DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed under Section 30 of workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short the Act ) against order dt. 28-02-2001 in W. C. Case No. 16 of 1997 on the file of Commissioner for Workmens compensation-cum-Assistant commissioner of Labour, Tirupati. The respondents in the claim application filed this appeal. ( 2 ) C. Panikucnar who was the son of the claimant was working as a sub-staff member in L. I. C. at the branch office at Madanapalli. According to the claimant, the deceased panikumar was proceeding to Andhra Bank on 24-06-1992 to remit cash of L. I. C. in the bank and on the way to the Bank some persons murdered him and committed theft of money from him. The said fact is not in dispute. The claimant filed the claim application before the Commissioner seeking a total compensation of rs. 1,67,192/- from the L. I. C. authorities. Among the respondents, the second respondent alone filed a counter opposing the claim application. It is the plea of the l. I. C. that the deceased was not a workman and therefore, he is not entitled for any compensation. The claimant examined herself as A. W. 1 and produced the documents Exs. A-1 to A-17. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the appellants. On a consideration of material available on record, the Commissioner held that the deceased was a workman. He directed the respondents to pay compensation of Rs. 87,563/- together with interest at 12% per annum from the date of accident til! the date of realization. Aggrieved by the said order, the L. I. C. authorities preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) THE substantial question of law to be determined in the present appeal is whether the deceased Panikumar is a workman within the ambit of the provisions of the Act and if so whether the claimant is entitled to recover the compensation? ( 4 ) "workman" is defined by Section 2 (n) of the Act. For the purpose of this appeal, the definition in Section 2 (n) (ii) of the Act is the relevant provision. As per the said definition, any person employed in any such capacity as is specified in schedule II of the Act is a workman. ( 4 ) "workman" is defined by Section 2 (n) of the Act. For the purpose of this appeal, the definition in Section 2 (n) (ii) of the Act is the relevant provision. As per the said definition, any person employed in any such capacity as is specified in schedule II of the Act is a workman. It therefore becomes necessary to consider various clauses in schedule II of the act to find out whether the deceased is a workman within the ambit of the provisions of the above Act. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent-claimant is unable to pinpoint any specific clause in schedule II to show that the deceased is covered by any specific clause as such. He merely contends that any employee who is employed otherwise than in a clerical capacity is a workman as defined in schedule II of the Act. It is to be stated that the said interpretation cannot be countenanced. If that is the only criteria to decide whether particular person is a workman or not there is no need for the legislature to have so many clauses in schedule II dealing with different types of employees. For instance, clause (i) of schedule II covers persons employed with the operation (repair) or maintenance of a lift or a vehicle propelled by steam or other mechanical power or by electricity or in connection with the loading or unloading of any such vehicle. Clause (ii) deals with employees who are employed in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof a manufacturing process as defined in clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories act, 1948, is being carried on or in any kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with any such manufacturing process or with the article made, whether or not employment in any such work is within such premises or precincts any steam, water or other mechanical power or electrical power is used. The other clauses in schedule II deal with other categories of employees. Those aspects were referred to pinpoint that the criteria to decide whether an employee is a workman or not does not merely depend upon the question whether he is working in a clerical capacity or not. The other clauses in schedule II deal with other categories of employees. Those aspects were referred to pinpoint that the criteria to decide whether an employee is a workman or not does not merely depend upon the question whether he is working in a clerical capacity or not. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent-claimant placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in s. K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra According to this decision, a Development Officer working in L. I. C. is a workman as defined in section 2 (s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This decision does not help the respondent in the present appeal. The Apex Court in paragraph 4 of its judgment extracted the definition of a workman in Section 2 (s) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As per that judgment, any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work is a workman as far as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are concerned. ( 7 ) A reading of the above provision shows that the definition of workman in section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is wider than the definition of a workman as per schedule II of the Workmen s Compensation act. The provisions of Workmen s compensation Act exclude employees doing clerical or supervisory work. However, the definition of a workman as per Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act not only includes skilled or unskilled labour but also includes employees working in supervisory, technical or clerical work. For the principle of law laid down in the above decision, this court cannot come to conclusion that the respondent established that the deceased panikumar was a workman as defined in schedule II of Workmen s Compensation act. No other decision is cited on behalf of the respondent in support of the contention that the deceased can be treated as a workman under the provisions of Workmen s compensation Act. ( 8 ) ANOTHER decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-claimant is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in naima Bibi v. Lodhne Colliery Co. ( 8 ) ANOTHER decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-claimant is a decision of the Calcutta High Court in naima Bibi v. Lodhne Colliery Co. Ltd. The calcutta High Court held that while a workman was going home on completion of his duty and if he was stabbed by some unknown persons it is to be held that the injury caused to the workman arises out of and in the course of his employment and his employer is liable to pay compensation. That question does not arise for consideration in the present appeal. If the respondent wants to invoke the jurisdiction of the commissioner under the provisions of workmen s Compensation Act to claim any compensation, it is essential and mandatory for the respondent to establish that the deceased was a workman within the ambit of the provisions of Workmen s Compensation act. If that jurisdictional fact was not established by the person invoking jurisdiction of the Commissioner for workmen s Compensation Act, no compensation can be awarded by the commissioner. In the present case, the respondent failed to establish that her deceased son was a workman within the ambit of the provisions of Workmen s compensation Act. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the Commissioner awarding compensation to the respondent is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed without costs. The impugned order passed by the Commissioner is set aside. The claim application in W. C. Case No. 16 of 1997 is dismissed without costs. ( 10 ) ADMITTEDLY, deceased Panikumarwas working as a staff member in L. I. C. It is represented that half of the amount already awarded by the Commissioner was withdrawn by the rpspondent. I hope and trust that the appellants-L. I. C authorities would not proceed further to recover back the amount already withdrawn by the respondent who is aged about more than 70 years.