JUDGMENT - MOHITE R.S., J.:---By this writ petition the petitioner seeks to quash and set aside the two impugned Awards dated 3-8-1999 and 16-11-1999 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in Reference No. CGIT-2/39 of 1998. By the impugned Award dated 3-8-1999 the Industrial Tribunal held that the domestic enquiry which was held against the workman was in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that the findings of the enquiry officer were not perverse. By its further Award dated 16-11-1999 the Industrial Tribunal has concluded that the action on the part of the management of the Life Insurance Corporation of India in removing the petitioner from service w.e.f. 21-1-1995 was legal and justified. 2. The brief facts of the case are as under :- (a) On 11-12-1990 the petitioner was appointed as a Trainee by respondent No. l i.e. Life Insurance Corporation of India. In March 1991 he was appointed as an Assistant and was confirmed as Assistant on 11-6-1991. (b) On 22-7-1993 at around 11.00 a.m., an incident occurred in the Central Office of the respondent No. 1 Corporation. One Shri A.D. Nene who was the Administrative Officer in the Finance Department requested the petitioner to part with a Calculator which was in petitioner's possession as the same was required by another officer. It is the case of respondent No. 1 that the petitioner assaulted the officer Shri Nene by giving a blow on his face near the nose in front of other staff members. One Shri A.S. Kambli, Record Clerk in the department was passing by at the relevant time and he rushed to intervene, upon which the petitioner assaulted Shri Kambli on his face. That thereafter one Mr. Hande intervened to take the petitioner away from the scene. However, the petitioner again rushed to Mr. Nene and inflicted further injuries on him. That some of the staff members then went to call one Shri Shantaram Chavan, who was a Trade Union Worker and the said Mr. Chavan came to pacify the petitioner. However, the petitioner broke a water bottle on the table of one Mrs. Billimoria and tried to hit Mr. Chavan in his stomach. One Mr. Bhalekar, record clerk in the department and other staff members intervened to save Mr. Chavan from the petitioner's attack and in the process, both Mr. Bhalekar and Mr. Chavan came to pacify the petitioner. However, the petitioner broke a water bottle on the table of one Mrs. Billimoria and tried to hit Mr. Chavan in his stomach. One Mr. Bhalekar, record clerk in the department and other staff members intervened to save Mr. Chavan from the petitioner's attack and in the process, both Mr. Bhalekar and Mr. Chavan were badly injured by the petitioner with the broken bottle. (c) On 22-7-1993 itself, the petitioner was served with an order of suspension and was debarred from entering into the head office of respondent No. 1. (d) On 5-8-1993, a charge-sheet containing the allegations as mentioned aforesaid was prepared. The same was served upon the petitioner. (e) On 10-12-1993, a letter was issued to the petitioner allowing entry into the head office for attending a disciplinary enquiry to be held at a venue to be fixed by the Enquiry Officer. (f) On 25-10-1993 the petitioner furnished his reply to the charge-sheet. In his reply he contended that the Calculator was being used by him and that he had requested Shri Nene to take another Calculator which was lying in the Cupboard, at which it was Nene who abused and slapped him. He contended that Shri Kambli also intervened on behalf of Shri Nene and started assaulting him. Then thereafter a crowd of more than 15 persons attached to Federation and Shiv Sena union came from various departments at the head office and started fisting and kicking him, thereby causing several injuries to his body. (g) On 10-11-1993, the petitioner addressed a letter to the Enquiry Officer in which he expressed apprehension that there was a threat to his life in and around the head office building and made a request to shift the place of the enquiry to some other place or to provide him a police protection as the petitioner had no faith in the security employed by respondent No. 1. (h) By the letter dated 17-11-1993 the petitioner was informed that the place of enquiry could not be shifted. (i) On 4-1-1994, the Enquiry Officer commenced the enquiry. (j) On 24-1-1994 immediately after the enquiry had commenced, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 405 of 1994 challenging his order of suspension dated 22-7-1993. (h) By the letter dated 17-11-1993 the petitioner was informed that the place of enquiry could not be shifted. (i) On 4-1-1994, the Enquiry Officer commenced the enquiry. (j) On 24-1-1994 immediately after the enquiry had commenced, the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 405 of 1994 challenging his order of suspension dated 22-7-1993. In this writ petition the petitioner sought interim stay of the departmental enquiry proceedings as well as the suspension order. (k) However, on 7-3-1994 the petitioner made an application for withdrawal of the writ petition and this writ petition was allowed to be withdrawn. (l) In the course of the enquiry, several witnesses were examined on behalf of respondent No. 1 Corporation. The petitioner did not remain present before the enquiry but persisted in writing letters seeking a change of place of enquiry. (m) On 25-10-1994, the petitioner sent written arguments which enclosed some documents and this was taken on record by the Enquiry Officer. (n) On 8-11-1994 the Enquiry Officer submitted his report in which he held the 3 charges to be proved. On 23-11-1994, respondent No. 1 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why a penalty of removal should not be imposed on the petitioner. This was replied to by the petitioner vide his reply dated 27-12-1997. (o) However, ultimately on 21-4-1995, respondent No. 1 issued an order removing the petitioner from the services of respondent No. 1. An internal appeal filed by the petitioner came to be rejected on 16-8-1995 and a memorial submitted to the Chairman of respondent No. 1 came to be dismissed on 31-7-1996. (p) On 31-1-1998 the Labour Commissioner made a Reference to the Industrial Court. (q) On 14-7-1998 a statement of claim came to be filed by the petitioner in the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Mumbai and it is in this adjudication that the impugned Awards came to be passed 3. (p) On 31-1-1998 the Labour Commissioner made a Reference to the Industrial Court. (q) On 14-7-1998 a statement of claim came to be filed by the petitioner in the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Mumbai and it is in this adjudication that the impugned Awards came to be passed 3. The submissions which are made on behalf of the petitioner can be summarised as follows :- (a) That the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry officer was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice, principally for 3 reason:- (i) that the request made by the petitioner to shift the venue of the enquiry due to an apprehended threat to his life was unfairly not agreed to; (ii) that in a case involving allegation of assault, one Dr. Hiranandani who had treated the injured was neither cited as a witness in the charge-sheet nor was he examined as a witness to prove the nature of the injuries. (iii) that medical papers indicating that the petitioner had been injured which were enclosed alongwith written arguments were not considered by the Enquiry Officer. (b) That as far as the Award part I was concerned, the Tribunal erred in framing an issue as to whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse. It was contended that after the introduction of section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act and after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Workman of Firestone Tyre Rubber Co. v. Management others)1, reported in 1973(26) F.L.R. 359, the issue as framed by the Tribunal would never has been framed. In this regard, reliance was placed by the petitioner upon two judgments of this Court, both delivered by D.R. Dhanuka, J., one in the case of (E. Merck (I) Ltd., Bombay v. V.N. Parulekar others)2, reported in 1994(III) L.L.J. (Suppl.) 546 and another in the case of (Bhavani Metal Works v. P.R. Sawant others)3, reported in 1994(III) L.L.J. (Suppl.) 711. Vide these judgments, this Court has categorically held that an issue as to whether findings recorded by Enquiry Officer were perverse or not was not an issue that could be raised in an adjudication by the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act. Vide these judgments, this Court has categorically held that an issue as to whether findings recorded by Enquiry Officer were perverse or not was not an issue that could be raised in an adjudication by the Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act. It was contended that this Court in the two judgments referred to (supra) had categorically held that the adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act can be said to have committed an error in law by raising such an issue and that the issue which ought to have been raised i.e. whether the finding of mis-conduct was justified by the evidence, was never framed in the adjudication proceedings at all as was required to be done under the said judgments of this Court. 4. On behalf of respondent No. 1, by way of reply the submissions were as follows :- (a) that this Court ought not to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It was contended that pending the enquiry, the petitioner had approached this Court but had not made any prayer in the writ petition for shifting the venue of his enquiry. It was argued that this indicated that the petitioner had no real apprenhension of danger to his person. It was further contended that the petitioner had been offered security and that his contention that he had no faith in the security had no real or concrete basis. As regards non-examination of Dr. Hiranandani it was contended that the only certificate issued by the doctor had been produced on record and in a disciplinary proceeding, where strict rules of evidence did not apply the said certificate could be read in evidence. This certificate pertained to the injuries said to have been suffered by Mr. Nene. As regards the other injuries it was contended that the witnesses themselves had stated that they had not asked for any medical certificate and the doctor had not issued any medical certificate. In the absence of such medical certificates the doctor's evidence could not have had much significance. It was further contended that it was possible to prove the charge through occular evidence of the injured witnesses who had infact been examined and therefore, mere non-examination of doctor would not by itself render the enquiry unfair or improper. In the absence of such medical certificates the doctor's evidence could not have had much significance. It was further contended that it was possible to prove the charge through occular evidence of the injured witnesses who had infact been examined and therefore, mere non-examination of doctor would not by itself render the enquiry unfair or improper. As regards the medical papers furnished by the petitioner it was contended that the same were annexed to the written argument. They were produced by the petitioner at a belated stage and the petitioner had not led any evidence in that enquiry. That in such circumstances, mere non-consideration of the medical papers furnished by the petitioner, by itself would not render the enquiry unfair or improper. 5. I have considered the contentions of both the sides. Notwithstanding the fact that enquiry was ex parte, I am not inclined to exercise my jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to hold that the enquiry was unfair or improper. It does appear from the record that respondent No. 1 was offered security. In his reply dated 25-10-1993, the petitioner did not mention that the security of respondent No. 1 was present but did not intervene. He did raise the contention regarding inadequacy of the security in his letter dated 10-11-1993 and also raised the issue of the venue being changed but in the writ petition which he subsequently filed, he made no prayer for change of venue. In these circumstances, it does not appear that the apprehension of the petitioner regarding his personal safety was a serious apprehension. It is pertinent to note that at the end of the enquiry, petitioner had furnished written arguments which he forwarded through his friend. It could have open to the petitioner to appear in the enquiry through a next friend as the rules permitted the same. As far as the non-examination of Dr. Hiranandani in the enquiry is concerned, I find that the injured witnesses have been examined. One certificate issued by Dr. Hiranandani has been produced on record and the other, injured witnesses have categorically stated that they did not obtain any medical certificate from Dr. Hiranandani. It is nobody's case that the injuries were grevious in nature. Hiranandani in the enquiry is concerned, I find that the injured witnesses have been examined. One certificate issued by Dr. Hiranandani has been produced on record and the other, injured witnesses have categorically stated that they did not obtain any medical certificate from Dr. Hiranandani. It is nobody's case that the injuries were grevious in nature. The charge was mainly on the footing that the petitioner had assaulted his superior officers, the emphasis being on the factum of assault and not on the nature of the injuries caused. It cannot be said that in a domestic enquiry, merely because some relevant evidence has not been led, that by itself would render the enquiry unfair or improper. It is not disputed before me that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable to a domestic enquiry and that the medical certificate which was relied upon by respondent No. 1, could have been read without formal proof required under the Evidence Act. As regards the non-consideration of the medical papers furnished by the petitioner to show some simple injuries to himself, the Enquiry Officer has infact stated in his enquiry report that he could not come to any conclusion regarding this aspect of the matter as no evidence has been led. Had the petitioner been serious about proving that he himself had suffered injuries, he could have sent his medical papers at much earlier stage of the enquiry and the record indicates he did not do so, choosing to send his documents after the evidence was completed, annexed to his written arguments. In my view, the non-consideration of the medical certificate sent an annexures to the written argument cannot be said to be a factor which would render the enquiry unfair or improper. I, therefore, feel that it would not be proper to disturb the finding on Issue 1 in Award I to the effect that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Having concluded thus, obviously there would not be any question of the employer leading fresh evidence to prove the charges before the Tribunal. 6. On the 2nd contention, however, the petitioner stands on a good footing. Lengthy arguments were made before me on the question as to whether the powers exercised by the Industrial Tribunal under section 11-A are in the nature of review, superintendence, or appeal. 6. On the 2nd contention, however, the petitioner stands on a good footing. Lengthy arguments were made before me on the question as to whether the powers exercised by the Industrial Tribunal under section 11-A are in the nature of review, superintendence, or appeal. To my mind the question involved is really not one of nomenclature but one of the substance nature of the powers conferred by section 11-A. Before I deal with this question, a little background would be essential for a proper understanding. 7. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act was introduced by Amending Act, 45 of 1971 and came into force w.e.f 15-12-1971. The said section 11-A pertained to the power of Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of a workman. 8. Prior to 15-12-1971 the powers of aforesaid Tribunals were laid down by the decisions of several courts. The leading judgment of the Apex Court on the nature of those powers was the case of (Indian Iron Steel Co. v. Their Workman)4, reported in 1958(1) L.L.J. 260 . In the said judgment the Apex Court after considering several earlier judgments had opined on the nature of the powers of an Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating a labour dispute. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case was in the following terms:- "Undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline but the power is not unlimited and when the dispute arises, Industrial Tribunal had been given powers to see whether the termination of service of workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal or mis-conduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere. In cases of dismissal or mis-conduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere. (i) when there is a want of good faith; (ii) when there is a victimisation or unfair labour practice: (iii) when the management has been guilty of basic error or violation of principles of natural justice; and (iv) when on the materials the finding is completely baseless or perverse (emphasis provided) The limitation on the powers of a Tribunal as laid down in the case of Indian Iron Steel Company Ltd., (supra) and earlier recommendations of the international labour organisation adopted in June 1963 were cited in the Statement of Objects and Reasons in the amending Act which introduced section 11-A into the Industrial Disputes Act. The recommendation of the Industrial Labour organisation was to the effect that the workers aggrieved by termination of the employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination to neutral bodies, such as an Arbitrator, Court, or Arbitration Committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be empowered to examine reasons given in the termination of employment and other circumstances relating to the case and to render decision on the justification of the termination. Accordingly as stated above, on 15-12-1971 section 11-A was brought into force. The essence of the power of the Tribunal was contained in section 11-A itself and the relevant part of the said section is reproduced here in above :- "11-A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.—Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its Award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the Award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: (emphasis provided) 9. The said section came up for interpretation before the Apex Court in the case of workman of (Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management and others)5, 1973(26) L.L.J. 351. In paragraph 31 of the said judgment, the Apex Court after referring to the earlier decisions of various courts prior to the introduction of section 11, went on to consider the changes in the powers of the Tribunals/courts as brought about by section 11-A and concluded as under :- "Previously the Tribunal had no power to interfere with the finding of misconduct recorded in the domestic enquiry unless one or other infirmities pointed out by this Court in Indian Iron Steel Co. Ltd. (1) existed. The conduct of disciplinary proceeding and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to be a managerial function with which the Tribunal had no power to interfere unless the finding was perverse or the punishment was so harsh as to lead to an inference of victimisation or unfair labour practice. This position, in our view, has now been changed by section 11-A. The words "in the course of the adjudication proceeding, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified" clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to re-appraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer established the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now been given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct. The limitation imposed on the powers of the Tribunal by the decision in India Iron Steel Co. Ltd. (1) case can no longer the invoked by an employer. The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct, but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer has ceased to be so, and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter." 10. The conclusion was reached by the Apex Court after considering in detail the reasons and background for which section 11-A was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. The conclusion was reached by the Apex Court after considering in detail the reasons and background for which section 11-A was introduced in the Industrial Disputes Act. 11. In the case of (Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union and another v. Christian Medical College, Vellore Association others)6, reported in A.I.R. 1988 Supreme Court 37, the Apex Court while considering the question of the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act vis a vis a minority institution, inter alia dealt with section 11-A and in doing so referred to the ratio in Indian Iron Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workman, (supra). There was however, no reference to the earlier judgment of the Apex Court in the case of the Workman of Firestone Tyre Rubber Co. As regards section 11-A, the Apex Court observed as follow :- "Section 11-A which has been introduced since then into the Act which confers the power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to substitute a lesser punishment in lieu of the order of discharge or dismissal passed by the management again cannot be considered as conferring an arbitrary power on the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court. The power under section 11-A of the Act has to be exercised judicially and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court is expected to interfere with the decision of a management under section 11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned." 12. It can be seen from this observation that the Apex Court in the case of Christian Medical College (supra) basically looked into the powers of the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court while considering the question of punishment and held that the said powers could not be exercised arbitrary and ought to be exercised judicially. 13. Advocate for the petitioner drew my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of (General Employees Union v. Ambassador Sky Chef)7, reported in 1995(4) Bom.C.R. 596 where a Single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble Justice Srikrishna, J., as he then was) after referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Workman of Firestone Tyre Rubber Company (supra) observed as follows :- "Section 11-A was brought on the statute book specifically to give two additional powers to the Industrial adjudicator. First is virtually a power of appeal against findings of the facts made by Enquiry Officer in his report with regard to the adequacy of the evidence and the conclusion on facts. The second, and the fare more important, is the power of reappraisal of the quantum of punishment." As against this the respondents relied upon another judgment of the Single Judge of this Court in the case of (USV Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and another)8, reported in 1998(1) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)604 , decided by Lodha, J., in which the analysis of the powers under section 11-A was made in the following terms :- "However, the power given to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal in section 11-A is not in the nature of unruly horse and cannot be exercised as an appellate forum over the findings given by the Disciplinary Authority. The power exercisable by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal or the National Tribunal under section 11-A cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner or in a fanciful way or in a colour of capriciousness. If the Disciplinary Authority has awarded the punishment of dismissal or discharge commensurate with the gravity of the offence which has been duly proved in the enquiry and neither the enquiry proceedings are vitiated by any error or law nor findings of the gravity of the charge suffer from any error and the Award of punishment is commensurate with the gravity of charge, I am afraid the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its power under section 11-A cannot substitute such just punishment by observing that it is unjustified. The exercise of the powers by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under section 11-A has to be in the nature of the power that may be exercised by any supervisory authority but not as an Appellate Authority. The exercise of the power under section 11-A therefore has to be within its framework and should not exceed its power by passing arbitrary or fanciful orders. The exercise of the power under section 11-A therefore has to be within its framework and should not exceed its power by passing arbitrary or fanciful orders. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court or of the Industrial Tribunal under section 11-A though very wide yet not as wide as the appellate forum, is always circumscribed by the power that may be exercised by Supervisory Authority." It appears that in the later judgment of this Court, no reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Workman of Firestone Rubber Co. (supra). Though reliance is placed on the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Christan Medical College (supra) there is also no reference to the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of General Employees Union (supra). In a sense, it would be true to say that the Tribunal or the Labour Court is not an Appellate Authority exercising powers of appeal but in my view, it does appear that the powers as mentioned in section 11-A and as interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Workers of Firestone (supra) by this Court in the case of General Employees Union (supra) are interpreted to be very wide and almost akin to the wide powers of an appellate forum in so far as the re-appraisement of the entire evidence with a view to form an independent judgment on all aspects is permissible. In this view, I am unable to agree with a view taken by a Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in case of (S.R.T.C., Bangalore v. John D'Souza)9, reported in 1995 Lab.I.C. 1119, to the effect that a Tribunal has to first review the matter in the light of the grounds adduced before it and unless this first stage of appraisal has been gone through and unless and until there is a clear cut finding to the effect that the order is wrong it would not be permissible for the Tribunal to exercise the expanded power under section 11-A. 14. The vital question that now arises is that though the limitations as imposed by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Iron Steel Co. The vital question that now arises is that though the limitations as imposed by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Iron Steel Co. v. Their Workman (supra), including the limitation to interfere when on the materials the finding of an Enquiry Officer was completely baseless or perverse, was expressly removed by an interpretation of the newly introduced section 11-A by the Apex Court in the case of Workman of Firestone (supra), could the Labour Court have framed an issue as to whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse. It is noticed that firstly this issue was framed as a preliminary issue for deciding Award Part-I, though this issue obviously pertaining to the merits of the charge. 15. In my view, issues pertaining to merits of the charge or quantum of punishment cannot be framed for the purpose of deciding Award Part-I. The bifurcation of the adjudication into two parts was contemplated by the Apex Court in its judgment in the case of (Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe)10, reported in A.I.R. 1975 Supreme Court 1900. In the said judgment, the preliminary issue which was required to be framed for deciding Award Part-I was clearly suggested by the Apex Court to be as under :- "Whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice?" In my view only this and no other issue should be framed for the purpose of deciding Award Part-I. This issue pertains to the procedural aspects of the domestic enquiry and not to the merits of the charge or to the quantum of punishment. This issue would include and cover a finding as to whether the enquiry was conducted as per any binding prescribed procedure such as one laid down under a Standing Order. The issue which pertain to the merits of the charge and the quantum of punishment necessarily must be framed only for deciding Award Part-II. Thus in the present case framing of the 2nd issue in proceedings to decide Award Part-I was itself an error in law. Infact the issue as framed could not even has been framed in proceedings to decide Award Part-II. This aspect of the matter is not res integra. There are two judgments of this Court which squarely cover this point and which have been relied upon by the petitioner. Infact the issue as framed could not even has been framed in proceedings to decide Award Part-II. This aspect of the matter is not res integra. There are two judgments of this Court which squarely cover this point and which have been relied upon by the petitioner. The first is the judgment of this Court passed in the case of E. Merck (I) Ltd. v. V.N. Parulekar others (supra) by D.R. Dhanuka, J., in which this Court after referring to several judgments including the Indian Iron Steel Co. (supra) observed as follows :- "The Tribunal's powers under section 11-A of the said Act are thus very wide and are not limited to the grounds on which it could interfere with the order of dismissal or discharge passed by the management under the pre-existing law. In my judgment, the Tribunal was under a duty to reappraise the evidence and satisfy itself as to whether the misconduct alleged against the workman was proved or not. It is unfortunate that even after 17 years, the issue which is being framed by the Tribunal at least in some of the reference is as to whether the finding on the charge of misconduct recorded by the Enquiry Officer was perverse or not. Framing of such an issue by the Tribunal is totally erroneous and amounts to ignoring the beneficial and benevolent provision like section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The issue to be framed should be to the following effect: Whether the charge of misconduct levelled against the workman is proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal by acceptable evidence? 16. The other case i.e. Bhavani Metal Works v. P.R. Sawant others (supra) relied upon by the petitioner was also decided by this Court by D.R. Dhanuka, J., on the same day and contains a similar observation. In both these cases, this Court, on the basis of the aforesaid observation, came to be conclusion that the Award suffered from legal infirmity in as much as issue No. 2 framed by the Tribunal was to the effect as to whether findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were perverse or not. In one of the cases, this Court went on to decide the matter on merits whereas other matter was remanded to the Industrial Tribunal for fresh consideration. 17. In one of the cases, this Court went on to decide the matter on merits whereas other matter was remanded to the Industrial Tribunal for fresh consideration. 17. It is now evident that the anguish expressed by this Court to the effect that even after 17 years of the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of Fire Stone (supra) the issue which was being framed by the Tribunal, at least in some of the references as to whether the finding of the charge of mis-conduct recorded by the Enquiry Officer was perverse or not, has gone without heed. This Court had observed that if the question to be asked is as to whether finding is perverse, the approach of the Tribunal was bound to be very narrow. 18. For the sake of clarification, it is once more stated that in matters before the Labour Court or Tribunal under Industrial Disputes Act, for the purpose of giving Award Part-I the only issue which is required to be framed is as under :- "Whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice?" 19. As far as the proceedings for deciding Award Part-II are concerned, the issues that would pertain to the culpability of the workman under the charge, the quantum of punishment and the conclusion should be framed as under :- (a) Whether the charge of misconduct levelled against the workman is proved to the satisfaction of the Tribunal by acceptable evidence? (b) Whether the punishment given to the workman is proper? (c) What order ? It is obvious that if the first issue in proceedings for the Part-II Award is held to be negative then the decision on the 2nd issue would not arise. 20. In this background the finding on issue No. 2 in Award Part-I as well as Award Part-II need to be quashed and set aside. I have given some anxious consideration as to whether I should myself go into the entire evidence, but I feel that it would be desirable if the last Court on facts consider the evidence as led in the domestic enquiry afresh as this exercise was not done with a proper approach. I have given some anxious consideration as to whether I should myself go into the entire evidence, but I feel that it would be desirable if the last Court on facts consider the evidence as led in the domestic enquiry afresh as this exercise was not done with a proper approach. In fact the observations in Award Part-II indicate that the evidence was looked into by taking a very narrow approach and under the belief that the Tribunal could not go into findings of fact arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. 21. In the circumstances, the petition is partly allowed. The finding and order in so far as the 2nd issue in Award Part-I dated 3-8-99 is quashed and set aside. Similarly Award Part-II dated 16-11-99 also stands quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded for a fresh decision to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Mumbai. The Tribunal, without allowing any fresh evidence, after re-appraising evidence as recorded in the domestic enquiry will arrive at a fresh conclusion on the issues as framed in para 17 hereinabove. It is made clear that all contentions on the merits of the charge and on the quantum of punishment are being kept open. It is also made clear that any observations relating to the same made in this judgment have been made only for the purpose of deciding whether the enquiry was fair and proper and will not be taken into account for adjudicating Award Part-II. 22. Since the matter is pending from 1997, it would be desirable that the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Mumbai, hear and dispose of the matter expeditiously and in any case before 30th April, 2004. The Advocate for the respondents seeks stay of the operation of this order for a period of 4 weeks. The execution of this order is stayed for a period of 4 weeks. The writ be sent to the trial Court forthwith. A copy of this judgment be circulated to all the Labour and Industrial Courts in Maharashtra. Petition partly allowed. -----