P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) G. JAWAHARLAL respondent in W. A. No. 1268/2003, is the writ petitioner in W. P. No. 14828/2003. Rural Electrification Corporation Limited, represented by its Chairman and Managing director - 1st appellant in the Writ Appeal, is the respondent in the writ petition. In view of the commonness of the questions involved in the writ appeal and the writ petition aforesaid, both are being disposed of by this Common Order. ( 2 ) THE respondents in W. P. No. 1713ii 99, aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge dated 26-2-2003 had preferred the Writ Appeal. The respondent in the Writ appeal filed W. P. No. 14828/2003 praying for a writ of mandamus directing the Corporation to restore the increments due for the years 1999-2000 and fix the scale to the next higher grade as Special Grade post and consider the case for promotion to the post of Deputy Chief (Economics) and consequently direct the respondent to pay all the benefits accrued as a sequel to the outcome of W. P. No. 17137 of 1999 and pass such other suitable orders. ( 3 ) FOR the purpose of convenience gjawaharlal is referred to as petitioner and the Rural Electrification Corporation Limited as Corporation, in short. ( 4 ) SRI S. Ravi, the learned Counsel representing the Corporation made the following submissions. The learned Counsel pointed out that the petitioner filed W. P. No. 22654/99 praying for the relief of consideration for promotion and had withdrawn the same without reserving any liberty and hence W. P. No. 14828/2003 praying for the same relief is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The learned Counsel also maintained that in the present case, the corporation imposed only minor penalty as per the Rural Electrification Corporation limited (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) rules, hereinafter in short referred to as "rules" for the purpose of convenience, and hence the Corporation is liable to follow only the procedure under Rule 27 of the rules. The learned Counsel also submitted that the Corporation had given the gist of imputations of misconduct and misbehaviour against the petitioner and the petitioner having fully understood the same gave a reply and the Disciplinary Authority having considered the same imposed only minor penalty. The learned Counsel also submitted that the Corporation had given the gist of imputations of misconduct and misbehaviour against the petitioner and the petitioner having fully understood the same gave a reply and the Disciplinary Authority having considered the same imposed only minor penalty. The learned Counsel also further submitted that there was no procedural irregularity or any other legal infirmity and the procedure as per the Rules, principles of fair play and justice had been complied with and hence the learned Single Judge had erred in granting the relief to the petitioner. ( 5 ) PER contra, Sri Challa Kodanda ram, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner/g. yawa/iar/a//respondent in the writ Appeal, made the following submissions. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and submitted that there is no illegality committed by the learned single Judge warranting any interference in the Writ Appeal. The learned Counsel also meticulously had taken us through different rules and explained that having initiated the proceedings for imposition of major penalty, the Corporation had given a go-bye to the same and this had definitely caused prejudice to the petitioner. The learned Counsel also commented that there was only a show- cause and there were no specific imputations; what was called upon was only some clarification. The learned Counsel also submitted that no reasons had been recorded by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate Authority. An attempt also was made to show that the original authority had no jurisdiction at all to impose such punishment and though it was not made a ground of attack, it being a pure question of law, it was contended, the same can be raised at any stage. Strong reliance was placed on certain decisions too. ( 6 ) MS. Krowidi Padrnaja, the learned counsel representing the petitioner in the writ Petition submitted that the petitioner is entitled to all benefits and is entitled to be considered for promotion and hence the Writ petition has to be allowed as prayed for. ( 7 ) HEARD the Counsel on record at length and also perused the material available on record and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition referred to supra as against which the Writ appeal was preferred. ( 7 ) HEARD the Counsel on record at length and also perused the material available on record and the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition referred to supra as against which the Writ appeal was preferred. ( 8 ) W. A. No. 1268/2003 was admitted on 28-2-2003 and a direction to expedite the hearing of the Appeal, was made. In w. A. M. P. No. 2148/2003, the following order was made on 20-8-2003: "interim suspension. However, it is made clear that pendency of this appeal will not be a bar in the appellants considering the application of the respondent for voluntary retirement, in accordance with Rules. " the petitioner filed W. P. No. 17137/99 praying for issuance of a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari to call for the records pertaining to the impugned order No. 5/l (l)/ 91/pers/d-V/1497 dated 29-6-1998 passed by the 2nd respondent and also modified order No. REC/vig/11/132/96/2179 dated 14-10-1998 passed by the 3rd respondent and to quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and violative of the statutory provisions of c. D. A . Rules, 1979 and consequently to set aside the same. ( 9 ) THE petitioner was initially appointed as Economics Analyst in 1978 in the Corporation and was promoted as assistant Director in the year 1981 and was further promoted as Deputy Director in 1986. In 1996, a Director was appointed on contract basis for a period of two years and during that time, by an order dated 4-1-1996, the said Director kept the petitioner in additional charge of Administration and General services by virtue of which the petitioner was expected to supervise the General administration also Personnel matters and the petitioner also was made a Member of the Purchasing Committee. The Audit Report in 1996 had revealed some shortage of certain materials and hence the Deputy Chief (Personnel) of the Corporation issued a memo dated 23-9-1997 requiring the petitioner to give certain clarifications in the matter of purchase of sofa and curtain clothes and an explanation in detail dated 23-11-1997 was submitted in this regard and while denying the allegations the petitioner also requested the Corporation to make a detailed enquiry, if necessary. The disciplinary Authority decided to hold an enquiry and appointed an Enquiry Officer as contemplated by Rule 25 of the Rules by an order dated 27-1-1998, and a Presenting officer also was appointed by an order dated 29-1-1998. The petitioner was served with the proceedings dated 29-6-1998 imposing punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect and aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Appeal to the appellate Authority and the Appellate authority by the order dated 14-10-1998 had affirmed the said punishment with modification that the stoppage of increments to be without cumulative effect. The petitioner had questioned the order of the disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate Authority in the Writ Petilon. The learned Single Judge, after recording reasons in detail had arrived at the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Corporation is not justified in giving a go-bye to the procedure and imposing a minor penalty having initiated the original proceeding for imposition of major penalty. The learned Single Judge also dealt with the rules in detail and had arrived at the conclusion that the non-recording of reasons or unsatisfactory reasons recorded by both the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate Authority also would vitiate the proceedings. The learned Judge also had commented about the non-specification of clear imputations in this regard. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ appeal had been preferred by the Corporation. ( 10 ) BEFORE proceeding with the further discussion, at the outset it may be relevant to look into the relevant Rules. Rule 23 of the Rules deals with penalty and the relevant portion of the said Rule reads as hereunder: the following penalties may be imposed on an employee, as hereinafter provided, for misconduct committed by him or for any other good and sufficient reasons : minor penalties : (a) Censure; (b) Withholding of increments of pay with or without cumulative effect; (c) withholding of promotion; and (d) recovery from pay or such other amount as may be due to him of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Corporation by negligence or breach of orders. Major penalties : (e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; and (g) dismissal. Major penalties : (e) reduction to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in a time scale; (f) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment; and (g) dismissal. The Explanation to Rule 23, wherein what may not amount to a penalty within the meaning of the said Rule had been laid down, may not be relevant for the present purpose. Rule 24 deals with Disciplinary authority and the same reads as hereunder: "the Disciplinary Authority, as specified in the schedule, or any authority higher than it may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 23 on any employee. " rule 25 deals with Procedure for imposing major penalties and sub-rules (3) and (19) of Rule 2$, respectively read as hereunder:" (3) Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry, the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations against the employee. The charges, together with a statement of the allegations, on which they are based, a list of documents by which and a list of witnesses by whom, the articles of charge are proposed to be sustained, shall be communicated in writing to the employee, who shall be required to submit within such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority (not exceeding 15 days), a written statement whether he admits or denies of or all the articles of charges. Explanation:it will not be necessary to show the documents listed with the charge- sheet or any other documents to the employee at this stage. Explanation:it will not be necessary to show the documents listed with the charge- sheet or any other documents to the employee at this stage. " (19) (I) After the conclusion of the inquiry, a report shall be prepared and it shall contain: (a) a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputation of the misconduct or mis-behaviour; (b) a gist of the defence of the employee in respect of each article of charge; (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; (d) the findings on each article of charges and the reasons therefore explanation: If in the opinion of the inquiring authority the proceedings of the inquiry establish any article of charge different from the original articles of the charge, it may record its findings on such articles of charge provided that the findings on such article of charge shall not be recorded unless the employee has either admitted the facts on which such article of charge is based on has had a reasonable opportunity of defending himself against such article of charge. (ii) The inquiring authority, where it is not itself the disciplinary authority, shall forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry which shall include: (a) The report of the inquiry prepared by it under sub-clause (i) above; (b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the employee referred to in sub-rule (13); (c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; (d) written briefs referred to in sub-rule (16), if any, and (e) the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary^ authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the enquiry; rule 26 deals with Action on the inquiry report and sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 26 read as hereunder:" (3) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Rule 23 should be imposed on the employee, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 27, make an order imposing such penalty. (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee. (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the employee. " rule 27 deals with Procedure for imposing minor penalties and the said Rule reads as hereunder: (1) Where it is proposed to impose any of minor penalties specified in clauses (a) to (d) of Rule 23, the employee shall be informed in writing of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour against him are given an opportunity to submit his written statement of defence within a specified period not exceeding 15 days. The defence statement, if any, submitted by the employee shall be taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority before passing orders. The record of the proceedings shall include : (i) a copy of the statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour delivered to the employee; (ii) his defence statement, if any, and (iii) the orders of the disciplinary authority together with the reasons therefore. The amended Schedule specifies as hereunder: Post Disciplinary uthority Appellate Authority Reviewing Authority Class III &iv (i) Corporate Office I/c Pers Jt. Chief/jtdir/ Chief (P&a) General Manager (P&a) (ii) Project Office and Sub-Office Chief Project Manager - (iii) Central Institute for RE (ORE) Jt. Director I/cadmn. Director (cire) General Manager (P&a) (iv) Lineman Training Centers (LMTC) Course Director Class-II & Class-I (up to a Chief (P& A) Manager (P&a) General CMD maximum of sale of Rs. 1300/-) Class-I (up to a General Manager (P&a) CMD Board Maximum of scale of Rs. 1600/-) Class-I CMD Board Board (Above the maximum of scale of Rs. 1600/-) the stand taken by the Corporation is that it is for the Disciplinary Authority to take a decision and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Disciplinary Authority had taken a decision to inflict minor penalty in accordance with the Rules and since there is no procedural infirmity, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief. ( 11 ) THE Memo dated 23-9-1997 issued by the Deputy Chief (Personnel) had referred to certain purchases made from 3-1-1996 to 19-1-1996 from different agencies and certain discrepancies were pointed out and a careful reading of the Memo would reveal that some information was called for in this regard. The petitioner accordingly submitted his explanation furnishing the details. ( 11 ) THE Memo dated 23-9-1997 issued by the Deputy Chief (Personnel) had referred to certain purchases made from 3-1-1996 to 19-1-1996 from different agencies and certain discrepancies were pointed out and a careful reading of the Memo would reveal that some information was called for in this regard. The petitioner accordingly submitted his explanation furnishing the details. No doubt, the language of the Memo may be suggestive of making some imputations as against the petitioner, but the imputations are not clear and at any rate the said imputations are vague and therefore the said memo cannot be equated to that of a show- cause notice for holding a Disciplinary enquiry. It is pertinent to note that the disciplinary Authority had decided to conduct enquiry under Rule 25 and an enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer also were appointed and when specific charges were to be framed and further enquiry was to be proceeded with, the impugned order dated 29-6-1988 was made. It is pertinent to note that both the order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate Authority do not specify any reasons and definitely these orders are made in violation of the principles of natural justice. The learned Single Judge in the judgment had observed:"the other submission is about furnishing of reasons by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate authority. Even if it is to be assumed that the Memo dated 23-9-1997 is to be treated as memorandum of imputations of misconduct and misbehaviour , and the explanation given by the petitioner as the written statement , contemplated under Rule 27 of the Rules, the Disciplinary Authority was under obligation to furnish reasons in support of its conclusion. The Rules have exempted only holding of a detailed disciplinary enquiry, for imposition of minor penalty. That does not mean that the very process of reasoning is dispensed with. "in Fred Dawson Calvin v. John Henry brownlow Carr and others, 1980 A. C. Law reports 574, while dealing with this aspect, the learned Judges at page 589 held:"the first issue arising in this appeal is whether the committee had any jurisdiction to enter upon the appeal. The plaintiffs proposition is that it had not, for the reason that the stewards "decision" was, on the assumption stated, void. The plaintiffs proposition is that it had not, for the reason that the stewards "decision" was, on the assumption stated, void. A condition precedent, it was said, of an appeal was the existence of a real, even though voidable, decision. This argument led necessarily into the difficult area of what is void and what is voidable, as to which some confusion exists in the authorities. Their Lordships opinion would be, if it became necessary to fix upon one or other of these expressions, that a decision made contrary to natural justice is void, but that, until it is so declared by a competent body or Court, it may have some effect or existence, in law. This condition might be better expressed by saying that the decision is invalid or vitiated. In the present context, where the question is whether an appeal lies, the impugned decision cannot be considered as totally void, in the sense of being legally non-existent. So to hold would be wholly unreal. The decision of the stewards resulted in disqualification, an effect with immediate and serious consequences for the plaintiff. This was a fact; the plaintiff lost his membership of the Australian Jockey Club and could be excluded from their premises. These consequences remained in effect unless and until the stewards decision was challenged and, if so, had sufficient existence in law to justify an appeal. "it was further held at page. 591:"the plaintiffs second argument can be stated, for purposes of description, as being that such defects of natural justice as may have existed as regards the proceedings before the stewards, were not capable of being cured by the appeal proceedings before the committee, even though, as was not contested before this Board, these were correctly and fairly conducted. The defendants contend the contrary. This part of the argument involved consideration of a wide range of authorities of this Board, and in australia, Canada, England and New Zealand. As regards decisions of this Board a conflict was said to exist between Annamunthodo v. Oilfields Workers Trade Union [1961] AC 945 and Pillai v. Singapore City Council [1968] 1 W. L. R. 1278, each of which has been followed by other decisions. As regards decisions of this Board a conflict was said to exist between Annamunthodo v. Oilfields Workers Trade Union [1961] AC 945 and Pillai v. Singapore City Council [1968] 1 W. L. R. 1278, each of which has been followed by other decisions. There was also said to be a conflict between annamunthodo s case, and the High Court in australian Workers Union v. Bowen (No. 2),77 c. L. R. 601, a conflict giving rise to difficulties for Australian State Courts. Other individual decisions were cited which it appears difficult to reconcile. Although, as will appear, some of the suggested inconsistencies of decisions disappear, or at least diminish, on analysis, their Lordships recognize and indeed assert that no clear and absolute rule can be laid down on the question whether defects in natural justice appearing at an original hearing, whether administrative or quasi- judicial, can be "cured" through appeal proceedings. The situations in which this issue arises are too diverse, and the rules by whether they are governed so various, that this must be so. There are, however, a number of typical situations as to which some general principle can be stated. First there are cases where the rules provide for a rehearing by the original body, or some fuller or enlarged form of it. This situation may be found in relation to social clubs. It is not difficult in such cases to reach the conclusion that the first hearing is superseded by the second, or, putting it in contractual terms, the parties are taken to have agreed to accept the decision of the hearing body, whether original or adjourned. Examples of this are de Verteuil v. Knaggs [1918] A. C. 557, 563; posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange and gardiner (1965) 53 D. L. R. (2d) 193; In re dark and Ontario Securities Commission (1966) 56 D. L. R. (2d) 585; In re Chromex nickel Mines Ltd. (1970) 16 D. L. R. (3d) 273; and see also Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] a. C. 40, 79, per Lord Reid. At the other extreme are cases, where, after examination of the whole hearing structure, in the context of the particular activity to which it relates (trade union membership, planning, employment etc.) the conclusion is reached that a complainant has the right to nothing less than a fair hearing both at the original and at the appeal stage. At the other extreme are cases, where, after examination of the whole hearing structure, in the context of the particular activity to which it relates (trade union membership, planning, employment etc.) the conclusion is reached that a complainant has the right to nothing less than a fair hearing both at the original and at the appeal stage. This was the result reached by Megarry J. in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders [1971] ch. 34. In his judgment in that case the judge seems to have elevated the conclusion thought proper in that case into a rule of general application. In an eloquent passage he said, at p. 49: "if the rules and the law combine to give the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal, why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with an unjust trial and a fair appeal?. . . . . . As a general rule. . . I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body. "in their Lordships opinion this is too broadly stated. It affirms a principle which may be found correct in a category of cases: these may very well include trade union cases, where movement solidarity and dislike of the rebel, or renegade, may make it difficult for appeals to be conducted in an atmosphere of detached impartiality and so make a fair trial at the first -probably branch - level an essential condition of justice. But to seek to apply it generally overlooks, in their lordships respectful opinion, both the existence of the first category, and the possibility that, intermediately, the conclusion to be reached, on the rules and on the contractual context, is that those whether hav: joined in an organization, or contract, shou be taken to have agreed to accept what in the end is a fair decision, notwithstanding- some initial defect. "in the decision Union of India v. Dinanath shantaram Karekar, AIR 1998 SC 2722 , at paras 4 and 10, the Apex Court held:"so far as the service of show-cause notice is concerned, it also cannot be treated to have been served. "in the decision Union of India v. Dinanath shantaram Karekar, AIR 1998 SC 2722 , at paras 4 and 10, the Apex Court held:"so far as the service of show-cause notice is concerned, it also cannot be treated to have been served. Service of this notice was sought to be effected on the respondent by publication in a newspaper without making any earlier effort to serve him personally by tendering the show-cause notice either through the office peon or by registered post. There is nothing on record to indicate that the newspaper in which the show-cause notice was published was a popular newspaper which was expected to be read by the public in general or that it had wide circulation in the area or locality where the respondent lived. The show-cause notice cannot, therefore, in these circumstances, be held to have been served on the respondent. In any case, since the very initiation of the disciplinary proceedings was bad for the reason that the charge-sheet was not served, all subsequent steps and stages, including the issuance of the show- cause notice would be bad. Where the disciplinary proceedings are intended to be initiated by issuing a charge- sheet, its actual service is essential as the person to whom the charge-sheet is issued is required to submit his reply and, thereafter, to participate in the disciplinary proceedings. So also, when the show-cause notice is issued, the employee is called upon to submit his reply to the action proposed to be taken against him. Since in both the situations, the employee is given an opportunity to submit his reply, the theory of "communication" cannot be invoked and "actual Service" must be proved and established. It has already been found that neither the charge-sr et nor the show-cause notice were ever served upon the original respondent - Dinanath Shantaram Karekar. Consequently, the entire proceedings were vitiated. "in Union of India v. Tulasiram Patel, air 1985 SC 1416 , the majority held:"a disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. "in Union of India v. Tulasiram Patel, air 1985 SC 1416 , the majority held:"a disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by article 311 (3) is not binding upon the Court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case and Court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. "in G. Pentaiah v. Union of India, 1983 (3) slr 529, it was held that where simple procedure is mentioned in Rule 16 (l) (a) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and elaborate procedure is mentioned in rule 16 (l) (b) for imposing minor penalty, the disciplinary authority must after the receipt of reply/representation of the employee apply its mind to the question as to whether elaborate enquiry mentioned in rule 16 (l) (b) read with Rule 14 is necessary or not and there is no absolute discretion in disciplinary authority to follow either of the procedure without applying its mind to the facts of the case and that an order imposing minor penalty without applying mind to this aspect of the case is arbitrary. In Transport Commissioner, Madras v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, (1995) 1 SCC 332 , while dealing with the aspect of vagueness of the charges, it was held by the Apex Court at paras 9 and 10 as follows:"insofar as the vagueness of the charges is concerned we find that it deserves acceptance. It is asserted by Shri Vaidyanathan, learned counsel for the respondent that except the memo of charges dated 4-6-1989, no other particulars of charges or supporting particulars were supplied. This assertion could not be denied by the learned Counsel for the appellant. A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which the was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. A reading of charges would show that they are not specific and clear. They do not point out clearly the precise charge against the respondent, which the was expected to meet. One can understand the charges being accompanied by a statement of particulars or other statement furnishing the particulars of the aforesaid charges but that was not done. The charges are general in nature to the effect that the respondent along with eight other officials indulged in misappropriation by falsification of accounts. What part did the respondent play, which account did he falsify or help falsify, which amount did he individually or together with other named persons misappropriate, are not particularised. The charge is a general one. It is significant to notice that respondent has been objecting to the charges on the ground of vagueness from the earliest stage and yet he was not furnished with the particulars. It is brought to our notice that respondent s name was not included in the schedule appended to G. O. Ms. 928 dated 25-4-1988 mentioning the names of officials responsible for falsification of accounts and misappropriation and that he is also not made an accused in the criminal proceedings initiated in that behalf. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the Tribunal is right insofar as it holds that the charges communicated to the respondent are vague. In the ordinary course we would have directed the disciplinary authority or the authority which framed the charges to particularise the charges and then to proceed with the enquiry but it appears that the respondent has hardly about seven or eight months to go for retirement. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the matter should end here. "in U. P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay narayan, AIR 1980 SC 840 , it was held that a regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter s explanation is obtained. "in U. P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay narayan, AIR 1980 SC 840 , it was held that a regular departmental enquiry takes place only after the charge-sheet is drawn up and served upon the delinquent and the latter s explanation is obtained. It was also held that the rules of natural justice in the circumstances require that the respondent should be given a reasonable opportunity to deny his guilt to defend himself and to establish his innocence which means and includes an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses relied upon by the appellant- corporation and an opportunity to lead evidence in defence of the charge as also a show-cause notice for the proposed punishment. In C. R. Worrier v. State of kerala, 1982 (3) SLR 374, the High Court of Kerala had expressed the view that the findings against an employee even where minor penalty is imposed should be supported by reasons. The same view was expressed in R. P. Bhatta v. Union of India, 1985 (3) SLR 745. In Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Haryana State Electricity Board, chandigarh, 1988 (3) SLR 525, it was held at para 6:". . . . . The penalty was imposed on April 15, 1968 and, as a result of which, he was deprived of the monetary benefit of one increment for one year only. The penalty by way of stoppage of one increment for one year was without any future effect. In other words, the appellant s increment for one year was stopped and such stoppage of increment will have no effect whatsoever on his seniority. Accordingly, the Board acted illegally and most arbitrarily in placing the juniors of the appellant above him in the seniority list and/or confirming the appellant in the post with effect from December 1, 1969, that is, long after the date of confirmation of the said respondents Nos. 2 to 19. The question of seniority has nothing to do with the penalty that was imposed upon the appellant. It is apparent that for the same act of misconduct, the appellant has been punished twice, that is, first by the stoppage of one increment for one year and, second, by placing him below his juniors in the seniority list. 2 to 19. The question of seniority has nothing to do with the penalty that was imposed upon the appellant. It is apparent that for the same act of misconduct, the appellant has been punished twice, that is, first by the stoppage of one increment for one year and, second, by placing him below his juniors in the seniority list. "in the light of the decisions referred to supra and in view of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a case warranting interference at our hands sitting as Appellate Court. ( 12 ) ELABORATE reasons had been recorded in detail by the learned Single judge while arriving at the conclusion why the petitioner is entitled to the relief. It is no doubt true that on the strength of the schedule, the jurisdictional aspect of the disciplinary authority is raised on the ground that it is a pure question of law. But however, without a plea or factual foundation in this regard, this Court is not inclined to permit the same to be raised at this stage. When two views are possible within the permissible legal parameters and the learned Single Judge within the permissible limits not opposed to law had recorded certain findings furnishing detailed reasons thereof, the Appellate Court in intra, Court Appeal should be slow in interfering with the same and hence such findings need no disturbance at our hands and hence such findings are hereby confirmed. Even while imposing minor penalty, imputations should be specific and they cannot be vague. At any rate, when explanation in detail had been given, it is clear, as reflected by the impugned orders made by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the appellate Authority that the detailed explanation had not been considered in the proper perspective and no reasons relating thereto had been recorded and hence definitely both the orders are vitiated, being in violation of principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the writ appeal fails and the same shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs. Accordingly, the writ appeal fails and the same shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs. W. P. No. 14828 of 2003: ( 13 ) THE prayer in the Writ Petition is as follows: "to issue a writ, order or direction, more particularly in the nature of writ of mandamus, directing the respondent-Corporation to restore the increments due for the year 1999-2000 and fix the scale to the next higher grade as Special Grade post and to consider the case of the petitioner for the promotion to the post of Deputy Chief (Economics) and consequently direct the respondent to pay all the benefits accrued as a sequel to the outcome of W. P. No. 17137/99, dated 26-2-2003. " ( 14 ) THE factual matrix need not be repeated again in view of the narration supra. In W. P. No. 22654/99, the prayer is as follows:"to issue a writ of mandamus to direct the respondent-Management to examine the various representations submitted by the petitioner for his promotion to the next higher post of "deputy Chief (Economics) and to consider and promote the petitioner as "deputy Chief with effect from the date on which he became eligible and entitled with all consequential benefits. "by an order dated 31-3-2003, the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn and the order reads as follows:"learned Counsel for the petitioner filed a letter dated 28-3-2003 to the effect that the petitioner communicated to him to withdraw the writ petition due to his personal problems. In view of the letter filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner the writ petition is dismissed as "withdrawn". No costs. " it is clear from the order that the writ petition was withdrawn due to personal reasons and liberty was not reserved to file another writ petition. Hence, as far as the relief prayed for in WP. No. 22654/99 relating to promotion of the petitioner as Deputy chief (Economics), in the light of the above order, cannot be granted in the present writ petition and the same is hereby negatived. It is made clear that the petitioner will be entitled to other benefits, if any, as per Rules which may be consequential to the result in WA No. 1268/2003. It is made clear that the petitioner will be entitled to other benefits, if any, as per Rules which may be consequential to the result in WA No. 1268/2003. Except of this extent, the relief relating to the promotion cannot be in any way considered in the light of the withdrawal of the earlier writ petition without reserving any liberty in this regard. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, the writ petition is disposed of with the above direction. No order as to costs.