JUDGMENT - GOKHALE H.L., J.:---This petition seeks to quash and set aside the order of detention dated 30th January, 2002 directing the detention of one Salim Mirza under the provisions of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "COFEPOSA"). The 2nd respondent to this petition is the then Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department, Incharge of Preventive Detention, who has issued the impugned detention order and has filed her affidavit in reply to justify the detention. The petitioner claims to be the next friend of the detenu. 2. The facts leading to the impugned detention order are as follows :-- The aforesaid Salim Mirza arrived at the International Airport at Mumbai on 8th June, 2001 from Dubai. He opted for the red channel and declared goods worth Rs. 19,600/-. Scrutiny of his passport revealed that he had made five prior visits abroad and all to Dubai during the last two months. That led to suspicion and therefore his baggage was screened. At the time of screening, some very dark patches were seen which indicated the presence of some heavy metal. Detailed examination in the presence of panchas resulted in recovery of some 87 mercury quoted gold pieces weighing in all 1 kg. and 693 gms. The gold was valued at Rs. 7,27,990/- at the local money value. The gold was found concealed in household items. 3. The statement of Salim Mirza was recorded by the Customs Authorities on the very day under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 wherein he is reported to have admitted the concealment, possession and recovery of the gold under seizure. He was therefore arrested and subsequently produced before the concerned Magistrate when he was granted bail on 18th June, 2001 on filing personal bond and a security bond of Rs. 1,50,000/- without any further condition attached. This Salim Mirza is supposed to be a resident of Delhi. The order of detention was issued under COFEPOSA on 30th January, 2002 for indulging into smuggling activities. However, the same could be served only on 13th March, 2003. The said Mirza is in detention thereafter. 4. The present petition seeks to challenge this order of detention. Various grounds are raised to challenge this order, the principal one from amongst them being:-- (i) Vital documents required to be made available to the detenu were not supplied to him. However, the same could be served only on 13th March, 2003. The said Mirza is in detention thereafter. 4. The present petition seeks to challenge this order of detention. Various grounds are raised to challenge this order, the principal one from amongst them being:-- (i) Vital documents required to be made available to the detenu were not supplied to him. (ii) Some of the pages of the documents furnished to him were not eligible. (iii) There was a substantial delay in issuing the detention order, which according to the petitioner indicates that there was no need to take him in custody. (iv) On the top of it there was delay in serving and executing this order of detention. (v) Passingly there were also submissions made on the merits of the order of detention. 5. As far as the first submission, namely that a vital document was not furnished, it was submitted that when the detenu was on bail, an application was made for cancellation of his bail and the application came to be rejected by the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 17th July, 2001. It was submitted that amongst the documents relied upon by the Detaining Authority and which were furnished to the detenu, this document did not figure. 6. The second submission of the petitioner, namely some of these documents were not legible can also be dealt with along with this submission. Mrs. Ansari, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the documents at page Nos. 1 to 6, 40, 41, 53, 55, 63 and 64 were not legible. There is some substance in her submission inasmuch as some parts of these documents are little difficult to read. However, Mr. Mhaispurkar, A.P.P. appearing for the Detaining Authority, drew our attention to the contents of these documents. As far as page Nos. 1 to 6 are concerned, they contain the list of passengers who travelled on the same flight. Page Nos. 40 and 41 are pages reflecting the panchanama conducted at the residence of the detenu where nothing incriminating was found. Page 53 is the bail application moved by the detenu. At page 55 is a copy of the application for extension of remand moved by the Intelligence Officer before the learned Magistrate and pages 63 and 64 are the reply of the detenu to the application for cancellation of bail. Mrs. Page 53 is the bail application moved by the detenu. At page 55 is a copy of the application for extension of remand moved by the Intelligence Officer before the learned Magistrate and pages 63 and 64 are the reply of the detenu to the application for cancellation of bail. Mrs. Ansari relied upon a few judgments to substantiate her submission. Firstly, she relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Bhupinder Singh v. Union of India)1, reported in 1987(2) S.C.C. 234 . That was a matter where the detenu had made a complaint before the Advisory Board that the copies of the documents, which were supplied to him along with the grounds of detention, were not legible. The Secretary to the Government conceded the demand of the detenu for legible copies. Now it so happened that before the legible papers were furnished to the detenu the detention order came to be confirmed. The Apex Court held that the detenu was thus clearly denied the opportunity of making a representation and there was therefore clear contravention of the right guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 7. Similar are the facts in the case of (Smt. Dharmista Bhagat v. State of Karnataka)2, reported in J.T. 1990(1) S.C. 192. In this matter also, immediately after receipt of the grounds of detention, the detenu immediately made a request to the Detaining Authority for giving him typed copy of the document and the request was turned down and no eligible or typed copy of the said document was supplied. Amongst these documents, was a panchanama. The Court held that refusal on the part of the Detaining Authority to supply legible copies of the relevant document infringed his right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Mrs. Ansari also relied upon another order in the case of (Manjit Singh Grewal Alias Gogo v. Union of India)3, reported in 1990(Supp.) S.C.C. 59, where also the appellant had asked for certain copies of the documents, which were though supplied were not legible, and the Apex Court held that this affected the safeguard provided by the Constitution. She also referred to and relied upon another order in the case of (Mehrunnisa v. State of Maharashtra)4, reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1861. She also referred to and relied upon another order in the case of (Mehrunnisa v. State of Maharashtra)4, reported in A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1861. In this matter, the State had not made the copies of the documents available contending that the detenu was already aware of the contents thereof. The Apex Court held that this was hardly any answer. On this behalf, Mrs. Ansari lastly relied upon an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 452 of 1987 decided on 24th July, 1987 in the case of (Mrs. Maya Dooman Awaze v. D.N. Kapoor others)5. This was a matter wherein there were two statements of retraction given by the detenu. The first one was made available to the detenu which was a shorter one. The second one was a detailed one and it was not placed before the Detaining Authority. The Division Bench had interfered with the detention of the person concerned. 8. Mr. Mhaispurkar, learned A.P.P. for the State, on the other hand, relied upon a judgment in the case of (Kamrunnisa v. Union of India)6, reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1640. In that judgment of Ahmedi, J., (as the Hon'ble Judge then was), the Apex Court held in paragraph 14 that the settled legal position was that the documents relied upon ought to be supplied and the documents not relied upon but casually referred to were also to be supplied if the detenu demanded the same. Mr. Mhaispurkar submits that the documents, with respect to which the submission is made, are not documents relevant to justify the detention. No demand for these documents has been made by the detenu at any point of time earlier. In the said judgment, the detenu had sought copies of the search authorisation. However, the Court held that in order to succeed, it must be shown that the search authorisation had a bearing on the detention order. The Court further held: "It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation. The Court further held: "It is not sufficient to say that the detenus were not supplied the copies of the documents in time on demand but it must further be shown that the non-supply has impaired the detenu's right to make an effective and purposeful representation. Demand of any or every document, however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu, merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention order. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this behalf but what is essential is that the detenu must show that the failure to supply the documents before the meeting of the Advisory Board had impaired or prejudiced his right, however slight or insignificant it may be." In the facts of the case, the Court held that the detenu had only made an averment that the documents were not supplied but there was no pleading that it had resulted in the impairment of his right in order to point out any such prejudice. 9. In the present case, what we find is that the order rejecting the application to cancel bail has no bearing on the detention of the person concerned. At that time, he was on bail. The department had applied for cancellation and that application had come to be rejected. Similarly the panchanama at his residence where nothing incriminating was found as well has no relevance with the order of detention. Same will have to be said all it the bail application, the application to extend remand and also the reply of the detenu to the application for cancellation of bail. In the circumstances, the fact that the order passed by the learned Magistrate rejecting the application for cancellation of bail was not supplied cannot vitiate the order of detention. Similarly the other documents supplied, as stated above, do not have any bearing with respect to the detention order and hence the fact that they are partly illegible cannot be pressed into service to submit that the detention order is vitiated. 10. The main criticism of the impugned detention order by Mrs. Ansari was that the order was issued belatedly. Thus whereas the incident is reported to have taken place on 8th June, 2001 the order of detention is issued on 30th January, 2002. Mrs. 10. The main criticism of the impugned detention order by Mrs. Ansari was that the order was issued belatedly. Thus whereas the incident is reported to have taken place on 8th June, 2001 the order of detention is issued on 30th January, 2002. Mrs. Ansari submits that basically the idea in detaining the persons concerned under COFEPOSA is to snape the live-link between such persons and such activities. If the department itself took so much time to issue the detention order, in her submission, the order was not called for at all. Similarly she submits that thereafter the department has taken more than a year and two months to serve the order. That will also go to destroy the case of the Detaining Authority that the detention of the person concerned was necessary. 11. Now as far as the first part, namely the gap between the initial arrest with the smuggled goods and the issuance of the detention order is concerned, it is explained firstly by the sponsoring authority, i.e. one Shri Gopinathan, Joint Secretary of Customs, COFEPOSA Cell, Airport, Mumbai, and thereafter by respondent No. 2 the Detaining Authority. Mr. Gopinathan in paragraph 5 of his return has pointed out that although Mr. Mirza was arrested with the smuggled articles on 8th June, 2001, he was ordered to be released on bail 18th June, 2001 under the orders of the Magistrate. Thereafter a proposal for detaining him was prepared and the same was forwarded to the COFEPOSA Cell by the Air Intelligence Unit on 28th June, 2001. The proposal was scrutinised by the Superintendent of COFEPOSA Cell and was forwarded to the Screening Committee on 9th July, 2001. The Screening Committee approved it on 10th July, 2001. The minutes of the Screening Committee were received by the Sponsoring Unit on 1st August, 2001. Thereafter five sets of the documents containing the proposal were required to be made and then it was forwarded to the Detaining Authority on 7th August, 2001. The Detaining Authority in paragraph 6 of her affidavit has stated that on receiving the proposal the same was scrutinized by her office. It was noticed that additional information regarding the correct address of the proposed detenu and some further documents were required from the sponsoring authority. A letter was accordingly addressed on 9th August, 2001. That information was received on 14th September, 2001. It was noticed that additional information regarding the correct address of the proposed detenu and some further documents were required from the sponsoring authority. A letter was accordingly addressed on 9th August, 2001. That information was received on 14th September, 2001. Thereafter the necessary note was prepared and was placed before the Desk Officer on 25th September, 2001. The Desk Officer forwarded it to the Deputy Secretary on 27th September, 2001. Thereafter the empowerment of the Detaining Authority was obtained on 5th October, 2001 and the proposal was placed before it through proper channel on 18th October, 2001. Thereafter the draft grounds were prepared and were approved by the Detaining Authority on 25th October 2001. Since the accused did not know English very well, the documents were translated into Urdu. It took some time. Reminders were sent to the concerned authority for translation. Finally the documents were received on 21st November, 2001. The documents were placed before the Detaining Authority through the Desk Officer and then the Deputy Secretary on 11th December, 2001. The grounds of detention were reformulated on 12th December, 2001. When all the papers were finally ready the detention order was issued on 30th January, 2002. 12. As far as delay in effecting the service is concerned, it is submitted in paragraph 9 of this affidavit that the order of detention was immediately sent to the authorities in Delhi for its service vide letter dated 7th February, 2002. The Detaining Authority thereafter received a letter from the Commissioner of Police, Delhi dated 21st February, 2002 informing that the order could not be executed as the detenu was not available and the efforts to trace him were going on. The Detaining Authority waited for some time and then sent a wireless message to the Commissioner on 16th May, 2002 asking him to send detailed information about the efforts made. Since the proposed detenu could not be traced, the Detaining Authority therefore initiated the proceeding under section 7(1)(a) and (b) of COFEPOSA on 11th June, 2002. The order under section 7(1)(b) was issued on 18th June, 2002 and the intimation was given to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi under section 7(1)(a) on 23rd July, 2002. It is thereafter submitted that still the detenu could not be arrested. The order under section 7(1)(b) was issued on 18th June, 2002 and the intimation was given to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi under section 7(1)(a) on 23rd July, 2002. It is thereafter submitted that still the detenu could not be arrested. He however himself surrendered to the authorities of PCB CID, Mumbai with his letter dated 11th March, 2003 and that is how the order came to be executed on 13th March, 2003. 13. With respect to the question of delay in issuing the order of detention, Mrs. Ansari firstly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (T.A. Abdul Rehman v. State of Kerala)7, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225. In paragraphs 3 and 4 of that judgment, it is seen that the seizure of the gold biscuits, which were smuggled, took place on 30th November, 1986, whereas the detention order was issued 11 months later on 7th October, 1987. The Court noted that there was no satisfactory explanation for this undue and unreasonable delay. In paragraph 11 of the judgment, the Court held that the question whether the prejudicial activities necessitating passing of the detention order was proximate to the time when the order was made or whether a live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule could be laid down. However, the Court had to scrutinise whether the Detaining Authority had satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded the tenable and reasonable explanation. In the facts of that case, the Court held that such an explanation was not available. Reliance was then placed on a judgment in the case of (Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar v. S. Ramamurthi)8, reported in A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 656. That was a judgment where on the basis of statements of witnesses disclosing some criminal activities, an order of detention was passed some five months later from the registration of the last such case and four months from the submission of proposal. That was a case under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act. Again here what is seen is that in the facts of that case, there was no satisfactory explanation. That was a case under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act. Again here what is seen is that in the facts of that case, there was no satisfactory explanation. The above referred propositions in the case of Abdul Rehman (supra) were pressed into service and the Court came to the conclusion that the delay was unexplained and the detention order was interfered. 14. Mr. Mhaispurkar, on the other hand, relied upon two judgments, which lay down as to what should be the approach in matters of detention under COFEPOSA. Firstly, he relied upon the judgment in the case of (Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat)9, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1255 and particularly paragraph 10 thereof. The relevant paragraph 10 made it specifically clear for guidance of various High Courts the distinction between the delay in making of an order under the law relating to preventive detention like the COFEPOSA and complying with the procedural safeguards under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The said paragraph 10 reads as follows : "10. Viewed from this perspective, we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. It has been laid down by this Court in a series of decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. Quite obviously, in cases of Foreign Exchange Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warranted unless the Court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. The decisions to the contrary by the Delhi High Court in (Anil Kumar Bhasin v. Union of India)10, Cri.W. No. 410/86 dated 20-12-1987 reported in 1987 Cri.L.J. 1632, (Bhupinder Singh v. Union of India)11, 1985(8) Delhi L.T. 493, (Anwar Esmail Aibani v. Union of India)12, Cri.W. No. 375/86 dated 11-12-1986 reported in 1987(3) I.J. Rep. 383, (Surinder Pal Singh v. M.L. Wadhawan)13, Cri.W. No. 444/86, dated 9-3-1987; 1987(2) Crimes 449 and other cases taking the same view do not lay down good law and are accordingly overruled." In paragraph 12 of the judgment, the Court noted that there was no explanation for the delay of nearly four months, i.e. between 2nd February and 28th May, 1997. Yet it was held that it could not give rise to a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate was not genuine or that the grounds were stale or illegal or there was no rational connection between the grounds and the impugned order. In the same paragraph, the Court quoted with approval the judgment in (Golam Hussain v. Commissioner of Police)14, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1336 to the effect that the credible chain between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the Detaining Authority and the purpose of detention is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval was sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long. The second judgment relied upon in this behalf is in the case of (Abdul Salam v. Union of India)15, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1446. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long. The second judgment relied upon in this behalf is in the case of (Abdul Salam v. Union of India)15, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1446. In this judgment, the law laid down in Rajendrakumar's case (supra) is referred to in paragraph 13 and in the same paragraph the judgment in Abdul Rehman's case (supra) is explained by observing that though there was a delay of 11 months, there was no satisfactory explanation and therefore it was held that the delay throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. In paragraph 14, the Court again reiterated that if the Detaining Authority is satisfied on the available material, then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the detention on that ground. 15. The next submission of Mrs. Ansari was that there was gross delay in effecting the service of detention order and she referred to the various periods as seen from the return filed by the Detaining Authority with respect to the date of the issuance of the order and the actions taken thereafter. She submitted that if the detenu was not traceable, an application could have been made to cancel his bail. But in the instance case, it is to be noted that the proposed detenu was not on bail on any condition as such. He was released on bail on giving a personal bond. In the instant case, therefore, an application was made under section 7(1)(a) and (b) COFEPOSA. As far as this aspect is concerned, Mrs. Ansari referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of (P.U. Iqbal v. Union of India)16, reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1900, in which case also there was almost a delay of 9 months in making a request to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to take an action under section 7(1)(a) of COFEPOSA. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, the Court held that the circumstances of the case indicate that after passing the order of detention, the Detaining Authority was indifferent in securing the detenu by not taking proper action. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, the Court held that the circumstances of the case indicate that after passing the order of detention, the Detaining Authority was indifferent in securing the detenu by not taking proper action. At the end of paragraph 18, the Court observed that the question whether the delay was unreasonable and unexplained depended on the facts and circumstances of each case. As far as the present case is concerned, Mr. Mhaispurkar pointed out that the address of the proposed detenu, as available to the Detaining Authority, was that of Delhi. The order of detention could not be executed by the Commissioner of Police. Delhi as informed by him on 21st February, 2002 since the detenu was not available. The authorities in Mumbai therefore waited to give some time to the Police Commissioner at Delhi. Then wireless message was sent to the Commissioner on 16th May, 2002 and since the detenu could not be traced, the action under section 7(1)(a) and (b) of COFEPOSA was initiated on 11th June, 2002. The order under section 7(1)(b) was issued on 18th June, 2002 and the intimation was given to the Magistrate in Delhi under section 7(1)(a) on 23rd June, 2002. Mr. Mhaispurkar therefore submitted that looking to these dates, it could not be said that there was delay in taking necessary steps under section 7(1)(a) and (b) of COFEPOSA. 16. The next judgment relied upon by Mrs. Ansari was in the case of (SMF Sultan Abdul Kader v. Joint Secretary to Government of India)17, reported in 1998(8) S.C.C. 343 . Here also the order of detention was passed on 14th March, 1996, but the person concerned was detained nearly after one year and 4 months thereafter on 7th August, 1997. In the facts of that case, the Court noted that the Joint Secretary had not explained the efforts to apprehend the petitioner. It is therefore in the facts of the case, the Court held that there was gross delay which was unexplained. Thereafter the reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of (P.M. Hari Kumar v. Union of India)18, reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 70, where also when the accused could not be traced, the proclamation under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was expected to be published and which was not resorted to. Thereafter the reliance was placed on the judgment in the case of (P.M. Hari Kumar v. Union of India)18, reported in A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 70, where also when the accused could not be traced, the proclamation under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was expected to be published and which was not resorted to. As noted above, in the facts of the present case, the Detaining Authority resorted to section 7(1)(a) and (b) of COFEPOSA as noted earlier. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the notification under section 7(1)(b) was not printed in the Government Gazette. However we are not very much concerned with the effect of non-publication. We are concerned with the fact that as far as the Detaining Authority is concerned, whether it has initiated the necessary steps within reasonable time. With respect to the delay in getting the accused arrested, Mr. Mhaispurkar relied upon the judgment in the case of (Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu)19, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 541, wherein the Apex Court has observed that where the proposed detenu himself is absconding, the authorities cannot be blamed. In paragraph 6 of the judgment, the Court noted that where the delay was found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the link not snapped but strengthened. In that matter, the proposed detenu was absconding for over 4 years and the Court held that he cannot take advantage of that kind of situation. In the present case, the Detaining Authority has taken the necessary steps by issuing the proclamation. The detenu was not available for almost about 6 months until he himself surrendered. It is submitted by Mr. Mhaispurkar that the detenu cannot take advantage of his own absence. The approach of the Apex Court in Bhawarlal's case is approved in a subsequent judgment in the case of (Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana)20, reported in 1994(6) S.C.C. 14 . In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court has referred to the judgment in Bhawarlal's case (supra) with approval and held that where the detenu himself had delayed the detention, the detention order could not be vitiated. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court has referred to the judgment in Bhawarlal's case (supra) with approval and held that where the detenu himself had delayed the detention, the detention order could not be vitiated. We find the same approach reflected in the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of (Union of India v. Arvind Shergill)21, reported in A.I.R. 2000 S.C.W. 3258 and the judgment in the case of (Sitthi Zuraina Begum v. Union of India)22, reported in A.I.R. 2002 S.C.W. 4807. In paragraph 9 of the judgment in the case of Zuraina Begum, the Court noted that the detenu's passport disclosed that he had made several trips abroad when he was not a man of such affluence as to make so business activities. The Court observed: "Therefore, considering the number of trips he had made out of the country, the volume of goods seized now and the prima facie misdeclaration of value, an inference can be drawn that the detenu was a part of bigger network in bringing the goods for commercial distribution inside the country by avoiding the payment of duty." Mr. Mhaispurkar submitted that in the facts of the present case also, all these yard sticks squarely apply. It is the potentiality of the person concerned and his likelihood of indulging into such activities hereafter is to be inferred on the background of his past conduct. 17. Mrs. Ansari then made some other submissions such as that metal detected was not sent for its examination to ascertain as to whether it was gold. It is to be noted that in his own statement under section 108 of the Customs Act, the detenu has accepted it to be mercury quoted gold. It was also tried to be submitted that the particular items were not in the baggage of the accused concerned. However, the record from the Airport is to the contrary. 18. Having considered all these rival submissions from both the parties, as pointed out earlier, it is not possible to accept that the detenu was not furnished the relevant document as claimed, namely the order passed on the application for cancellation of bail. Similarly the submission that the non-legible documents supplied affected the right of representation also cannot be accepted. None of those documents can be said to have bearing on the order of detention as discussed earlier. Similarly the submission that the non-legible documents supplied affected the right of representation also cannot be accepted. None of those documents can be said to have bearing on the order of detention as discussed earlier. On the question of delay in issuance of the detention order, in our view, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rajendrakumar (supra) and explained in Abdul Salam's case (supra) is quite clear and on the matters of COFEPOSA although the liberty of the individual is undoubtedly important, the Court has to keep in mind the purpose of the Act. One has to see on that background as to whether there is any delay in issuing the detention order and, in the facts of the present case, in our view, there is satisfactory explanation given by the Detaining Authority for the time taken for issuance of the detention order. Similarly as far as the service aspect is concerned, in our view, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Bhawarlal's case holds the field and in the facts of the present case, it has been explained that the detenu could not be traced by the executing authority in Delhi and thereafter the proclamation was issued under section 7(1)(a) and (b) of COFEPOSA. Thereafter it is the detenu himself who has surrendered some 6 months thereafter, who could not be traced in the meanwhile. That itself cannot lead to an inference that there was no warrant for executing the detention order and that live-link was in any manner snapped. 19. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the challenge raised in the present petition. Petition is therefore dismissed. Rule discharged. 20. Mrs. Ansari makes a request that since the detenu is from Delhi, he may be transferred to a jail in Delhi. If an application is made on behalf of the detenu, we expect that the State Government will consider it sympathetically. 21. Authenticated copy of this order be made available to the parties. 22. Certified copy expedited. Petition dismissed. -----