B. S. A. SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) LETTERS Patent Apeal Nos. 184 of 2002 and 185 Of 2002 are filed against the common order of the learned Single Judge dated 11-9-2002 in C. C. No. 493 of 2001 and c. CNo. 1211 of 2001, where under a finding was recorded that the respondents- government has wilfully and deliberately violated the common order passed by this court in W. P. Nos. 6511 and 6513 of 1999 dated 11-8-1999. The respondent in c. C No. 185 of 2002 (sic. 1211 of 2001) filed a wrong sworn affidavit in W. P. No. 6513 of 1999 for which he is liable for perjury apart from other consequences. But the learned judge has taken a lenient view on the contemnor, since he was retiring from service by the end of that month, further in view of an unconditional apology offered by him, therefore passed the following order:-"taking into consideration that the respondent is at the fag end of his service and that he is retiring from service by the end of this month, I am inclined to take a lenient view of the matter and not to initiate further proceedings against him for the perjury. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that it is now found that the land has been resumed by virtue of the proceedings of the then Deputy collector, it is not necessary that the petitioners shall be entitled only for the land which was actually excavated. The fact that the petitioners were not allowed to enjoy the land and the land was resumed in the year 1998 they are entitled for compensation as per the guidelines contained in g. O. Ms. No. 1307, dated 23-12-1993. Accordingly, the contempt cases are disposed of directing the respondent to work out the ex gratia which is payable to the petitioners to the extent of Ac. 24. 82cts. of land and arrange to pay the same to them or their legal heirs within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. " ( 2 ) THE factual background of these cases is that the petitioners filed W. P. No. 65ll of 1999 and W. P. No. 6513 of 1999 questioning the action of the respondents in resuming the assigned lands through impugned proceedings in Re. " ( 2 ) THE factual background of these cases is that the petitioners filed W. P. No. 65ll of 1999 and W. P. No. 6513 of 1999 questioning the action of the respondents in resuming the assigned lands through impugned proceedings in Re. No. E. 235/95, dated 18-10-1998 for excavation of Srisailam right bank canal without paying ex gratia to which they are entitled to as per G. O. Ms. No. 1307, dated 23-12-1993. There writpetitioners were disposed of along with another writ petition by order dated 11-8-1999. The order reads as follows:"under these circumstances, the writ petitions are disposed of with a direction that the petitioners shall file a detailed representation to the respondents giving the extents of land assigned to them and the date of resumption of land or dispossession from the respective lands and other details as may be required by the authorities within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. On such representation, the respondents shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders keeping in view the directions of the Government in g. O. Ms. No. 1307 dated 23-12-1993 within aperiod of six weeks thereafter. " ( 3 ) SINCE the above orders were not complied with by the authorities concerned, c. C. No. 493of 2001 and C. C. No. 1211 of 2001 were filed. One Ganpathi Rao, Special Deputy collector, L. A. O. S. R. B. C. Nandyal, Kurnool district filed a counter stating that Mr. M. A. Basil, Special Deputy Collector, L. A. who signed the notices for resumption of assigned lands etc. never worked as L. A. O. S. R. B. C and his signatures on the memo dated 18-10-1998 was fabricated and were forged. As such the alleged resumption of the lands belonging to the petitioners is absolutely false and they never resumed the lands of the petitioners. ( 4 ) NEXTLY it was found on verification that an extent of Ac. 1-03 cents was subject to excavation of soil and the entire land was barren. The learned Judge having considered the pleas has given notice to Mr. Basil who retired from service. In his affidavit he stated that he was full in-charge of the additional charge of the post from 2-9-1998 to 31-10-1998 under the proceedings in rc. No. A4/485/95, dated 2-9-1998 of the special Collector, Srisailam Project. The learned Judge having considered the pleas has given notice to Mr. Basil who retired from service. In his affidavit he stated that he was full in-charge of the additional charge of the post from 2-9-1998 to 31-10-1998 under the proceedings in rc. No. A4/485/95, dated 2-9-1998 of the special Collector, Srisailam Project. He has taken charge from K. Harnath, who went on long leave and during the said period the land was resumed and necessary proceedings were issued. Thereafter, Sri Ganapathi Rao filed an additional affidavit pleading for the mercy of the Court for swearing false affidavit. But at the same time he tried to submit that the entire extent of Ac. 24. 82 cents was not resumed but only excavation was done in Ac. 2. 40 cents of land and therefore, the petitioners are not entitled for any ex-gratia. The learned Judge having considered the case of respective parties held that Mr. Basil, the then Depuly Collector issued proceedings on 18-10-1998 resuming ac. 24-82 cenls of land by virlue of the powers conferred on him, since the lands were assigned. In the said proceedings it also mentioned that assignees and their legal heirs are entitled to 30% compensation towards ex-gratia. The learned Judge further observed that when once the assignees are thrown out from the land assigned to them il is not proper for the respondents to conlend in a calculated move that they excavaled only in ac. 2-82 (sic. 2-40) cents of land. In the circumstances, having clearly recorded a finding that the Officer concerned swore to a false affidavil as contended above, passed the above order directing the respondents to pay compensation for the entire extent of ac. 24. 82 cents of land that was resumed as per the guidelines contained in g. O. Ms. No. 1307, dated 23-12-1993. Questioning the said order, the present LP As are filed. ( 5 ) THE learned advocate General appearing for the Land Acquisition Officer strongly contended:1. that the Courts while exercising the jurisdiction under contempt of courts Act cannot give any direction. The Court jurisdiction is to satisfy itself whether the Contemnor violated the orders wilfully whether he is to be punished for contempt or not? After discharging the contemnor the charge for whatever reason, the Court is not empowered to pass any other order in the contempt case. 2. The Court jurisdiction is to satisfy itself whether the Contemnor violated the orders wilfully whether he is to be punished for contempt or not? After discharging the contemnor the charge for whatever reason, the Court is not empowered to pass any other order in the contempt case. 2. Whether contempt case is barred by limitation or within the time? 3. Even on merits the learned Judge erred in directing payment of exgratia for the whole extent of ac. 24-82 cents of land without a full and comprehensive enquiry while exercising contempt jurisdiction; and 4. As per the latest full the bench decision no compensation need be paid for the assigned lands in the event of their resumption letters Patent Appeal Nos. 33 and 34 of 2003: ( 6 ) L. P. A. NO. 33 of 2003 was filed by the commissioner, Tuni Municipality, Tuni, l. P. A. No. 34 of 2003 was filed by five individuals clamingto be the highest bidders and purchasers in the auction held for shops by the Municipality, questioning the modified orders passed by the Court in c. C. No. 456 of 2003 dated 29-4-2003 LP A was filed by the Municipality contending that it is beyond the scope of order passed in w. P. M. No. 4116of2002andw. V. M. P. No. 809 of 2003 in W. P. No. 3346 of 2002. ( 7 ) THE factual background of this case is that Tin Makers Co-operative Society, Tuni, hereinafter called as the Society for brevity, represented by its Secretary contended that the members of the Society are eking out their livelihood by making tin vessels etc, with old tin material in the market area in a small place covering it with umbrella or plastic hut opposite to Sai Baba temple, Tuni subject to weather conditions. Hence the members of the said Co-operative Society are making repeated representations to the government and municipality from time to time seeking their assistance to have a permanent shelter. The Municipality in its resolution No. 637 dated 24-3-1983 resolved to construct 24 shops to rehabilitate tin makers. Hence the members of the said Co-operative Society are making repeated representations to the government and municipality from time to time seeking their assistance to have a permanent shelter. The Municipality in its resolution No. 637 dated 24-3-1983 resolved to construct 24 shops to rehabilitate tin makers. But in the year 2001 the Municipality seemed to have proposed to construct 82 shop rooms, 41 in ground floor and 41 in first floor with the financial assistance of the government of India under integrated development of small and medium towns scheme at a cost of 17 lakhs and with a view to auction the shop rooms by way of good will non-refundable amount fixing normal rent to improve the financial position of the municipality for providing civil amenities to the tax payers. After construction of shops the Commissioner issued notification in eenadu dated 8-2-2002 to auction the shops on good will basis. The Society filed the Writ petition No. 3346 of 2002 and sought for a direction against the Commissioner of municipality, Tuni, not to auction the shop numbers 136 to 163 in Block-A at Chakkala market. The Court having initially granted ex parte stay by order dated 21-2-2002 in wpmp No. 4116 of 2002 and WVMP No. 809 of 2002 on a vacate stay petition filed by the municipality, this Court passed on order on 21-10-2002, which is as hereunder:"heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The question as to whether the petitioners are liable to deposit the amount of goodwill needs to be decided only at the time of disposal of the writ petition. However, with a view to protect the interests of the petitioners as well as the respondents it is directed that: (a) the auction of good will proposed by the respondent may go on; (b) such of the petitioners/member of the Society who were in possession of the land or structures upon which the present complex is construted shall be entitled to be inducted into possession of the respective shops on their depositing half of the goodwill fetched in the auction; (c) The petitioners so inducted shall be liable to pay the amount, which is uniformly fixed for all the shops. (d) In the event of petitioners being held not liable to deposit the good, will the amounts, which will be deposited by those pursuance to the order of this Court shall be adjusted in their furture rents. (e) The interim order granted by this court in w. P. M. P. No. 4116 of 2002 shall stand modified to the extent indicated above. " the writ appeal filed by the Society aggrieved by the said orders was dismissed on 3-4-2003- Subsequent to the orders of the learned Judge on the vacate stay petition the commissioner seemed to have issued a fresh notification on 4-4-2003 and conducted auction. At this stage the Society seemed to have offered to pay 50% of the good will to the Municipality, which was fetched in the auction as per the orders of this Court. But the Municipality without considering the representations of the members of the Co- operative Society confirmed the auction of favour of the auction bidders and possession of the mulgies was delivered to them. Hence the Society filed CC. No. 456 of 2003 of punish the contemnor for not implementing the orders of this Court dated 23-10-2002 as modified with several other prayers. The society alleged that such action on the part of the Municipal Commissioner is in violation of the orders of this Court passed in WPMP 4116 of 2002 in WVMP No. 813 of 2002 dated 21-10-2002. While giving notice on the contempt case the learned single Judge passed the order in 15-4-2003 as hereunder:"it is further ordered that pending further orders, there shall be interim direction to the Respondent No. l not to induct any person including the auction bidders in the shops bearing No. 136 to 163 in Block A at Chekkala Market, opp. Sai Baba Temple, Tuni. "when counters were filed, the learned Single judge after hearing both sides on 29-4-2003 passed the following order in C. C. No. 456 of 2003:"after hearing the learned counsel for both parties, the order of this Court dated 15-4-2003 is modified to the effect that it shall be open to the respondents to allot the shops to the members of the petitioner association half in the first floor and half of the ground floor on payment of 50% of the goodwill which is fetched in the auction. "aggrieved by these orders, the commissioner of Municipality, Tuni filed lpa No. 33 of 2003 along with c. M. P. No. 13923 of 2003 which was filed to condone the delay of 30 days in filing LPA no. 33 of 2003 and the Division Bench of this court condoned the delay by order dated 26-6-2003 and another C. M. P. No. 13924 of 2003 which was filed for grant of interim suspension of the order dated 29-4-2003. On. 26-6-2003 the Division Bench passed the following order:"pending admission, interim suspension of the order dated 29-4-2003 in CC. No. 456 of 2003. Post after ten days. "whereas the third parties filed LPA No. 34 of 2003 along with C. M. P. No. 14067 of 2003 seeking permission of the Court of condone the delay of 14 days of filing the LPA against the order in CC No. 456 of 2003. They also filed another CMP to direct the Municipality to deliver possession of the shops as per the termsand conditions of auction. The Division bench in C. M. P. No. 14068 of 2003 in LPA no. 34 of 2003 suspended the order of the learned Single Judge on 26-6-2003. "interim suspension of the order dated 29-4-2003. "further, the Division Bench in c. M. P. No. 14067 of 2003 passed the following order on 26-6-2003 which runs as follows:-"there is a delay of fourteen days in filing the appeal. Learned Counsel for respondents vehemently opposes the application on the ground that the delay has not been satisfactorily explained. We have heard the learned counsel for both sides. For the reasons stated in the affidavit, we are inclined toaccept the explanation offered by the petitioners. Accordingly we condone the delay. "it is interesting to note that this L. P. A. was filed by the third parties who filed C. A. No. 488 of 2002 in C. C. No. 456 of 2003 seeking leave of the Court to permit them to come on record as respondents claiming that they are the highest bidders in the public auction even before the Court passed any order on their implead petition. ( 8 ) IN these two contempt cases the issues that arise for consideration are: (1) Whether the Court is empowered to pass any orders in contempt proceedings and whether LPA is maintainable against those orders. ( 8 ) IN these two contempt cases the issues that arise for consideration are: (1) Whether the Court is empowered to pass any orders in contempt proceedings and whether LPA is maintainable against those orders. (2) Whether the private parties who want to implead themselves can file lpa, though no orders were passed on their implead petitions. (3) Whether L. P. A. is maintainable after 1-7-2002 the date on which Section 100-A CPC came into force? ( 9 ) NEXTLY when contempt cases are being filed before the learned single Judges, whose orders confirmed by the Division Benches, for not complying those orders the learned advocate General was always contending that the contempt cases are not maintainable before single Judges since the order of the learned single Judges merged in the orders of the Division Benches and if any contempt case has to be filed, it has to be filed before a division Bench but not before the Single judges. It is also common knowledge that in cases where single Judge directs appearance of Government Officers before the Court in any contempt case, LPAs are being filed and contempt proceedings are being stayed before the learned single Judge. ( 10 ) IN one word the learned Advocate general is protecting the interests of the government Officers under his broad shoulders by raising various tenable and untenable contentions, which we never heard either in the law College or during our association with this institution of considerable length of time. At times we doubt whether we know the elementary principles of law or not in the light of the contentions raised by the Advocate General, which was found favour with some of our brother Judges. The net result is that some of the bureaucrats neither have any respect for the Courts nor Courts nor having fear of the consequences that will flow if the orders of the competent Courts are violated. It is common knowledge that very rarely the orders of the single Judge directing regularisation of temporary employees after being confirmed by Division Bench are not being implemented and the Court became a silent spectator in these matters. With the result about 70,000/- temporary employees working in various public sector undertakings for over three decades are spending sleepless nights without knowing their fate in spite of the orders that are being passed by the High Court. With the result about 70,000/- temporary employees working in various public sector undertakings for over three decades are spending sleepless nights without knowing their fate in spite of the orders that are being passed by the High Court. Likewise, the owners of the lands that were acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act decades back could not get the legitimate compensation due to them even after finalisation of the land acquisition proceedings and they are going round the courts, with a fond hope that the Courts will come to their rescue. Their hopes are being shattered since they are not in a position to know whether they will get the compensation due to them at all. ( 11 ) FURTHER, we have also noticed that diametrically opposite views were expressed by the Courts on some of the issues that have arisen for consideration in these cases. Hence we requested the learned Advocate General to address arguments on his oft-repeated, contentions for which the learned Advocate general rightly agreed and advanced arguments. ( 12 ) WE formula ted the issues as hereunder for consideration. (1) Whether a single Judge is having jurisdiction to entertain a contempt case for flouting the orders passed by him after the same was confirmed or modified by an order of the division Bench of whether the contempt Case has to be filed before a Division Bench? (2) Whether the Court is competent to pass any other orders in the interest of justice and fair play instead of convicting the Officer for flouting the orders of this Court? (3) Against what orders L. P. A. is maintainable? (4) Whether L. P. A. lies against a notice directing the appearance of the respondent issued by a learned single Judge? (5) Whether the Judgment of the Full bench in Gandta Punnala Bhulakshmi v. Managing Director, A. P. S. R. T. C. 2003 (4) ALD 216 = 2003 (4) ALT 216 is a good law? role of Judiciary in a Civilised Society. ( 13 ) BEFORE going into the merits of the case, we would like to examine the role of judiciary in any form of Government. ( 14 ) THE maxim "salus populi supreme lex". (i. e) welfare of the people is the supreme law" adequately enunciates the idea of law. role of Judiciary in a Civilised Society. ( 13 ) BEFORE going into the merits of the case, we would like to examine the role of judiciary in any form of Government. ( 14 ) THE maxim "salus populi supreme lex". (i. e) welfare of the people is the supreme law" adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially, without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained. ( 15 ) IN Municipal Board, Pratabgarh v. Mahendra Singh Chawla, the Supreme Court observed, "laws cannot be interpreted and enforced divorced from their effect on human beings of whom the laws are meant. Undoubtedly, rule of law must prevail but as is often said, rule of law must run akin to rule of life. And life of law is not logic. " ( 16 ) IN Halbury and Martin s Modern Equity (14th Edn. , 1993) by Jill E. Martin, at p. 3 it is stated, on the "general Principles of Equity" that equity is a word with many meanings. In a wide sense, it means that which is fair and just, moral and ethical; but its legal meaning is much narrower". "developed system of law has ever been assisted by the introduction of a discretionary power to do justice in particular cases where the strict rules of law cause hardship. Rules formulated to deal with particular situations may subsequently work unfairly as society develops. Equity is the body of rules which evolved to mitigate the severity of the rules of the common law. " ( 17 ) FROM this it is seen that rules formulated at a particular point of time may subsequently work unfairly as the society develops and a duty cast on the Court to do justice by invoking equity jurisdiction by introducing discretionary power to do justice in particular case when strict rules of law cause hardship. ( 18 ) A Court of equity must so act, within the permissible limits so as to prevent injustice. "equity is not past the age of child- bearing" and an effort to do justice between the parties is a compulsion of judicial conscience. ( 18 ) A Court of equity must so act, within the permissible limits so as to prevent injustice. "equity is not past the age of child- bearing" and an effort to do justice between the parties is a compulsion of judicial conscience. Courts can and should strive to evolve an appropriate remedy, in the facts and circumstances of a given case, so as to further the cause of justice, within the available range and forging new tools for the said purpose, if necessary to chisel hard edges of the law (vide C. Chenga Reddy v. State of a. P.) ( 19 ) JUSTICEV. Bose in his dissent judgment in K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India extracted the observation of Lord Denning in his book"the Changing Law". Lord Denning has cited instance after instance to show how this has come about and how it is still in the process of formation, flexible and fluid with the drive behind to do real justice between man and man, and man and the State, rather, than to continue to apply a set of ancient hide-bound technicalities forged and fashioned in a wholly different world with a different conscience and very different evaluations of human dignity and human rights. At pp. 54 and 55 Lord Denning sums up this new orientation in legal thinking thus "coming to those decisions, the Courts expressly applied a doctrine of equity which says a Court of equity will not allow a person to enforce his strict legal rights when it would be inequitable to allow him to do so. This doctrine warrants the proposition that the Courts will not allow a person to go back on a promise which was intended to be binding, intended to be acted, on and has in fact been acted on. " ( 20 ) HIS Lordship then concluded as "lam not advocating sudden and wild departure from doctrines and precedents that have been finally settled but I do contend that we, the highest Court in the land giving final form and shape to laws of this country, should administer them with the same breadth of vision and understanding of the needs of the times as do the Courts in England. The underlying principles of justice have not changed but the complex pattern of life that is never static requires a fresher outlook and timely and vigorous moulding of principles to suit new conditions and ideas and ideals. It is true that the courts do not legislate but it is not true that they do not mould and make the law in their processes of interpretation. " ( 21 ) IN Roshanlal Nuthiala v. R. R. Mohan singh Oberai while considering the role of a judge in equitable jurisdiction the Apex Court extracted a passage from Current Legal problems, 1952 Vol. 5 Stevens and Sons Ltd. , london P. I. "a new days may bring the people into new ways of life and give them new outlooks; and with these changes there may come a need for new rules of law. But legislation lags. Here steps in equity for the role of judge, is to develop the law and adapt it to the needs of the members of his society. . . . . . . . . . . . . Equity is not penalty but justice and even where neither party, as here, is at fault, equitable considerations may shape the remedy. " the learned Judge concluded in para 35:"in short, our equitable jurisdiction is not hidebound by tradition and blinkered by precedent, though trammeled by judicially approved rules of conscience. . . . . . . . . . " ( 22 ) IN Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer speaking for the Bench while rejecting the contention of the counsel for the appellant that the High Court ought not to have taken cognizance of subsequent events, disastrous as they proved to be - held that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the Us has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. ( 23 ) THE Constitution Review Commission while expressing satisfaction over the functioning of the higher judiciary in the country for the last 50 years observed that there are some exceptions too and in the recent years more such exceptions are coming to light. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is these few persons whose conduct calls for disciplinary system so as to preserve the fair name of the judiciary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "in such a situation, it would be unreasonable to be astonished if affected parties, be they private litigants or public bodies raising eye brows and even voicing muted suspicion on judicial motives. . . . . . . . . It is well to remember that judiciary ceases to be an effective instrument if its image and reputation for integrity and independence suffers. There cannot be a greater disaster to our polity than this. A few among the Judges have conveniently forgot the qualities required of a Judge. ( 24 ) JUSTICE Devinder Gupta, Honourable chief Justice A. P. in his Independence Day speech on 15th August, 2003 while lamenting on the decline the erosion of values of general standards in the society opined that materialistic thinking has brought in dishonesty and corruption. ( 25 ) THE learned Advocate General while speaking on the occasion observed that the entire constitutional edifice revolves round the welfare of the common man and since every one of us has forgotten the fundamental duties enshrined in Article 51-A of the constitution, the country is passing through a critical faze. ( 26 ) WE referred to the above decisions and opinions of the persons holding high offices in the country to emphasize that the paramount consideration of the Courts in administering justice is welfare of the people, which is supreme law and the Courts, in india are not only Courts of Law, but Courts of Equity also. ( 26 ) WE referred to the above decisions and opinions of the persons holding high offices in the country to emphasize that the paramount consideration of the Courts in administering justice is welfare of the people, which is supreme law and the Courts, in india are not only Courts of Law, but Courts of Equity also. Even if the rules framed at a particular point of time become otiose and come in the way to render justice, the Courts in exercise of the equity jurisdiction should render substantial justice to the needy. Further the law cannot be static and Courts are bound to have fresh outlook and should mould the old principles to suit new conditions, ideas and ideals and the role of judge is to develop the law and adapt it to the needs of the members of the society at that given point of time. To put it aptly, the law courts are expected to render justice taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing at the relevant point of time and protect the citizen from the unlawful and arbitrary actions of the other two wings of democracy. On the contrary, If the Court turns to be a friend of Executive then the democracy and Rule of law comes to an end. After 55 years of Independence, we find justification in the words of Krishnayyar, J. that the Courts in India are rendering class justice than real justice. With the result the common man who is feeling suffocated with the arbitrary and capricious actions of the other two wings of Democracy cannot be seen anywhere near the precincts of the Court. The functioning of the Courts made the ruling class to think that "king can do no wrong". Whatever he does, whatever he speaks is lawto-day. With these few introductory observations on the role of Judiciary in a developing Society, we proceed to examine the evolution of contempt jurisdiction. Whether An L. P. A. Maintainable on an order Passed in a Contempt case after 1-7-2002. ( 27 ) BEFORE we go to merits of the case, we would like to advert to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Prabhakar appearing for the respondents in C. A. Nos. 33 and 34 of 2003 that Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable after the newly introduced section 100-A CPC came into force from 1-7-2002. ( 27 ) BEFORE we go to merits of the case, we would like to advert to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Prabhakar appearing for the respondents in C. A. Nos. 33 and 34 of 2003 that Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable after the newly introduced section 100-A CPC came into force from 1-7-2002. On the other hand the learned advocate General submits that when the high Court exercises appellate jurisdiction further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters patent Act is prohibited under Section 100-A of CPC and the section has no application for an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction. Since the order passedby a single Judge under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act being an original order, L. P. A, is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act. We agree with the contention of the learned Advocate general and hold that Section 100-A of CPC will not come in the way of an aggrieved party to file an appeal under Clause 15 of letter Patent Act. But as the judgment on which the counsel placed reliance runs counter to the judgment of the Supreme court, we would like to clear the confusion created by this judgment. ( 28 ) IN support of his contention mr. Prabhakar placed reliance on a Fullbench judgment of this Court in Gandla Pannala bhulaxmi v. Managing Director A. P. S. R. T. C. Musheerabad it is true that a Full Bench interpreted the expression "notwithstanding any thing contained in any Letters Patent for any high Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in any other law for the time being in force" we hold that it takes into its ambit of the legislations including the special enactments where a right of appeal may have been provided against the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge to a division Bench. Their Lordships further observed that what is prohibited is preferring of a further appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment and decree of a single Judge not only under the Letters Patent for any high Court, but also under any special enactments even if an appeal is provided in such special enactments. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment reads as follows:-"8. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the said judgment reads as follows:-"8. It is true that no amendments as such are made to the Letters Patent. The letters Patent remains intact. Burt what is prohibited is further appeal notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law. 9. In our considered opinion, the provisions contained in Section 100-A of the Code are equally applicable to the proceedings arising under the special enactments also since section 100-A of the Code specifically prohibits further appeal against the judgment and decree or order made by a learned Single Judge of a High Court. The language employed in Section 100- a of the Code is simple, clear and free from any vagueness. " ( 29 ) HAVING observed that Section 100-A cpc prohibited from filing further appeal against the judgment and decree or order of a single Judge to Division Bench not withstanding anything contained in Letters patent falling for consideration in that case their Lordships concluded their judgment in paragraphs 14,15,16, and 17 which run as hereunder:"14. We have already noticed that the newly incorporated Section 100-A of the Code in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of learned singlejudgetoadivision Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides further appeal to a division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law -beitagainst an original or appellate decree or order heard and decided by a single Judge. 15. In the case on hand, the Motor Vehicles, act itself does not provide for any further, appeal against the decree or order passed by a learned single Judge, to a Division Bench. 16. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the right of appeal available under the letters Patent is taken away by Section 100- a of the Code even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law. 17. The reference is answered accordingly. 16. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the right of appeal available under the letters Patent is taken away by Section 100- a of the Code even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law. 17. The reference is answered accordingly. " ( 30 ) HAVING observed that the judgment in shamdadevi v. State of Bihar wherein the Apex court held that right of appeal under Letters pa tent Act cannot be restricted in the absence of such a provision in the statute itself was prior to the introduction of 100-A CPC. In other words the Full Bench is of the opinion that in the light of the embargo contained in section 100-A of CPC. even Letters Patent appeal under the provisions of Special enactment like Motor Vehicles Act is not maintainable with effect from 1-7-2002, the day on which that section came into force. But this Court rendered this judgment without noticing the Full Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in Subal Paul v. Malina paul, wherein their Lordships in the Supreme court entertained a short question that fell for consideration in that appeal is as to whether Letters Patent Appeal would He against the judgment of the learned single judge of the High Court filed under section 299 of the Indian Succession act, 1925. Their Lordships observed that section 104 (1) CPC specified the orders that are filing of appeal against an order in appeal under that section. Under this clause, no appeal shall lie against the order passed in appeal to mean that when a Learned Single judge passed an order exercising appellate jurisdiction no further appeal is maintainable in exercise of powers under Letters Patent act. Nextly they stated that Section 299 thereof provides for an appeal to the High court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In para 15 of the Judgment their Lordships considered whether Section 104 of the Code of Civil procedure is attracted to the appellate proceedings under the Indian Succession Act. Nextly they stated that Section 299 thereof provides for an appeal to the High court in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In para 15 of the Judgment their Lordships considered whether Section 104 of the Code of Civil procedure is attracted to the appellate proceedings under the Indian Succession Act. In paragraph 18 their Lordships having observed that had the intention of the legislature been that an appeal under section 299 of the Indian Succession Act if governed by the provisions of the Code of civil Procedure, the Legislature could have used the language as has been done in section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act providing that all decrees and orders passed under the Act may be appealed from under any law for the time being in force. In paragraphs 19,20 21 and 22 their Lordships held as follows:-"19. It is one thing to say that as no decree is prepared, the procedural provisions for preferring an appeal as reguired under Order 41 Rule 11 of the code of Civil Procedure shall not be applicable and, thus, a copy of the decree is not required to be annexed with the memorandum of appeal but it is another thing to say that a right of appeal is provided under Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself. Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifies matters, which would be appealable and no other. Under the Code of Civil procedure appeals from orders are provided for in Section 104 land order 43, Rule 1 thereof. the said provisions contain a full list of appealable orders. It does not contemplate orders or decree passed under a special statue. 20. By reason of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure the bar of appeal under a special statute is saved. A plain rending of Section 104 of the Code of civil Procedure would show that an appeal shall be from an appealable order an no other order save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this code of or by any law for the time being in force. Section 104 of the Code merely recognises appeals provided under special statute. It does not create a right of appeal as such. It does not, therefore, bar any further appeal also. Section 104 of the Code merely recognises appeals provided under special statute. It does not create a right of appeal as such. It does not, therefore, bar any further appeal also. If the same is provided for under any other Act, for the time being in force. Whenever the statute provides such a bar, it is so expressly stated, as would appear from section 100-A of the Code of Civil procedure. 21. If a right of appeal is provided for under the Act, the limitation thereof must also be provided therein. A right of appeal which is provided under the letters Patent cannot be said to be restricted Limitation of a right of appeal in absence of any provision in a statute cannot be readily inferred. It is now well settled that the appellate jurisdiction of a superior Court is not taken as excluded simply because subordinate Court exercises its special jurisdiction. In G. P. Singh s principles of statutory interpretation it is stated as follows;-" The appellate and revisional jurisdiction of superior Courts is not taken as excluded simply because the subordinate Court exercises a special jurisdiction. The reason is that when a special Act on matters governed by that act confers a jurisdiction to an established Court, as distinguished from a persona designata, without any words of limitation, then the ordinary incident of procedure of that court including any general right of appeal or revision against its decision is attracted. 22. But an exception to the aforementioned rule is on matters where the special Acts sets out a self- contained Code the applicability of the general law procedure would be impliedly excluded (See Upadhyaya hargovind Devshankar v. Direndmsinh virbhadrasinghji Solanki and others: AIR 1988 SC 915 : (1988) 2 SCR 1043 ). Their lordships in para 35 that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a litigant against any judgment passed under any Act unless the same is expressly excluded. Clause 15 may be subject may be subject to an Act but when it is not so subject to the special provision the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal from a judgment would be effective. It further held that the matter may be examined from another angle. Clause 15 may be subject may be subject to an Act but when it is not so subject to the special provision the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal from a judgment would be effective. It further held that the matter may be examined from another angle. Sub-section (2) of section 104 of the Code of Civil procedure provides that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this Section. This also shows that if appeal is provided for under any other law. Section 104 of the Code of civil Procedure would have no application. Their Lordships having that the Judgment in Shah Babulau khimji s case is not applicable to the facts of the case for the reason that the high Court passed an order in an application filed under Order 40 Rule cpc for appointment of a Receiver and for issue of injunction order under order 39 Rule 1 CPC in exercise of original jurisdiction held that the learned single Judge of the High Court while exercising appellate powers under Section 299 of the Indian succession Act was not exercising an appellate power provided under section 104 of the Code of Civil procedure. Their Lordships approved the decision of that Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar (2002) 3 Supreme Court cases 705. " ( 31 ) FROM this judgment it is very clear that unless the special enactment prohibits filing of an appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent act against the appellate order of a Single judge passed under that Act a further appeal under Section 15 of the Letters Patent Act is maintainable since the LPA is continuation of the proceedings in the High Court which is constituted under the Constitution. In coming to the above conclusion, their lordships approved the reasoning given by the Supreme Court in Sharada Devi s case (7 supra ). Though this judgment is earlier to the judgment of the Full Bench, the same was not brought to the notice of the Court. ( 32 ) IN the light of the above decision we hold that the judgment of the Full Bench decision in Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi s case (6th supra) is no more good law. Though this judgment is earlier to the judgment of the Full Bench, the same was not brought to the notice of the Court. ( 32 ) IN the light of the above decision we hold that the judgment of the Full Bench decision in Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi s case (6th supra) is no more good law. Inherent Powers of High Court Under article 215 of The Constitution vis-a-vis the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: ( 33 ) IN England Contempt of Court is considered as an offence against the Courts or persons to whom the judicial functions of the Crown were delegated. ( 34 ) ACCORDING to Oswald on "contempt of Court", it has been irreverently termed as a legal thumbscrew is so manifold in its aspects that it is difficult to lay down any exact definition of the offence. It is defined or described " to be disobedience to the Court, an opposing or a despising the authority, justice or dignity thereof. It commonly consists in a party s doing otherwise than he is enjoined to do, or not doing what he is commanded or required by the process, order, or decree of the Court. It is also well settled that a Court of justice without power to vindicate its own dignity, to enforce obedience to its mandates,, to protect its officers, or to shield those who are entrusted to its care, would be an anomaly, which could not be permitted to exist in any civilized community. Without such protection, Courts of Justice would soon lose their hold upon the public respect, and the maintenance of law and order would be rendered impossible. Hence it is that the summary power of punishing for contempt has been given to the Courts - "to keep a blaze of glory around them, and to deter people from attempting to render them contemptible in the eyes of the public". ( 35 ) THE law has armed the High Court of justice with the power and imposed on it, the duty of preventing brevi manu and by summary proceedings any attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. It is on thatground, and no ton any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individuals, that insults to Judges are not allowed. ( 35 ) THE law has armed the High Court of justice with the power and imposed on it, the duty of preventing brevi manu and by summary proceedings any attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. It is on thatground, and no ton any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individuals, that insults to Judges are not allowed. ( 36 ) THE power to punish for contempt has been vested in the Judges not for their personal protection only, but for that of the public, whose interest it is, that decency and decorum should be preserved in Courts of justice. ( 37 ) IN England while superior courts of record as well as common law courts exercising the powers of contempt and they are having power to attach and commit for acts amounting to contempt of their own proceedings as contempt of court without reference to the fact whether the acts alleged constitute an offence under the Indian Penal code or not. In India the Chartered High courts of judicature established under Letters patent Act, were exercising the power of contempt as courts of record. ( 38 ) IN Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya pradesh, Jabalpur referred the Judgment in re Abdool v. Mahtab (1867) 8 WR Cr 32 at page 33 wherein the position prevailing in england was referred to, Peacock, C. J. laid down the rule quite broadly in the following words: "there can be no doubt that every court of record has the power of summarily punishing for contempt. " ( 39 ) THE 1884 edition of Belchamber s practice of the Civil Court at page 241 it is observed that "every superior Court of record, whether in the United Kingdom or in the colonial possessions or dependencies of the Crown has inherent power to punish contempts, without its precincts, as well as in facie curiae. . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 40 ) IN Mcleod v. St. Aubyn, (1899) AC 549 (c) Lord Moriss in delivering the judgments of the Judicial Committee said that "the power summarily to commit for contempt is considered for the proper administration of justice," ( 41 ) IN the case of Snkhdev Singh Sodhi it has been observed that". . . . . . . . . Aubyn, (1899) AC 549 (c) Lord Moriss in delivering the judgments of the Judicial Committee said that "the power summarily to commit for contempt is considered for the proper administration of justice," ( 41 ) IN the case of Snkhdev Singh Sodhi it has been observed that". . . . . . . . . the power of a high Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all courts of record Section 1 (2) of the Code expressly excludes special jurisdiction from its scope. " ( 42 ) IN State of Bombay v. P. , the Bombay high Court held that "the jurisdiction which each Judge of the High Court possesses and uses as constituting a Court of Record is a jurisdiction which is inherent in the Court itself for punishment for contempt of Court, whether it is ex facie the Court or otherwise and that for the exercise of that jurisdiction it is not necessary to refer either to the Letters Patent or the Rules framed by the Court thereunder and that it is a jurisdiction which is being exercised in the same manner as was exercised in the Court of King s bench Division in England. ( 43 ) THE Constitution makers by incorporating Articles 129 and 215 reiterated the pre-existing inherent power vested in courts of Record not only to punish for contempt of themselves but also to pass any other equitable order to undo the injustice done to a citizen and to do real justice to the parties by exercising the equity jurisdiction vested in it. ( 44 ) THE contempt powers of Supreme court as well as High Courts under articles 129 and 215 were considered by the supreme Court. ( 45 ) IN T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Government of a. P. , the Apex Court held in para 9 as follows:"9. Articles 129 and 215 of the constitution of India declare the supreme Court and every High Court to be a Court of record having all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. These articles do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme court and the High Courts. Articles 129 and 215 of the constitution of India declare the supreme Court and every High Court to be a Court of record having all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. These articles do not confer any new jurisdiction or status on the Supreme court and the High Courts. They merely recognise a pre-existing situation that the Supreme Court and the High Courts are courts of record and by virtue of being courts of record have inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt of themselves. Such inherent power to punish, for contempt is summary. It is not governed or limited by any rules of procedure excepting the principles of natural justice. The jurisdiction contemplated by Articles 129 and 215 is inalienable. It cannot be taken away or whittled down by any legislative enactment subordinate to the constitution. The provisions of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of articles 129 and215oftheconstitution. The provisions of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971 cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of jurisdiction contemplated by the said two articles. " ( 46 ) IN Supreme Court Bar Assn v. Union of india, the Honourable Supreme Court again observed in para 10 of the Judgment as follows:"this Court held that courts of record enjoy power to punish for contempt as a part of their inherent jurisdiction; the existence and availability of such power being essential to enable and courts to administer justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner and to uphold the majesty of law and prevent interference in the due administration of justice (para 12 ). No act of Parliament can take away that inherent jurisdiction of the court of record to punish for contempt and parliament s power of legislation on the subject cannot be so exercised as to stultify the status and dignity of the supreme Court and/or the High Courts, though such a legislation may serve as a guide for their determination of the nature of punishment which a court of record may impose in the case of established contempt. The power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself vesting in the Supreme Court flows from Article 129 and 142 (2) of the constitution independent of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1941 (para 21 ). The power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself vesting in the Supreme Court flows from Article 129 and 142 (2) of the constitution independent of Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1941 (para 21 ). Section 12 of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971 provides for the punishment which shall ordinarily be imposed by the High Court in the case of an established contempt. This section does not deal with the powers of the supreme Court to try or punish a contemner in committing contempt of the Supreme Court or the courts subordinate to it (para 28, 29 and 37 ). Though the inherent power of the High court under Article 215 has not been impinged upon by the provisions of the contempt of Courts Act, the Act does provide for the nature and types of punishments which the High Court may award. The High Court cannot create or assume power to inflict a new type of punishment other than the one recognised and accepted by Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971" ( 47 ) FROM the these judgments, it is seen that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 can neither stultify nor abridge the powers of high Court, which is court of record and it is only in addition to the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 215 of the constitution. The Contempt of Court Act provides the nature of offences and the types of punishment, which the High Court may award in exercise of summary proceedings. ( 48 ) THEIR Lordships considered the words court of record in a case reported in In Re: vinay Chandra Mishra and held as follows: " 26. The English and the Indian authorities are based on the basic foundation of inherentpower of a Court of Record, having jurisdiction to correct thejudicialordersof subordinate courts. The King s Bench in England and High courts in India being superior Courts record and having judicial power to correct orders of subordinate courts enjoyed the inherent power to contempt to protect the subordinate courts. The supreme Court being a Court of Record under Article 129 and having power of judicial supervision over all the courts in the country, must possess and exercise similar jurisdiction and power as the High Court had prior to Contempt legislation in 1926. The supreme Court being a Court of Record under Article 129 and having power of judicial supervision over all the courts in the country, must possess and exercise similar jurisdiction and power as the High Court had prior to Contempt legislation in 1926. Inherent powers of a superior Court of Record have remained unaffected even after codification of Contempt Law. 39. The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not only the third pillar, but the central pillar of the democratic State. In a democracy like ours, where there is a written Constitution which is above all individuals and institution and where the power of judicial review is vested in the superior courts, the judiciary has a special and additional duty to perform, viz. , to oversee that all individuals and institutions including the executive and the legislature act within the framework of not only the law but also the fundamental law of the land. This duty is apart from the function of adjudicating the disputes between the parties which is essential to peaceful and orderly development of the society. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to, it, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise, the very cornerstone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it will disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. It is for this purpose that the courts are entrusted with the extraordinary power of punishing those who indulge in acts whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine their authority and bring them in disrepute and disrespect by scandalising them and obstructing them from discharging their duties without fear of favour. When the court exercises this power, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual judge who is personally attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty of the law and of the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection and disrespect of the authority of the court by creating distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets eroded. ( 49 ) IN Mohd. Imthiazuddin v. E. Bala Veera raghavaiah, a Division Bench of this Court held that the power of Court of Record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is not limited to imposing punishment upon the contemner but the main purpose of this power of the Court is to see the order of the court is given effect to. " ( 50 ) IN Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu olympic Association, Justice P. S. Mishra, as he then was speaking for the Full Bench observed as follows: 46. We can see thus clearly that the courts in India invariably accepted the law applied in England and found (1) a party to the suit if he had notice or knowledge of the order of the Court and (2) a third party or a stranger, if he had aided or abetted the violation with notice or knowledge of the order of injunction guilty civil contempt and otherwise found a third party guilty of criminal contempt if he has been found knowingly obstructing implementation of its order of direction, if it is found in the instant suit that Shri Shukla was directly or indirectly a party defendant in the suit and the order of the learned single Judge was directed to his conduct also he violated the order after notice or knowledge, he shall be guilty of civil contempt. He can still be found guilty of civil contempt if he is found to have aided and abetted the violation of the order of the Court, Even otherwise it is found that he obstructed or attempted to obstruct the implementation of the court s injunction/direction, he may be found guilty of criminal contempt provided he had the notice or the knowledge of the order of the Court. It will be only after a determination of the nature of the disobedience that it will be possible for the Court to say whether the procedure applied to a civil contempt shall be applied to a contempt proceeding in his case or the procedure applied to a criminal contempt will be applied to it. In the former case, the learned single Judge shall be competent to proceed. In the latter case, it shall be before Division Bench and subject to such conditions as are envisaged under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. We have however no hesitation, in view of the principles of law noticed by us that this Court's power as the Court of record will extend not only to the determination of the contempt but also the determination whether on the allegations brought before it, a civil contempt is made out or a criminal contempt is made out and instead of any action of committal for contempt, the Court should make any such order which would be in the administration of justice or not. We have already noticed that there are provisions in order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of civil Procedure as a remedy for the violation of temporary or interim injunction. Besides what is contemplated under Order XXXIX, rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, courts have found another source of power in Section 151 of the Code of civil Procedure and if that is also ignored for a moment, this Court's power as a Court of Record and a Court of Special jurisdiction is preserved under Articles 215 and 225 of the constitution of India. There have been cases before several Courts in which when faced with situations that some order or direction was violated and the violation resulted in grave and serious injury, the Courts took the view that the code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive. There are cases which say that if remedy to do justice is not provided for in the Code or any other act, the High Court must not fold its hands and allow injustice to be done. There are cases which say that if remedy to do justice is not provided for in the Code or any other act, the High Court must not fold its hands and allow injustice to be done. " ( 51 ) FROM this it is seen that not only the party to the proceedings but also a stranger or a third party who is having knowledge of the order of the Court if he is found aided or abetted the violation of the order and is having notice of the order he is liable for punishment either for civil or criminal contempt. ( 52 ) THEIR Lordships further held that this court's power as the Court of Record and a court of Special jurisdiction is preserved under Articles 215 and 225 of the Constitution of India. There ha ve been cases before several courts in which when faced with situations that some order or direction was violated and the violation resulted in grave and serious injury and if remedy to do justice is not provided for in the Civil Procedure Code or any other Act, the High Court must not fold its hands and allow injustice to be done. Their Lordships also referred catena of decision in support of this view. ( 53 ) THE learned advocate General contends that this judgment is not a binding precedent. It is true that this Judgments is not binding on this Court. But at the same time its persuasive value cannot be questioned. Further, their Lordships did not lay down any new proposition. Their lordships simply restated in nutshell, what was stated earlier in a catena of decisions. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention and accordingly rejected. ( 54 ) AGAIN the question whether the 1971 act curtails the powers of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution came up for consideration in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian. Having considered the provisions of the Contempt of Courts act, 1926,1952,1971 and Article 215 and the case law on this aspect, the Supreme Court held as follows:" 30. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are courts of record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. There can be no doubt that both this Court and High Courts are courts of record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt. The decisions of this Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under article 129 and Article 215 is absolute, can there by any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215, there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment, or what my or may not be regarded as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or article 215 of the Constitution. 31. This Court has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power. Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature, it would stand to reason that the power under article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict the provisions should be construed harmoniously. ( 55 ) IN Pritam Pal's case (9 supra), the supreme Court was called upon to adjudica te whether the provisions of 1971 Contempt of courts Act stultifies or abridges the powers of the High Court under Article 215 of the constitution of India, having surveyed the entire case law both in English Courts and indian Courts, their Lordships in para 41 observed as follows:"41. The position of law that emerges from the above decisions is that the power conferred upon the Supreme court and the High Court, being Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively is an inherent power and thatthe jurisdiction vested is a special one not derived from any other statute but derived only from articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India (See D. N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 260 and therefore the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down. Not can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal procedure or any Rules. The caution that has to be observed in exercising this inherent power by summary procedure is that the power should be used sparingly, that the procedure to be followed should be fair and that the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. " ( 56 ) FROM the judgments referred above it is clear that the power to investigate and punish for contempt of itself vests in the supreme Court under Article 129 and article 142 (2) of the Constitution of India and the same cannot be taken away by an Act of Parliament and the Contempt Court Act neither stultifies nor abridges the powers of the Supreme Court and High Courts, they being courts of record and 1971 Act only provides the nature and types of punishments which may be awarded by these Courts. This position is made clear in Section 22 of 1971 act itself. The above discussion leads to the irresistible conclusion that the powers of the supreme Court and High Courts to punish for contempt of itself or to pass orders to do real justice to the parties instead of punishing the contemnor under Articles 129 and 215 can neither be regulated nor controlled by the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. ( 57 ) THE need for contempt proceedings was elaborately considered in Pritam Pal's case {9 supra ). Their Lordships of the supreme Court held in paras 48 to 52 as follows: " 48. In Morris v. The Crown Officer, (1970) 1 AH ER 1079 at page 1081, Lord denning, M. R. said:"the course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Their Lordships of the supreme Court held in paras 48 to 52 as follows: " 48. In Morris v. The Crown Officer, (1970) 1 AH ER 1079 at page 1081, Lord denning, M. R. said:"the course of justice must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the very foundations of our society. "49. In the same case, Lord Justice Salmon spoke: "the sole purpose of proceedings for contempt is to give our Courts the power effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be obstructed or prevented. "50. Frank Furter, J. in Offutt v. U. S. (1954) 348 US 11 expressed his view as follows: "it is a mode of vindicating the magesty of la w in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage"51. In Jennison v. Baker, (1972) 1 All ER 997 at page 1006, it stated: "the law should not be seen to sit by limply while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope. "52. Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the bench in Advocate-General, Bihar v, m. P. Khair Industries, (1980) 3 SCC 31 : ( AIR 1980 SC 946 ), citing those two decisions in the cases of Offut and jennison (supra) stated thus (para 7of air): ". . . . . . . . . it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for Contempt of Court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult of injury as the expression "contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. " ( 58 ) THEIR Lordships referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in In Re, vinay Chandra Mishra's case (14 supra) reported in AIR 1995 SC 2348 = (1995) 2 SCC 584 , wherein it was held that "the judiciary is not only the guardian of the rule of law and third pillar but in fact the central pillar of a democratic state. If the judiciary is to perform its duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted to it, the dignity and authority of the Court have to be respected and protected at all costs. Otherwise the very corner-stone of our constitutional scheme will give way and with it, will disappear the rule of law and the civilized life in the society. It is for this purpose that the Courts are entrusted with extraordinary powers of punishing those who indulge in acts, whether inside or outside the courts, which tend to undermine the authority of law bring it in disrepute and disrespect by scadalising it, When the Court exercises this power, it does not do so to vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual Judge who is personally attacked or scandalised, but to uphold the majesty of the law and of the administration of justice. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. When the foundation itself is shaken by acts which tend to create disaffection and disrespect for the authority of the Court by creating distrust in its working, the edifice of the judicial system gets eroded. " ( 59 ) THOUGH the Supreme Court made these observations while considering the criminal contempt committed by the contemnor, they are equally applicable to the civil contempt also. Since the command of law is that a party to the proceedings who suffered a Judgment in the adversarial system of administration of justice, is bound to comply with the orders of the Court, unless and until the Judgment is set aside by a competent Court. Since the command of law is that a party to the proceedings who suffered a Judgment in the adversarial system of administration of justice, is bound to comply with the orders of the Court, unless and until the Judgment is set aside by a competent Court. If the party who fails to comply the command of the court by giving lame excuse or perverse interpretation and makers the Judgment subverted, we are sure that the very foundation reposed in the institution is shaken, which results in erosion of the dignity and authority of the Court and the edifice of the judicial system gets eroded. ( 60 ) IN Re. Agundhati Roy, their Lordships here observed that the law of contempt has been enacted to secure public respect and cofindence in the judicial process. If such confindence is shaken or broken, the confidence of the common man in the institution of judiciary and democratic set up is likely to be eroded which, if not checked, is sure to be disastrous for the society itself. ( 61 ) FURTHER the Court observed that the power to punish for contempt of Court is a safeguard not for Judges as persons but for the function, which they exercise. Before that, their Lordships having taken note of the past events observed "after more than half a century of independence, the judiciary in the country is under a constant threat and being endangered from within and without The need of the time is of restoring confidence amongst the people for the independence of judiciary. Its impartiality and the glory of law has to be maintained, protected and strengthened. The confidence in the Courts of justice, which the people possess, cannot in any way, be allowed to be tarnished, diminished or wiped out by contumacious behaviour of any person. The only weapon of protecting itself from the onslaught to the institution is the long hand of contempt of Court left in the armoury of judicial repository which, when needed, can reach any neck howsoever high or far away it may be. The only weapon of protecting itself from the onslaught to the institution is the long hand of contempt of Court left in the armoury of judicial repository which, when needed, can reach any neck howsoever high or far away it may be. " without punishing the Contemnors whether the Court is Competent to give directions for Implementation of the original Order: ( 62 ) FIRSTLY the should keep in mind that though contempt proceedings is not a substitute to execution proceedings gradually it is turning out to be so for two reasons (1) No effective mechanism is provided for getting the relief granted by the high Courts in exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. (2) The Contempt of Courts act, 1974 for the first time categorised the contempt into Civil and Criminal Contempt and any wilful disobedience to anyjudgment, decree, direction, order writ to other process of a Court constitutes civil contempt and this power isbeing exercised by the Court mainly to see that the orders of the Court are given effect to. ( 63 ) NEXTLY, we must keep in mind that neither the party nor the Court is interested in sending the person who disobeyed the orders of the Court either wittingly or unwittingly to Jail. If the Courts start sending these officials to Jail, the Jails in India will be flooded with the Bureaucrats only. They are interested in implementation of the order in their true spirit. From the case law referred above it is seen that the provisions of the contempt of Courts Act are only in addition to the inherent powers vested in the High court being the Court of record and the provisions of 1971 Act neither stultifies nor abridges the powers of High Court under art. 215 of the Constitution. The Act is more intended to regulate the exercise of jurisdiction. ( 64 ) THERE can be no doubt that under art. 215, the High Court is having power not only to punish the contemnors for flouting the order of the Court but can also give directions for compliance of the orders passed initially. In fact Sections 9 and 22 of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 made this position very clear. 215, the High Court is having power not only to punish the contemnors for flouting the order of the Court but can also give directions for compliance of the orders passed initially. In fact Sections 9 and 22 of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971 made this position very clear. As per Section 9 of the act, the provisions of the Act shall not be construed as implying the enlargement of scope of contempt and as per the Section 22 of the Act the provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of other laws relating to contempt. Under Section 23 the Supreme court as well as the High Court is empowered to make rules under the Contempt of Courts act. The High Court of A. P. framed Rules in roc. No. 173/lso/80. Rule 27 itself says that the court while exercising contempt powers may pass such order or orders as the Justice of the case may require. ( 65 ) THE Learned Advocate General strenuously contended that the Court exercise of jurisdiction under Contempt of courts Act is to see whether the respondent flouted the order of the Court and whether he has to be punished for the offence or not, but the Court is not empowered to give any direction. When once the respondent passes an order in compliance with the order of the court, the Court cannot examine the correctness or otherwise of the order in contempt proceedings and if the order passed by the respondent is not in consonance with the order of the Court, it gives fresh cause of action but the Court is not competent or empowered to give any fresh direction or orders is the contempt case. ( 66 ) IN support of his contention he placed reliance on the following judgments. ( 67 ) IN J. S. Parihar v, Ganpat Duggar, the apex Court held that 'once there is an order passed by the government on the basis of directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The order may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions, but that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of assailing the same in appropriate proceedings. The order may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions, but that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of assailing the same in appropriate proceedings. The same cannot be reviewed in a contempt proceeding. ' at the same time there was no reference to art. 215 of the Constitution and Rule 27 of the Contempt of Courts Act. ( 68 ) IN Rabin Bee @ Khajabee v. R. Subrahnianyam, a Division Bench of this court followed the above view of Supreme court. ( 69 ) IN the Contempt Case No. 1137 of 1995 the main grievance of the petitioner in this contempt case is that having passed a preliminary award for higher amount of rs. 34,36,468/- passed the award on 26-10-1995 after receiptnotice in the contempt case passed another award for Rs. 7,72,537/- on 3-12-1995 without any notice to the petitioner and the second award is illegal etc. Two questions arose before the learned Single judge: (1) When once an award is passed by the second respondent who is authorized Officer, is it open to the first respondent to change, modify or pass a fresh award? (2) Whether the action of the first respondent amounts to proper compliance of the order passed by this Court on 23-3-1995? ( 70 ) THE learned Judge felt that a further question arises as to whether in a contempt case this Court can enter into and examine the questions raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Judge, being of the view that the said questions are important questions referred the matter to a division Bench. ( 71 ) THE Division Bench following the above judgment of the Apex Court in j. S. Parihar's case (19 supra) observed that party from that if the petitioner is not satisfied with the award it is open to the petitioner to seek reference under Section 18 of the Land acquisition Act and obtain appropriate relief under law. In this view of the matter we think unnecessary to take further steps against the respondent in these proceedings. Their Lordships are impressed by the fact that a substantial relief by way of seeking a reference to Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is available to the petitioner. In this view of the matter we think unnecessary to take further steps against the respondent in these proceedings. Their Lordships are impressed by the fact that a substantial relief by way of seeking a reference to Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is available to the petitioner. In Lalith Mnthur vs. L. Majeswara rao the Honourable Supreme Court seemed to have taken a similar view. ( 72 ) THE petitioner filed writ petition in the high Court seeking a writ of mandamus for directing the respondent to consider his representation for absorption in the alternative government service and the same was allowed by the Court directing the concerned to consider and dispose of the representation. Thereafter, the representation was rejected by the Government. Contempt petition in filed and the learned single Judge having taken notice that as many as 40 co- employees of the petitioner were already absorbed in other organizations and one satyanarayana, who is junior to the petitioner is being continued in service by virtue of the orders passed by the authority under Shops establishments Act directed the respondent to absorb the petitioner in any suitable post of the government department or public undertakings within three months from the date of the receipt of copy of that order. Their lordship of the Supreme Court held in paragraph 3 which is as follows:"this order, in our opinion, is wholly without jurisdiction and could nothave been made in proceedings under the contempt of Courts Act or Under Art, 215 of the Constitution. The High Court in the writ petition had issued a direction for consideration of the respondent's representation by the state Government. This direction was carried out by the State Government which had considered and thereafter rejected the representation on merits. Instead of challenging that order in a fresh writ petition under Art,226 the respondent took recourse to contempt proceedings which did not lie as the order had already been complied with by the State Government which had considered the representation and rejected it on merits. Taking the above view the SLP was allowed. " ( 73 ) TO our mind their Lordship have taken the above view since the respondents rejected representation of the petitioner before he filed contempt case. Taking the above view the SLP was allowed. " ( 73 ) TO our mind their Lordship have taken the above view since the respondents rejected representation of the petitioner before he filed contempt case. Though their Lordship observed that such an order would not have been passed by the learned Judge under article 215 of the Constitution there was nc discussion whatsoever in coming to the above conclusion. ( 74 ) AT this stage we feel appropriate to refer to the case in Badrinath v. Government of tamil Nadu. The learned Judges having rejected the contention of the Counsel for the government of Tamil Nadu that it is not the province of the Court to issue a Mandamus to promote the appellant to the super-time scale nor to assess his grading, their Lordships observed in paragraph 84 to 87 as follows:-"84. we may, nevertheless, point out that it is not as if there are no exceptions to this general principle. The occasions where the Court issued a writ of certiorari and quashed an order and had also issued a Mandamus at the same time to the State or public authority could be very rare but we might emphasis that the power of this court to mould the relief in the interests of justice in extraordinary cases cannot be doubted"having surveyed the case law on the aspect, their Lordships issued a writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to promote the appellant to super-time scale. It is useful to extract paragraphs 86 and 87 of the said judgment, which are as follows:-"86. In the light of the above precedents, we have considered whether this is a fit case here this Court should issue a mandamus or remit the matter back to the State Government. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts of the case, we are of the view that having regard to our findings on Points 1 to 5 and to the continuous unfair treatment meted out to the appellant by the State of Tamil Nadu-even as accepted by the central Government in its comments- this is a pre-eminently fit case requiring the issue of Mandamus. We are therefore constrained to exercice all the powers this Court for rendering justice and to out short further proceedings. We are therefore constrained to exercice all the powers this Court for rendering justice and to out short further proceedings. The consideration of the appellant's case for the said promotion has been hanging fire and going up and down for the last twenty-five years. Disgusted with the delays, the appellant has also taken voluntary retirement. In the light of our decision on Points 1 to 5 we declare the censure on the fourth case as void and without jurisdiction and in the alternative also as liable to be quashed under Wednesbury principles. The adverse remarks of by-gone years prior to 1972 have lost all their sting. The positive factors in the appellant's favour both recorded (at the compulsion of the Central Government) and others to which we have referred to earlier as meriting consideration are, in our opinion, sufficient to entitle him for promotion to the super-time scale. The appellant's case is, in our view, no less inferior to the cases of the other Officers who were conferred the similar benefit of super-time scale by the State of Tamil nadu, details of which have been profusely given in the writ petition. For the aforesaid reasons, we quash the punishment of censure, the assessment made by the Joint Screening Committee, the orders passed by the State and central Government refusing to grant him super-time scale and in rejecting the appeal of the appellant and we further direct as follows:87. In the special and peculiar circumstances of the case, we direct the respondents to grant the appellant the benefit of the super-time scale from the date on which the appellant's junior sri. P. Kandaswamy was granted super- time scale. The respondents are accordingly directed to pass an order in this behalf within eight weeks of the receipt, of this order and to give him all consequential benefits attendant thereto. The said benefits shall also be reflected in his pension and other retrial benefits. They shall be worked out and paid to him within the time aforementioned. "from the above it is seen that when the respondents exhibit continuous unfair treatment to the appellant, aggrieved person, the court is well within its powers to issue positive directions by issuing a writ of mandamus. In the past, people were respecting the judgments of the Court and used to fact positively in giving relief to the person wronged by implementing the judgment of the Court. In the past, people were respecting the judgments of the Court and used to fact positively in giving relief to the person wronged by implementing the judgment of the Court. Hence the Courts were observing restraint without giving the relief in the positive terms. To-day we are in completely changed scenario. The fall in ethical standards and degeneration of values are being witnessed in all walks of life. No government Officer is willing to implement the orders of the Court in their true spirit. In fact they are trying to subvert the orders of the court by giving perverse interpretation of the order of the Court that too after taking several adjournments in the contempt cases filed by the aggrieved persons. We feel that the judges should interpret the law responding to the contemporaneous circumstances prevailing at a given point of time since the law can never be static and it requires fresh outlook. Moulding the old principle to suit the new conditions and ideals is the compulsion of judicial conscience to do justice between the parties. Otherwise the very system of administration of justice will come to a grinding halt and the people will lose faith in the system. ( 75 ) NEXT Case relied on by the Advocate general is;t. V. Chowdary v. M/s Riata industrial Corporation Private Limited, hyderabad, in which a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that the Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction is not empowered to give any direction. In w. P. 12386 of 1991 the Director, Mines and geology, was directed to dispose of the application for mining lease in accordance with law. After contempt case was filed the director of Mines and Geology rejected the mining lease application for various reasons setoutinhisorder dated 29-9-1997. Thereafter contempt case was filed stating that the order is in violation of the directions of given by this Court. The learned single Judge examined each and every ground and came to the conclusion that almost all of them were "non-existent grounds", and the decision taken by the Director of Mines and Geology virtually amounted to defiance of the order of this Court. Accordingly the contempt case was disposed of with the following direction:"therefore, the respondents are liable for contempt. The learned single Judge examined each and every ground and came to the conclusion that almost all of them were "non-existent grounds", and the decision taken by the Director of Mines and Geology virtually amounted to defiance of the order of this Court. Accordingly the contempt case was disposed of with the following direction:"therefore, the respondents are liable for contempt. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and having and to the fact that the civil Contempt is remedial, the primary object being to enforce the order for the benefit of the party in whose favour the order has been made, I directed the respondent to implement the decision of this Court in W. P. No. 12386 of 11991 dated 18-10-1996 on or before 14th of november, 97, failing which the respondent is liable for punishment for contempt of Court. " ( 76 ) QUESTIONING the said order a contempt appeal was filed by the Director contending that the Judge exceeded powers vested in the court. The learned Judges observed that" we are not for a moment saying that the order passed by the appellant is valid. On that aspect, we express no opinion. At best, we are only concerned with the limited question whether the order of rejection was passed in a predetermined manner, and whether the whole exercise is farcical and colourable. We are unable to reach that conclusion. As observed already we cannot subject the order to judicial review and to into the controversial questions as to whether the order passed is in accordance with law or not. As far as the Court dealing with contempt is concerned, it can only embark upon a limited enquiry as indicated above. " ( 77 ) THEIR Lordships also found fault with the order by stating that the order in the contempt case goes beyond the scope of the direction granted in the writ petition by observing that the direction given by the learned Single Judge virtually amounts to a directions to pass an order granting mining lease because in the course of discussion the learned Single Judge expressed that there could possible be no legal objection for grant of lease. This in our view goes beyond the scope of direction granted in the writ petition. The learned Judge while dealing with the contempt application ought not have granted such a direction. This in our view goes beyond the scope of direction granted in the writ petition. The learned Judge while dealing with the contempt application ought not have granted such a direction. ( 78 ) WHILE passing the said order their lordships recorded a finding "that they arc unable to reach a conclusion that the order was passed in a pre-determined manner and whole exercise is farcical and colourable. " Suppose if respondents pass an order with a predetermined manner and the whole exercise is farcical and colourable one the question would be whether the Courts are having a solemn duty to prevent miscarriage of justice in exercise of the inherent powers vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of india or whether it is prohibited from giving any directions and whether the Court is justified in asking the petitioner to start the litigation afresh. As observed by their lordships in the above decisions, if the citizen files another writ petition questioning that order which is not is consonance with the order passed by the Court, that writ petition will be allowed. After exhausting plethora of appeals again the respondent refuses to implement that order and passes the same order by giving extraneous reasons. Again the petitioner sets in motion the litigation afresh. Like this how long the petitioner has to knock the orders of the Court as in the case of Vaikuntapali ands whether the Courts are justified in subjecting the citizens to untold miseries without knowing the mind and purport of the order passed by the respondents. Ultimately, in the process the petitioner may not get justice. On the other hand, he incurs the wrath of the Officer concerned and he has to pay heavy price for the sin of approaching the Court seeking redressal of his grievance. Then for what purpose these Law Courts do exist. Are the courts meant for Judges and Lawyers or to wipe out the tears of the litigant public who approach the Courts in distress with clean hands? Can be Court remain as a silent spectator when the respondents are trying to deny the relief to the aggrieved person after a competent Court adjudicated the dispute which attained finality, with a per- determined mind and without any ostensible reason. According to us Article 215 of the constitution of India comes into play to render justice. Can be Court remain as a silent spectator when the respondents are trying to deny the relief to the aggrieved person after a competent Court adjudicated the dispute which attained finality, with a per- determined mind and without any ostensible reason. According to us Article 215 of the constitution of India comes into play to render justice. Otherwise, the very foundation of judiciary i. e. the trust and confidence of the people will be eroded and when once the faith of the litigant is lost in the system, very existence of the Courts will become otiose. ( 79 ) WE would like to demonstrate how the common man is feeling suffocated and shedding tears in silence while groping in darkness in search of Justice. ( 80 ) IN Smt. Santha Kumari, IAS v. K. Ravi, the contemnor/appellant was convicted sentenced to imprisonment till the Court raises and to pay Rs. 2000/- as fine within two weeks and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one week in C. C. No. 704 of 2002. A Division Bench of this Court set aside the order on various grounds. One of them is that there is no material on record to show that the appellant herein wantonly and deliberately disobeyed any direction issued by the Court while giving leave to the respondents to assail the legality and correctness of the proceedings dated 5-9-2002 issued by the appellant rejecting their case for cross-promotion, if they are so advised. Since the appeal arises out of the order passed by one of us and the judgment do not reflect the correct factual position in its anxiety and to set aside the judgment, we would like to state the correct factual position in the context of the subject under discussion. Since the appeal arises out of the order passed by one of us and the judgment do not reflect the correct factual position in its anxiety and to set aside the judgment, we would like to state the correct factual position in the context of the subject under discussion. ( 81 ) FROM the order it is seen that the learned Judges did not hold that the order passed by the appellant after contempt proceedings are initiated is in consonance with the order passed in W. P. No. 17560 of 1999 dated: 5-11-1999 or the judgment of division Bench in Giridhar Kishore and others in W. P. No. 205330 of 1995, To put it aptly, the learned Judges having realised that the order dated 5-9-02 runs counter to the relief granted in the Writ Petition in the normal course would have directed the appellant to comply with theorder in the W. P. even at that belated stage. The aggrieved parties were given liberty to question the correctness of the order by setting the law in motion afresh. Whether such a direction results in miscarriage of justice or not is the moot question. Let us see the facts of the case. If the judges have patience to go through the record, they would have noticed the following undisputed facts. The A. P. Social welfare Residential Educational Institutions society was giving cross-promotions to its employees till 1994 i. e a teacher working in a particular subject is being given promotion as a graduate teacher in the subject in which the teacher obtained post-graduate qualification. When the society stopped cross- promotions Giridhar Kishore and others filed w. P. No. 2533/1995 and batch questioning the said action. A Division Bench of this court allowed the writ petition presided over by Justice P. Venkatarama Reddy, as he then was, by holding that one need not have teaching experience in the subject in which he obtained post-graduate degree for considering his case for promotion. When the said Judgment was not implemented the petitioners therein filed Contempt case and they were given promotions. But the benefit was denied to the similarly placed persons. In those circumstances the respondents in the con tempt appeal, K. Ravi and others filed writ Petition No. 17560 of 1999 in not considering their case as per the judgment of this Court in Giridhar Kishore case. But the benefit was denied to the similarly placed persons. In those circumstances the respondents in the con tempt appeal, K. Ravi and others filed writ Petition No. 17560 of 1999 in not considering their case as per the judgment of this Court in Giridhar Kishore case. The standing Counsel and his Junior stoutly opposed the relief claimed by them by stating that the rule that fell for consideration in giridhar Kishore case was amended and the petitioners were not entitled to any relief. Having heard the arguments at length, b. S. A. S. J. allowed the writ petition on 5-11-1999 and directed the respondents to consider their cases for promotion within three months by recording a finding that there is no change in the rule and the same old rule is being continued on the statute book. Aggrieved by the said order the secretary preferred Writ Appeal No. 193 of 2000 on 29-12-1999. That writ appeal come up for hearing nearly three years thereafter and ultimately a Division Bench by its order directed the Secretary to consider the case of the Teachers in terms of the Judgment of this court in Giridhat Kishore case. Thereafter the petitioners filed CC. No. 704 of 2002 on 20-6-2002. Notice was issued on 21-6-2002 returnable in two weeks. Thereafter, the contempt case was listed in the Court on 26-7-2002 and the following order was passed:-"since W. A. No. 193 of 2000 was disposed of on 13-6-2002 and also w. A. Nos. 993 of 2000 and 566 of 2001 were disposed of on 29-10-2001 agreeing with the view taken in Giridhar Kishore case, the respondent is given four weeks" time to implement the order of this Court. If the order is not complied with, the respondent- contemnor shall appear before this Court on 16-8-2002. Post on 16-8-2002. "on 13-9-2002 the Court passed the following order:-"by order dated 26-7-2002, I directed the respondent to implement the orders of this Court and in the event of non- implementation of the orders, she should appear before this Court on 16-8-2002. On that day, the respondent filed an application for dispensing with her presence and another application seeking extension of time for complying with the orders of this Court. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that subsequently two adjournments were taken on behalf of the petitioners' Counsel but not at the instance of the respondent's counsel. On that day, the respondent filed an application for dispensing with her presence and another application seeking extension of time for complying with the orders of this Court. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that subsequently two adjournments were taken on behalf of the petitioners' Counsel but not at the instance of the respondent's counsel. The fact remains that when the case was adjourned for the second time also the order was not passed. Now the respondent passed the order rejecting the claim of petitioners. The respondent shall appear before his Cout on 27-9-2002. Post on 27-9-2002. "on 27-9-2002 on the appearance of the Officer the Court explained the consequences that will flow, if she fails to comply with the orders. When the Secretary refused to comply with the orders of this Court this Court convicted the Officer and imposed punishment as stated supra. Now while allowing the Contempt Appeal on 18-11-2002 their Lordships Kicked the ball to the same place where it started its journey in 1999 in fact to 1995 when the Society stopped giving cross-promotions. It is not known how many years it will take for these people to get relief in the writ petition and it is not known how many more years it will take to complete the plethora of appeals. Even at that stage the fate of the order in the hands of an Officer who consistently exhibited the defiant attitude in implementing the orders of the Court is not known. Be that as it may that the Court declared the legal position way back in W. P. No. 20533 of 1995 and Banch dated 24-10-1997. Except someof the persons covered by those orders the other similarly placed persons are running from pillar to post seeking justice. In their pursuit they have already spent more than seven years. It is not known how many more years they have to wait to get justice and whether they will be able to see the fruits of litigation before they retire from service. Can itbe said that rule of law and justice prevailed in the facts and circumstances of this case. This court being a Court of Record should administer justice with the same breadth of version and understanding the needs of the times, as do Courts in England. Can itbe said that rule of law and justice prevailed in the facts and circumstances of this case. This court being a Court of Record should administer justice with the same breadth of version and understanding the needs of the times, as do Courts in England. Are we, the judges, can default or vary the judicial process by taking recourse to procedural laws and allow the respondent to subvert the law as declared by a competent Court. We can multiply any number of such instances within our knowledge. ( 82 ) NEXTLY, the learned Judges have taken objection that no malafides are attributed and no new grounds were raised in contempt case by filing additional affidavit having noticed that the Secretary passed the order long after the contempt case was filed i. e. on 20-6-2002 more so after taking two weeks time on 16-8-2002 to comply with the order. Their Lordships jumped at the conclusion "that there is no attempt on the part of the appellant herein to/lout the orders passed by this court and in any wilful and deliberate manner and even if the order is erroneous, it cannot be equated to that of contumacious one and this is a bonafide exercise of jurisdiction in compliance with the direct ions of this Court. " Merely on the ground that no malafides were alleged, can it be said that the order passed by the Officer is a bonafide one after so much contest at every stage from 1995 onwards after Giridhar kishore's case won't she know the issue in controversy. Can it be said that the order do not suffer from the vice of malice in law. We leave this issue here. ( 83 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion we hold that the Court cannot drive the litigant to an endless litigation and a duty is cast on it to see whether the respondent exercised the power vested in him in good faith or with a view to defy and disobey the order. We leave this issue here. ( 83 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion we hold that the Court cannot drive the litigant to an endless litigation and a duty is cast on it to see whether the respondent exercised the power vested in him in good faith or with a view to defy and disobey the order. If the order is not in conformity with the initial order, the Court is bound to punish him by upholding the majesty of law and also compel the respondent to comply with the order by giving suitable directions or passing suitable orders, but not at variance with the earlier orders, in exercise of the inherent powers vested in the Court under article 215 of the Constitution of India. ( 84 ) BE that as it may, none of the cases can be treated as an authority on the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court since their Lordships did not consider the powers of the High Court either under Article 215 or rules 27 of the Contempt Rules. Under rule 27 of the Contempt of Court Rules the court is having ample powers to pass such orders as the justice of the case requires. Even rule 14 of the rules for contempt of supreme Court 1975 is to that effect. Rule 14 - The Court may pass such orders as it thinks fit including orders as to costs which may be recovered as if the orders were a decree of the Court. Rule 27 of the Contempt rules was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Kanedena Veeraiah v, Narra venkateswarlu held that the High Court is a court of Record and in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and also under Rule 27 of the contempt Rules framed by this Court under section 23 of the Act the High Court is having ample power to pass any other order in the contempt petition apart from punishing the contemnor. The question arose before the court was whether in exercise of contempt jurisdiction this Court is having power to pass any other order while disposing of the contempt petition. The question arose before the court was whether in exercise of contempt jurisdiction this Court is having power to pass any other order while disposing of the contempt petition. In that case a learned single Judge having found that the District collector and Tahsildar violated the orders of the Court wilfully convicted them but however let them off by administering a warning if any recurrence happens in future they will be dealt with more severely and directing restoration of land to the petitioner. This order was appealed before the Division bench. It is relevant to extract the paragraph 9 to 18 is as under;- "9. It is enshrined in Article 215 that the high Court, as Court of Record, has undoubtedly inherent power to punish for contempt of itself and to exercise all the powers of the Court of Record. While so, it has to be seen whether the High court as a Court of Record in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, can pass any other order while disposing of a con tempt petition with the sole purpose of helping the administration of justice. The source for the Rule of inherent powers of a Court of a Court can be traced to a Latin Maximum. "quando lex Aliquid Alicui Camadit, Concedere videtur Id Sine Quo Ipsaesse" which means that "when the law gives anything to any one, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. " There can be no doubt that the object underlying" the contempt of Courts Act is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Law courts and their image in the minds of the public. Article 215 vests in a High court all the powers of a Court of record, including the power to punish for contempt. The words 'powers to punish for contempt' does not limit the other powers of the High Court as it possesses as a Court of Record. The contempt of Courts Act is meant for limiting the powers of the Courts in punishing and to regulate the procedure and in addition it expressly confers upon the High Court (the power ) to commit for contempt of Subordinate courts also. The contempt of Courts Act is meant for limiting the powers of the Courts in punishing and to regulate the procedure and in addition it expressly confers upon the High Court (the power ) to commit for contempt of Subordinate courts also. But under Art. 215, the powers of a High Court, as a Court of record, are wide enough to give appropriate direction " to close the breach " which is a result of interference with the due course of justice committed by contemnors. The learned Advocate- general has fairly submitted that the high Court while exercising this inherent jurisdiction, can give suitable directions byway of an order with a view to undo the mischief caused by the act of contempt committed by the contemnors. In Oswald's Contempt of court (Third Edition ). A passage at page 16 reads thus:- "the Court however, has power to restrain by injunction threatened contempts. It is competent for the Court where a Contempt is threatened or has been committed, and on an application to commit, to take the lenient course of granting an injunction instead of making an order for committal or sequestration whether the offender is a party to the proceedings or not. " 10. This passage suggests that the Court can pass certain other orders in a contempt petition. 11. In Halsbury's Law of England (Fourth Edition Vol. 9) Chapter "civil contempt" a passage in para 104 dealing with the subject of 'other remedies' reads thus:-"the Court may, in its own discretion, grant an injunction, in lien of committal or sequestration, to restrain" the commission or repetition of a civil contempt. The Court may in lieu of any other penalty require the contemnor to pay the costs of the motion on a common fund basis. In a doubtful case, the Court may, instead of proceedings, for contempt, grant an order requiring the defendant to state whether he has complied with an undertaking. If an order of mandamus, a mandatory order, injunction or judgment or order of for the specific performance of a contract is not complied with the Court may, besides or instead of proceedings for contempt, direct the act to be done by some person appointed for that purpose. "12. If an order of mandamus, a mandatory order, injunction or judgment or order of for the specific performance of a contract is not complied with the Court may, besides or instead of proceedings for contempt, direct the act to be done by some person appointed for that purpose. "12. From this passage also it becomes clear that the Court can, be way of relief, give certain other directions also in a contempt application with a view to help the administration of justice. 13. Sri. P. Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants, however, submits that even assuming that the high Court has such inherent power still the Court cannot give directions for restoration of possession, when the rights of the third parties have intervened. But, this again depends to what extent in a given case the High court; which is the Court of Record, which is vested with inherent power under Article 215 of the Constitution of india can pass appropriate orders in the interest of administration of justice. In this context, it is useful to refer to some of the decisions particularly those of the Supreme Court,14. In Elliot v. Kinger and others 1967 (3) all E. R. 141 Judge referred to the passage in Oswald's Contempt of Court (supra) and observed thus:"i do not for a moment quarrel with that statement of the law, but in my experience the lenient course mentioned in the passage which I have read is taken by this Court on its own initiative and not at the instance of plaintiff whose proper remedy, where an injunction has been disobeyed or where there has been aiding and abetting by a third party of a breach of injunction, is to move either to commit, or to apply, in the case of a company for a writ of sequestration. "15. It may be noted that this is a case where the plaintiff moved against the persons who were not parties to the action and the learned Judge, while approving the passage in Oswald's contempt of Court, observed that the grant of injunction sought would not give any further advantage to the plaintiff. If may be noted that in the case before us the appellants were also party- respondent in the contempt application as they were brought on record and after giving an opportunity to them, the order of restoration was passed. If may be noted that in the case before us the appellants were also party- respondent in the contempt application as they were brought on record and after giving an opportunity to them, the order of restoration was passed. Now we shall examine some of the cases decided by the Supreme Court. 16. In Mohd. Idris v. Rustom Jehangir, air 1984 SC 1826 their Lordships, while disposing of a Contempt Case, observed thus: "on merits, the learned counsel submitted that the undertaking given was not in respect of the property concerned and that in any case the learned Single Judge was not justified in giving certain directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of Court. We find no substance in the submissions made by the learned Counsel. There was a clear breach of the undertaking given by the petitioners and we are of the opinion of that the single Judge was right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach. "17. In another contempt case, Union of india and others v. Osival Woolem Mills limited while dismissing the contempt application, passed an order vacating the interim order passed by the High court. 18. From the foregoing discussion, it emerges that the high Court as a Court of Record, has undoubtedly inherent power as enshrined in Article 215 of the constitution of India to punish for its contempt and to have all the powers of such a Court of record to pass orders in exercise of its inherent power to help the administration of Justice, and rule 27 of the Contempt of Court Rules framed by this Court by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 23 read with Article 215 of the Constitution only reiterates what is enshrined in Art. 215 and is in conformity with the ratio laid down by the Courts in the above mentioned case. " ( 85 ) THE above judgment completely answered the contention of the learned advocate General. But the learned Advocate general contended that the Court gave such a direction restraining the threatened contempt based on the concession made by the then Advocate General and as per his written arguments in the present case the court is concerned with the order which nullifies the order passed in compliance of with the initial orders in the writ petition. But the learned Advocate general contended that the Court gave such a direction restraining the threatened contempt based on the concession made by the then Advocate General and as per his written arguments in the present case the court is concerned with the order which nullifies the order passed in compliance of with the initial orders in the writ petition. At any rate this judgment does not hold the field as the Supreme Court has expressed itself categorically in regard to the specific situation with which we are concerned in the present case. We have no hesitation in rejecting the contention of the Learned advocate General for more than one reason. Firstly it is seen from the Judgment that the then Advocate General conceded the legal position in the light of Article 215 of the constitution of India and Rule 27 of Contempt rules. We feel that any advocate who is committed to uphold the majesty of law cannot make any other submission. We have already dealt with the inherent powers of the high Court under the above provision elaborately. Apart from that under Rule 27 of the Contempt Rules, the Court is competent to pass orders in the ends of Justice. The law neither requires the concession of anyone nor it takes a round about turn when there is change in the incumbent. Nextly, on the facts of the case, the learned Judge having recorded a finding that the Officer has sworn to a false affidavit not on one count but on various counts left him with a warning and issued the direction which is in the nature of clarification. Thirdly, we have already held that the judgments cited by the learned advocate General did neither refer to article 215 of Rule 27 of Contempt Rules. ( 86 ) IN A. Sadamnd v. Y. M. PAL Dy. Thirdly, we have already held that the judgments cited by the learned advocate General did neither refer to article 215 of Rule 27 of Contempt Rules. ( 86 ) IN A. Sadamnd v. Y. M. PAL Dy. General manager, Syndicate Bank, Hyderabad, this court having held that the Bank did not violate the orders of this Court in w. P. No. 16216 of 1996 dated 5-11-1996 in proceeding with the inquiry since the inquiry was not stayed by the Court pending disposal of the Contempt Case by placing reliance on rule 27 of thecontempt Rules gave directions to the Bank to eschew the evidence of the two officers of the Vigilance department who conducted preliminary enquiry on the ground of non-supply of the inquiry reports to the delinquent while determining the guilt of the petitioner if the bank sticks to its stand not be furnish copy of the inquiry report submitted by these officers to the petitioner. In that case during the course of hearing the court noticed serious infirmities in conducting disciplinary proceedings the court was faced with a situation whether to interdict the disciplinary proceedings even before completion of the inquiry or to wait till the completion of the enquiry and till the petitioner exhausts the remedies available under law. The Court preferred the first course by relying on Rule 27as the illegalities noticed by this Court goes to the very root of the disciplinary proceedings and the proceeding as are likely to be declared as ab initio void as an when questioned before the court. ( 87 ) IN Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company Private Limited, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows:-"the contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt; the principle that a contemner ought not to be permitted to enjoy and /or keep the fruits of his contempt is we\l- settled in Mohd. ldris V. R. J. Babuji (1985) iscr 598: (AIR1984 SC 1826) this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its Orders". A Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Imthiazuddin's case (15 supra), held that "contempt proceedings are not criminal proceedings,but are summary proceedings and the High Court can evolve its own procedure. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Imthiazuddin's case (15 supra), held that "contempt proceedings are not criminal proceedings,but are summary proceedings and the High Court can evolve its own procedure. The power of the Court of Record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India is not limited to imposing punishment upon the contemner but the main purpose of this power of the Court is to see that the order of the Court is given effect to. . . . . " ( 88 ) KEEPING in view the overwhelming decisions rendered by the Apex Court as well as this Court the High Court being a court of record is exercising its inherent power not only to punish the person or authority which is guilty of flouting or disobeying the orders of the Court wilfully and wantonly but also empowered to pass any just and equitable order to do real justice between the parties. Contempt of Courts Act only provides nature and the types of punishment which the High Court can award in exercise of its contempt powers under art. 215 of the Constitution of India under section 12 of the Act. This section only acts as a restraint on the powers of the High Court in creating new offences and inflicting new punishments other than those recognised by the Contempt of Courts Act. Hence the High court is well within its powers to do real justice by giving suitable or equitable directions not contrary to the order passed in the main case in the interests of justice and fair play to see that the aggrieved person gets relief. This power is in addi tion to the powers of the High Court to punish the person/ authority concerned for flouting the lawful orders passed by the Court. Wilful Disobedience - What Does it Mean? ( 89 ) NEXTLY, the learned Advocate General contended that there should be sufficient material on record to show that the appellant herein wantonly and deliberately disobeyed the direction issued by the Court and the conduct of that person should be contumacious to proceed against him for civil Contempt. He placed reliance on the decision in Smt. A. Santha Kumari's case (24 supra), wherein a Division Bench of this court observed "51. The process of civil contempt will invariably depend upon proving a breach of the order which has been made or given. He placed reliance on the decision in Smt. A. Santha Kumari's case (24 supra), wherein a Division Bench of this court observed "51. The process of civil contempt will invariably depend upon proving a breach of the order which has been made or given. This requirement has two facets, namely (i) the existence of the breach and (ii) the proof thereof. The necessity of determining whether there has been a factual breach of an order on the part of the person brought before the Court clearly demands that the terms of the order itself be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. The person accused of contumacious conduct should know with complete precision what it is he is required to do or to abstain from doing. The requirement of clarity has been admirably stated in a leading American case, where it was said of an injunction that: In Collins v. Wayne Iron Works 227 pa. 326 76a, 24, 25 (1910) cited in Spray, equitable Remedies (1971)"it should be as definite, clear and precise in its terms as possible, so that there may be reason or excuse for misunderstanding or disobeying it; and when practicable, it should plainly indicate to the defendant all of the acts which he is restrained from doing, without calling on him for inferences or conclusions about which persons may well differ" ( 90 ) WHAT is meant by wilful disobedience was considered by the Supreme Court in kapildeo Prasad Sail v. State of Bihar, the supreme Court held"9. For holding the respondents to have committed contempt, civil contempt at that, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience of the judgment or order of the court. Power to punish for contempt is to be resorted to when there is clear violation of the court's order. Since notice of contempt and punishment for contempt is of far- reaching consequence, these powers should be invoked only when a clear case of wilful disobedience of the court's order has been made out. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are to be properly understood and complied with. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience particularly when the attention of the person is drawn to the court's orders and its implications. Whether disobedience is wilful in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. Judicial orders are to be properly understood and complied with. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience particularly when the attention of the person is drawn to the court's orders and its implications. Disobedience of the court's order strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based. Power to punish for contempt is necessary for the maintenance of effective legal system. It is exercised to prevent perversion of the course of justice. 10. In his famous passage, Lord Diplock in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers ltd. (1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL) said that there is also " an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded with impunity". Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person who reuses to comply with the order of the Court or disregards the order continuously. Initiation of contempt proceedings is not a substitute for execution proceedings though at time that purpose may also be achieved. 11. No person can defy the court's order. Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. A petitioner who complains breach of the court's order must allege deliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court's order. " ( 91 ) FROM the above decision of the supreme Court it is clear that very disobedience of the court's order strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our system of governance is based and the power to punish for contempt is intended to prevent perversion of the course of justice. Even the negligent and careless action of person can amount to disobedience particularly wher the attention of the person is drawn to the court's orders and its implications, therefore the judicial orders are to be properly understood and complied with. Their lordships also observed that though contempt proceedings may not be substituted for execution proceedings, at times that purpose may also be achieved. Only some acts, which are not contumacious, are saved from contempt. Their lordships also observed that though contempt proceedings may not be substituted for execution proceedings, at times that purpose may also be achieved. Only some acts, which are not contumacious, are saved from contempt. But the burden lies heavily on the contemner to show that his action in not complying with the orders is neither wanton nor wilful butfor the reasons beyond his control. ( 92 ) IN P. Chinna Reddy v. District Collector, east Godavari District, Kakinada a Division bench of this Court was called upon to adjudicate whether the authorities who are expected to implement the decision of the courtcan take up the responsibility of sitting in judgment over the correctnessor otherwise of such decisions and claim justification for not implementing of the same. The facts of that are that the petitioners were granted 'd' form pattas to take up tree growth other than sandalwood. When the petitioners approached the authorities for issuance of transit permits to remove the forest growth, the authorities refused to transit permits. Hence they filed writ petitioners. A learned single Judge of this Court directed the Forest department to exploit the tree growth through by itself and credit the amount realized to the account of the petitioners towards further investment for development of lands. In the writ appeal that order was modified by a Division bench of this Court by directing the District collector, that if the forest Department failed to remove forest growth within two months he should have the tree growth removed through his own agencies and credit the amount realized to the account of each of the petitioners in proportion to their shares. The District collector was also directed to devote personal attention to this matter. When these orders were not complied with, the petitioners once again approached the High Court for issuance of writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to issue transit permit to transport the timber cut from the lands assigned to them and for other directions. The respondents in their counters have taken a stand that the decision of the Court need not be acted upon, since the assignment of land in favour of the petitioners are bad and the petitioners are not entitled to tree growth on the lands assigned to them. The respondents in their counters have taken a stand that the decision of the Court need not be acted upon, since the assignment of land in favour of the petitioners are bad and the petitioners are not entitled to tree growth on the lands assigned to them. Justice P. A. Chowdary, as he then was, referred the matter to a Division Bench by observing as follows;-"although this direction was issued on 9th November, 1977, with a solemn expression of hope by the Bench that the Collector, East Godavari, will bestow his personal attention, it is regrettable that nothing has been done by the District Collector, East Godavari sofar. The least that one can say about this conduct is that it is unfortunate. In fact under strict law, this is nothing short of disobedience by the district Collector of the clear directions by this Court. " ( 93 ) WHEN the Division Bench took up the matter for consideration , their Lordships having surveyed the case law on the above issue observed in paragraphs 11 to 14 as follows:-"11. It is not necessary to burden that judgment with further citations. Suffice it to conclude it with the observation of the Supreme Court which speaking through Rajagopala Ayyangar, J. , on behalf of the Bench consisting of five judges in State of Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari, (1961) 1. S. C. R. 728: A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 221 and made thus: "it is of the essence of the rule of law that every authority within the State including the Executive Government should consider itself bound by and obey the law. It is fundamental to the system of polity that India has adopted and which is embodied in the constitution that the Courts of the land are vested with the powers of interpreting the law and applying it to the facts of the cases which are properly brought before them. If any party to the proceedings considers that any Court has committed any error, in the understanding of the law or in its application, resort must be had to such review or appeals as the law provides. If any party to the proceedings considers that any Court has committed any error, in the understanding of the law or in its application, resort must be had to such review or appeals as the law provides. When once an order has been passed which the Court has jurisdiction to pass, it is the duty of all persons bound by it to obey the order so long as it stands, and it would tend to the subversion of orderly administration and civil government, if parties could disobey orders with impunity. If such is the position as regards private parties, the duty to obey is all the more imperative in the case of Governmental authorities. If disobedience could go unchecked, it would result in orders of Courts ceasing to have meaning and judicial power itself becoming a mockery. When the state Government obeys a law, or gives effect to an order of a Court passed against it, it is not doing anything which detracts from its dignity, but rather, invests the law and the Courts with the dignity which are their due, which enhances the prestige of the executive government itself, in a democratic set up. If the Government had deliberately intended to disobey the order of the court, because for any reason they considered it wrong, their conduct deserves the severest condemnation. If on the other hand it was merely a case of inadvertence and arose out of error, nothing would have been lost and there was everything to be gained, even in the matter of the prestige of the government, by a frank avowal of the error committed by them and an expression of regret for the lapse, and it is lamentable that even at the stage of the hearing before us, there was no trace of any such attitude. "judicial Process and Contempt of Court12. Decisions of the Courts shall have to be obeyed by the authorities concerned. Obey they must. 13. Any person or authority including government obliged to implement decisions of the Courts cannot take upon themselves the onerous responsibility of sitting in judgment over the correctness or otherwise of such decisions as a justification either for not implementing them or for delayed implementation of the same. 14. Obey they must. 13. Any person or authority including government obliged to implement decisions of the Courts cannot take upon themselves the onerous responsibility of sitting in judgment over the correctness or otherwise of such decisions as a justification either for not implementing them or for delayed implementation of the same. 14. The attitude of the Governmental authorities either in being reluctant or in refusing to obey and implement the decision of the Courts, is subversive of judicial process besides being annihilative of the very concept of rule of law constituting thus gross contempt of Court. "in G. Omprakash v. V. R. Karanna, Chief personnel Manager, Vazir Sulthan Tobacco company Limited, Azamabad, Hyderabad, a learned Single Judge of this Court held "that nobody should be permitted to question the authority of the Court under the guise of its own interpretation of law knowing fully well the consequences of his act he has taken the defiant stand. " ( 94 ) FROM the above it is seen that the decisions of the Courts shall have to be abided by the authorities concerned or by any person or party including Government who are having knowledge of the order and to implement the decisions but not take upon themselves the responsibility of adjudicating the correctness or otherwise of such decisions as a justification for not implementing the order. A refusal to abide and implement the orders of the Court is nothing but subverting the judicial process and this constitutes gross contempt of Court. ( 95 ) NOW let us examine the facts of the case in Santhakumari's case (24 supra ). According to the learned Judges the orders passed on 5-9-2002 by the Secretary cannot be held to be contumacious and there is no material on record to show that the appellant herein wantonly and deliberately disobeyed the directions issued by the Court since no reference was made to Giridhar Kishore case while disposing the writ Petition No. 17560 of 1999 in the following words. "suffice that there is no reference to the order passed by Division Bench of this court in Giridhar Kishore case (W. P. No. 2533/95) in the order possed by the learned single Judge in w. P. No. 17560 of 1999 precisely for the said reason the learned judge in the order under appeal observes that. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I have in mind the judgment of the Giridhar Kishore case while disposing the writ petition No. 17560/99"in this context let us see the first paragraph of the order in the Writ petition which is as follows:-"in fact the issued in squarely covered by a Judgment of this Court. But, both the counsel for the respondent-society sri Chandraiah and his junior stoutly opposed the relief sought for by the petitioners by contending that the society has given cross promotions due to some exigencies in the administration till the year 1994 and thereafter they prepared seniority list subject wise and the claims of candidate as Post Graduate teacher in a subject other than the subject in which he was appointed, were considered. " ( 96 ) NEXTLY, having extracted and considered the rule afresh, this Court held that there is no change in the rule as contended by the counsel for the Society. In the result, the writ petition was allowed and writ of mandamus was issued directing respondents to consider the case of the petitioners for promotion as Post graduate teachers not only in the subject in which they were appointed as graduate teachers but also in other subjects if they are having post graduate degree with minimum of 50% marks in the Post Graduate level when it is stated in the judgment that the issue in squarely covered by the judgment of this Court what is the judgment the Court had in its mind if not Giridhar Kishore case. Is it the case of the judges that there is any judgment on the subject? Be that as it may, the Court having considered the rule position gave a direction afresh to consider the case of the petitioners for promotions as post graduate teacher not only in the subject in which they were appointed as trained graduate teachers but in any other subject in which they were qualified post graduation. Is the ratio deci dendi laid down in Giridhar kishore case is something different than the direction given in the writ petition. Be that as it may on 26-7-2002 when the contempt case came up for hearing after notice did the court not refer to Giridhar Kishore's case and gave four weeks time to comply with the order. Is the ratio deci dendi laid down in Giridhar kishore case is something different than the direction given in the writ petition. Be that as it may on 26-7-2002 when the contempt case came up for hearing after notice did the court not refer to Giridhar Kishore's case and gave four weeks time to comply with the order. Having taken two, three adjournments the Secretary by her proceedings dated 5-5-2002 rejected their case by giving a perverse interpretation to the order of the court. On the date when the Secretary appeared in the Court i. e. on 27-9-2002 the court did explain to her that her order dated 5-9-2002 runs counter to the direction given by the Court and if she fails to comply with the order the Court will be left with no other alternative except to proceed against her under the provisions of the Contempt of courts Act in the presence of packed Court. In fact the Court gave sufficient time to her to think over in the morning and when the case was taken up in the afternoon she refused to withdraw the order and stood by her order in the presence of Advocates and the litigant public in the packed Court. If this defiant attitude does not amount to contempt of court, we do not know what type of conduct on the part of the official concerned will amount to contempt of Court. Nextly, the appellant in her order dated 5-9-29002 stated that the Division Bench set aside the judgment passed in the writ petition wherein the petitioners therein claimed the relief which is similar to the relief sought for by the petitioners in W. P. No. 17560 of 1999. Did the learned Judges verify the correctness of otherwise of the statement? ( 97 ) NEXT objection they have taken was that there was no specific plea in the contempt case complaining any beach of specific direction issued by the Court. The direction given in the writ petition was already extracted supra. Is it not a declaration of law, if the petitioners are not complaining violation of those orders for what purpose they filed the contempt petition? Assuming for a moment, that they could not express themselves clearly in claiming the relief, on that ground can the Court throw them away without knowing or understanding their grievance? Is it not a declaration of law, if the petitioners are not complaining violation of those orders for what purpose they filed the contempt petition? Assuming for a moment, that they could not express themselves clearly in claiming the relief, on that ground can the Court throw them away without knowing or understanding their grievance? When once the Court understands their grievance is it not duty of the Court to undo the mischief committed by the concerned by modifying the relief appropriately. ( 98 ) THE learned Judge have taken another objection that no malafides are attributed and no new grounds were raised in contempt case by filing additional affidavit, having noticed that the Secretary passed the order long after the contempt case was filed i. e. on 20-6-2002, more so, after taking two weeks time on 16-8-2002 to comply with the order. Their Lordships jumped at the conclusion"that there is no attempt on the part of the appellant herein to flout the orders passed by this Court and in any willful and deliberate manner and even if the order is erroneous, it cannot be equated to that of contumacious one and this is a bonafide exercise of jurisdiction in compliance with the directions of this court. "merely on the ground that no malafides were alleged, can it be said that the order passed by the Officer is a bonafide one after so much contest at every stage from 1995 onwards after Giridhar Kishore's Case. Can it be said that the order do not suffer from the vice of malice in law. We leave this issue here. ( 99 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion we hold that the authority concerned cannot sit in Judgment on the orders passed by the court. The command of the law is that they have to obey the order simpliciter and on no ground they can excuse themselves for not implementing the order. A duty is cast on it to see whether the respondent exercised the power vested in him in good faith only or with a view to defy and disobey the order. If the order is not in conformity with the order of the Court he is bound to be punished to uphold the majesty of law. A duty is cast on it to see whether the respondent exercised the power vested in him in good faith only or with a view to defy and disobey the order. If the order is not in conformity with the order of the Court he is bound to be punished to uphold the majesty of law. An onerous duty is cast on the party, which fails to comply with the order to prove that in spite of its best efforts, the order could not be implemented due to some unforeseen reasons that came in its way and those reasons should be acceptable to the Court. When the order of a Learned Single Judge is subjected to an Appeal under Section 15 of the Letters Patent Act in Which Court the contempt Case has to be filed? (Before single judge or Division Bench): ( 100 ) THE undisputed fact is that the chartered Courts in India were exercising powers of contempt as a Court of Record before and after Contempt of Courts act, 1926 came into existence for the first time. This pre-existing power of Courts of record has been incorporated in Article 129 in case of Supreme Court and Article 215 in case of High Courts. Subsequently, Contempt law underwent changes. 1926 Act was repealed by 1952 Act, which was again repealed and replaced by 1971 Act. During all these years, the contempt applications are being dealt with by the concerned Judge or judges who delivered by Judgment for the first time, but not by the Division Bench even after the order was subjected to further appeal on the ground of merger. But the present advocate General after assuming the constitutional office, started contending that when once the Judgment of a single Judge is subjected to an appeal, any Contempt Case has to be filed before the Division Bench, but not before the concerned single Judge who dealt with the Writ Petition in the first instance, since his order is merged in the order of the Division Bench. ( 101 ) THE learned Advocate General submits that several appeals filed by him on this ground were admitted and in fact two division Benches of this Court upheld his contention. ( 101 ) THE learned Advocate General submits that several appeals filed by him on this ground were admitted and in fact two division Benches of this Court upheld his contention. ( 102 ) BEFORE considering the correctness or otherwise of the contentions of learned advocate General, we would like to examine various decisions cited on the doctrine of merger by the learned Advocate General, learned counsel for the Respondents and the amicus Curiae in opposition to his contention. ( 103 ) ACCORDING to P. Ramanatha Aiyar, "the doctrine of merger arises only when there are two independent thingsand the greater one would swallow up or may extinct the lesser one by the process of absorption. " (Law Lexicon - P. 1224, 2nd Edn. ). ( 104 ) THE first decision cited by the learned advocate General is U. J. S. Chopra v. State of bombay, The case arose under Criminal procedure Code. The facts of this case are that the appellant before the Supreme Court was convicted by the Presidency Magistrate, bombay and the appeal preferred by him was summarily dismissed by the High Court. After dismissal of that appeal, the State of bombay filed a Criminal Revision in the high Court for enhancement of the sentence. Having received notice on admission, the appellant his right under Section 439 (6) to show cause against the conviction. The High court having not permitted him to do so dismissed the Revision Petition filed by the state seeking enhancement of the sentence and granted a certificate of fitness under article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution of India. ( 105 ) THE question that arose for consideration before the Honourable supreme Court was 'whether the summary dismissal of the appeal preferred by the appellant precluded him from taking advantage of the provisions of Section 439 (6) of Criminal Procedure Code when he was called up to show cause why the sentence imposed upon him should not be enhanced. " ( 106 ) THE Supreme Court in para 25 held as follows:"25. The principle as to the finality of criminal judgments has also been invoked while considering this questions. " ( 106 ) THE Supreme Court in para 25 held as follows:"25. The principle as to the finality of criminal judgments has also been invoked while considering this questions. This principle has been recognised by this Court in - 'janardan reddy v. State of Hyderabad', AIR 1951 sc 217 (X), at p. 225 where Fazl Ali J. observed: "it is true that there is no such thing as the principle of constructive 'resjudicata' in a criminal case, but there is such a principle as finality of judgments, which applies to criminal as well as civil cases and is implicit in every system, wherein provisions are to be found for correcting errors in appeal or in revision. Section 430, Criminal P. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has given express recognition to this, principle of finality by providing that "judgments and orders passed by an appellate Court upon appeal shall be final, except in cases provided for in s. 417 and Chapter XXXII". Section 417 relates to appeals on behalf of Government in cases of acquittal by any Court other than a High Court and chapter XXXII ralates to reference and revision which also are powers exercised by the High Court over the judgments or orders of inferior Courts, thus excluding from the purview of this exception all judgments and orders passed by the High Court as an appellate Court. Section 430 does not in terms give finality to the judgments of the High court passed in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, but the same principle would apply whether the High Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction or its revisional jurisdiction, because in either case the High Court which is the highest Court of Appeal in the State would have pronounced its judgment, which judgment would replace the judgment of lower Court and would be final. Even while exercising its revisional powers under S. 439 the High Court exercises any of the powers conferred an a Court of Appeal by Ss. 423,426,427 and 428 and it is in effect an exercise of the appellant jurisdiction though exercised in the manner indicated therein. This principle of finality of criminal judgments therefore would equally apply when the High Court is exercising its revisional jurisdiction. 423,426,427 and 428 and it is in effect an exercise of the appellant jurisdiction though exercised in the manner indicated therein. This principle of finality of criminal judgments therefore would equally apply when the High Court is exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Once such a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court either in the exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment and there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable even the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction over the same. The judgment of the High Court would replace that of the lower Court which would no longer be subsisting but would be replaced by the High Court judgment and thus it is only the High court judgment which would be final and would have to be executed in accordance with law by the Courts below. " ( 107 ) IN Amba Bai v, Gopal, the Honourable supreme Court considered the principle of doctrine of merger. ( 108 ) IN that case the High Court disposed of the Second Appeal without knowing that the second appellant died and without bringing his legal representatives on record. The legal representative of the deceased appellant resisted the execution application by contending that the decree passed by the high Court in Second Appeal is nullity and hence it cannot be executed. The Sub-Court rejected their contention and held that the execution proceedings can be initiated in accordance with the decree, which was passed by the first appellant Court, since the high Court did not carry out any amendment in the decree of the trial court and the question of merger of the decree of the first appellate court decree passed by the second appellate court did not arise. When this order was challenged before the High Court, the learned single Judge of the High Court held that the order passed in the first appellant Court decree merged into the order passed in the second appeal and there is no executable decree. ( 109 ) THE Apex Court held as follows: "11. When this order was challenged before the High Court, the learned single Judge of the High Court held that the order passed in the first appellant Court decree merged into the order passed in the second appeal and there is no executable decree. ( 109 ) THE Apex Court held as follows: "11. If the judgment of order of an inferior court is subjected to an appeal or revision by the superior court and in such proceedings the order or judgment is passed by the superior court determining the rights of parties, it would supersede the order or judgment passed by the inferior court. The juristic justification for such doctrine of merger is based on the common law principle that the cannot be, at one and the same time, more than one operative order governing the subject-matter and the judgment of the inferior court is deemed to lose its identity and merges with the judgment of the superior court. In the course of time, this concept which was originally restricted to appellate decrees on the ground that an appeal is continuation of the suit, came to be gradually extended to other proceedings like revisions and even the proceedings before quasi-judicial and executive authorities. 12. This Court is State of Madras v. Maditraimills Co. Ltd. ( AIR 1967 SC 681 ) observed as under (AIR Headnote)"the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the inferior authority and the other by a superior authority, passed in an appeal or revision, there is a fusion or merger of two orders irrespective of the subject- matter of the appellate or revisional order and the scope of the appeal or revision contemplated by the particular statute. The application of the doctrine depends on the nature of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. "13. In a recent decision in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 this court held that an order dismissing special leave petition, more so when it is by a non-speaking order, does not result in merger of the order impugned into the order of the Supreme Court. 14. In the instant case, there is no question of the application of the doctrine of merger. 14. In the instant case, there is no question of the application of the doctrine of merger. As the second appellant Radhu Lal died during the pendency of the appeal, and in the absence of his legal heirs having taken any steps to prosecute the second appeal, the decree passed by the first appellate courtmust be deemed to have become final. By virtue of order passed by the first appellate court, the plaintiff's suit for specific performance was decreed. Failure on the part of the legal heirs of Radhu Lal to get themselves impleaded in the second appeal and pursue the matter further shall not adversely affect the plaintiff decree- holder as it would be against the mandate of Rule 9 Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The impugned order is, therefore, not sustainable in law and the same is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The executing court may proceed with the execution proceedings. Parties to bear their respective costs. " ( 110 ) SINCE the Second Appeal abated due to the death of 2nd appellant, the Honourable supreme Court held that the Judgment and decree of the 1st appellate Court became final and merger of this judgment in the judgment of 2nd appellate Court i. e. High court on the principle of doctrine of merger does not arise. ( 111 ) IN Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode, constituted under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 in O. A. No. 5 of 1981. held that an extent of Ac. 10. 02 of land did not vest in the Government. The appeal as well as S. L. P. filed by the State Government were dismissed. Thereafter, the State government amended the Act and introduced Section 8c amongst other with retrospective effect and filed an application before the High Court seeking review of the orders passed by the Tribunal under the Act. The appellants herein raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of the review application and directed the review petition be posted for hearing on merits. Aggrieved by the order, the appellants carried the matter to Supreme Court by contending that the order of the High Court dated 17-12-1982 merged in the order of the supremecourt dated 18-7-1983 and the order of the High Court ceased to exist in the eye of law. Aggrieved by the order, the appellants carried the matter to Supreme Court by contending that the order of the High Court dated 17-12-1982 merged in the order of the supremecourt dated 18-7-1983 and the order of the High Court ceased to exist in the eye of law. Therefore an application seeking review of the order of the High Court is entirely misconceived. The Supreme Court considered the doctrine of merger and held as follows: "7. The doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognised. It is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the hierarchy of justice delivery system. On more occasions than one this Court had an opportunity of dealing with the doctrine of merger. It would be advisable to trace and set out the judicial opinion of this Court as it has progressed through the times. " ( 112 ) HAVING reviewed the case law, their lordship held that"the logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree of operative orders governing the same subjected-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the Us before it either way- whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority which is final, binding and operative decree of order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. " ( 113 ) IN S. Shammtgavel Nadar v. State of tamil Nadu, the constitutional validity of madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act 13 of 1960), wherein certain amendments were incorporated in the Madras City Tenants protections Act, 1921 were question in Civil writ Petitions filed before the Madras High court and the validity of the Act was upheld by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme court dismissed the S. L. P on certain technical grounds. Subsequently the Madras City, tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996) was enacted by the State Legislature and came into force with effect from 11-1-1996. When the constitutional validity of this Act was questioned, the Division Bench keeping reliance on the earlier judgment held that the earlier judgment operates as res indicate. A full Bench of the Madras High Court took view that the Judgment of the Division Bench in M. Varadaraja Pillai case (85 LW 760) merged in the order of Supreme Court, though the same was dismissed on technical ground, and therefore, it was no more open for the Full Bench to examine and consider the correctness of the law laid down by the division Bench. Aggrieved by the said order, the appeals were filed by Special Leave before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court having held that the Court did not go into the question of constitutional validity of Act 3 of 1960 nor the Court apply its mind on the first occasion held in para 17 as follows:"17. We are clearly of the opinion that in spite of the dismissal of the appeals on 10-9-1986 by this Court on the ground of non-joinder of necessary party, though the operative part of the order of the Division Bench stood merged in the decision of this Court, the remaining part of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be said to have merged in the order of this Court dated 10-9-1986 nor did the order of this Court make any declaration of law within the meaning of Article 141 of the constitution either expressly or by necessary implication. The statement of law as contained in the Division bench decision of the High Court in m. Varadaraja Filial case would therefore continue to remain the decision of the high Court, binding as a precedent on subsequent Benches of coordinate or lesser-strength but open to reconsideration by any Bench of the same High Court with a Coram of judges more than two. " ( 114 ) WHILE arriving the above conclusion their Lordship considered the doctrine of merger in paras 10 and 11 as follows:"10. Firstly, the doctrine of merger. Though loosely an expression merger of judgment, order or decision of a court or forum into the judgment, order or decision of a superior, forum is often employed, as a general rule the judgment or order having been_,_dealt with by a superior forum and having resulted in confirmation, reversal or modification, what merges is the operative part i. e. the mandate or decree issued by the court which may have been expressed in a positive or negative form. For example, take a case where the subordinate forum passes an order and the same, having been dealt with by a superior forum, is confirmed for reasons different from the one assigned by the subordinate forum, what would merge in the order of the superior forum is the operative part of the order and not the reasoning of the subordinate forum; otherwise there would be an apparent contradiction. However, in certain, cases, the reasons for decision can also be said to have merged in the order of the superior court if the superior court has while formulating its own judgment or order, either adopted or reiterated the reasoning, or recorded an express approval of the reasoning, incorporated in the judgment or order of the subordinate forum. 11. Secondly, the doctrine of merger has a limited application. In State of U. P. v. Mohd Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) the constitution Bench by its majority speaking through S. R. Das, CJ. so expressed itself. "while it is that a decree of a court of first instance may be said to merge in the decree passed on appeal therefore or even in the order passed in revision, it does so only for certain purposes, namely, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for execution of the decree; (AIR p. 95, para 13 ). ( 115 ) SRI. ( 115 ) SRI. K. V. Satyanarayan, Senior advocate, appointed as Amicus Curiae brought to the notice of this Court the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in shankar Ramchandra Abhyanka v. Krishnaji dattatraya Bapat, herein their Lordship held that two things are required to constitute appellate jurisdiction - (1) the existence of the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of former to review decisions of the latter. . . . . . . . . . . . . the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause, the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and, indeed, in any form in which legislature may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762 of work of story on Constitution ( of United states) Vol. 2 the most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at least those which are most known in the United States; are by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a retrial. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a retrial. ( 116 ) FROM the above it is seen (1) the existence of the relation of superior of inferior court and the power an the part of the former to review the decisions of the later, (2) that doctrine of merger is neither a constitutional law nor a statute law, but based on common law principle that there cannot be at one and the same time more than one operative order governing the subject matter, (3) the doctrine of merger implies that when the order of the inferior Court or Tribunal is subjected to appeal or revision before the superior Court, the order passed by the superior Court will be the final order on the merits of the case and the order of the inferior Court merges in the order of the appellate Court, (4) what would merge in the order of superior forum is the operative part of the order of and not the reasoning of the subordinate forum, (5) an order dismissing special leave petition by a non-speaking order, does not result in merger of the order impugned into the order of the Supreme Court, (6) This concept which was originally restricted to appellate decrees under Common Law on the ground that an appeal is continuation of the suit, in the course of time, came to be gradually extended to other proceedings like revisions and even the proceedings before quasi-judicial and executive authorities and (7) the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal application, but it has only a limited application. ( 117 ) BUT none of these cases can be treated as an authority for the proposition advanced by the learned Advocate General. If the plea of the learned Advocate General is accepted, in civil matter also from where the doctrine of merger emanated the execution petitions have to be filed in the Court where the judgment attained finality. ( 117 ) BUT none of these cases can be treated as an authority for the proposition advanced by the learned Advocate General. If the plea of the learned Advocate General is accepted, in civil matter also from where the doctrine of merger emanated the execution petitions have to be filed in the Court where the judgment attained finality. But Order 21, rule 10 CPC is as hereunder:"application for execution.- Where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf, or if the decree has been sent under the provisions hereinbefore contained to another Court then to such Court or to the proper officer thereof. "from the above it is seen that after the lis attained finality, if the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the court, which passed the decree in the first instance. Accordingly all execution petitions are being filed in the trial court to get the judgment of the appellate Court executed in whatever form it may stand i. e. either confirmed or modified, but not the appellate court which modified the order. ( 118 ) ON the same analogy contempt cases though cannot be treated as Execution petitions have to be dealt with by the Judge of Judges whose order has been violated, in the event of its confirmation or modification by the appellate forum i. e. either a Division bench of Larger Bench. We understand that was the practice not only in Andhra Pradesh but also all over the country. We should also keep in mind that the question filing any contempt case for violation of the order of learned Judge if it is set aside or quashed does not arise, since the order of learned single Judge is no more in existence. ( 119 ) BUT a Judgment of this Court in contempt Case No. 282 of 2001 dated 31st july, 2001 held as follows:"having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that this contempt case before the learned single Judge was not maintainable. ( 119 ) BUT a Judgment of this Court in contempt Case No. 282 of 2001 dated 31st july, 2001 held as follows:"having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that this contempt case before the learned single Judge was not maintainable. However, in view of the facts that certain directions have been issued by a division Bench of this Court, the petitioner shall be at liberty to file contempt Petition before the Division bench, the Contempt Case is dismissed with the aforementioned observations. "but no reasons were given by the Division bench is holding that the contempt case before learned single Judge is not maintainable. ( 120 ) IN Smt. A. Santhi Kumari's (24 supra), a Division Bench of this Court having extracted the above case law, held in paras 41 and 42 as follows:"41. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the order passed by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 17560 of 1999 has been subjected to remedy available under the law before the Division Bench. The said order got merged into the judgment passed by the writ appellate court and it is the order of the writ appellate Court, which is final, binding and operative order and it is that order which subsists and remains operative and capable of enforcement in the eye of law. 42. In our considered opinion, the contempt Case filed by the respondent- writ petitioners, which itself arises out of the order passed, by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 17560 of 1999, is not maintainable in law since the order passed by the learned Single Judge no more subsists in the eye of law. The order passed by the learned Single Judge is sunk or disappeared and stood absorbed into the order of the writ appellate Court. "though L. P. A. is inter-court appeal, the jurisdiction of the Division Bench under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act is capable of reversing modifying or confirming the order of a learned single Judge. To that extent there is no dispute. ( 121 ) FIRSTLY, the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that the order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition got merged in the order of the Division Bench. To that extent there is no dispute. ( 121 ) FIRSTLY, the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that the order of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition got merged in the order of the Division Bench. The learned judges have not gone into the aspect whether the order of the Division Bench is at variance from the order of the learned single Judge or not. Nextly, they might have been carried away with the observation that even if the judgment is confirmed by the Division Bench, the learned single Judge's order merges into the appellate Court order. ( 122 ) ASSUMING for a moment that the proposition is corr ect, the next question would be before which Court the Contempt case has to be filed. Absolutely, there is no discussion, more so, with reference to the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act and the Rules made thereunder. ( 123 ) NOW let us have a glance at the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. ( 124 ) UNDER Section2 (b)of Act. 1971,'civil contempt' is defined as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. ( 125 ) UNDER Section 9 the provisions of the act should not be understood as enlarging the scope of contempt. ( 126 ) UNDER Section 10, the High Court shall exercise the same jurisdiction under the contempt Courts Act in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to it was well as in respect of contempt of itself. ( 127 ) SECTIONL2deals with the punishment for Contempt of Court. ( 128 ) UNDER Section 15, the High Court or the Supreme Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by the advocate General for a criminal contempt other than the contempts referred to in section-14. ( 129 ) SECTION 17 deals with the procedure after taking cognizance of contempt. ( 130 ) UNDER Section 18, every case of criminal contempt shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two judges. ( 131 ) SECTION 19 deals with the appeals. ( 132 ) SECTION 23 deals with power of supreme Court and High Court to make rules. ( 130 ) UNDER Section 18, every case of criminal contempt shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two judges. ( 131 ) SECTION 19 deals with the appeals. ( 132 ) SECTION 23 deals with power of supreme Court and High Court to make rules. ( 133 ) FROM the above, it is seen that the Act simply stated that the High Court shall exercise the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act for Civil Contempt. As far as criminal Contempt is concerned, the High court has to take cognizance either on its own or on a motion made by the Advocate general or any other person and it has to be heard and determined by a Bench of two judges. From the scheme of the Act it is seen that the High Court is having power to punish for contempt of itself and any Court subordinate to it, we have to presume from section 18, that in case of civil Contempt the matter has to be heard and determined by a single Judge and if it is a criminal Contempt the matter has to be heard and determined by a Division Bench. This view of ours is fortified by Section 19, which provides for an appeal to a Division Bench of not less than two Judges against the order of single Judge and to the Supreme Court against the order of a Division Bench. ( 134 ) THE High Court framed the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980 in ROC No. 173/so/80 in exercise of its rule making power under section 23 of the Act read with Articles 215, and 227, of Constitution of India and section 129 of Civil Procedure Code. Rule. 3 says that every case initiated for Contempt of court under the Act shall be presented in the office of the Registrar and registered as a contempt Case. ( 135 ) UNDER Rule, 5 every contempt case other than the Contempt referred to in rule, 4 has to be taken cognizance by the high Court for taking action either suo motu or on a petition made by the Advocate- general or on a petition made by any person and in case Criminal Contempt with the consent in writing of the Advocate- General of the State of Andhra Pradesh. ( 136 ) AS far as posting of the Contempt cases are concerned, they are dealt with in rules, 12,13 and 14. It is useful to extract the same. Rule-12. Every case for Civil Contempt of the High Courtshall be posted before, the Judge or Judges in respect of whose judgment, decree, Direction Order, Writ or other process the contempt is alleged or before whom the undertaking was given in respect of which wilful breach was committed or before some other judge or Judges as the Chief Justice may direct in case the Judge or Judges concerned is or/are not available, for preliminary hearing and for orders as to issue of notice to the contemner or contemners as the case may be, if there is a 'prima facie case and for further hearing before them after notice, if issued. Upon such preliminary hearing, the Judge or Judges if satisfied that no prima facie has been made out for issue of notice, may dismiss the petition. 13. Every case of contempt shall be posted before a single Judge for Civil contempt and before a Bench of two judges for Criminal Contempt as the chief Justice may direct, if the contempt alleged is of a Subordinate Court and before a Bench of two Judges as the chief Justice may direct, if the contempt alleged is in respect of the High Court and is the one other than that referred to in Rule 12 supra, for preliminary hearing and for orders as to issue of notice to the contemner or contemners, as the case may be, if there is a prima fade case. Upon Such preliminary hearing, the Court, if satisfied that no prima facie case has been made out for issuing of notice, may dismiss the petition. 14. The cases referred to in Rule 13 supra, after notice if issued, shall be posted for further hearing before, a single Judge or a Bench of two Judges as the case may be, dealing with such cases for the time being or as directed by the chief Justice. 14. The cases referred to in Rule 13 supra, after notice if issued, shall be posted for further hearing before, a single Judge or a Bench of two Judges as the case may be, dealing with such cases for the time being or as directed by the chief Justice. ( 137 ) FROM the above, it is seen the under rule, 12 every contempt case for civil contempt of the High Court has to be posted before the Judge or Judges in respect of whose judgment, decree or direction, order has been violated for preliminary hearing as well as further hearing in the matter after notice has been issued and only in the event of that particular Judge or Judges are not available, then the Honourable Chief Justice gets jurisdiction to post the case before some other Judge or Judges, but not otherwise. ( 138 ) UNDER Rule, 13 if the contempt alleged is of a Sub-Court or the high Court other than the contempt referred to in Rule -12, the contempt cases have to be posted before bench of two Judges as per the orders of the honourable Chief Justice. ( 139 ) UNDER Rule 14after issuance of notice, the cases referred in Rule-13 shall be posted for further hearing before single Judge or a bench of two Judges as the case may be dealing with such cases for the time being or as directed by the Chief justice. ( 140 ) RULE, 17 says that a learned single judge of the Court while hearing the contempt case can refer the matter to Bench of two judges and a Division Bench hearing the contempt cases is empowered to refer the matter to a Bench of more than two Judges for hearing, if the learned single Judge or the division Bench hearing the contempt case are of the opinion that the said case requires consideration by more than one or two judges, as the case may be. ( 141 ) AS observed earlier, till 1991 all the contempt cases used to be listed before the judge or Judges whose orders as alleged to have been violated for taking action either confirmed or modified by the appellate forum. But in 1991, Rule-12 was omitted by roc No. 1932/so/91, dated 13-8-1991 and all contempt cases used to be posted before one learned single Judge. But in 1991, Rule-12 was omitted by roc No. 1932/so/91, dated 13-8-1991 and all contempt cases used to be posted before one learned single Judge. Having realised the impracticability of the new procedure and wastage of precious time of the Court, the rule was again reinserted by Circular by roc No. l278/so/95 vide R. S. to Part II (Ext.) A. P. Gazette, dt 7-7-1995. ( 142 ) IF a harmonious interpretation is given to the Act and the Rules made thereunder, the contempt case in case of civil contempt is to be posted before the Judge who is the first instance decided the rights of the parties as per Rule-12 of the Rules. Rule-12 of the Rues makes it very clear that civil Contempt matters should be posted and heard before the Judge or Judges (in respect of) whose judgment has been wilfully disobeyed or flouted. The words 'judge or judges' occurring in Rule-12 mean the 'judge or Judges' who originally decided the issue. While making this rule, the Court has kept in mind that ordinarily the cases decided in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Constitution of India under Article 226 will be heard by a single Judge and the appeals arising out of certain special enactments like Income Tax Act, Andhra pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) act, 1982 have to be heard by a Division bench of not less than tow Judge at the High court level. We also make it clear that as long as Rule-12 is on the statute book, the contempt Cases have to be posted before the judge or Judges whose judgment has been violated or disobeyed and if the learned judge or Judges feel that the matter requires consideration by more than one Judge is view of the importance involved in the matter, he is given the option to refer the matter to a division Bench. Likewise, if the learned Judge or Judges who heard the matter initially are not available, then the Honourable Chief justice is empowered to post before some other Judge or Judges. ( 143 ) NOW let us consider Rule-15 of the contempt Rules, which deals with the procedure in contempt cases initiated by the court in exercise of suo motu powers. "15. ( 143 ) NOW let us consider Rule-15 of the contempt Rules, which deals with the procedure in contempt cases initiated by the court in exercise of suo motu powers. "15. Where a Judge or Judges of the high Court considers or consider that any matter might have come to his or their notice in any way, requires initiation of proceedings in contempt against any person, the papers relevant thereto together with a statement of the fact of the case and the direction of the judge or Judges may be placed before the Chief Justice for directions to send the papers to the Advocate General or may be sent to the Advocate General for taking appropriate action or initiation of proceedings may be taken suo motu by the High Court on the original side as per the specified directions of the Judge of Judges concerned, if any, and the side case shall be posted before the said Judge or judges concerned in the case of Civil contempt of the High Court as mentioned in Rule 12 supra or before a single Judge or Division Bench as mentioned in Rule 13 supra. " ( 144 ) FIRSTLY the question of initiation of contempt of proceedings in exercise of suo motu power by a Judge or Judges will arise only when they are hearing a particular case and when the conduct of a party comes to the adverse notice of Court, the Judge or Judges sets the law into motion by passing a preliminary order. ( 145 ) FROM this Rule, it is seen that when the Court in exercise of its suo motu powers initiates contempt proceedings against any person, the papers shall be placed before the honourable Chief Justice for direction to send the papers to the Advocate General for initiation of proceedings as per the directions of the judge or Judges concerned, and the said case shall be posted before the said judge of Judges concerned as mentioned in rule-12 supra or before a Division as mentioned in Rule-13 supra in case the contempi alleged is of Subordinate Court. ( 146 ) FURTHER, when the contempt petition has to be posted before the Judge or Judges concerned, who initiated proceedings suo motu, there cannot be any justification in not posting a contempt petition before the Judge or Judges, whose judgmenthas been violated when the same was brought to the notice of the Court on a petition filed by the person aggrieved by the illegal action of contemner. ( 147 ) IF the reasoning given by the learned judges in Smt. A. Santhi Kumari's case (24 supra) is to be accepted and the contempt case is to be posted before a Division Bench of the ground that the order of the learned single Judge merged with theappellate order, then the appeal provided under Section 19 of the Act whereunder an appeal is provided to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the court against the order or decision of a single judge becomes redundant and otise. ( 148 ) JUSTICE K. Ramaswamy, as the then was, in K. K. R. Nair v. Sri Mohan Das Mosses, m. D. FCI, held that doctrine of merger does not bar the petitioner to move contempt case before the learned Judge of the High Court who heard the matter initially and contempt proceedings could be initiated before the concerned single Judge or Judges of Division bench whose orders, directions etc. are disobeyed or wilful breach was committed. . ( 149 ) IN that case, the order of termination of the services of the petitioner was quashed by learned single Judge in Writ Petition no. 86692 of 1981, Writ Appeal No. 361 of 1985 was filed and the same was dismissed without much discussion. The S. L. P. filed before the Supreme Court was also dismissed. Thereafter, the respondent did not choose to reinstate him even after the repeated representations and legal notices. Hence, the petition filed the Contempt Case. ( 150 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised similar objection by contending that the order passed by the learned single Judge is merged in the order of the Supreme Court and if any remedy is available has to file contempt case in Supreme court. Hence, the petition filed the Contempt Case. ( 150 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the respondent raised similar objection by contending that the order passed by the learned single Judge is merged in the order of the Supreme Court and if any remedy is available has to file contempt case in Supreme court. ( 151 ) HAVING considered the issue at length it was held that there is no divergent opinion as regards the doctrine of merger and held that the order of the learned single Judge merged with the order of the Supreme Court. The view may not be correct in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in s. Shanmugavel Nadar's case (34 supra ). Then the proceeded to examine the provisions of the Act and Rules to decided before which court the contempt case has to be filed and held in para 7 of the Judgment as follows. "7. But still, the question is, which is the order that is enforceable under Section 12 of the Act. This Court, in exercise of the power under Sec. 23 of the Act read with Article 215 and 227 of the constitution of India and Section 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, framed the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980, for short, "the Rules" published in the gazette and became effective from march 26,1981. Rule 12 provides thus:"every case for Civil Contempt of the high Court shall be posted before the judge or Judges in respect of whose judgment, decree direction, order, writ or other process the contempt is alleged or before whom the undertaking was given in respect of which wilful breach was committed or before some other judge of Judges as the Chief Justice may direct in case the Judge or Judges concerned is or are not available, for preliminary hearing and for orders as to issue of notice to the contemnor or contemnors as the case may be, if the there is a prima facie case and for further hearing before them after notice, if issued. Uponsuch preliminary hearing the Judge of Judges if satisfied that no prima facie case has been made out of issue of notice, may dismiss the petition. Uponsuch preliminary hearing the Judge of Judges if satisfied that no prima facie case has been made out of issue of notice, may dismiss the petition. "rule 13 also provides similar power in respect of a civil or criminal contempt of a subordinate court and the court to take cognisance thereof and to follow the procedure provided in subsequent rules in the disposal of the contempt cases. The court, thereby, while being aware of the doctrine of merger, have specifically made rule 12 to post the civil contempt of the high Court before the Judge or Judges in respect of "whose Judgment" decree, direction, order, writ or other process" the contempt of wilful disobedience is complained of or before whom the undertaking was given in respect of which "wilful breach" was committed, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . The only exception is thatwhen the Judge of Judges concerned is/are not available, then the Chief Justice has been empowered to direct the case to be posted before some other Judge of Judges to deal with the matter. Thereby, it is clear that it is the Judge or Judges whose judgment, writ, etc. , are alleged to have been wilful violated or in respect of which wilful breach was committed, has to hear and dispose of the contempt case unless the judge or Judges themselves direct to post it before some other court for reasons stated by the Judge or Judges. Thereby the rule itself provides as clue that despite the doctrine of merger and carrying the proceedings in appeal to the appellate forums either under Clause 15 of the letters Patent to the Division Bench of under Article 136 of the Constitution, etc. to the Supreme Court and the decision rendered thereon by the Division Bench of two Judges or a Full Bench or by the supreme Court, the Judge or Judges has/ have power and jurisdiction u/s. 12 of the Act. The reason is obvious. In an appropriate case, contempt maybe in the nature of execution. For execution of a decree, despite the decree of the trial Court gets merged with the decree of the appellate Court- either in first appeal or second appeal or the Supreme Court, the decree of the higher superior Court is the executable decree. It is executable in the court of first instance. For execution of a decree, despite the decree of the trial Court gets merged with the decree of the appellate Court- either in first appeal or second appeal or the Supreme Court, the decree of the higher superior Court is the executable decree. It is executable in the court of first instance. "decree" is defined in Section 2 (2) of C. P. C. to mean, the formal expression of an adjudication which. . . . . . conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. Even rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within sec. 144, is also declared to be a decree, but exclusion has been made in respect of any adjudication from which an appeal lies a an appeal from an order, or any order of dismissal for default. In the sense, the order, judgment, decree, writ, direction, etc. issued by a single Judge may comprise of several facets. In the proceedings arising under writ jurisdiction - under Article 226, the learned single Judge may give in the first instance some positive direction or order for compliance by the respondent or observation to be adhered to before taking any further action or decision by the respondents; or an undertaking may be given by the contemnor. In a case where the matter is carried in appeal and the division Bench merely confirms the order or writ or direction or observations without any modification then while implementing the order, it is the observations or the directions, etc. , as originally issued by the learned single judge and confirmed in appeal, constitute the basis for wilful disobedience or wilful breach for initiation of the proceedings for contempt. In such a situation, in my respectful view, it is the learned single judge that can take cognisance of the proceedings for contemptand take further steps as provided under the Act and the rules. In such a situation, in my respectful view, it is the learned single judge that can take cognisance of the proceedings for contemptand take further steps as provided under the Act and the rules. Take an instance, on appeal, the division Bench might not agree with the reasoning or directions or observations made, but it may reach the same conclusion with different reasoning, directions or observations, then for the purpose of initiation of proceedings for contempt, it is those observations, directions or reasoning, if they are wilfully disobeyed or wilful breach is committed, and it is the Division Bench or the Full bench that constitutes the proper forum to take cognisance and to pursue follow- up action. Take further instance, that when the matter is carried in appeal to the supreme Court, the Supreme Court may disagree with the Division Bench and may agree with the reasoning observations or directions of the learned single Judge. Then it is the order or direction of the single Judge that forms basis. Or the Supreme Court itself may make further observation or give directions. If the breach or wilful disobedience complained of is against the observation or directions of the supreme Court, then it would constitute cause of action for initiating the proceedings for contempt, before the supreme Court. If the directions observations, etc. of the Division Bench are disobeyed, the contempt proceedings can be laid before the Division Bench. It is to be seen that Section 19 provides appeal to the Division Bench against the order in the contempt proceedings of the learned single Judge and a further appeal to the supreme Court, When the statute provides right of appeal, if the contention of the learned Counsel is given credence to, then the appellate forum provided under Section 19 is rendered nugatory. It is also to be further seen that the rules of procedure are only step in aid or handmaid rendering substantial justice and the procedure would be an end in itself but be tailored to meet the requirement of the law. Moreover, the petitioner who complains of wilful, disobedience or breach of the orders of the Court issued under Article 226, is relegated to pursue the remedy in the Supreme Court, the party would be needlessly mulcted with heavy costs or gives up the remedy due to indigency and thereby prevent the party to redress the injury. Moreover, the petitioner who complains of wilful, disobedience or breach of the orders of the Court issued under Article 226, is relegated to pursue the remedy in the Supreme Court, the party would be needlessly mulcted with heavy costs or gives up the remedy due to indigency and thereby prevent the party to redress the injury. Thereby, the contemner, with impunity, would get away with his contumacious conduct to deliberately or wilful disobey the order issued by the single Judge or the Bench of two Judges of the High Court of commits wilful breach of the undertaking given. Take for instance the case on hand. The order or termination of the services of the petitioner was merely quashed. As a consequence, in the eye of law, there is no order of termination the respondent are obliged to reinstate the petition into service with all consequential benefits and to allow him to continue in service till he attains the age of superannuation or until any other event that may legally or otherwise arise. If the respondents refuse to reinstate the petitioner into service, necessary the petitioner has to initiate proceedings for contempt, as it amounts to wilful disobedience of the writ obsolute issued by the learned single Judge . The division Bench and the Supreme Court merely confirmed the orders of the learned single Judge without any Further directions or observations. Thereby it is the writ absolute that was issued by the learned Single Judge which is complained for wilful disobedience that would constitute cause of action to initiate proceedings under Section 12 of the Act and the Rules. It is already held by the supreme Court that the doctrine of merger is not a rigid or absolute or inevitable rule. It has to be tailored with reference to the facts and circumstances and situation. Thus considered I am of the considered view that despite the operation of the doctrine of merger, proceedings for contempt could be initiated before the single judge of Judges of Division Bench whose orders, directions, writ, etc. It has to be tailored with reference to the facts and circumstances and situation. Thus considered I am of the considered view that despite the operation of the doctrine of merger, proceedings for contempt could be initiated before the single judge of Judges of Division Bench whose orders, directions, writ, etc. are disobeyed or wilful breach is committed, ( 152 ) ADMITTEDLY, this Judgment was not cited before the Division Bench and the learned Advocate General could not produce any order in support of his pea either of the supreme Court or of any High Court except the above two judgments, though the jurisdiction under Contempt of Court Act is being exercised by the Courts of Record from time immemorial. ( 153 ) WE are in agreement with the reasoning given by the learned Judge is arriving at the conclusion that it is the writ absolute that was issued by the learned single judges, which is complained of wilful disobedience that would constitute cause of action to initiate proceedings under section 12 of the Act and the Rules. But it is difficult to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that if the order of the learned single Judge is subjected to an appeal and if the Division Bench reaches the same conclusion with the different reasoning and if the respondents wilful disobeyed those directions or observations, it is that Division bench or the Full Bench that constitute the proper Forum to take cognizance and to pursue follow up action. The learned Judge reached this Conclusion under the impression that the since the order of the learned single Judge merged with the order of the appellate forum, that forum constitute the proper forum to take cognizance of the wilful disobedience of its orders. AS discussed supra, the doctrine of merger is neither a doctrine of Constitutional Law nor doctrine statutorily recognised, but it is only a common law doctrine based on the principle that there cannot be one and the same time the more then one operative order governing the subject matter and the judgment of the inferior court will be deemed to lose its identity and merges with the judgment of the superior court. It is having only limited application and subject to the statutory provisions on the subject concerned, since it is not having any rigid or universal application. It is having only limited application and subject to the statutory provisions on the subject concerned, since it is not having any rigid or universal application. Admittedly, the High Court being a Court of Record exercises the power to contempt. Under the provisions of the contempt of Courts Act it is made clear that except High Court no other Court subordinate to it can exercise the contempt powers and the Act prescribes not only the procedure for taking cognizance of the offence, but the nature and types of offences that can be treated as Contempt of Court, both Civil and Criminal, and the punishment that can be imposed thereon. ( 154 ) SINCE the Contempt of Courts Act being self-contained code, the doctrine of merger cannot be pressed into service for hearing of the contempt cases under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act and invariably all civil contempt cases alleging wilful disobedience of an order of a High have to be filed before the learned single judge or Judges whose judgment as confirmed or modified has been disobeyed or flouted and the aggrieved person is entitled to carry the matter in appeal to a Division bench or to the Supreme Court to test the correctness or otherwise of the order, even if the order is subjected to an appeal, on the analogy of Order 21, Rule 10 of CPC, wherein the Execution Petitions have to be filed in the court, which passed the decree even after its modification or confirmation. ( 155 ) ON the other hand, if was accept the contention of the learned Advocate General, the Government being the biggest in the country fighting the litigation with the peoples' money will rush to the Supreme court even in petty cases and mostly the common man may not be able to present his case before the Supreme Court due to prohibitive cost of litigation. In the event the honourable Supreme Court confirms or modifies the orders of the High Court and the Government fails to comply with that order also, the party may not be able to approach the Honourable Supreme Court due to indigency and file a contempt case there. The result would be denial of justice to the party and the contemner would flout the orders wilful with impunity and gets away with his contumacious conduct. The result would be denial of justice to the party and the contemner would flout the orders wilful with impunity and gets away with his contumacious conduct. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the doctrine of merger has no application. At any rate, the same cannot have overriding effect over the statutory provisions. ( 156 ) FURTHER our enquiries reveal almost all the Courts in India are following the practice of listing the contempt cases before the Judge or Judges whose orders have been alleged to have been violated or committed wilful breach of the orders. ( 157 ) BY following the practice that is in vogue from times immemorial not only precious time of the Courts is being saved, but it will also help the litigant public to get justice, since the learned single Judge who dwelled into facts of the case and rendered judgment will have grip over the facts of the case and the he knows under what circumstances he passed such an order and the moment the Contempt Case is taken up for hearing, he will be able to decide whether the order of the Court has been violated or not. On the other hand, if the case is posted before any other Judge or Judges, the entire matter has to be re-argued and reheard which will result in wasting the precious time of the court. It is not uncommon in this country that justice is being delivered by the learned judges as per their notions and their social background plays a vital role in deciding the lis, otherwise so many conflicting judgments would not have emanated from Court of justice. ( 158 ) AFTER judgment is reserved in this batch of cases from the cause list we have seen that the Honourable Chief Justice directed the Registry to post these contempt cases before the Judges having the regular provision. ( 159 ) IT is not in dispute that the Honourable chief Justice is having prerogative in fixing the roster and allot the work to the brother judges as long as the rules are silent. It is also not in dispute that the Honourable Chief justice is having power to withdraw any particular case from any Court if he received any adverse report against the Judge that the reputation of the Institution is not eroded. It is also not in dispute that the Honourable Chief justice is having power to withdraw any particular case from any Court if he received any adverse report against the Judge that the reputation of the Institution is not eroded. But when once a particular aspect is covered by a statutory rule, the Chief Justice cannot act contrary to the rules. Hence, we hold that the direction of the Chief Justice not to post contempt cases before the learned Judges whose orders have been violated or flouted, but post before the judges who are having regular provision runs counter to Rules 12 and 15 of Contempt Rules and the same cannot be sustained in law. ( 160 ) HENCE, we direct the Registry to post contempt cases filed either by the aggrieved person or initiated by the Court in exercise of suo motu powers before the Judge or Judges in respect of whose Judgment the contempt is alleged or the Judge or Judges who initiated contempt proceedings as contemplated under Rules 12 and 15 of thecontempt Rules. Against what order an L. P. A is maintainable: ( 161 ) THE law is now well settled that unless the High Court finds the alleged contemner guilty or contempt and punishes him, no appeal under Section 19 (1) of the Act would lie. If the High Court refuses to exercise its jurisdiction to punish the respondent for contempt for a variety of reasons, even then when it was brought to the notice of the learned Judge of the High Court with regard to the violation or non-compliance of the order passed by the learned Judge and the learned Judge before taking cognizance of commission of contempt of court by the respondent as alleged by the person, he is empowered to pass an interlocutory order to meet the ends of justice in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Article 215 of the constitution of India. Against that order an appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters if that order is at variance to the original order. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration would be whether the Court can pass an order to do justice between the parties in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and appeal under Clause-15 of Letters Patent act before a Division Bench. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration would be whether the Court can pass an order to do justice between the parties in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and appeal under Clause-15 of Letters Patent act before a Division Bench. ( 162 ) IN T. N. Taneja v. Shri Bhajan Lal, the supreme Court interpreted Section 19 (1) of the Act and held in para 12 as follows:"12. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration. In this connection itmay be noticed that there was no right of appeal under the Contempt of Courts act 1952. It is for the first time that under section 19 (1) of the Act, a right of appeal has been provided for. A contempt is a matter between the court and the alleged contemnor. Any person who moves the machinery of the court for contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting contempt of court. After furnishing such information he may s till assist the court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only two parties, namely, the court and the contemnor. It may be one of the reasons which weighed with the legislature is not conferring any right of appeal on the petitioner for contempt. The aggrieved party under section 19 (1) can only be the contemnor who has been punished for contempt of court. " ( 163 ) TO the same effect a case reported in shantha v. Pai v. Vasanth Builders, Madras, dr. A. S. Anand, C. J. speaking for the Bench held in para 9 as follows:"9. The preliminary objection about the lack of maintainability of the appeal under Section 19 (1)of the Act, therefore, succeed and we hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the learned trial Judge refusing to commit the respondent for contempt of court is not appealable, as of right, under Section 19 (1) of the Act. The preliminary objection about the lack of maintainability of the appeal under Section 19 (1)of the Act, therefore, succeed and we hold that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the learned trial Judge refusing to commit the respondent for contempt of court is not appealable, as of right, under Section 19 (1) of the Act. "in para 10 of the judgment, their Lordships posed the question "we shall now consider whether an appeal under Clause 15 of the letters Patent is competent against the order of the learned trial Judge" and held in paras 11 and 12 as follows:"11. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent, the appeal is also not competent under clause 15 of the letters Patent, firstly for the reason that the Act is a law defining and limiting the exercise of power under the Act recourse cannot be had to any other law for maintaining the appeal, and secondly, for the reason, that an order passed in contempt proceedings, whereby no punishment is recorded against the alleged contemner, cannot be construed to be a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters patent, thereby ousting recourse to the letters Patent,12. In Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1990 and L. P. A. No. 123 of 1990, while disposing of C. M. P. No. 9042 of 1990 the division Bench of this Court in Vidya charan Shukla's case (supra) dealt with an identical submission raised before the Bench. The Bench noticed that clause 15 of the Letters Patent is subject to clause 44 of Letters Patent, rendering clause 15 subject to the legislative powers of amendments and modifications. The Bench opined that an appeal is a creature of a statute and unless the right of appeal is specifically conferred, a litigant has no right to prefer an appeal, It observed that clause 15, subject to the restrictions and limitations contained therein, or in any other statute, confers on a litigant, a right to file an appeal against any judgment and therefore, unless an appeal from an order of a single Judge is prohibited by any statute, recourse to CI. 15 can be made by a litigant to file an appeal though interference under clause 15 would depend upon the conditions contained in that clause being satisfied. 15 can be made by a litigant to file an appeal though interference under clause 15 would depend upon the conditions contained in that clause being satisfied. After referring to number of authorities, the Division Bench held: "section 19 (1) of the Act, indeed, restricts the right appeal to the Division bench from an order or decision of a single Judge and to the Supreme Court from an order or decision of a Division bench, passed in exercise of the High court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt where any punishment to punish for contempt where any punishment is recorded against the contemnor. it does not provide for an appeal in any other eventuality. It is therefore, only in the filed occupied by section 19 (1) of the Act that recourse to clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot be had and not in cases not governed by sec. l9 (1 ). As a matter of fact, Section 22 of the Act itself declares that the provisions of the contempt of Court act shall be in addition to, and in derogation of, the provisions of any other law relating to contempt. The other law referred to in Section 22 would also embrace Article 215 of the constitution of India which declares every High Court to be a court of record, having all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Any order passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, as a court of record, except which is appealable under Section 19 (1) of the Act, would, if it qualifies the test of being a 'judgment' within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters patent and does not fall in any of the excluded categories enumerated therein, wouldbe appealable under that clause. If the intention of the Legislature was to take away the power of the High court to entertain appeals in all contempt matters, there was no difficulty in saying so in unequivocal terms in Sec. 19 (1) itself. If the intention of the Legislature was to take away the power of the High court to entertain appeals in all contempt matters, there was no difficulty in saying so in unequivocal terms in Sec. 19 (1) itself. The only effect that Section 19 (1) of the Act can have on clause 15 of Letters Patent is that an appeal against an order or decision passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt would lie, as of right, under that section and not under clause 15 of the Letters patent because, by virtue of clause 44 of the Letters Patent, the special provisions of Sec. l9 (1) would prevail over the general right of appeal contained in clause 15 of the Letters Patent. "in taking the view noticed above the Division bench found support form the following observations of the apex Court in Umaji v. Radhikabai, AIR 1986 SC 127 at page 1314:"the position which emerges from the above discussion is that under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the chartered High Courts, from the judgment (within the meaning of that term as used in that clause) of a single judge of the High Court an appeal lies to a Division Bench of that High Court and there is no qualification or limitation as to the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the single Judge while passing his judgment, provided an appeal is not barred by any statute (for example, Section 100-A of the Code of civil Procedure, 1908) and provided the conditions laid down by clause 15 itself are fulfilled. The conditions prescribed by clause 15 in this behalf are: (1) that it must be a judgment pursuant to Section 108 of the government of India Act of 1915, and (2) it must not be a judgment falling within one or the excluded categories set out in clause 15. "the above judgments are thus a clear answer to be preliminary objection raised by the respondent. " from the above it is seen that under section 19 (1) of the Act, no appeal is maintainable against the orders passed by the Court except in case where the Court found the contemner guilty and punished. At the same time. "the above judgments are thus a clear answer to be preliminary objection raised by the respondent. " from the above it is seen that under section 19 (1) of the Act, no appeal is maintainable against the orders passed by the Court except in case where the Court found the contemner guilty and punished. At the same time. Section 22 of the Act embraces Article 215 of the Constitution of india and any order passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction as a Court of record, except which is appealable under section 19 (1) of the Act. Would it qualifies the test of being a Judgment is appealable under Clause 15 of Letters Patent Act. ( ( 168 ) FROM this it is evident that if there is any ambiguity or there was any difficulty in understanding the order of the Court or if the order is not properly interpreted, the court is competent to give clarifications in the contempt case. ( 169 ) IN Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Taraknath ganguly, the Apex Court held "it is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein, then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court execcising jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the passing the judgment or order. " ( 170 ) FROM the above it is seen that the courts while exercising jurisdiction under contempt of Courts Act are not expected to grant substantial reliefs and any direction to be issued should be in consonance with the passed by the court, which disposed of the matter and if there is any ambiguity in the directions given by it, the Court can direct the party to seek clarification of the order from the Court in which the original proceeding was decided instead of taking upon itself the power to decide original proceedings in exercise of the jurisdiction under them Contempt of Courts. ( 171 ) IN Shah Babulal Khimji v. jayaben d. Kama, a Constitutional Bench of the supreme Court interpreted the word 'judgment' occurring in Clause 15 of Letters patent, held as follows: in M. B. Sirkar's case ( AIR 1956 Cal. 630 ). . . . . . . . . . . . In finding out whether the order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent it has to be found out that the order affects the merits of the action between the parties by determining some right of liability. The right of liability is to be found out by the court. The nature of the order will have to be examined in order to ascertain whether there has been a determination of any right to liability. " (Emphasis ours ). The right of liability is to be found out by the court. The nature of the order will have to be examined in order to ascertain whether there has been a determination of any right to liability. " (Emphasis ours ). Thus, having noticed the ratio of some of the cases of this court referred to above, regarding the tests to determine the import and meaning of the word 'judgment' we now proceed to deal with the specific question after interpreting clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High court and the corresponding clauses of letters Patent of other High Courts. We shall endeavour to interpret the connotation and the import of the word 'judgment' particularly in the light of pertinent and pointed observations made by this Court on earlier occasions as discussed above. 108. The relevant portion of Cl. 15 of the letters Patent may be extracted thus:- "we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of judicature of Madras, Bombay, Fort william in Bengal from the judgment. . . . . o f one Judge of said High Court 109. Clause 15 makes no attempt to define what a judgment is. As Letters patent is a special law which carves out its own sphere, it would not be possible for us to project the definition of the word 'judgment' appearing in Sec. 2 (9) of the Code of 1908, which defines 'judgment' into the Letters Patent: " judgment' means the statement by the Judge of the grounds of a decree of order. " 110. Inmt. Shahzadi Begum v. Alakh Nath, air 1935 All 620 (2) (FB), Sulaiman, C. J. , very rightly pointed our that as the letters Patent were drafted long before even the Code of 1882 was passed, the1 word 'judgment' used in the Letters patent cannot be relatable to or confined to the definition of 'judgment' as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure which came into existence long after the Letters Patent were given. In this connection, the Chief Justice observed as follows:- "it has been held in numerous cases that as the Letters Patent were drafted long before even the earlier Code of 1882 was passed, the word 'judgment' used therein does not mean the judgment as defined in the existing code of Civil Procedure. In this connection, the Chief Justice observed as follows:- "it has been held in numerous cases that as the Letters Patent were drafted long before even the earlier Code of 1882 was passed, the word 'judgment' used therein does not mean the judgment as defined in the existing code of Civil Procedure. At the same time the word 'judgment' does not include every possible order, final, preliminary or interlocutory passed by a Judge of the High Court. " 111. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made by the Allahabad High Court on this aspect of the matter. 112. The definition of the word 'judgment' in sub-section (9) of section 2 of the Code of 1908 is linked with the definition of 'decree' which is defined in sub-section (2) of Section 2 thus: "'decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 47 or Section, 144, but shall not include- (a ) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation:- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be party preliminary and party final. " 113. Thus, under the Code of Civil procedure, a judgment consists of the reasons and grounds for a decree passed by a court. As a judgment constitutes the reasons for the decree it follows as a matter of course that thejudgmentmust be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of civil Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted by sub-sec. (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word 'judgment' as used in CI. 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters patent has advisedly not used the term 'order' or 'decree' anywhere. (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into the definition of the word 'judgment' as used in CI. 15 of the Letters Patent because the Letters patent has advisedly not used the term 'order' or 'decree' anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers of the letters Patent was that the word 'judgment' should receive a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word 'judgment' used to the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number of orders which would be appealable under the Letters patent. It seems to us that the word 'judgment' has undoubtedly a concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words, a judgment can be of three kinds:- (1) A final judgment - A judgment which decides all the questions or issues in controversy so far as the trial Judge is concerned and leaves, noting else to be decided. This would mean thatby virtue of the judgment, the suit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. Such an order order passed by the trial Judge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning the letters Patent and even amounts to a decree so that an appeal would lie from such a judgment to a Division bench. (2) A preliminary judgment- This kind of a judgment may take two forms - (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. (2) A preliminary judgment- This kind of a judgment may take two forms - (a) where the trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendant or the party opposing on the ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the trial Judge would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the trial Judge is concerned and, therefore, appealable to the larger bench, (b) Another shape which a preliminary judgment may take is that where the trial Judge passes an order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e. g. , bar of jurisdiction, resjudicata, a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Sec. 80 and the like, and these objections are decided by the trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried in merits but the order of the trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, if his objections are valid, is entitled to get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides in important aspect of the trial which affects vital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to larger Bench. (3) Intermediary or interlocutory judgment-Mostof the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43, Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Before the such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect an the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. Before the such an order can be a judgment the adverse effect an the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote. For instance, where the trial Judge in a suit under order 37 of the Code of Civil procedure refuses the defendant leave to defend the suit, the order directly affects the defendant because he loses a valuable right to defend the suit and his remedy is confined only to contest the plaintiff's case on this own evidence without being given a chance to rebut that evidence. Assuch an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appealable to a larger Bench. Take the converse case in a similar suit where the trial Judge allows the defendant to defend the suit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely affected but the damage or prejudice caused to him is not direct or immediate but of minimal nature and rather too remote because the plaintiff still possesses his full right to show that the defence is false and succeed in the suit. Thus, such an order passed by the trial judge would not amount to judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purely an interlocutory order. Similarly, suppose the trial Judge passes an order setting aside an ex parte decree against the defendant, which is not appealable under any of the clauses of 0. 43, R. 1 though an order rejecting an application to set aside the decree passed ex parte falls within Order 43, rule 1, clause (d) and is appealable, the serious question that arises is whether or not the order first mentioned is a judgment within the meaning of Letters patent. The fact, however, remains that the order setting aside the exporte decree puts the defendant to great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence of the order, the plaintiff has now to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to a larger bench. In these circumstances, therefore, the order passed by the trial Judge setting aside the ex parte decree vitally affects the valuable rights of the plaintiff and hence amounts to an interlocutory judgment and is therefore, appealable to a larger bench. " ( 172 ) FROM the above it is seen that the judgments can be of three kinds - (1) final judgment, (2) preliminary judgment and (3) in termediary or in terlocutory judgment. As far as interlocutory orders are concerned, their Lordships held that if an order virtually affects the valuable right of the defendant, it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent Act so as to be appealable to larger Bench. In fact in para 120 of the Judgment they have certain illustrations of interlocutory orders, which may be treated as Judgments. ( 173 ) IN Barada Kanta Mishra v. Orissa High court, their Lordship of the Supreme Court ruled that no appeal is maintainable on an interlocutory orders pertaining to procedures of the Court. It was held that "only those orders or decisions in which some point is decided or finding is given the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt, are appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The order in question is not such an order or decision. It is an interlocutory order pertaining purely to the procedure of the Court. All that the order is question says is that all the points arising in the case, including the one of maintainability of the proceedings, would be heard together and, it rejected mr. B. Mishra's prayer for hearing the case piecemeal, that it, first with regard to the question of maintainability. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal. The stay in consequence stands, vacated. " ( 174 ) IN Purushotam Dass Goel v. Honourable mr, Justice B. S. Dhillon, the Supreme Court ruled that "in our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under S. 19. The stay in consequence stands, vacated. " ( 174 ) IN Purushotam Dass Goel v. Honourable mr, Justice B. S. Dhillon, the Supreme Court ruled that "in our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under S. 19. " ( 175 ) IN Union of India v. Mario Cabral e. SA, their Lordships of the Supreme Court by placing reliance on the judgment reported in Purshotam Dass's case (45 supra), held that"an order initiating proceedings for contempt by a notice issued under Section 17 of the act, is not appealable under Section 19 thereof. It was observed: (SCC p. 372, para 3) "in our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under section 19. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the constitution from an order initiating the proceeding. But that is entirely a different matter. . . . . . . . . . . " ( 176 ) IN State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob s. Allibiwy, the Apex Court held "the right of appeal will be available under sub- section (1) of Section 19 only against any decision or order of High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the provision of Article 215 of the constitution which provides that every High court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a curt including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the High Court derives the jurisdiction to punish for contempt from article 215 of the Constitution. . . . . . " ( 177 ) IN B. F. Pushpaleela Deviv. State of AP. Article 215 confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the High Court derives the jurisdiction to punish for contempt from article 215 of the Constitution. . . . . . " ( 177 ) IN B. F. Pushpaleela Deviv. State of AP. , having reviewed the entire case law on clause 15 of Letters Patent Act it was held in para 29 as follows:"from the above it is clear that in order to treat an 'order' as 'judgment' within the meaning of the Letters Patent, a controversy must have been decided affecting the valuable rights of the parties and it must contain the traits and trappings of finality. "from the above, it is clear that in order to treat an ' order' as 'judgment' within the meaning of the Letters Patent, as controversy must have been decided affecting the valuable right so the parties and it must contain the traits and trappings finality. ( 178 ) THEIR Lordships further held that"pending the main proceedings if the learned judge proceeded to determine the valuable rights of the parties in an interlocutory application, which he ought not to, which had in effect amounted to final disposal of the main proceeding itself, then, in such cases, the affected party has a right of appeal against the order under Clause 15 of the letters Patent as it would be a judgment within the meaning of the said clause. " ( 179 ) FROM the above discussion, it is seen that an L. P. A. under Clause 15 of the Letters patent Act will be against an interim order if valuable right of the parties are decided and if it contains the traits and trappings of finality, otherwise not and initiation of proceedings in contempt case and orders relating to procedures like ordering notice to appear before this Court etc, no appeal is maintainable. ( 180 ) LIKEWISE, an L. P. A. is maintainable against an order passed while dismissing the contempt petition, which is at variance to the original order passed in the writ petition. ( 180 ) LIKEWISE, an L. P. A. is maintainable against an order passed while dismissing the contempt petition, which is at variance to the original order passed in the writ petition. Likewise, the Court having recorded a finding that the respondent is guilty of contempt and without punishing him is well within its competence to direct the respondent to comply with the order of the court, if necessary, explaining the purport and intention of the order and in such an event, no L. P. A. is maintainable. On the other hand, if such an order is at variance to the original order, an appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of Letters Patent Act. ( 181 ) FROM the above discussion the following principles are deduced: (1) The Courts in India are not in only the Courts of law but also Court of equity and every effort should be made by the Court to do justice between the parties and it is a compulsion of judicial conscience. (2) The Courts should strive to evolve an appropriate remedy, in the facts and circumstances of a given case in furtheranceofcauseof justice within the available range by forging new tools for the said purpose and if necessary by chiselling the hard edges of law. (3) The underlying principles of justice have not changed but the complex pattern of life that is never static requires a fresher outlook and a timely and vigorous moulding of old principles to suit new conditions and ideas and ideals. (4) The law Courts are expected to render justice taking into consideration the circumstances prevailing at the relevant point of time and protect the citizen from the unlawful and arbitrary actions of the other two wings of democracy. On the contrary, if the Court turns to be a friend of the Executive then the democracy and rule of law come to an end and the judiciary ceases to be an effective instrument if its image and reputation for integrity and independence suffers. There cannot be a greater disaster to our polity than this. On the contrary, if the Court turns to be a friend of the Executive then the democracy and rule of law come to an end and the judiciary ceases to be an effective instrument if its image and reputation for integrity and independence suffers. There cannot be a greater disaster to our polity than this. (5) In the right of the judgment of the supreme Court in Subal Paul's case (8 supra), wherein it was held that unless the special enactment prohibits filing of an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent act against the appellate order of a single judge passed under that act, the embargo placed under section 100-A of the Code of Civil procedure has no application for the cases arising under Special enactments; the judgment of this court in Gandla Pannala Bhulaxmi's case (6 supra)is no longer good law. (6) At any that question in this case does not arise since the appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act is filed against the order of learned single Judge in a contempt case for the first time. (7) The power to punish for contempt of Court that is being exercised by the Supreme Court and Highcourts of India flows from under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of india they being a Court of Record. The provisions of Contempt of courts Act, 1971 can neither stultify nor abridge the powers of High court and it is only an addition to the powers conferred on the High court under Art. 215 of the constitution. It specifies the nature of offences and the types of punishments, which the High Court may award in exercise of summary proceedings. (8) The power to punish for contempt vested in the Supreme Court and high Court cannot be taken away by an act of Parliament and in fact under Section 22 of the Act 1971 makes this position very clear. (9) The Courts are exercising powers of contempt not to vindicate the honour of the Judge but to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. If such confidence is shaken or broken the confidence of the common man in the democracy is likely to be eroded which if not checked is sure disastrous for the society itself. (9) The Courts are exercising powers of contempt not to vindicate the honour of the Judge but to secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. If such confidence is shaken or broken the confidence of the common man in the democracy is likely to be eroded which if not checked is sure disastrous for the society itself. (10) Not only the party to the proceedings but also a stranger or a third party who is having knowledge of the order of the Court if he is found aided or abetted the violation of the order of is having notice of the order he is liable for punishment either for civil or criminal contempt. (11) The decision of the courts have to be obeyed by any person or authority including the government simpliciter and there are no grounds to excuse themselves for not implementing the order. They shall not take up the onerous responsibility of sitting in judgment over the correctness or otherwise of such decisions as a justification for not implementing them or for delayed implementation of the same. (12) The word "wilful" occurring in section 12 would exclude exceptional and bonafide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order. The burden is on the courts to see whether the respondents have exercised in just and proper manner and if the order is not in conformity with the order of the Court of the respondents should be punished to uphold the majesty of law. (13) An enormous duty is cast on the party who fails to comply with the order to prove that in spite of his best efforts the order could not be implemented due to some unforeseen circumstances that came in their way and the reasons should be acceptable to Court. (14) Even if the Hon'ble Court is not willing to punish the contemnor for violation of the order of the Court or it the Court feels that there are no sufficient grounds to hold that the contemner flouted the orders of the court, the power of the Court to give suitable and equitable directions not contrary to the orders passed in the main case in the interests of justice and fair play to see that the aggrieved person gets relief is very much available under art. 215 of the Constitution of India- as well as under Rule 27 of the contempt of Court Rules. (15) Such a power has to be exercised not only to render justice between the parties but to cut short further litigation. (16) Under Rule 12 of the Contempt Rules framed by the High Court in exercise of its rule making power under section 23 of Contempt of Courts act read with 215, 227 and section 121 (9) of the CPC, all the contempt Cases have to be posted before the learned Judge or judges whose orders are alleged to have been violated or have not been obeyed. Likewise all contempt cases initiated by the court in exercise of suo motu powers have to be filed before the Judge or Judges who initiated contempt proceedings under Rule 15 of the Contempt Rules. The Hon'ble Chief Justice gets jurisdiction to post the case before any other Judge or Judges when the judge or Judges who dealt with the case originally are not available to hear the cases. As such, the instructions given by the honourable Chief Justice on administrative side to post the contempt cases elsewhere under than the Judge who dealt the matter originally cannot be sustained in law. Hence, Registrar (Judicial) is directed to comply Rule 12 and 15 of contempt Rules in listing the cases before the Court. (17) The common law principle Doctrine of Merger is having only a limited application but no having any rigid or universal application and the same is subject to statutory provisions on the subject concerned. (18) Admittedly the contempt of Courts act is a self-contained code wherein the nature of offences the manner and procedure to deal with the contempt cases were specified therein, the principle of merger has no application for hearing the contempt cases. (19) Except Santha Kumari's case (24 supra) the learned Advocate general was not able to cite any judgment in support of his contention. Since the learned Judges in that case jumped at the above conclusion that the order passed by the learned single Judge is merged in the order passed in the division bench and the contempt case in not maintainable in law before the single judge without looking into the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, we express our inability to follow the said judgment. (20) Since we have taken the view that the Court is having ample power to pass orders in furtherance of cause of justice to punish the respondents for contempt in exercise of inherent powers under Art. 215 of the constitution of India as well as under rule 27 of the Contempt Rules, if the court passes any interim order or final order while exercising contempt jurisdiction and the order is having the trapping of a Judgment, an appeal is maintainable against such order under Clause 15 of the l. P. Act. (21) If the orders passed by the Court in exercise of contempt jurisdiction is in conformity with the original order passed by the Court initially no LPA is maintainable. If the order is at variance to the order passed in the main case an appeal shall lie against that order. (22) It is also made clear that the High court is competent to give necessary clarification in regard to implementation of the order made by the Court if the high Court feels that the order in the writ petition was not properly interpreted or misunderstood by the concerned authority. (23) No Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against an interim order passed by the Court if it is not having the trapping of a judgment. (24) At any rate no appeal is maintainable on an interlocutory order relating to the procedure of Court. LPA Nos. 184 and 185 of 2003. ( 182 ) THE learned Judge having held that the respondent committed contempt of Court has taken a lenient view on the contemner since he was retiring from service by the end of that month and in view of the unconditional apology offered by him and gave directions of pay compensation for resumed the land belonging to the petitions or their legal heirs within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the order. It is to be seen whether the order is at variance with the order passed in W. P. on 11-8-99. The honourable Court while dealing with the grievance of the petitioners that their lands were resumed by the Government without paying ex-gratia as required under g. O. Ms. It is to be seen whether the order is at variance with the order passed in W. P. on 11-8-99. The honourable Court while dealing with the grievance of the petitioners that their lands were resumed by the Government without paying ex-gratia as required under g. O. Ms. No. 1307, dated 23-12-1993 directed the petitioners to file a detailed representation before the respondents giving the extents of lands assigned to theme and the date of resumption of land on receipt of the same the respondents were directed to consider the same and pass appropriate orders keeping in view the G. O. Ms. No. 1307, dated 23-12-1993 within a period of six weeks thereafter. The respondents having failed to take action to comply with the order of this court filed a counter affidavit in the contempt case stating that the land of the petitioners were not resumed but only extent of Ac. 1-03 cents of land was subjected to excavation and the entire land was barren. The learned judge having referred to the proceedings of the Special Collector, Srisailam dated 18-10-1998 wherein an extent of Ac. 24-82 cents of land was resumed gave the above direction. It is true in the main order the extent of land was not mentioned. The liability on the part of the Government to pay ex-gratia in the event the assigned lands are resumed was brought to the notice of the respondents and they were directed to dispose of the representation to be filed by the petitioners. When the Learned Judge found in black and white the orders passed by the Collector on 18-10-1998 resuming the land for which compensation has to be paid mentioned the extent of land in the order while disposing of the Contempt Petition. We do not see any variance between the order passed in the writ petition and in the order passed in the contempt case and the order is a clarificatory one. The liability to pay ex-gratia is not disputed by the government if the assigned lands are resumed under G. O. Ms. No. 1307. Hence we hold that this Court is perfectly justified in giving directions to pay ex-gratia for the entire extent of Ac. 24-82 cents of land belonging to the petitioners in exercise of the inherent powers vested in the Court. Hence we do not find any merit in these LPAs. No. 1307. Hence we hold that this Court is perfectly justified in giving directions to pay ex-gratia for the entire extent of Ac. 24-82 cents of land belonging to the petitioners in exercise of the inherent powers vested in the Court. Hence we do not find any merit in these LPAs. accordingly, these LPAs are dismissed as devoid of merits. C. C. No. 456 of 2003: ( 183 ) IN the writ petition filed by the society seeking a direction not to auction the shop nos. 136 to 163 block A at Chakkal market this Court passed an interim order on 21-10-2002 in modification of the earlier order dated 15-4-2003 that such of the petitioners/ members of the society who were in possession of the land or structures upon which the present complex is constructed shallbe entitled to be inducted into possession of the respective shops on their depositing half of the good will fetched in the public auction. The municipality without considering the requests of the members of the society for allotment of shops on payment of 50% of the good will as per the above directions of the Court confirmed the auction in favour of the auction bidders and possession of mulgies were delivered to them. In these circumstances, the Contempt Case no. 456 of 2003 was filed and the learned judge after filing counter modified the earlier order dated 15-4-1993 passed the order under appeal on 29-4-2003. Aggrieved by the said orders the Commissioner of the Municipality filed LPA No. 33 of 2003. A Division Bench of this Court by order dated 26-6-2003 while condoning the delay in filing contempt case suspended the order in the contempt case and thereafter this case was posted for final hearing before this Court. The Commissioner, tuni Municipality having suffered adverse order in the writ petition kept quite without questioning the said order. He went ahead in confirming the auction in favour of the auction bidders and the mulgies were delivered to them. In those circumstances the above order was passed in the contempt case. Though the order in the contempt case is in conformity with the interim order passed by this Court, the same was suspended while admitting the LPA. Further, the order passed in the contempt case is an interim order and the very writ petition filed by the Society is still pending. Though the order in the contempt case is in conformity with the interim order passed by this Court, the same was suspended while admitting the LPA. Further, the order passed in the contempt case is an interim order and the very writ petition filed by the Society is still pending. Hence we direct the parties to maintain status-quo prevailing as on this day till the disposal of the main writ petition to avoid future complications. With the above direction the L. P. A. is disposed of. LPA No. 34 of 2003: ( 184 ) THIS L. P. A. was filed by third parties assailing the order passed in C. C. No. 456 of 2003. They seemed to have filed an application seeking permission of the Court to implead themselves in the contempt case as party respondents. Admittedly, the appellants in this LPA are not parties in the writ petition. According to them, in the auction held by the Municipality after this court passed an interim order in W. P,no. 3346 of 2002 on 21-10-2002 they became highest bidders in the auction. Subsequently, when a contempt case was filed by the petitioners- association alleging violation of interim orders passed on 21-10-2002 the appellants filed C. A. No. 482 of 2002 in C. C. No. 456 of 2003 seeking leave of the Court to permit them to come on record as respondents while that application is pending consideration by the Court, they knocked this Court by filing this LPA. questioning the orders of the Court in C. C. No. 456 of 2003. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we hold that these appellants have no locus standi to file this appeal, since they are neither parties in the writ petition nor the application filed by them to get themselves impleaded is ordered by this Court. Accordingly, we dismiss this lpa as a misconceived one. ( 185 ) IN the last, we place on record the valuable assistance extended by amicus Curiae- Sri K. V. Satyanarayana, appointed by this Court and other advocate - Sri M. V. Suresh Kumar, sri Vedula Venkataramana ,and Addepalle suryanarayana, in assisting the Court in delivering this Judgment.