primary grievance raised is common though there are certain ancillary issues raised as well in one or other writ petitions. The main challenge in these writ petitions is to the Notification dated 29. 8. 2003 issued by the Central Government in exercise of its power conferred by sub -. Section (1) of Section 4a read with Section 9 of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) act, 1995 (hereinafter to be referred as the act for short ). Put it simply, the effect of the notification is to defer the implementation of conditional Access System (CAS) indefinitely in respect of specified areas of Delhi. It may be pointed out at this stage itself that the central Government had earlier issued notifications (details whereof would be mentioned at appropriate stage) implementing cas w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003 in some specified areas of Delhi as well as in the cities of Chennai, mumbai and Kolkatta. Whereas the CAS has duly been implemented in Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkatta w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003, the Notification dated 29. 8. 2003 has deleted the specified areas of Delhi as mentioned in earlier notifications and thus CAS has not been implemented in Delhi. The petitioners in these writ petitions have alleged that the impugned action of the respondents is not only arbitrary, mala fide and based on irrelevant considerations, it is politically motivated as well. ( 2 ). CWP. No. 5676/2003 is filed by one dr. Arvind Gupta in the nature of public interest Litigation; CWP. No. 5697/2003 is by jay Polychem India Ltd. and; CWP. No. 5698/ 2003 is by M/s. Siti Cable Network Ltd. and cwp. No. 5494/2003 is filed by Cable Network association. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the controversy, one will have to track the events leading to introduction of CAS in four metropolis. ( 4 ) IN or around 1991 with the advent of satellite television, cable television services also made their debut in India. The service entered an unregulated regime and hence grew in an unbridled manner. Initially the cable services were primarily provided by local area cable operators who provided the last mile linkage. Subsequently, Multi Service Operators (MSOs), such as Siti Cable Network Ltd. , IN cable, WIN Cable etc. , entered the field for providing cable television services. The service entered an unregulated regime and hence grew in an unbridled manner. Initially the cable services were primarily provided by local area cable operators who provided the last mile linkage. Subsequently, Multi Service Operators (MSOs), such as Siti Cable Network Ltd. , IN cable, WIN Cable etc. , entered the field for providing cable television services. With an intent to regulate the Cable Television industry, the Parliament enacted Cable television Network (Regulations) Act,1995. While the Act, did, to some extent, regulate the cable television networks, it, in its existing form, was inadequate to deal with several issues which had been addressed by developed countries such as:- A) Under declaration of subscriber base by the cable operators leading to loss of revenue to the Government by way of, inter-alia, service tax and entertainment tax; b) Provision of proper quality of service, lack of which was detrimental to public at large; c) Regulating levy and fixation of charges for programmes, channels and bouquets thereby eliminating arbitrary increases in subscription rates; d) Inability of the viewer to choose what he wishes to view and eliminate what he does not wish to view as also to pay only for channels he wishes to view. ( 5 ) IN order to understand the occurrence of the aforesaid problems, one will have to take note of the system of distribution of various signals ultimately reaching the household viewers through the cable connection. Under the existing system of distribution there are several headends (i. e. a set up where the signals are received, processed and combined for further retransmission) all over the country which are engaged in the distribution of signals to cable operators which are ultimately taken to the household viewers through the cable connection. In the current method of distribution, the viewers pay a lump sum amount to the cable operator to receive all the signals of Free-to-Air Channels and pay channels. The varjous types of channels which are now received by households through the cable operator are: terrestrial Channels: The channels which are distributed through terrestrial antenna/microwave transmitters. The only terrestrial channels in India are doordarshan channels viz. , DD1 and dd2. Satellite Free-to-Air Channels: The channels which are broadcasted via satellite. For reception of this, only a Dish Antenna is required and no special decoders are needed. The only terrestrial channels in India are doordarshan channels viz. , DD1 and dd2. Satellite Free-to-Air Channels: The channels which are broadcasted via satellite. For reception of this, only a Dish Antenna is required and no special decoders are needed. If the channel is digital, a receiver is required and if the channel is encrypted, then a decoder is required but no payment needs to be made for the decoder, as in the case of mtv channel. Well known free-to-air channels are Aaj Tak, Sahara Samay etc. , satellite Pay Channels: These are the channels which are broadcasted via satellite. However, these channels cannot be received with dish antennae only. They require special decoders and a viewing card. The signal in these channels is encrypted and can be Viewed only after they are decoded. Payment is to be made to the broadcaster for receiving these channels who in turn authorise the particular box to receive and decode the encryption, eg. , Zee bouquet of Channels, Star bouquet, sony etc. , cable channels: These are the channels which are telecast by the Multi System operators from their various headends. eg. , Siti Channel, In Channel, Win channel etc. , video Channels: These are the channels run by the local cable operator by inserting of VCDs and Video cassettes from his own control room. These channels cover local programmes, devotional music etc. ( 6 ) UNDER the existing system, the distribution of Satellite channels is done only through the cable Operator. The viewer is not able to choose as to which channel he wishes to view. Moreover in such a case, the viewer s right to pay only for what he/she wishes to watch is not exercisable. It has also been observed in the past that MSOs of the cable operators are not submitting correct declarations of connectivity. For example, if a cable operator is providing services to 5000 homes, he may pay to the broadcaster for merely 500 homes. This results in losses to the Government in relation to Entertainment tax and to the broadcaster as both are not paid as per the number of viewers receiving signals. ( 7 ) TO address the aforesaid issues, the respondent on 25-9-2001, constituted a Task force consisting of representatives from the indian Broadcasting Federation, Multi Services operations (MSOs), Content Creators, Cable operators, Broadcasters, Infrastructure. ( 7 ) TO address the aforesaid issues, the respondent on 25-9-2001, constituted a Task force consisting of representatives from the indian Broadcasting Federation, Multi Services operations (MSOs), Content Creators, Cable operators, Broadcasters, Infrastructure. Providers, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, representatives of Consumer Activities and technical Experts. The Task Force was headed by the Joint Secretary (Broadcasting), ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The pointed issue before the Task Force was to examine the need and feasibility for introducing a Conditional Access System (CAS) as a solution to the aforesaid issues. ( 8 ) THE Task Force submitted its report dated 27. 2. 2002. As per this report the Task Force was unanimous that CAS is necessary to bring transparency at different levels and as a solution to the outstanding issues. The implementation of CAS was envisaged as beneficial to all concerned including MSO, cable Operators, Consumers and government. It was also reported that revenue generated was noted to the close of rs. 5700 crores. However, owing to under reporting, the exchequer was deprived of legitimate dues. As it is this report which led to amendment in the Act and as strong reliance was placed by the petitioners in support of their submissions, on this report, it would be apposite to extract significant portions of this report in order to have a feel of the same: " SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS: it was acknowledged that Cable television in India was a technology, which had entered in an unbridled manner and had become a reality totally through private investment. A connectivity of over 35 million homes had been achieved in this syndrome. The MSOs were later entrants. Cable and Satellite Television had gradually become an irresistible force in the process of transformation of communication technology and the perceived potential of Cable TV, DTH, dtt etc. was immense. The Cable operators observed that since demand of content was driving ad revenue and viewership, the Broadcasters and the content Creators were whimsically levying exorbitant charges for programmes, channels and for bouquets, arbitrary increases in subscription rates were creating a problem because, Cable operators were left with no option but to pass on this burden frequently to the subscribers. The Cable operators observed that since demand of content was driving ad revenue and viewership, the Broadcasters and the content Creators were whimsically levying exorbitant charges for programmes, channels and for bouquets, arbitrary increases in subscription rates were creating a problem because, Cable operators were left with no option but to pass on this burden frequently to the subscribers. The Group discussed the problems and alternatives available and was of the view that the consumer needed to exercise a choice of watching what he chose, and that the viewer should be made aware of what it would cost to view Pay Channels. Addressability is a technique, where signals are sent in an encoded from and an equipment, placed at the subscriber s end, decodes the signals in accordance with the choice exercised by the consumer and authorized by the Service Provider, specifically on the subscriber s request. The Task Force considered it desirable that the Conditional Access System should be introduced to provide the consumer choice of viewing and an option to pay for what he chose to watch. The consumer should also not be expected to pay unreasonably for the "free to Air" channels and must be able to receive the "free to Air" channels without any Set Top Box or any need to change the existing receiver. The Task force acknowledged the existence -of the value chain starting from the Content Maker, to the Content provider (Broadcaster) to the main content Distributor, to the last mile content Distributor (Cable Operator) and finally the consumer household. In the existing arrangement the consumer was paying for all the channels, irrespective of what he actually watched or desired to watch. There was now need to make the system transparent in respect of the Pay Channels/pay programmes, which can be watched by selective subscribers. The subscribership of all "pay" channels should be fully determinate. This transparency would allow entitled revenue to accrue to the different links in the chain, permit the consumer to have programming of his choice and watch channels according to their affordability, hopefully at a lower cost, and provide realistic and authentic viewership data. The Task Force was unanimous that the Conditional Access system is necessary to bring transparency at different levels, but that it should not add to the financial burden of the consumer. It was decided that the Government should mandate it by law. The Task Force was unanimous that the Conditional Access system is necessary to bring transparency at different levels, but that it should not add to the financial burden of the consumer. It was decided that the Government should mandate it by law. The Set Top Box, allowing addressability, should be required only for "pay" channels; for subscribers who opt to view only "free to Air" Channels, there would be no requirement of a set Top Box. The Set Top Box shall be supported by the MSOs/cable operators through installation of necessary infrastructure like Subscriber management System etc. It was considered desirable that the government must be empowered to enter and inspect the premises and operations of the MSOs and Cable operators to ensure enforcement of the requirements of the Set Top Box, of transparent recording of viewership figures, display for channels rates etc. " "the Task Force was unanimous in its view that there was need for an enabling provision in the legislation for government to prescribe certain basic minimum standards for the equipment and its performance. In order to consider all issues relating to prescriptions of standards and Performance Parameters, for the Set Top Box/conditional Access system a Sub-Committee made recommendations on the standards and the specifications for Digital Cable TV and Analogue Cable TV, as well as for digital/analogue Set Top Boxes. " " The Task Force was of a strong view that there was urgent need to educate the subscribers, by all the stake holders, on the operation of Cable Television and the cost of various services, including the operation and cost of Set Top boxes. The Task Force accepted the recommendations of the Sub- committee, for an enabling provision in the Act to prescribe basic minimum technical standards and performance parameters, through the Bureau of India standards (BIS ). " " RECOMMENDATIONS: (a) The Conditional Access System and the supporting subscriber management system mandated under the Cable television Net Works Regulations Act, 1995. (b) The Set Top Box shall be required only for "pay" Channels and the "free to Air" channels shall be receivable by the subscribers in the current mode, without Set Top Box. The encrypted channel should be defined as "subscription based Channel". (b) The Set Top Box shall be required only for "pay" Channels and the "free to Air" channels shall be receivable by the subscribers in the current mode, without Set Top Box. The encrypted channel should be defined as "subscription based Channel". (c)The technical parameters of the Set top Box shall conform to the Indian standards, to be prescribed by the bureau of Indian Standards, in accordance with provisions of the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 1986. While doing so, the Bureau of Indian Standards may take into account the internationally acceptable standards and obtain recommendations from technologists and manufacturers of equipment. (d) It shall be mandatory for the equipment Provider/manufacturer to declare, in a transparent manner, the capability of the Set Top Box and its interoperability on other networks. (e) In order to ensure transparency in the operations between MSOs, Cable operators etc. , the Government must be empowered to obtain detailed information, on regular basis, from each level of operation. This may include information on total subscriber base on individual programmers, viewership of independence channels, subscription rates, charges fixed by the Broadcasters, content Creators for each Channel etc. Each subscriber shall be kept informed in a tran spa rent manner of the subscription rates for each individual "pay" channel. (f) Unauthorised viewing/distribution/ redistribution of the broadcast signal should be made to cognizable offence. (g) The Government shall regulate the price of Basic Tier of the Tree to Air channels . The Government should also be enabled to revise the cost of the basic Tier from time to time. The government will also make a special provision for the channels of the Public services Broadcaster. No Government intervention was considered necessary with regard to the cost of the Set Top box or the rates ofthe individual pay channel. (h) There should be no requirement for change of the receiving set, irrespective of whether the consumer chooses to watch "free to Air" channels and /or Pay channels. (i) There was an immediate need to educate the consumer on the operation of cable television, on the cost of content creation and its distribution upto the house holds. The Broadcasters, content Creators and MSOs should not enhance the charges of the "pay" channels arbitrarily, it should be done in a transparent manner. (i) There was an immediate need to educate the consumer on the operation of cable television, on the cost of content creation and its distribution upto the house holds. The Broadcasters, content Creators and MSOs should not enhance the charges of the "pay" channels arbitrarily, it should be done in a transparent manner. (j) The packaging of services, includes value Added Services, as well as the pricing of the paid bouquets would be left to market force. However, consumer interest needed to be protected by providing efficient and responsive service and through a transparent and accurate billing and collection system. This will also ensure that the revenue accruable to the government is determined in a fair manner. " ( 9 ) THEREAFTER the Bureau of Indian Standard formulated and notified the standards for various CAS hardware such as Set Top Box (STB ). ( 10 ) THE recommendations of Task Force resulted in Parliament amending the Act of 1995. A new provision in the form of Section 4a was inserted and Sections 9,11,16 and 22 were suitably amended. These amendments empowered the Central Government, in public interest to make it obligatory for all Cable operators to transmit programmes of every pay channel through the addressable system upon the issue of a Notification as would be clear from reading of Section 4a of the amendment Act. We may, for our purpose, extract that part of Section 4a which may be relevant for this case: "4a. Transmission of programmes through addressable system, etc.- (1) Where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest to do so, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make it obligatory for every cable operator to transmit or retransmit programme of any pay channel through an addressable system with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification and different dates may be specified for different states, cities, towns or areas, as the case may be. (2) If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, it may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify one or more free-to-air channels to be included in the package of channels, forming basic service tier and any or more such channels may be specified, in the notification, genre-wise for providing a programme mix of entertainment, information, education and such other programmes. (3) The Central Government may specify in the notification referred to in sub- section (2), the number of free-to-air channels to be included in the package of channels forming basic service tie for the purposes of that sub-sectior and different members may be specified for different States, cities, towns or areas, as the case may be. (4) If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, it may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify the maximum amount which a cable operator may demand from the subscriber for receiving the programmes transmitted in the basic service tier provided by such cable operator. (5) to (8) xxxxx (9) Every cable operator shall submit a report to the Central Government in the prescribed form and manner containing the information regarding - (i) the number of total subscribers; (ii) subscription rates; (iii) number of subscribers receiving programmes transmitted in basic service tier or particular programm e or set of programmes transmitted on pay channel, in respect of cable services provided by such cable operator through a cable television network, and such report shall be submitted periodically at such intervals as may be prescribed and shall also contain the rate of amount, if any, payable by the cable operator to any broadcaster. "at this stage, it would also be useful reproduce Sections 9 and 16 as amended: " Section-9. Use of standard equipment in cable television network.- No cable operator shall, on and from the date 6f the expiry of a period of three yeaps from the date of the establishment and publication of the Indian Standard by the Bureau of indian Standards in accordance with the provisions of the Bureau of Indian standards Act, 1986 (63 of 1986), use any equipment in his cable television. network unless such equipment conforms to the said Indian Standard: [provided that the equipment required for the purposes of Section 4a shall be installed by cable operator in his cable television within six months from the date, specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1) of that section, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act for said purposes. ]" "section-16. ]" "section-16. Punishment for contravention of provisions of this act.- [ (1)] Whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Act shall be punishable, - (a) for the first offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both; (b) for every subsequent offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. [ (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the contravention of section 4a shall be a cognizable offence under this section. ]" ( 11 ) THE aforesaid amendments were carried by Act 2 of 2003 w. e. f. 31. 12. 2002. Under section 4a, Central Government is empowered to issue necessary Notification for introducing addressable system and it can fix different dates for different States, cities, areas etc. No sooner the Government was empowered to issue Notification by virtue of the aforesaid Amendment Act, the Central government sprung into action and without loss of any time issued the Notification dated 14. 1. 2003 in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 4a read with Section 9 of the, act,1995 notifying 15. 1. 2003 as the date within six months of which it was obligatory for every cable operator to transmit programmes of every pay channel through cas in the Metropolitan areas of Chennai, mumbai, Kolkata and National Capital Territory of Delhi. Six months time given in this notification was primarily to enable the cable operators/msos to import the necessary equipments. As per this Notification, therefore, the Cable Operators were under obligation to transmit/re-transmit programmes of every pay channel through the addressable system w. e. f. 15. 7. 2003. This Notification also records that the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary to have this addressable system for the aforesaid areas. ( 12 ) WITH the issuance of the Notification for the implementation of CAS, MSOs/cable operators, were required and obliged to make arrangements for installing CAS hardware at their headends and also make arrangements for the STBs to be made available to the consumers by or before the stipulated date to enable watching of the pay channels, as desired. ( 12 ) WITH the issuance of the Notification for the implementation of CAS, MSOs/cable operators, were required and obliged to make arrangements for installing CAS hardware at their headends and also make arrangements for the STBs to be made available to the consumers by or before the stipulated date to enable watching of the pay channels, as desired. As such, the MSOs, including Siti cable Network Ltd. started making arrangements for identifying and procuring cas hardware, keeping 15th July,2003 deadline in mind. In February, 2003 M/s. Handan Broadinfocom Co. Ltd. Of South korea was identified as the manufacturer of stbs and was also informed of the general quantity that will be required. Simultaneously, in March,2003, Siti Cable Network Ltd, started identifying and identified importers and traders such as the petitioner no. 1 for purchasing stbs from Handan, importing them into India and thereafter selling them to its cable operators. ( 13 ) IT is the case of the petitioners in cwp. No. 5697/2003 that in April,2003 petitioner no. l entered into various agreements(including with the State Trading corporation) for the purchase and import of 2,31,000 STBs from M/s. Handan of South korea, at a total cost of approximately Rs. 58 crores. The delivery schedules were spread out keeping in mind the project and expected phased demands. In the initial phase 78,750 pieces were to be imported, the total cost of which was about Rs. 20,16,19,996/ -. Out of this quantity of 78,750; 31,000 was through stc and the balance through others. ( 14 ) LIKEWISE petitioner in CWP. No. 5698/2003, namely, M/s. Siti Cable Network Ltd. has averred that it also took possible steps to ensure that deadline of 15. 7. 2003 fixed by the Central Government for implementation of the CAS is met by the said petitioner and for this purpose it made following arrangements/investments: (I) equipment required for Headend in the Sky (HITS) was procured and installed by ASC Enterprises (which is wholly owned Group Company of the zee Group ). This involved an investment of more than Rs. 200 crores including setting up of encryption equipment, earth station etc. (ii) The petitioner No. l herein hired three transponders from ISRO capable of uplinking 36 channels on INSAT 3a satellite. The petitioner is already making payments for the same from 10. 7. 2003. (iii) Arrangements were made by the petitioner for crypto Technology from conax of Norway. 200 crores including setting up of encryption equipment, earth station etc. (ii) The petitioner No. l herein hired three transponders from ISRO capable of uplinking 36 channels on INSAT 3a satellite. The petitioner is already making payments for the same from 10. 7. 2003. (iii) Arrangements were made by the petitioner for crypto Technology from conax of Norway. (iv) Subscriber Management System and billing software arrangements were also put in place by the petitioner which also involves investment of large sums of money (approximately 2 Million US $ ). (v) The petitioner set up call centres and helplines apart from taking out advertisements and conducting live shows for the purpose of educating consumers about CAS. (vi) The petitioner entered into agreements with its cable franchisees to ensure smooth implementation of cas in a consumer-friendly manner. (vii) The petitioner, directly and through its distributors, has ordered approximately 5 lakh Set Top Boxes, out of which one lakh have already been received. This has also involved a very large and substantial investment by the petitioner, to the tune of 25 million US$. ( 15 ) THE Central Government on its part in order to implement CAS in orderly and timely manner constituted a Task Force to examine various issues relevant thereto. The Task force held several meetings which were attended by MSOs as well as Cable Operators association and in these meetings it was stressed that date of 15. 7. 2003 was sacrosanct and would not be postponed and all the cable operators were asked to ensure that necessary hardware for implementing cas is installed at their respective network well in time. The MSOs were even asked to furnish from time to time details with regard to status of the CAS hardware being procured by them. These details were furnished by msos. The Government also on its part, attempted to facilitate import of the necessary equipments and in the process it issued notification dated 28. 5. 2003 under the customs Tariff Act, 1975 substantially reducing the custom duty payable on specified CAS hardware including STBs from whooping 51. 8% to marginally 5%. Availing these reduction in duty MSOs made necessary imports. Sale price of STBs was announced with the consent of the MSO/respondent passing on the benefit of the reduction in duty to the ultimate consumers. 2003 under the customs Tariff Act, 1975 substantially reducing the custom duty payable on specified CAS hardware including STBs from whooping 51. 8% to marginally 5%. Availing these reduction in duty MSOs made necessary imports. Sale price of STBs was announced with the consent of the MSO/respondent passing on the benefit of the reduction in duty to the ultimate consumers. The Union of India in order to encourage indignization also reduced the customs duty on the three critical components of the STB, namely RF modulator, Tuner and Remote Control Unit: the Union of India also reduced the Excise duty for the Indian Manufacturers of the STB to NIL. ( 16 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, by first week of July,2003 sufficient hardware necessary for implementation of CAS had arrived in india. However, the Central Government was of the view that sufficient quantity was not available to ensure proper implementation of cas by 15. 7. 2003. Under these circumstances on 10. 7. 2003 the Central government issued another Notification superceding earlier Notification dated 14. 1. 2003 and notifying first date of march,2003 as the date within six months of which CAS was to be implemented. However, it would also be discerned form this Notification that in respect of these four metropolitan cities the areas were also specified wherein the CAS was to be implemented. Thus instead of covering all the areas of these four cities, some specified areas only were stipulated including in respect of NCT of Delhi. The areas which are mentioned would indicate that areas falling in South Delhi were sought to be covered. ( 17 ) THE net result of this Notification was to extend the date of implementation from 15. 7. 2003 to 1. 9. 2003. This was followed by issuance of Order on 29. 7. 2003 by the Government reiterating and reaffirming the implementation of CAS in terms of the aforesaid Notification w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003. This order recorded that in order to ensure the smooth implementation of CAS and effective coordination and monitoring, it had been decided to set up Implementation Committee which would meet every week and would closely monitor various aspects, namely, availability of STBs and their readiness for installation, modalities of installation including testing, upgradation of infrastructure and network, availability of full information in respect of pricing of channels and the amount that Cable TV will have to pay etc. The committee was to be chaired by an Additional secretary which had two more official representatives as Members. The other members included representatives from various TV Channels, MSOs and concerned state Governments. This Committee held its meetings from time to time. It is stated that in the first meeting held on 5. 8. 2003 the implementation Committee after examining the figures regarding availability of hardware, concluded that availability of hardware was no longer an issue. The petitioners have produced minutes of second meeting held on 14. 8. 2003. A perusal of these minutes would show that the Additional Secretary mentioned that since the date for roll out of cas in the zones of Kolkata, Mumbai and delhi and entire Chennai metro had been firmed up, it was important for the MSOs and cable Operators to ensure that their systems were upgraded to receive the "pay" channel and to deliver quality signals. They should also ensure that adequate number of Set top Boxes (STBs) were available to take care of the demand. The MSOs submitted the figures for availability of STBs in writing. M/s. RPG, M/s. Siti Cable, M/s. Incable and M/s. Hathway had availability of approximately 1. 53 lakhs Boxes. An additional 53000 Boxes were awaiting customs clearance and an additional 4. 35 lakhs boxes were to become available by September 2003. There was consensus that keeping in view the potential of the market for STBs in the zones of Delhi, mumbai and Kolkata and in Chennai, the availability of STBs would not be an issue. ( 18 ) IN the detailed discussions held, following observations were made by the Committee: "1. The Government is determined to implement CAS in the four metros with effect from 1. 9. 2003 according to the notification. 2. There would be no backtracking of the rate of Rs. 72 plus taxes, already fixed by it for basic service tier at least for some time. 3. The Committee will only monitor the smooth implementation of CAS. 4. Some pockets of South Delhi andsouth Mumbai have been identified as under prepared, and in case the situation so warrants, steps would be taken to ensure that the transition to cas is smoother in these areas even if it meant delaying CAS in such areas. 5. For the month of August, the rates as presently exist, would continue. 6. 4. Some pockets of South Delhi andsouth Mumbai have been identified as under prepared, and in case the situation so warrants, steps would be taken to ensure that the transition to cas is smoother in these areas even if it meant delaying CAS in such areas. 5. For the month of August, the rates as presently exist, would continue. 6. In areas of local cable operators if the cable operators continue to show non-cooperation and unpreparedness, the other MSOs and cable operators should move in to provide service so that the consumer does not suffer. " ( 19 ) WHEN the date of enforcement was few days away and the Implementation committee was also satisfied that all necessary steps for implementation had been taken, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, government of India even issued statement in Newspapers for the consumers at large in public interest which was obtained on 21. 8. 2003 informing that the Central government had made it clear that w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003 every cable operator in the NCT of delhi will transmit/re-transmit every pay channel through STBs in the areas specified therein (details of areas as per the Notification were mentioned ). According to the petitioners when everything was in order and they were waiting for implementation of CAS, hardly a week ago from the specified date, Hon ble minister for Information and Broadcasting issued following statement on 25. 8. 2003: "cas has unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi. We do not want any consumer friendly initiative to become an issue for " competing" politics. So, in today's meeting, we have decided that CAS will be rolled out as planned in Mumbai, chennai and kolkata in Delhi, it will be introduced immediately after the assembly Elections. This is our decision. " this was followed by the impugned Notification dated 29. 8. So, in today's meeting, we have decided that CAS will be rolled out as planned in Mumbai, chennai and kolkata in Delhi, it will be introduced immediately after the assembly Elections. This is our decision. " this was followed by the impugned Notification dated 29. 8. 2003 which is to the following effect: s. O. (E)-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 4a read with Section 9 of the Cable television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 (7 of 1995), the Central government having been satisfied that it is necessary in public interest so to do, hereby makes the following amendments, in the notification of the government of India in the Ministry of information and Broadcasting published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, in Part-II-Section 3- Sub-section (ii), number S. O. 792 (E) dated 10th july,2003, namely:- in the said notification, item (ii) and entries thereto shall be deleted. "0 ( 20 ) THE team of lawyers appearing for various petitioners was led by Mr. Harish Salve, mr. A. S. Chandhiok and Mr. M. S. Syali sr. Advocates. The onslaught was defended by the Central Government through mr. K. K. Sud, Additional Solicitor General of India ably assisted by, among others, Mr. Aman lekhi. ( 21 ) AFTER highlighting the significant events (which have already been noted above) mr. Harish Salve submitted that the very purpose of making amendment in the Act by act 2 of 2003, which included insertion of section 4a, was to implement CAS in order to get rid of the ills with which existing system has been suffering. With the issuance of notification on 14. 1. 2003 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of section 4a, read with Section 9 of the Cable television Networks (Regulations) Act, 1995, it was abundantly clear that the Central government was satisfied that transmission / re-transmission of programmes of pay channels through addressable system was in public interest. In fact such satisfaction was recorded in the Notification dated 14. 1. 2003 itself. This was further clear from the report of the Task Force set up for this purpose which provided the background material and justification for the amendment of Act as well as issuance of the Notification. Therefore, such an addressable system was the need of the hour could not be countenanced. He argued that as per this Notification the date was notified as 15. Therefore, such an addressable system was the need of the hour could not be countenanced. He argued that as per this Notification the date was notified as 15. 1. 2003 which was subsequently amended to 1. 3. 2003 vide notification dated 10. 7. 2003. Six months time was given in this Notification only for the purpose of arranging for the necessary equipments as the system was to be imported. He further submitted that the Central government even appointed Implementation committee in order to ensure orderly and timely implementation of the Scheme. The central Government also monitored the progress in the various meetings of the MSOs/ cable operators with the Central Government as well as of Implementation Committee. It was stressedtime and again that the government was determined to implement the CAS w. e. f. the notified date and any breach thereof would entail necessary consequences including penal consequences as specified in the Act. The MSOs /cable operators were, thus, asked to instal the system necessary for implementation of CAS including Subscriber Management System (SMS), Scrambling technology, CAS system etc. in time. For this they were required to make huge investments. The Government kept on monitoring the status of import as well. MSO/cable Operators were required to furnish from time to time status of CAS hardware being procured by them including delivery schedule details of physical arrival etc. The date was extended once from 15. 7. 2003 to 1. 9. 2003 only because government was of the opinion that necessary equipment had not arrived in India for smooth implementation. However, this problem was also over as was noted in the very first meeting of the Implementation committee held on 5. 8. 2003. Thereafter, the government started regularly issuing large advertisements in several national daily publications and also initiated a multimedia awareness campaign informing the public that as of 1. 9. 2003 every cable operator in the notified areas of Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai and chennai will transmit every pay channel through a STB and its failure to do so would constitute a cognizable offence. Thus decks for implementation of the CAS were cleared. However, at the last moment i. e. just two days before vide impugned Notification only in respect of Delhi the implementation was deferred indefinitely although it has been duly rolled out in Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. Thus decks for implementation of the CAS were cleared. However, at the last moment i. e. just two days before vide impugned Notification only in respect of Delhi the implementation was deferred indefinitely although it has been duly rolled out in Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. He submitted that while the respondents still maintain that the implementation of CAS is in public interest and is consumer friendly as per respondents own admission, the only reason for not implementing in Delhi was the ensuing assembly Elections which were slated in december,2003. He submitted that this was more than clear in view of the statement of minister for Information and Broadcasting on tv on 25. 8. 2003 in which he admitted, without mincing words that CAS had unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi and also mentioned that in Delhi it would be introduced after the Assembly elections. He also referred to the minutes dated 9. 9. 2003 of the meeting of CAS implementation Committee dated 1. 9. 2003 which confirmed this as the reason for postponement which is as under: "the Addl. Secretary clarified the reasons for postponement of CAS on delhi. He stated that CAS which was envisaged as a friendly consumer scheme and should not become a matter of unnecessary controversy and debate between political parties. Hence, it had been decided to postpone CAS till after the Assembly Elections in Delhi. He further stated that people who had already bought Set Top Boxes in Delhi should be encouraged to retain the same, as CAS would be implemented. He advised the Cable Operators not to threaten any increase in the monthly cable rates as it would unnecessarily create panic in the public. . ". Mr. Salve thus, paraphrased his challenge to the impugned Notification by formulating the following grounds that: a. It constituted an abuse of power and was issued for extraneous and irrelevant considerations; b. This frustrated the legitimate expectations of the petitioners and sought to take away vested rights. ( 22 ) HE further submitted that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, reasons given for deferring the implementation of CAS in the specified areas of Delhi would also confirm that it was nothing but abuse of powers and in any case it is based on extraneous and irrelevant consideration which had no relevance to the issue at hand. According to him, reading of the counter- affidavit would show that following justifications are given for deferment of implementation of CAS in Delhi: I)CAS is consumer friendly initiative but in view of the impending elections it has unfortunately become an issue of competing and conflicting political. interests which it should not be. ii) Involvement of administrative machinery is required to implement CAS but the said machinery was needed for elections; iii) The issue was likely to create law and order problems; iv) The decision had been taken purely after weighing the pros and cons of the circumstances arising from conflicting political interests so as to ensure that a consumer friendly initiative does not become a casuality of competing political interests. ( 23 ) IN support of their submission that the impugned Notification constitutes an abuse of power and has been issued for extraneous and irrelevant consideration, the petitioners relied upon the following judgments: I) Padfield and others Vs. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and others - (1968) 1 All ER 694. ii) Smt. S. R. Venkataraman Vs. UOI and Anr. reported as (1979) 2 SCC 491 . iii) Sterling Computers Ltd. Vs. Mandn publications Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 445 . iv) Mahabir Auto Stores and Ors. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 752 . v) Collector (District Magistrate) allahabad and Anr. Vs. Raja Ram jaiswal1985) 3 SCC 1. Dilating the second proposition, namely, the impugned Notification frustrated the legitimate expectation of the petitioners, learned counsel submitted that the Notification seeks to take away the petitioners' vested rights which had accrued in their favour. In support of this argument, following decisions were cited: i) R. V. North and East Devon Health authority (2000) 3 All ER 850. ii) Rowland Vs. Environment Agency [chancery Division]- (2003) 1 All ER 625. ". . [68] By a representation (a term which embraces a regular practice and a course of dealing) a public body does not give rise to an estoppel but may create an expectation in another (the citizen) from which it would be an abuse of power to resile (see R V East Sussex cc, ex p Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd, reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd Vs. East sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8, [2002] 4 all ER 58 ). The principle of good administration prima facie requires adherence by public authorities to their promises. East sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8, [2002] 4 all ER 58 ). The principle of good administration prima facie requires adherence by public authorities to their promises. " ( 24 ) ON behalf of the respondents, the learned additional Solicitor General submitted that the case of the petitioners was based on a complete misconception of Section 4a of the act of 1995. His submission was that the arguments advanced disregard the basic fact that the issue involved is one of conditional legislation. In his attempt to sustain that issue involved was one of conditional legislation, he relied upon the following observations of the supreme Court in the case of Sardar Inder singh Vs The State of Rajasthan and others AIR 1957 SC 510 : "when an appropriate legislature enacts a law and authorizes an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide, that is conditional and not delegated , legisl0ation. "he also took shelter under the following passage of the Lord Selborne in the case of queen Vs. Burah (5 Ind. App 178): "legislation which does not directly fix the period for its own commencement, but leaves that to be done by an external authority, may with quite as much reason be called incomplete, as that which does not itself immediately determine the wholearea to which it is to be applied, but leaves this to be done by the same external authority. If it is an act of legislation on the part of the external authority so trusted to enlarge the area within which a law actually in operation is to be applied, it would seem a fortiori to be an act of legislation to bring the law originally into operation by fixing the time for its commencement. " ( 25 ) HE submitted that it is an act of legislation of the external authority to bring the law into operation and, therefore, the Government was not obliged to consider any representation nor take into account any objection on behalf of members of the public when it exercised the power conferred upon by the statute. This was so, according to him, even if the decision of Government may involve civil consequences. This was so, according to him, even if the decision of Government may involve civil consequences. He submitted that in such a case it was not appropriate to infer therefrom any duty on the Government to follow principles of natural justice as was held by the Apex Court in the case of Tutsipur sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. The Notified Area committee, Tulsipur (1980) 2 SCC 295 in the following terms: "10. The second limb of the argument in support of the above contention is that the declaration made under Section 3 of the Act being in the nature of subordinate legislation, it was the duty of the State Government to follow the same procedure which was applicable to the promulgation of rules under section 39 of the Act. Our attention was drawn in this contention to sub section (3) of Section 39 of the Act which provided that the power to make rules under the said section was subject to the condition of the rules being made after previous publication. We are of the view that it is not possible to equate a declaration to be made under section 3 of the Act with rules made under Section 39. Sub-section (3) of section 39 of the Act does not in terms apply to a declaration to be made under Section 3 of the Act. The contention that the declaration to be made under Section 3 of the Act is in the nature of a subordinate legislation is also not tenable. The Court concluded at page 306:- "we are, therefore, of the view that a notification issued under Section 3 of the Act which has the effect of making the Act applicable to a geographical area is in the nature of a conditional legislation and that it cannot be characterized as a piece of subordinate legislation. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the contention of the plaintiff that the declaration made by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act declaring the area in which the sugar factory of the Plaintiff is situated as a part of the Tulsipur town area is invalid is not tenable. " ( 26 ) ACCORDING to him the distinction, therefore, between a legislative act and administrative adjudication cannot be ignored. This was noticed by the Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of State of t. N. Represented by Secretary, Housing deptt. " ( 26 ) ACCORDING to him the distinction, therefore, between a legislative act and administrative adjudication cannot be ignored. This was noticed by the Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of State of t. N. Represented by Secretary, Housing deptt. ,madras Vs. K. Sabanayagam and another 1998) 1 SCC 318. ( 27 ) HE argued that it is for the aforementioned reasons that the Courts have consistently declined to issue mandamus to the executive to direct it to commence operation of an enactment. For this proposition, he also referred to the case of Union of India Vs. Shree Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan (2002) 5 SCC 44 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "this Court, however, noticed that such power cannot be held to give an uncontrolled power to the executive in as much as there are practical difficulties in the enforcement of laws and those difficulties cannot be foreseen. It, therefore, became necessary to leave the judgment to the executive as to when the law should be brought into force. When enforcement of a provision in a statute is left to the discretion of the Government without laying down any objective standards, no writ of mandamus could be issued directing the Government to consider the question whether the provision should be brought into force and when it can do so. Delay in implementing the will of parliament may draw adverse criticism but on the data placed before us, we cannot say that the Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of Parliament. " ( 28 ) THE tests of challenge to conditional legislation, therefore, are different from ordinary cases of administrative adjudication. In no case however can the Court, in exercise of judicial review, examine the wisdom, merit or efficacy of the stand of the policy of the legislature or its delegate and can only see whether the exercise is intra-vires the parent act. In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary education and another Vs. In no case however can the Court, in exercise of judicial review, examine the wisdom, merit or efficacy of the stand of the policy of the legislature or its delegate and can only see whether the exercise is intra-vires the parent act. In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary education and another Vs. Paritosh bhupeshkumar Sheth and others (1984) 4 SCC 27 the Hon'ble Supreme Court (dealing with delegated not conditional legislation) held:- ""it would be wholly wrong for the court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation- making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. " ( 29 ) JUSTIFYING the decision taken to defer the implementation of CAS in Delhi, he submitted that the documents on record show that the government regards CAS as a measure for benefit of the public and has endeavoured to put the same into operation. It however felt that the time was not opportune to implement the system at Delhi. The decision to defer the implementation is clearly intra-vires the Act and is in exercise of power which the legislature has itself conferred. The wisdom of the measure and not the fact that on the same factual matrix a different opinion could be reached, cannot be agitated in judicial review; ( 30 ) REFUTING the petitioners' arguments of promisery estoppel and legitimate expectation, he submitted that such an argument was not available to the petitioners in the instant case inasmuch as in order to become a legitimate expectation it should have sanction of law or of established procedure in regular and natural sequence which was absent in the instant case. As to what meaning should be attributed to 'legitimate expectation he referred to the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan development Corporation and others (1993) 3 SCC 499. As to what meaning should be attributed to 'legitimate expectation he referred to the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan development Corporation and others (1993) 3 SCC 499. ( 31 ) FURTHERMORE, he submitted, that there was no representation that the power to defer implementation of the Act would not be exercised and, in fact, the implementation had been deferred on earlier occasion too. The Government had not abandoned the project but merely considered its application to the National Capital Territory in the present circumstances in-expedient. The Government was authorised to so reach the said decision and there is no principle of law on the basis of which the discretion of the Government to defer implementation could be fettered. ( 32 ) HE also submitted that the Doctrine of promissory Estoppel was also not complied with as there was no unequivocal promise to the petitioners in the instant case and in fact there cannot be any such promise because the very Act impugned was authorised by the Statute and he attempted to draw sustenance from the observations of the supreme Court in the caseof Kasinka trading and another Vs. Union of India and another (1995) 1 SCC 274 . Mr. Sud concluded his arguments by submitting that cas is a consumer-friendly initiative but in view of the impending elections it became an issue of competing and conflicting political interests. It was apprehended that proper enforcement of its provisions would be adversely affected and to ensure that a measure which is being introduced to benefit the public be not frustrated the Government thought it appropriate to defer its implementation. The exercise of this discretion is intra-vires the Act. The Parliament having left the issue of implementation tot he Central government the petitioner cannot mandate substitution of another judgment for that of the Government by means of this writ petition. The exercise of this discretion is intra-vires the Act. The Parliament having left the issue of implementation tot he Central government the petitioner cannot mandate substitution of another judgment for that of the Government by means of this writ petition. The argument that certiorari not mandamus is prayed for will make no difference in law as the former writ would issue only if the Court concluded it could interfere with the decision of the Government to defer the application of the Act to National Capital Territory of Delhi, there was furthermore no material on record to suggest that the decision of the government had been influenced by extraneous considerations and assessment by the Government of the ground realities is an assessment which the Government was competent to make in due exercise of power conferred by the legislature and hence there was no justification to strike down the same in exercise of the power of judicial review. ( 33 ) FROM the narration of facts and legal submission noted above, it is clear that the first and foremost question which needs consideration is"whether the issuance of notification under Section 4a of the Act is an act of conditional legislation". ( 34 ) THE distinction between conditional legislation and subordinate legislation is well- known and has been explained by the Apex court in the number of judgments. The gist of these judgments have already been reproduced above. It is clear from the reading of these judgments that when a legislature enacts a law and authorise an Executive authority to bring into force in such area or at such times, as it decides, or to understand the rule of the legislation, it is characterised as conditional legislation. The idea behind conditional legislation is that the legislature makes the law which is full and complete in all respects but it is not brought into operation immediately. The enforcement of the law is made depending upon the fulfilment of a condition, and what is delegated to outside agency is the authority to determine, by exercising its own judgment, whether or not the condition has been fulfilled. Thus in conditional legislation the law is there but its taking effect is made to depend upon the determination of some fact or condition by an outside agency, normally the Government. Thus in conditional legislation the law is there but its taking effect is made to depend upon the determination of some fact or condition by an outside agency, normally the Government. On the other hand, under delegated legislation the discretion conferred on the executive is much wider, as the delegatee is given power to legislate in respect of some aspects. Usually what happens is that the legislature enacts a law covering only the general principles and policies relating to the subject matter in question and confers rule making power on the Government or on some other administrative agency. ( 35 ) IN the case of K. Sabanayagam (supra) the Supreme Court classified conditional legislation into three categories and explained these categories in the following manner: 1. In the first category, the legislature has completed its task of enacting a statute and the entire superstructure of the legislation is ready but its future applicability to a given area is left to the subjective satisfaction of the delegate who being satisfied about the conditions indicating the ripe time for applying the machinery of the said Act to a given area exercises that power as a delegate of the parent legislative body. This would be an act of pure and simple conditional legislation depending upon the subjective satisfaction of the delegate as to when the Act enacted and completed by the parent legislature is to be made effective. 2. There may be second category of conditional legislations wherein the delegate has to decide whether and under what circumstances a completed act of the parent legislation which has already come into force is to be partially withdrawn from operation in a given area or in given cases so as not to be applicable to a given class of persons who are otherwise admittedly governed by the Act. In such an eventuality if the satisfaction regarding the existence of condition precedent to the exercise of such power depends upon pure subjective satisfaction of the delegate and if such an exercise is not required to be based on the prima facie proof of factual data for and against such an exercise and if such an exercise is to uniformly apply in future to a given common class of subjects to be governed thereby and when such an exercise is not to be confined to individual cases only, then even in such category of cases while exercising conditional legislative powers the delegate may not be required to have an objective assessment after considering rival versions on the data placed before it for being taken into consideration by it in exercise of such power of conditional legislation. 3. There may be a third category of cases wherein the exercise of conditional legislation would depend upon satisfaction of the delegate on objective facts placed by one class of persons seeking benefit of such an exercise with a view to deprive the rival class of persons who otherwise might have already got statutory benefits under the Act and who are likely to lose the existing benefit because of exercise of such a power by the delegate. In such type of cases the satisfaction of the delegate has necessarily to be based on objective consideration of the relevant data for and against the exercise of such power. This exercise is not left to his subjective satisfaction nor is it a mere ministerial exercise. ( 36 ) THE Supreme Court with regard to the first and second category held that the delegate exercises conditional legislation purely on subjective satisfaction and the principles of fair play, consultation and natural justice are not attracted. Paragraph 21 of the said judgment speaks as under: "21. In the aforesaid first two categories of cases delegate who exercises conditional legislation acting on its pure subjective satisfaction regarding existence of conditions precedent for exercise of such power may not be required to hear parties likely to be affected by the exercise of such power. Where the delegate proceeds to fill up the details of the legislation for the future-which is part of the integrated action of policy-making for the future, it is part of the future policy and is legislative. Where the delegate proceeds to fill up the details of the legislation for the future-which is part of the integrated action of policy-making for the future, it is part of the future policy and is legislative. But where he merely determines either subjectively or objectively-depending upon the "conditions" imposed in the statute permitting exercise of power by the delegate there is no legislation involved in the real sense and therefore, in our opinion, applicability of principles of fair play, consultation or natural justice to the extent necessary cannot be said to be foreclosed. Of course, the fact that in such cases of "conditional legislation" these principles are not foreclosed does not necessarily mean that they are always mandated. In a case of purely ministerial function or in a case where no objective conditions are prescribed and the matter is left to the subjective satisfaction of the delegate (as in categories one and two explained above) no such principles of fair play, consultation or natural justice could be attracted. That is because the very nature of the administrative determination does not attract these formalities and not because the determination is legislative in character. There may also be situations where the persons affected are unidentifiable class of persons or where public interest or interests of State etc. preclude observance of such a procedure. " ( 37 ) THE Court further held that in the firs two categories of cases delegate who exercises conditional legislation acting on its pure subjective satisfaction regarding existence of conditions precedent for exercise of such power may not be required to hear parties likely to be affected by the exercise a such power. On the other hand such a hearing may be necessary in the third category of cases where exercise for such power may deprive the rival class of persons who otherwise might have already got statutors benefits under the "act. The Court in this case was dealing with the provisions of payment of Bonus Act, 1965. Section 36 of the said Act empowers the Government to grant exemption to an establishment frot the operation of the Act. It was held the exercise of power under Section 36 of the payment of Bonus Act falls in third category of conditional legislation functions. Section 36 of the said Act empowers the Government to grant exemption to an establishment frot the operation of the Act. It was held the exercise of power under Section 36 of the payment of Bonus Act falls in third category of conditional legislation functions. ( 38 ) 1n the instant case the Centre government is empowered to issu notification in the Official Gazette there be making it obligatory for every Cable Operator to transmit or re-transmit programmes any pay channel through an addressab system. However, the Central Government can do this when it is satisfied that it necessary in the public interest to do so. It also empowered to specify the date with effect from which such a Notification is to be effected. Further the Central Government is also empowered to specify different dates for different States, Cities , Towns or areas, as the case may be. Such a power would clearly be in the nature of conditional legislation. We have already traced out the history of the legislation and particularly the purpose with which Act was amended by the Parliament in the year 2002 by inserting Section 4a and also making consequential amendments in existing Sections 9,11,16 and 22. A Task force consisting of representatives from various bodies was constituted and on the recommendations of this Task Force to the effect that CAS was necessary to bring transparency at different levels that the amendment Act was introduced in the parliament and aforesaid amendment effected. However, as to when such CAS is to be introduced in a particular State or area etc. and from which date is left to the Central government to exercise powers under Section 4a In the manner prescribed and noted above. This exercise would thus clearly fall under first category of the three categories mentioned in K. Sabanayagam case (supra ). ( 39 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner had argued that impugned notification was not a conditional legislation as notification issued by the Government was In exercise of power under Section 4a of the Act in order to implement a law which is already enforced. Petitioners' submission was that conditional legislation comes into being in force only when act has itself not been notified and the government has to bring the Act into force. Petitioners' submission was that conditional legislation comes into being in force only when act has itself not been notified and the government has to bring the Act into force. According to them in view of Section 1 (3) when Act had already come into force on the specified date and also Section 4a having been brought into force, there was no question of terming it as conditional legislation. This argument is not a valid argument in view of the law laid down in K. Sabanayagam case (supra) where even exercise of power under Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus act was treated as an act of conditional legislation in respect of an Act which had already come into force. ( 40 ) HOWEVER, if there was no Notification issued by the Central Government under sub- section (1) of Section 4a of the Act and the petitioners were seeking mandamus for issuance of such a Notification, position would have been different. Probably in such a case it would not have been permissible for the petitioners to seek such a mandamus in view of various judgments of the Supreme Court including the cases cited by the respondents, note of which has already been taken above. However, the Central Government went much ahead in this case. In fact the Central government itself exercised the power under section 4a (1) of the Act by issuing necessary notification dated 14. 1. 2003 followed by second Notification dated 10. 7. 2003. When notification dated 28. 1. 2003 is issued, it is clear that the Central Government was satisfied with the requirement of the conditions mentioned in the provision. This Notification is in respect of 4 cities only. Further the central Government was satisfied, as is clear from the Notification itself, that it was necessary in public interest to introduce CAS in the areas mentioned in the Notification. It also notified 15th day of January,2003 as the date, within six months from which, it shall be obligatory for every Cable Operator to transmit/re-transmit programmes of every pay channel through addressable system in those areas. By second Notification dated 10. 7. 2003 it specified particular areas of the four cities and the date of 15. 1. 2003 was extended to 1. 3. 2003 as the date within six months of which CAS was to be implemented. By second Notification dated 10. 7. 2003 it specified particular areas of the four cities and the date of 15. 1. 2003 was extended to 1. 3. 2003 as the date within six months of which CAS was to be implemented. ( 41 ) THUS after Notification was issued under section 4a of the Act, on being satisfied, that conditions for issuance of such a Notification were fulfilled in respect of areas mentioned therein and even the date was also specified, the relevant question that arises for consideration is as to whether in such circumstances, impugned Notification dated 29. 8. 2003 could be issued deleting one area altogether, namely, areas of NCT of Delhi specified in the earlier Notifications? To put it differently, after exercising such a power of conditional legislation given to it and bringing the law into force [i. e. provision of Section 4a of the Act in this case], whether it was left with the power to undo the enforcement of the Act or its particular provision? Therefore, whether it is a conditional legislation or not may not be of much importance. The question to be considered is as to whether the government can retract by issuing other notification thereby annulling the effect/partial effect of Notification and in case it is done and such an action is challenged in the court of law what are the principles of judicial review available to the Court in examining the validity of such a Notification? ( 42 ) IT should be clearly borne in mind that legislature has completed its task of enacting its statute, namely, Section 4a in this case. However, its applicability to particular areas and from particular dates was left to the subjective satisfaction of delegate, namely, the Central Government and exercise of such powers by the Central Government is termed as conditional legislation. Once Notification is issued notifying the date the Act comes into force". Thus we are of the prima facie view that the power given to the delegate gets exhausted by issuing such a notification after recording the satisfaction on satisfying itself that conditions are ripe for bringing the legislation/provision of the Act into effect. Only this much power is given to the delegate. When notification is issued it is the will of the legislature which has been brought into effect and it would start applying with all its vigor. Only this much power is given to the delegate. When notification is issued it is the will of the legislature which has been brought into effect and it would start applying with all its vigor. Thereafter if the Government has power to issue another notification cancelling its earlier notification, that may amount to giving the authority to repeal of the Act/provision of the act. It appears that conditional legislation is a button handed down to the delegate to switch it on at its discretion. But it may not extend to push the button off and on, whenever the government likes. If this is done, then the consequence may be serious as it would be left at the will of the Government to apply the provisions of a particular Act from particular date and thereafter withdraw the notification making the Act inoperative. Once the legislation is brought into force, it is the legislature who alone would be competent to repeal or nullify it. ( 43 ) WE may state that we are conscious of the provisions of Section 21 of the General clauses Act,1897. However, this provision may not be applicable in a situation like this as the notifications referred to in Section 21 may not include the conditional legislation. ( 44 ) HOWEVER, it can be debated, in the instant case, that impugned notification was issued even before the earlier notification came into effect. Therefore, we do not rest our decision on this aspect alone. ( 45 ) OBVIOUSLY, therefore, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the various cases in respect of conditional legislation may not be applicable to such a situation. It is stated at the cost of repetition that the petitioners are not seeking issuance of mandamus directing the Central Government to issue notification under Section 4a (1) of the Act, that was done by the Government itself by issuing necessary notification. What the petitioners are challenging is the notification of the respondents whereby the issuance of notification under Section 4a (1) earlier has been undone, albeit qua Delhi alone. What the petitioners are challenging is the notification of the respondents whereby the issuance of notification under Section 4a (1) earlier has been undone, albeit qua Delhi alone. ( 46 ) EVEN if we presume that there is a power to issue such a notification thereby rescinding or withdrawing an earlier notification, we are of the opinion that when such a notification is issued, it would be permissible for this Court to go into the validity of such an action on the principles on which the subordinate legislation is judicially reviewed. We say so on the strength of the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of dai-ichi Karkaria Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ore. (2000) 4 SCC 57 : "8. . . . . . . . . . SUBORDINATE legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation can be challenged: (i) that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made; (ii) that it is contrary to some other statute inasmuch as subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation; (iii) that it is unreasonable in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. The embargo of arbitrariness is embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. An inquiry into the vires of delegated legislation must be confined to the ground on which the plenary legislation may be questioned, except that subordinate legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice on which administrative action may be questioned. In cases where power vested in the Government is a power which has got to be exercised in public interest, as is the case in the present case, the court may require the government to exercise that power in a reasonable way in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. . . . . ". ( 47 ) HAVING put the matter in this perspective, let us now examine the validity of the impugned notification dated 29. 8. 2003 on the touchstone of aforesaid principles. It may be stated at the outset that the effect of this notification is not to defer the implementation of CAS to some future date. In fact by deleting the entry relating to specified area of NCT of delhi, insofar Delhi is concerned the implementation is put to hold. To put it differently earlier notification dated 14. 1. It may be stated at the outset that the effect of this notification is not to defer the implementation of CAS to some future date. In fact by deleting the entry relating to specified area of NCT of delhi, insofar Delhi is concerned the implementation is put to hold. To put it differently earlier notification dated 14. 1. 2003 stands withdrawn qua this territory. It is now the sweet will of the Government whether to issue such a notification in future or not. The matter is to be examined in the light of this situation. ( 48 ) WE have already examined as to what was the material before the Government which led to the decision while issuing Notification dated 14. 1. 2003 making it obligatory for every Cable Operator to transmit/re-transmit programmes of every pay channel through addressable system in the specified areas within six months from the date notified therein. Even before us the existence of such a material was not disputed. ( 49 ) THE aforesaid discussion leads to the conclusion that the Government was satisfied that there was a necessity of introducing cas. In fact such a move was in public interest and that is why vide notification dated 14. 1. 2003, 15. 1. 2003 was the date notified for this purpose and it was stipulated that within six months therefrom CAS would be implemented. We have also traced above the circumstances which led to the issuance of second notification justifying the postponement of notified date from 15. 1. 2003 to 1. 3. 2003. It is also noticed that after the issuance of second notification dated 10. 7. 2003, Implementation Committee was set up to closely monitor the development in order to ensure that smooth implementation of CAS takes places by the specified date i. e. w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003. It has also come on record that this Committee recorded in its meeting held on 14. 8. 2003 that everything was in place and thet minutes gave indication that there was no impediment for implementation of CAS w. e. f. the date specified. However, few days before the eventful date i. e. 25. 8. 2003, Hon'ble Minister made a public statement to the effect that it was decided to introduce CAS in Delhi after the Assembly elections. Thereafter on 29. 8. 2003 impugned notification is issued deleting the entry qua delhi. However, few days before the eventful date i. e. 25. 8. 2003, Hon'ble Minister made a public statement to the effect that it was decided to introduce CAS in Delhi after the Assembly elections. Thereafter on 29. 8. 2003 impugned notification is issued deleting the entry qua delhi. In order to find as to what prompted the Government to take such a decision, we had summoned the relevant record. It is not necessary to refer to the Noting which led to issuance of Notification dated 15. 1. 2003 and the steps which were taken by the government to ensure that the CAS is implemented in the four metropolitan cities by stipulated date. It is because developments in this respect have already been noted above. What is required to be noted is that the effective date of implementation, namely, 15. 7. 2003 was extended to 1. 9. 2003 primarily for the reason that the Government was of the opinion that the state of preparedness at that time indicated that the broadcasters/msos and the Cable Operators were ill-equipped to implement the addressable system in the four metropolitan cities by the time specified and it was decided that the system be implemented zone wise by dividing each metro into four zones. The date for implementation for the first zone was fixed as 1. 9. 2003. It is forthis reason that the second notification restricted the areas of these four metropolitan cities as well by prescribing only zone one area. Noting further shows that the government was taking all possible steps for implementation of the CAS w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003. However, in the file there is no reason recorded as to what prompted the Government to issue the impugned Notification thereby deferring the implementation of CAS in respect of Delhi indefinitely. It appears that decision taken at the appropriate level may be recorded in some other file which was, however, not produced before us. In this view of the matter, we shall go by the reasons as mentioned in the counter-affidavit as well as in the statement of Minister dated 25. 8. 2003. The statement dated 25. 8. 2003 of the Minister is in the following terms: "cas has unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi. We do not want any consumer friendly initiative to become an issue for " competing" politics. 8. 2003. The statement dated 25. 8. 2003 of the Minister is in the following terms: "cas has unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi. We do not want any consumer friendly initiative to become an issue for " competing" politics. So, in today's meeting, we have decided that CAS will be rolled out as planned in Mumbai, chennai and kolkata in Delhi, it will be introduced immediately after the assembly Elections. This is our decision. " ( 50 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents the respondents have justified the alleged deferment by repeating that decision has been taken purely after weighing the pros and cons of the circumstances arising from conflicting political interests so as to ensure that a consumer friendly initiative does not become a casualty of competing political interests. In addition, following averments are also made: "since the issue had potential to create law and order problems due to the conflicting political interests, the government thought it wise to defer it. In Delhi CAS will be introduced after the Assembly elections. This deferment is only a temporary. The best to be applied is the satisfaction of the Central government and coupled with the element of public interest. Subordinate legislation in this case is well within the defined legislative powers and competence. The issuance of the impugned notification does not, ipso facto, constitute the abuse of the powers by the Central Government". ( 20 ) THE team of lawyers appearing for various petitioners was led by Mr. Harish Salve, mr. A. S. Chandhiok and Mr. M. S. Syali sr. Advocates. The onslaught was defended by the Central Government through mr. K. K. Sud, Additional Solicitor General of India ably assisted by, among others, Mr. Aman lekhi. . ( 21 ) AFTER highlighting the significant events (which have already been noted above) mr. Harish Salve submitted that the very purpose of making amendment in the Act by act 2 of 2003, which included insertion of section 4a, was to implement CAS in order to get rid of the ills with which existing system has been suffering. With the issuance of notification on 14. 1. Harish Salve submitted that the very purpose of making amendment in the Act by act 2 of 2003, which included insertion of section 4a, was to implement CAS in order to get rid of the ills with which existing system has been suffering. With the issuance of notification on 14. 1. 2003 in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of section 4a, read with Section 9 of the Cable television Networks (Regulations) Act, 1995, it was abundantly clear that the Central government was satisfied that transmission / re-transmission of programmes of pay channels through addressable system was in public interest. In fact such satisfaction was recorded in the Notification dated 14. 1. 2003 itself. This was further clear from the report of the Task Force set up for this purpose which provided the background material and justification for the amendment of Act as well as issuance of the Notification. Therefore, such an addressable system was the need of the hour could not be countenanced. He argued that as per this Notification the date was notified as 15. 1. 2003 which was subsequently amended to 1. 3. 2003 vide notification dated 10. 7. 2003. Six months time was given in this Notification only for the purpose of arranging for the necessary equipments as the system was to be imported. He further submitted that the Central government even appointed Implementation committee in order to ensure orderly and timely implementation of the Scheme. The central Government also monitored the progress in the various meetings of the MSOs/ cable operators with the Central Government as well as of Implementation Committee. It was stressed time and again that the government was determined to implement the CAS w. e. f. the notified date and any breach thereof would entail necessary consequences including penal consequences as specified in the Act. The MSOs /cable operators were, thus, asked to instal the system necessary for implementation of CAS including Subscriber Management System (SMS), Scrambling technology, CAS system etc. in time. For this they were required to make huge investments. The Government kept on monitoring the status of import as well. MSO/cable Operators were required to furnish from time to time status of CAS hardware being procured by them including delivery schedule details of physical arrival etc. The date was extended once from 15. 7. 2003 to 1. 9. in time. For this they were required to make huge investments. The Government kept on monitoring the status of import as well. MSO/cable Operators were required to furnish from time to time status of CAS hardware being procured by them including delivery schedule details of physical arrival etc. The date was extended once from 15. 7. 2003 to 1. 9. 2003 only because government was of the opinion that necessary equipment had not arrived in India for smooth implementation. However, this problem was also over as was noted in the very first meeting of the Implementation committee held on 5. 8. 2003. Thereafter, the government started regularly issuing large advertisements in several national daily publications and also initiated a multimedia awareness campaign informing the public that as of 1. 9. 2003 every cable operator in the notified areas of Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai and chennai will transmit every pay channel through a STB and its failure to do so would constitute a cognizable offence. Thus decks for implementation of the CAS were cleared. However, at the last moment i. e. just two days before vide impugned Notification only in respect of Delhi the implementation was deferred indefinitely although it has been duly rolled out in Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai. He submitted that while the respondents still maintain that the implementation of CAS is in public interest and is consumer friendly as per respondents own admission, the only reason for not implementing in Delhi was the ensuing assembly Elections which were slated in december,2003. He submitted that this was more than clear in view of the statement of minister for Information and Broadcasting on tv on 25. 8. 2003 in which he admitted, without mincing words that CAS had unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi and also mentioned that in Delhi it would be introduced after the Assembly elections. He also referred to the minutes dated 9. 9. 2003 of the meeting of CAS implementation Committee dated 1. 9. 2003 which confirmed this as the reason for postponement which is as under:"the Addl. Secretary clarified the reasons for postponement of CAS on delhi. He stated that CAS which was envisaged as a friendly consumer scheme and should not become a matter of unnecessary controversy and debate between political parties. Hence, it had been decided to postpone CAS till after the Assembly Elections in Delhi. Secretary clarified the reasons for postponement of CAS on delhi. He stated that CAS which was envisaged as a friendly consumer scheme and should not become a matter of unnecessary controversy and debate between political parties. Hence, it had been decided to postpone CAS till after the Assembly Elections in Delhi. He further stated that people who had already bought Set Top Boxes in Delhi should be encouraged to retain the same, as CAS would be implemented. He advised the Cable Operators not to threaten any increase in the monthly cable rates as it would unnecessarily create panic in the public. . ". Mr. Salve thus, paraphrased his challenge to the impugned Notification by formulating the following grounds that: a. It constituted an abuse of power and was issued for extraneous and irrelevant considerations; b. This frustrated the legitimate expectations of the petitioners and sought to take away vested rights. ( 22 ) HE further submitted that in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, reasons given for deferring the implementation of CAS in the specified areas of Delhi would also confirm that it was nothing but abuse of powers and in any case it is based on extraneous and irrelevant consideration which had no relevance to the issue at hand. According to him, reading of the counter- affidavit would show that following justifications are given for deferment of implementation of CAS in Delhi:i)CAS is consumer friendly initiative but in view of the impending elections it has unfortunately become an issue of competing and conflicting political. interests which it should not be. ii) Involvement of administrative machinery is required to implement CAS but the said machinery was needed for elections; iii) The issue was likely to create law and order problems; iv) The decision had been taken purely after weighing the pros and cons of the circumstances arising from conflicting political interests so as to ensure that a consumer friendly initiative does not become a casuality of competing political interests. ( 23 ) IN support of their submission that the impugned Notification constitutes an abuse of power and has been issued for extraneous and irrelevant consideration, the petitioners relied upon the following judgments:i) Padfield and others Vs. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and others - (1968) 1 All ER 694. ii) Smt. S. R. Venkataraman Vs. UOI and Anr. reported as (1979) 2 SCC 491 . Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and others - (1968) 1 All ER 694. ii) Smt. S. R. Venkataraman Vs. UOI and Anr. reported as (1979) 2 SCC 491 . iii) Sterling Computers Ltd. Vs. Mandn publications Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 445 . iv) Mahabir Auto Stores and Ors. Vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 752 . v) Collector (District Magistrate) allahabad and Anr. Vs. Raja Ram jaiswal1985) 3 SCC 1. Dilating the second proposition, namely, the impugned Notification frustrated the legitimate expectation of the petitioners, learned counsel submitted that the Notification seeks to take away the petitioners' vested rights which had accrued in their favour. In support of this argument, following decisions were cited: i) R. V. North and East Devon Health authority (2000) 3 All ER 850. ii) Rowland Vs. Environment Agency [chancery Division]- (2003) 1 All ER 625. ". . [68] By a representation (a term which embraces a regular practice and a course of dealing) a public body does not give rise to an estoppel but may create an expectation in another (the citizen) from which it would be an abuse of power to resile (see R V East Sussex cc, ex p Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd, reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd Vs. East sussex CC [2002] UKHL 8, [2002] 4 all ER 58 ). The principle of good administration prima facie requires adherence by public authorities to their promises. " ( 24 ) ON behalf of the respondents, the learned additional Solicitor General submitted that the case of the petitioners was based on a complete misconception of Section 4a of the act of 1995. His submission was that the arguments advanced disregard the basic fact that the issue involved is one of conditional legislation. In his attempt to sustain that issue involved was one of conditional legislation, he relied upon the following observations of the supreme Court in the case of Sardar Inder singh Vs The State of Rajasthan and others AIR 1957 SC 510 :"when an appropriate legislature enacts a law and authorizes an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide, that is conditional and not delegated , legisl0ation. "he also took shelter under the following passage of the Lord Selborne in the case of queen Vs. Burah (5 Ind. "he also took shelter under the following passage of the Lord Selborne in the case of queen Vs. Burah (5 Ind. App 178):"legislation which does not directly fix the period for its own commencement, but leaves that to be done by an external authority, may with quite as much reason be called incomplete, as that which does not itself immediately determine the whole area to which it is to be applied, but leaves this to be done by the same external authority. If it is an act of legislation on the part of the external authority so trusted to enlarge the area within which a law actually in operation is to be applied, it would seem a fortiori to be an act of legislation to bring the law originally into operation by fixing the time for its commencement. " ( 25 ) HE submitted that it is an act of legislation of the external authority to bring the law into operation and, therefore, the Government was not obliged to consider any representation nor take into account any objection on behalf of members of the public when it exercised the power conferred upon by the statute. This was so, according to him, even if the decision of Government may involve civil consequences. He submitted that in such a case it was not appropriate to infer therefrom any duty on the Government to follow principles of natural justice as was held by the Apex Court in the case of Tutsipur sugar Co. Ltd. Vs. The Notified Area committee, Tulsipur (1980) 2 SCC 295 in the following terms: "10. The second limb of the argument in support of the above contention is that the declaration made under Section 3 of the Act being in the nature of subordinate legislation, it was the duty of the State Government to follow the same procedure which was applicable to the promulgation of rules under section 39 of the Act. Our attention was drawn in this contention to sub section (3) of Section 39 of the Act which provided that the power to make rules under the said section was subject to the condition of the rules being made after previous publication. We are of the view that it is not possible to equate a declaration to be made under section 3 of the Act with rules made under Section 39. We are of the view that it is not possible to equate a declaration to be made under section 3 of the Act with rules made under Section 39. Sub-section (3) of section 39 of the Act does not in terms apply to a declaration to be made under Section 3 of the Act. The contention that the declaration to be made under Section 3 of the Act is in the nature of a subordinate legislation is also not tenable. The Court concluded at page 306:-"we are, therefore, of the view that a notification issued under Section 3 of the Act which has the effect of making the Act applicable to a geographical area is in the nature of a conditional legislation and that it cannot be characterized as a piece of subordinate legislation. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the contention of the plaintiff that the declaration made by the State Government under Section 3 of the Act declaring the area in which the sugar factory of the Plaintiff is situated as a part of the Tulsipur town area is invalid is not tenable. " ( 26 ) ACCORDING to him the distinction, therefore, between a legislative act and administrative adjudication cannot be ignored. This was noticed by the Hon'ble supreme Court in the case of State of t. N. Represented by Secretary, Housing deptt. ,madras Vs. K. Sabanayagam and another 1998) 1 SCC 318. ( 27 ) HE argued that it is for the aforementioned reasons that the Courts have consistently declined to issue mandamus to the executive to direct it to commence operation of an enactment. For this proposition, he also referred to the case of Union of India Vs. Shree Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan (2002) 5 SCC 44 where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:"this Court, however, noticed that such power cannot be held to give an uncontrolled power to the executive in as much as there are practical difficulties in the enforcement of laws and those difficulties cannot be foreseen. It, therefore, became necessary to leave the judgment to the executive as to when the law should be brought into force. It, therefore, became necessary to leave the judgment to the executive as to when the law should be brought into force. When enforcement of a provision in a statute is left to the discretion of the Government without laying down any objective standards, no writ of mandamus could be issued directing the Government to consider the question whether the provision should be brought into force and when it can do so. Delay in implementing the will of parliament may draw adverse criticism but on the data placed before us, we cannot say that the Government is not alive to the problem or is desirous of ignoring the will of Parliament. " ( 28 ) THE tests of challenge to conditional legislation, therefore, are different from ordinary cases of administrative adjudication. In no case however can the Court, in exercise of judicial review, examine the wisdom, merit or efficacy of the stand of the policy of the legislature or its delegate and can only see whether the exercise is intra-vires the parent act. In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary education and another Vs. Paritosh bhupeshkumar Sheth and others (1984) 4 SCC 27 the Hon'ble Supreme Court (dealing with delegated not conditional legislation) held:-""it would be wholly wrong for the court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation- making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. " ( 29 ) JUSTIFYING the decision taken to defer the implementation of CAS in Delhi, he submitted that the documents on record show that the government regards CAS as a measure for benefit of the public and has endeavoured to put the same into operation. It however felt that the time was not opportune to implement the system at Delhi. The decision to defer the implementation is clearly intra-vires the Act and is in exercise of power which the legislature has itself conferred. It however felt that the time was not opportune to implement the system at Delhi. The decision to defer the implementation is clearly intra-vires the Act and is in exercise of power which the legislature has itself conferred. The wisdom of the measure and not the fact that on the same factual matrix a different opinion could be reached, cannot be agitated in judicial review; ( 30 ) REFUTING the petitioners' arguments of promisery estoppel and legitimate expectation, he submitted that such an argument was not available to the petitioners in the instant case inasmuch as in order to become a legitimate expectation it should have sanction of law or of established procedure in regular and natural sequence which was absent in the instant case. As to what meaning should be attributed to 'legitimate expectation he referred to the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Hindustan development Corporation and others (1993) 3 SCC 499. ( 31 ) FURTHERMORE, he submitted, that there was no representation that the power to defer implementation of the Act would not be exercised and, in fact, the implementation had been deferred on earlier occasion too. The Government had not abandoned the project but merely considered its application to the National Capital Territory in the present circumstances in-expedient. The Government was authorised to so reach the said decision and there is no principle of law on the basis of which the discretion of the Government to defer implementation could be fettered. ( 32 ) HE also submitted that the Doctrine of promissory Estoppel was also not complied with as there was no unequivocal promise to the petitioners in the instant case and in fact there cannot be any such promise because the very Act impugned was authorised by the Statute and he attempted to draw sustenance from the observations of the supreme Court in the case of Kasinka trading and another Vs. Union of India and another (1995) 1 SCC 274 . Mr. Sud concluded his arguments by submitting that cas is a consumer-friendly initiative but in view of the impending elections it became an issue of competing and conflicting political interests. Union of India and another (1995) 1 SCC 274 . Mr. Sud concluded his arguments by submitting that cas is a consumer-friendly initiative but in view of the impending elections it became an issue of competing and conflicting political interests. It was apprehended that proper enforcement of its provisions would be adversely affected and to ensure that a measure which is being introduced to benefit the public be not frustrated the Government thought it appropriate to defer its implementation. The exercise of this discretion is intra-vires the Act. The Parliament having left the issue of implementation tot he Central government the petitioner cannot mandate substitution of another judgment for that of the Government by means of this writ petition. The argument that certiorari not mandamus is prayed for will make no difference in law as the former writ would issue only if the Court concluded it could interfere with the decision of the Government to defer the application of the Act to National Capital Territory of Delhi, there was furthermore no material on record to suggest that the decision of the government had been influenced by extraneous considerations and assessment by the Government of the ground realities is an assessment which the Government was competent to make in due exercise of power conferred by the legislature and hence there was no justification to strike down the same in exercise of the power of judicial review. ( 33 ) FROM the narration of facts and legal submission noted above, it is clear that the first and foremost question which needs consideration is"whether the issuance of notification under Section 4a of the Act is an act of conditional legislation". ( 34 ) THE distinction between conditional legislation and subordinate legislation is well- known and has been explained by the Apex court in the number of judgments. The gist of these judgments have already been reproduced above. It is clear from the reading of these judgments that when a legislature enacts a law and authorise an Executive authority to bring into force in such area or at such times, as it decides, or to understand the rule of the legislation, it is characterised as conditional legislation. The idea behind conditional legislation is that the legislature makes the law which is full and complete in all respects but it is not brought into operation immediately. The idea behind conditional legislation is that the legislature makes the law which is full and complete in all respects but it is not brought into operation immediately. The enforcement of the law is made depending upon the fulfilment of a condition, and what is delegated to outside agency is the authority to determine, by exercising its own judgment, whether or not the condition has been fulfilled. Thus in conditional legislation the law is there but its taking effect is made to depend upon the determination of some fact or condition by an outside agency, normally the Government. On the other hand, under delegated legislation the discretion conferred on the executive is much wider, as the delegatee is given power to legislate in respect of some aspects. Usually what happens is that the legislature enacts a law covering only the general principles and policies relating to the subject matter in question and confers rule making power on the Government or on some other administrative agency. ( 35 ) IN the case of K. Sabanayagam (supra) the Supreme Court classified conditional legislation into three categories and explained these categories in the following manner:1. In the first category, the legislature has completed its task of enacting a statute and the entire superstructure of the legislation is ready but its future applicability to a given area is left to the subjective satisfaction of the delegate who being satisfied about the conditions indicating the ripe time for applying the machinery of the said Act to a given area exercises that power as a delegate of the parent legislative body. This would be an act of pure and simple conditional legislation depending upon the subjective satisfaction of the delegate as to when the Act enacted and completed by the parent legislature is to be made effective. 2. There may be second category of conditional legislations wherein the delegate has to decide whether and under what circumstances a completed act of the parent legislation which has already come into force is to be partially withdrawn from operation in a given area or in given cases so as not to be applicable to a given class of persons who are otherwise admittedly governed by the Act. In such an eventuality if the satisfaction regarding the existence of condition precedent to the exercise of such power depends upon pure subjective satisfaction of the delegate and if such an exercise is not required to be based on the prima facie proof of factual data for and against such an exercise and if such an exercise is to uniformly apply in future to a given common class of subjects to be governed thereby and when such an exercise is not to be confined to individual cases only, then even in such category of cases while exercising conditional legislative powers the delegate may not be required to have an objective assessment after considering rival versions on the data placed before it for being taken into consideration by it in exercise of such power of conditional legislation. 3. There may be a third category of cases wherein the exercise of conditional legislation would depend upon satisfaction of the delegate on objective facts placed by one class of persons seeking benefit of such an exercise with a view to deprive the rival class of persons who otherwise might have already got statutory benefits under the Act and who are likely to lose the existing benefit because of exercise of such a power by the delegate. In such type of cases the satisfaction of the delegate has necessarily to be based on objective consideration of the relevant data for and against the exercise of such power. This exercise is not left to his subjective satisfaction nor is it a mere ministerial exercise. ( 36 ) THE Supreme Court with regard to the first and second category held that the delegate exercises conditional legislation purely on subjective satisfaction and the principles of fair play, consultation and natural justice are not attracted. Paragraph 21 of the said judgment speaks as under:"21. In the aforesaid first two categories of cases delegate who exercises conditional legislation acting on its pure subjective satisfaction regarding existence of conditions precedent for exercise of such power may not be required to hear parties likely to be affected by the exercise of such power. Where the delegate proceeds to fill up the details of the legislation for the future-which is part of the integrated action of policy-making for the future, it is part of the future policy and is legislative. Where the delegate proceeds to fill up the details of the legislation for the future-which is part of the integrated action of policy-making for the future, it is part of the future policy and is legislative. But where he merely determines either subjectively or objectively-depending upon the "conditions" imposed in the statute permitting exercise of power by the delegate there is no legislation involved in the real sense and therefore, in our opinion, applicability of principles of fair play, consultation or natural justice to the extent necessary cannot be said to be foreclosed. Of course, the fact that in such cases of "conditional legislation" these principles are not foreclosed does not necessarily mean that they are always mandated. In a case of purely ministerial function or in a case where no objective conditions are prescribed and the matter is left to the subjective satisfaction of the delegate (as in categories one and two explained above) no such principles of fair play, consultation or natural justice could be attracted. That is because the very nature of the administrative determination does not attract these formalities and not because the determination is legislative in character. There may also be situations where the persons affected are unidentifiable class of persons or where public interest or interests of State etc. preclude observance of such a procedure. " ( 37 ) THE Court further held that in the firs two categories of cases delegate who exercises conditional legislation acting on its pure subjective satisfaction regarding existence of conditions precedent for exercise of such power may not be required to hear parties likely to be affected by the exercise a such power. On the other hand such a hearing may be necessary in the third category of cases where exercise for such power may deprive the rival class of persons who otherwise might have already got statutors benefits under the "act. The Court in this case was dealing with the provisions of payment of Bonus Act, 1965. Section 36 of the said Act empowers the Government to grant exemption to an establishment frot the operation of the Act. It was held the exercise of power under Section 36 of the payment of Bonus Act falls in third category of conditional legislation functions. Section 36 of the said Act empowers the Government to grant exemption to an establishment frot the operation of the Act. It was held the exercise of power under Section 36 of the payment of Bonus Act falls in third category of conditional legislation functions. ( 38 ) 1n the instant case the Centre government is empowered to issu notification in the Official Gazette there be making it obligatory for every Cable Operator to transmit or re-transmit programmes any pay channel through an addressab system. However, the Central Government can do this when it is satisfied that it necessary in the public interest to do so. It also empowered to specify the date with effect from which such a Notification is to be effected. Further the Central Government is also empowered to specify different dates for different States, Cities , Towns or areas, as the case may be. Such a power would clearly be in the nature of conditional legislation. We have already traced out the history of the legislation and particularly the purpose with which Act was amended by the Parliament in the year 2002 by inserting Section 4a and also making consequential amendments in existing Sections 9,11,16 and 22. A Task force consisting of representatives from various bodies was constituted and on the recommendations of this Task Force to the effect that CAS was necessary to bring transparency at different levels that the amendment Act was introduced in the parliament and aforesaid amendment effected. However, as to when such CAS is to be introduced in a particular State or area etc. and from which date is left to the Central government to exercise powers under Section 4a In the manner prescribed and noted above. This exercise would thus clearly fall under first category of the three categories mentioned in K. Sabanayagam case (supra ). ( 39 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner had argued that impugned notification was not a conditional legislation as notification issued by the Government was In exercise of power under Section 4a of the Act in order to implement a law which is already enforced. Petitioners' submission was that conditional legislation comes into being in force only when act has itself not been notified and the government has to bring the Act into force. Petitioners' submission was that conditional legislation comes into being in force only when act has itself not been notified and the government has to bring the Act into force. According to them in view of Section 1 (3) when Act had already come into force on the specified date and also Section 4a having been brought into force, there was no question of terming it as conditional legislation. This argument is not a valid argument in view of the law laid down in K. Sabanayagam case (supra) where even exercise of power under Section 36 of the Payment of Bonus act was treated as an act of conditional legislation in respect of an Act which had already come into force. ( 40 ) HOWEVER, if there was no Notification issued by the Central Government under sub- section (1) of Section 4a of the Act and the petitioners were seeking mandamus for issuance of such a Notification, position would have been different. Probably in such a case it would not have been permissible for the petitioners to seek such a mandamus in view of various judgments of the Supreme Court including the cases cited by the respondents, note of which has already been taken above. However, the Central Government went much ahead in this case. In fact the Central government itself exercised the power under section 4a (1) of the Act by issuing necessary notification dated 14. 1. 2003 followed by second Notification dated 10. 7. 2003. When notification dated 28. 1. 2003 is issued, it is clear that the Central Government was satisfied with the requirement of the conditions mentioned in the provision. This Notification is in respect of 4 cities only. Further the central Government was satisfied, as is clear from the Notification itself, that it was necessary in public interest to introduce CAS in the areas mentioned in the Notification. It also notified 15th day of January,2003 as the date, within six months from which, it shall be obligatory for every Cable Operator to transmit/re-transmit programmes of every pay channel through addressable system in those areas. By second Notification dated 10. 7. 2003 it specified particular areas of the four cities and the date of 15. 1. 2003 was extended to 1. 3. 2003 as the date within six months of which CAS was to be implemented. . By second Notification dated 10. 7. 2003 it specified particular areas of the four cities and the date of 15. 1. 2003 was extended to 1. 3. 2003 as the date within six months of which CAS was to be implemented. . ( 41 ) THUS after Notification was issued under section 4a of the Act, on being satisfied, that conditions for issuance of such a Notification were fulfilled in respect of areas mentioned therein and even the date was also specified, the relevant question that arises for consideration is as to whether in such circumstances, impugned Notification dated 29. 8. 2003 could be issued deleting one area altogether, namely, areas of NCT of Delhi specified in the earlier Notifications? To put it differently, after exercising such a power of conditional legislation given to it and bringing the law into force [i. e. provision of Section 4a of the Act in this case], whether it was left with the power to undo the enforcement of the Act or its particular provision? Therefore, whether it is a conditional legislation or not may not be of much importance. The question to be considered is as to whether the government can retract by issuing other notification thereby annulling the effect/partial effect of Notification and in case it is done and such an action is challenged in the court of law what are the principles of judicial review available to the Court in examining the validity of such a Notification? ( 42 ) IT should be clearly borne in mind that legislature has completed its task of enacting its statute, namely, Section 4a in this case. However, its applicability to particular areas and from particular dates was left to the subjective satisfaction of delegate, namely, the Central Government and exercise of such powers by the Central Government is termed as conditional legislation. Once Notification is issued notifying the date the Act comes into force". Thus we are of the prima facie view that the power given to the delegate gets exhausted by issuing such a notification after recording the satisfaction on satisfying itself that conditions are ripe for bringing the legislation/provision of the Act into effect. Only this much power is given to the delegate. When notification is issued it is the will of the legislature which has been brought into effect and it would start applying with all its vigor. Only this much power is given to the delegate. When notification is issued it is the will of the legislature which has been brought into effect and it would start applying with all its vigor. Thereafter if the Government has power to issue another notification cancelling its earlier notification, that may amount to giving the authority to repeal of the Act/provision of the act. It appears that conditional legislation is a button handed down to the delegate to switch it on at its discretion. But it may not extend to push the button off and on, whenever the government likes. If this is done, then the consequence may be serious as it would be left at the will of the Government to apply the provisions of a particular Act from particular date and thereafter withdraw the notification making the Act inoperative. Once the legislation is brought into force, it is the legislature who alone would be competent to repeal or nullify it. ( 43 ) WE may state that we are conscious of the provisions of Section 21 of the General clauses Act,1897. However, this provision may not be applicable in a situation like this as the notifications referred to in Section 21 may not include the conditional legislation. ( 44 ) HOWEVER, it can be debated, in the instant case, that impugned notification was issued even before the earlier notification came into effect. Therefore, we do not rest our decision on this aspect alone. ( 45 ) OBVIOUSLY, therefore, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the various cases in respect of conditional legislation may not be applicable to such a situation. It is stated at the cost of repetition that the petitioners are not seeking issuance of mandamus directing the Central Government to issue notification under Section 4a (1) of the Act, that was done by the Government itself by issuing necessary notification. What the petitioners are challenging is the notification of the respondents whereby the issuance of notification under Section 4a (1) earlier has been undone, albeit qua Delhi alone. What the petitioners are challenging is the notification of the respondents whereby the issuance of notification under Section 4a (1) earlier has been undone, albeit qua Delhi alone. ( 46 ) EVEN if we presume that there is a power to issue such a notification thereby rescinding or withdrawing an earlier notification, we are of the opinion that when such a notification is issued, it would be permissible for this Court to go into the validity of such an action on the principles on which the subordinate legislation is judicially reviewed. We say so on the strength of the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of dai-ichi Karkaria Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ore. (2000) 4 SCC 57 :"8. . . . . . . . . . SUBORDINATE legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation can be challenged: (i) that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made; (ii) that it is contrary to some other statute inasmuch as subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation; (iii) that it is unreasonable in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. The embargo of arbitrariness is embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. An inquiry into the vires of delegated legislation must be confined to the ground on which the plenary legislation may be questioned, except that subordinate legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice on which administrative action may be questioned. In cases where power vested in the Government is a power which has got to be exercised in public interest, as is the case in the present case, the court may require the government to exercise that power in a reasonable way in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. . . . . ". ( 47 ) HAVING put the matter in this perspective, let us now examine the validity of the impugned notification dated 29. 8. 2003 on the touchstone of aforesaid principles. It may be stated at the outset that the effect of this notification is not to defer the implementation of CAS to some future date. In fact by deleting the entry relating to specified area of NCT of delhi, insofar Delhi is concerned the implementation is put to hold. To put it differently earlier notification dated 14. 1. It may be stated at the outset that the effect of this notification is not to defer the implementation of CAS to some future date. In fact by deleting the entry relating to specified area of NCT of delhi, insofar Delhi is concerned the implementation is put to hold. To put it differently earlier notification dated 14. 1. 2003 stands withdrawn qua this territory. It is now the sweet will of the Government whether to issue such a notification in future or not. The matter is to be examined in the light of this situation. ( 48 ) WE have already examined as to what was the material before the Government which led to the decision while issuing Notification dated 14. 1. 2003 making it obligatory for every Cable Operator to transmit/re-transmit programmes of every pay channel through addressable system in the specified areas within six months from the date notified therein. Even before us the existence of such a material was not disputed. ( 49 ) THE aforesaid discussion leads to the conclusion that the Government was satisfied that there was a necessity of introducing cas. In fact such a move was in public interest and that is why vide notification dated 14. 1. 2003, 15. 1. 2003 was the date notified for this purpose and it was stipulated that within six months therefrom CAS would be implemented. We have also traced above the circumstances which led to the issuance of second notification justifying the postponement of notified date from 15. 1. 2003 to 1. 3. 2003. It is also noticed that after the issuance of second notification dated 10. 7. 2003, Implementation Committee was set up to closely monitor the development in order to ensure that smooth implementation of CAS takes places by the specified date i. e. w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003. It has also come on record that this Committee recorded in its meeting held on 14. 8. 2003 that everything was in place and thet minutes gave indication that there was no impediment for implementation of CAS w. e. f. the date specified. However, few days before the eventful date i. e. 25. 8. 2003, Hon'ble Minister made a public statement to the effect that it was decided to introduce CAS in Delhi after the Assembly elections. Thereafter on 29. 8. 2003 impugned notification is issued deleting the entry qua delhi. However, few days before the eventful date i. e. 25. 8. 2003, Hon'ble Minister made a public statement to the effect that it was decided to introduce CAS in Delhi after the Assembly elections. Thereafter on 29. 8. 2003 impugned notification is issued deleting the entry qua delhi. In order to find as to what prompted the Government to take such a decision, we had summoned the relevant record. It is not necessary to refer to the Noting which led to issuance of Notification dated 15. 1. 2003 and the steps which were taken by the government to ensure that the CAS is implemented in the four metropolitan cities by stipulated date. It is because developments in this respect have already been noted above. What is required to be noted is that the effective date of implementation, namely, 15. 7. 2003 was extended to 1. 9. 2003 primarily for the reason that the Government was of the opinion that the state of preparedness at that time indicated that the broadcasters/msos and the Cable Operators were ill-equipped to implement the addressable system in the four metropolitan cities by the time specified and it was decided that the system be implemented zone wise by dividing each metro into four zones. The date for implementation for the first zone was fixed as 1. 9. 2003. It is forthis reason that the second notification restricted the areas of these four metropolitan cities as well by prescribing only zone one area. Noting further shows that the government was taking all possible steps for implementation of the CAS w. e. f. 1. 9. 2003. However, in the file there is no reason recorded as to what prompted the Government to issue the impugned Notification thereby deferring the implementation of CAS in respect of Delhi indefinitely. It appears that decision taken at the appropriate level may be recorded in some other file which was, however, not produced before us. In this view of the matter, we shall go by the reasons as mentioned in the counter-affidavit as well as in the statement of Minister dated 25. 8. 2003. The statement dated 25. 8. 2003 of the Minister is in the following terms:"cas has unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi. We do not want any consumer friendly initiative to become an issue for " competing" politics. 8. 2003. The statement dated 25. 8. 2003 of the Minister is in the following terms:"cas has unfortunately become an unnecessary political issue in Delhi. We do not want any consumer friendly initiative to become an issue for " competing" politics. So, in today's meeting, we have decided that CAS will be rolled out as planned in Mumbai, chennai and kolkata in Delhi, it will be introduced immediately after the assembly Elections. This is our decision. " ( 50 ) IN the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents the respondents have justified the alleged deferment by repeating that decision has been taken purely after weighing the pros and cons of the circumstances arising from conflicting political interests so as to ensure that a consumer friendly initiative does not become a casualty of competing political interests. In addition, following averments are also made:"since the issue had potential to create law and order problems due to the conflicting political interests, the government thought it wise to defer it. In Delhi CAS will be introduced after the Assembly elections. This deferment is only a temporary. The best to be applied is the satisfaction of the Central government and coupled with the element of public interest. Subordinate legislation in this case is well within the defined legislative powers and competence. The issuance of the impugned notification does not, ipso facto, constitute the abuse of the powers by the Central Government". ( 51 ) INTERESTINGLY in the statement dated 25. 8. 2003 as well as in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is maintained that the introduction of CAS is a consumer friendly initiative. It is also not challenged that all the requirements including public interest as mentioned in Section 4a of the Act were fulfilled and Notifications dated 15. 1. 2003 and 10. 7. 2003 were issued as they were in public interest. The plethora of material produced to indicate the mind of the government in this behalf projecting indication for introduction of CAS is also not disputed. The reason for "deferment" of the decision in delhi, as given by the respondents is impending Assembly Elections in november,2003. It was felt that CAS was becoming an unnecessary political issue in delhi. It appears that the Government felt that it was becoming an issue for competing politics as some political parties wanted to make CAS a political issue. The reason for "deferment" of the decision in delhi, as given by the respondents is impending Assembly Elections in november,2003. It was felt that CAS was becoming an unnecessary political issue in delhi. It appears that the Government felt that it was becoming an issue for competing politics as some political parties wanted to make CAS a political issue. Thus fearing that some other political parties may take mileage out of it or that it may affect prospects of the party in power in the Assembly Elections, decision to defer implementation was taken. This consideration is clearly extraneous and not borne from the language of Section 4a of the Act. Once the Central Government was of the opinion that implementation of CAS is in public interest, it cannot be said that it would be in the public interest to defer the said decision because of alleged competing political interests. It is clear that as far as central Government is concerned it holds the view that it is in public interest to introduce cas. In any such policy decision there may be other views. Conflict of opinions is bound to be there. Many times such policy decisions are criticized by a section of society. Even when the Government is convinced that a particular move is in public interest and takes the decision, can it retract its steps fearing that those opposing hold different opinions may not make hue and cry and as elections are imminent, Government should avoid taking such " risky step". Obviously this would clearly be an arbitrary exercise of power. In fact if it is a consumer friendly step as the central Government thinks, the Government can take political mileage of it during the elections rather than shirking from implementation of action even when it thinks that action is in the interest of public at large. In the case of Padfield and others Vs. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and food and others (1968) 1 All ER 694, the court held:"as I have said already it seems just the type of situation for which the machinery of Section 19 was set up, but that is a matter for the Minister. He may have good reasons for refusing an investigation, he may have indeed good policy reasons for refusing it though that policy must not be based on political considerations which as FARWELL,l. J. Said in R. Vs. He may have good reasons for refusing an investigation, he may have indeed good policy reasons for refusing it though that policy must not be based on political considerations which as FARWELL,l. J. Said in R. Vs. Board of Education (23) are pre-eminently extraneous, (p. 717 ). . . His next statement-that it raises wide issues etc. shows a complete misapprehension of his duties, for it indicates quite clearly that he has completely misunderstood the scope and object of S. 19. (p. 718) ". . . This fear of parliamentary trouble (for in my opinion this must be the scarcely veiled meaning of this letter) if an inquiry were ordered and its possible results is also sufficient to vitiate the minister's decision which, as i have stated earlier, can never validly turn on purely political considerations; he must be prepared to face the music in Parliament if statute has cast on him an obligation in the proper exercise of a discretion conferred on him to order a reference to the committee of investigation. My Lords, I would add only this: that without throwing any doubt on what are well known as the club expulsion cases, where the absence of reasons has not proved fatal to the decision of expulsion by a club committee, a decision of the Minister stands on quite a different basis; he is a public officer charged by Parliament with the discharge of a public discretion affecting her Majesty's subjects; if he does not give any reason for his decision it may be, if circumstances warrant it, that a court may be at liberty to come to the conclusion that he had no good for reaching that conclusion and directing a prerogative order to issue accordingly. The Minister in my opinion has not given a single valid reason for refusing to order an inquiry into the legitimate complaint ( be it well founded or not) of the south east region; all his disclosed reasons for refusing to do so are bad in law. I would allow this appeal in the terms proposed by my noble and learned friend LORD REID. (P. 719 ). . "back home, our own Supreme Court in the case of Sterling Computers Ltd vs. Mandn Publications Ltd. (1993) 1 scc 445 held:". . . . . . . . . PUBLIC authorities are essentially different from those of private persons. (P. 719 ). . "back home, our own Supreme Court in the case of Sterling Computers Ltd vs. Mandn Publications Ltd. (1993) 1 scc 445 held:". . . . . . . . . PUBLIC authorities are essentially different from those of private persons. Even while taking a decision in respect of commercial transactions a public authority must be guided by relevant considerations and not by irrelevant ones. If such decision is influenced by extraneous considerations which it ought not to have taken into account the ultimate decision is bound to be vitiated, even if it is established that such decision had been taken without bias. . . . . . "same sentiments are accorded by the supreme Court in the case of Smt. S. R. Venkataraman Vs. Union of India and anr. reported in (1979) 2 SCC 491 which are as under:". . . . . . . . . . AS was stated by Lord Goddard, c. J. , in Pilling Vs. Abergele Urban district Council where a duty to determine a question is conferred on an authority which state their reasons for the decision, and the reasons which they state show that they have taken into account matter which they ought not to have taken into account, or that they have failed to take matters into account which they ought to have taken into account, the court to which an appeal lies can and ought to adjudicate on the matter------" ( 52 ) FOR same reasons, we are not able to persuade ourselves that it would be a valid ground to defer the decision as according to the respondents, issue had potential to create law and order problems due to the conflicting political interests. If the respondents otherwise felt that the move is in public interest, could it be deferred/cancelled only because its implementation would create the so called law and order problem? That apart, it is not stated as to what kind of law and order problem such an implementation, would have created and how it was not possible for the respondents to curb the same. Ex-facie, it is only a bogey created with no substance. ( 53 ) THUS we hold that issuance of impugned notification is an arbitrary exercise of power not supported by any valid reason and would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of india. Ex-facie, it is only a bogey created with no substance. ( 53 ) THUS we hold that issuance of impugned notification is an arbitrary exercise of power not supported by any valid reason and would be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of india. Such a notification, therefore, has to be quashed on this ground. ( 54 ) IN view of what we have held above, it is not necessary to examine the contention relating to legitimate expectation. Sufficeit is to state that the Government, after issuance of the first notification dated 14. 1. 2003 saw to it that respondents-MSOs/cable Operators have made necessary arrangement for installing CAS hardware at their headends and made them to invest substantial amount but because of the impugned notification such investment is lying idle. ( 55 ) THESE writ petitions are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute. Notification dated 29. 8. 2003 is hereby quashed. ( 56 ) WE may mention here that in cwp. No. 5494/2003, the petitioners have also made a prayer for quashing of Notification dated 7. 5. 2003. Since this notification has already been upheld by us in other proceedings, prayer to this extent is rejected.