BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these appeals have been filed against the same judgment passed by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 22410 of 2002. W. A. No. 1 of 2003 has been filed by the respondent No. 3 in the writ petition, whereas W. A. No. 62 of 2003 has been filed by the respondents 1 and 2 in the writ petition. The parties shall hereinafter be referred to as arrayed in the writ petition. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has filed a writ petition being W. P. No. 22410 of 2002 challenging the proceedings dt. 27-8-2002 disqualifying her from the office of member of 12th Ward of chilakaluripet Municipality, Guntur district as being arbitrary, illegal, unconstitutional and contrary to Section 16 (3) of the Andhra pradesh Municipalities act, 1965 (for short "the Act" ). The petitioner contended that she had contested for the post of member of 12th ward of Chilakaluripet Municipality in the elections that were held in the month of march, 2000. She stated that there were 1322 valid votes polled in all, she secured 828 votes and she was declared elected member of the 12th ward. She contested the election as an official candidate of Congress party. She contended that the Chairperson of the Municipal Council belonged to the telugu Desham Party. The impugned order dt. 27-8-2002 which was challenged is a resolution passed by the Municipal Council, chilakaluripeta, which is reproduced below,"copy OF THE RESOLUTION DATED 27-8-2002 OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, chilakaluripeta. PRESENT: Sri Bingi Rama Murthy, chair person. Smt. Beesa Bathini Pitchamma the 12th Ward Member of Chilakaluripeta municipal Council was absent from 4-5-2002 to 5-8-2002 (three months i. e. , 90 days) and for three consecutive meetings of the council and therefore she is disqualified as Member of the council under Section 16 (k) of A. P. Municipalities Act, 1965. Therefore, the said subject is placed before the Council for information and necessary decision. Council Agenda No. 124. dt. 27-8-2002 "approved" sd/- bingi Rama Murthy, chairperson, municipal Council, chilakaluripeta. " ( 3 ) NOW the whole controversy relates to interpretation of Section 16 (k) of the Act. The contention of the petitioner was that there could be a disqualification if the member had failed to attend three consecutive meetings, but for convening a meeting at least three days clear notice had to be given to each member. " ( 3 ) NOW the whole controversy relates to interpretation of Section 16 (k) of the Act. The contention of the petitioner was that there could be a disqualification if the member had failed to attend three consecutive meetings, but for convening a meeting at least three days clear notice had to be given to each member. All the members were supposed to receive notices, but she had not received any notice from the Commissioner or from the council or from the Chairperson for any such meeting, therefore if any meeting was held, that was contrary to the rules. Under section 16 (3) of the A. P. Municipalities Act there was a provision for restoration of the membership. Even if the resolution was legal, she had a right to be restored because she had made a representation immediately on the same day when the resolution was communicated to her under Section 16 (3) of the Act, but no action was taken on that representation. She stated that her son was unwell, she had intimated this to the Council and to the Commissioner and she had gone to Madras for treatment of her son in the month of May, 2002. Even after her return, she did not receive any notice relating to the meeting of the council and in the absence of any such notice, for not attending the meetings, she could not be disqualified. It was also contended that the 2nd respondent had not considered the application for restoration of the membership u/s. 16 (3) of the Act which was arbitrary and illegal. It was also contended that without deciding her representation, the 1st respondent- commissioner had issued the notification for re-election to the 12th ward member, which was also without jurisdiction. ( 4 ) COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT was filed by the 2nd respondent-Chairperson. It was denied that notice was not served on the petitioner. It was stated that under Section 353 of the Act if the person to whom notice had to be served was not available, notice could be served on some adult member or servant of his family. Since the petitioner was not available in the house, notices of the meetings were served on the adult members of the petitioner s family. The petitioner in her representation dt. 27-8-2002 had not denied service of notice of meetings on her. Since the petitioner was not available in the house, notices of the meetings were served on the adult members of the petitioner s family. The petitioner in her representation dt. 27-8-2002 had not denied service of notice of meetings on her. It was further submitted that the 1 st respondent by notice dt. 8-8-2002 intimated about the disqualification suffered by the petitioner. The same was received by the adult member of the petitioner s family on 10-8-2002 and as per Section 16 (k) (3) of the Act the petitioner could file a restoration petition within 15 days or on or before the next meeting of the council. However, the petitioner through her representation dt. 27-8-2002 requested the Municipal council to restore her membership. The said representation was sent to the 2nd respondent after conclusion of Municipal council meeting held on 27-8-2002. He gave a note to the Municipal Commissioner-1st respondent for issuance of an endorsement to the petitioner that there was no provision for consideration of her request since it had been received after conclusion of the meeting and was belated. Accordingly the 1st respondent endorsed in Roc. No. 2622/ 2002-E2, dt. 28-8-2002 which was served on the petitioner. The petitioner had not sought for restoration of the membership within the time stipulated u/s. 16 (k) (3) of the Act, therefore her membership could not be restored. It was submitted that the Municipal council in its meeting had resolved that the petitioner was disqualified. The Election commission has notified the casual vacancy by notification dt. 21 -10-2002 and appointed the 1st respondent as Election Officer. As per the schedule last date for receipt of nominations was 28-10-2002, date of publication of list of contesting candidates was 1-11-2002 and date of election was 14-11-2002. The petitioner approached the court belatedly and obtained an interim suspension order of disqualification. The interim order passed by the court was received by the Municipality on 13-11 -2002. ( 5 ) IN the light of these pleadings, the learned single Judge considered the matter and disposed of the writ petition permitting the petitioner to raise a dispute within three weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of his order before the District Judge who was an authority to hear the disputes u/s. 17 of the Act. He left it open to all the parties to raise contentions including limitation before the District Judge. He left it open to all the parties to raise contentions including limitation before the District Judge. Appellants are aggrieved of this order. ( 6 ) BEFORE going to the respective arguments of the parties, it would be necessary to go through the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 16 (1) (k) of the act lays down,"16. Disqualification of members: (1) Subject to the provisions of Sec. 17, a member shall cease to hold his office, if he- (a) to (j ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (k) absents himself from the meetings of the council for a period of three consecutive months reckoned from the date of the commencement of his term of office, or of the last meeting which he attended, or if his restoration to office as member under sub-section (3) as the case may be, or if within the said period less than three ordinary meetings have been held absents himself from three consecutive ordinary meetings held after the said date: provided further that no meeting from which a member absented himself shall be counted against him under this clause if notice of that meeting was not duly served on him. Section 16 (3) of the Act lays down, " (3) Where a person cases to be a councillor under Clause (k) of sub- section (1), the Commissioner shall at once intimate the fact in writing to such person and report the same to the council at its next meeting. If such person applies for restoration to the council on or before the date of its next meeting or within fifteen days of the receipt by him of such intimation; the council may at the meeting next after the receipt of such application, or suo motu restore him to the office of member. " ( 7 ) IT appears that there is no dispute that a notice was sent to the petitioner which was received by her. According to her representation dt. 27-8-2002, she had received the notice through her relation on 26-8-2002 and according to the commissioner the notice was issued on 8-8-2002. Therefore the representation was clearly made after 15 days and after the meeting of the council had taken place. According to her representation dt. 27-8-2002, she had received the notice through her relation on 26-8-2002 and according to the commissioner the notice was issued on 8-8-2002. Therefore the representation was clearly made after 15 days and after the meeting of the council had taken place. Therefore the question of restoration of the membership would not arise in the present case. But there are still questions which needed to be answered viz. , (1) whether any notices were, in fact, served on the petitioner directly or through adult members of the family, (2) whether the petitioner had intimated to the respondent No. 1 that she was going to Madras for treatment of her son and (3) whether she had left her Madras address with them and if so whether any letter was sent to her Madras address. Section 17 of the Act lays down,"17. District Judge to decide questions of disqualifications of members: (1) Where an allegation is made by any voter or authority to the Commissioner in writing that any person who is elected as a member has not qualified or has become disqualified under section 13, Section 13-A, Sec. 13-B, section 14, Section 16 or Section 19 and the Commissioner has given intimation of such allegation to the member and such member disputes the correctness of the allegation so made or where any member himself entertains any doubt whether or not he has become disqualified under any of those sections. (a) such member or any other member may, within a period of two months from the date on which such intimation is given or doubt is entertained, as the case may be; and (b) the Commissioner shall, either on the direction of the council or with the approval of the Government if no such direction is given within a period of two months from the date of placing of the matter by the commissioner before the council, apply for a decision to the District judge of the district in which the municipality is situated ( 8 ) SECTION 17 of the Act gives jurisdiction to the District Judge to decide the questions of disqualification. Now in the present case as rightly pointed out by the learned Single judge the questions of fact are involved, viz. , (1), whether the absence of the petitioner was willful or deliberate? (2) whether the notices for meetings were served on her? Now in the present case as rightly pointed out by the learned Single judge the questions of fact are involved, viz. , (1), whether the absence of the petitioner was willful or deliberate? (2) whether the notices for meetings were served on her? (3) whether the notice intimating her that she would incur disqualification was served on her? (4) whether the notices had been sent to her Madras address or not? (5) whether she had informed the concerned authorities about her Madras address? and (6) whether allegedly she had gone for treatment of her child? All these questions cannot be decided in this writ petition. However, the learned counsel for the appellants submit that there is time of two months prescribed for availing the remedy under Section 17 of the Act and even she approached this court after the period of limitation. The learned single Judge had not decided even the question of limitation, it was left open to the District judge to the decide the question. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that even after the writ petition having been disposed of, the petitioner has not approached the District Judge so far. This is obvious because the writ appeals were filed in this court. Now a reference has been given to a judgment of the Supreme court reported in Danda Rajeshwari v. Bodavula Hanumayamma This judgment was also relied upon by the learned single judge. In this case a writ petition was filed before the High Court after declaration of result of elections. The High Court directed the parties to avail statutory remedy of filing election petition before Tribunal within 3 weeks from the date of disposal of the writ petition. The High Court further directed the tribunal not to go into question of limitation and instead decide on merits. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the time prescribed for filing of election petition was 30 days from the date of declaration of result of the election, therefore the High Court could not have extended the limitation for filing of election petition, the argument which was made before the supreme Court,"the remedy is a statuary remedy and limitation is one of the conditions to entertain election petition. By judicial order the limitation cannot be nullified. By judicial order the limitation cannot be nullified. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment of this court in Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 453 ). We find no force in his contention. It is not his case that the high Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the election of a Sarpanch and declaration of the result of the election of a sarpanch, etc. The High Court exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution declined to interfere in the election disputes since alternative remedy of filing election petition and adjudication has been provided in the relevant statutory rules. Far from saying that the High Court has no jurisdiction, the High Court exercised self-restraint in exercise of the power under Article 226 and directed the parties to avail of alternative remedy. In this case, admittedly, the election of Sarpanch was held and result was declared on 24-6-1995 and the writ petition was filed on 25-6-1995. Power of the government on the process of electoral rolls was challenged in a batch of writ petitions. The writ petition in question is also one of such writ petitions. Under the circumstances, the High Court thought it expedient that since elections were already held, the disputed questions of facts would be canvassed in an election petition as provided in rule 3 of the Rules. The High Court rightly declined to investigate into disputed questions of facts and refused to go into the question relegating the parties to pursue the remedy of election dispute. In view of this the High Court has rightly directed filing of the election petition within three weeks from the date of disposal of the writ petition and further directed the Tribunal not to go into the question of limitation and instead decide the matter on merits. "the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kirloskar Penumatic Co. Ltd. (1996) 4 SCC 453 ) held as under; (SCC pp. 456-57, para 10 ). "the power conferred by Arts. 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. 456-57, para 10 ). "the power conferred by Arts. 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs authorities, who are the creatures of the Customs act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27, whether before or after amendment. May be the High court or a civil court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Art. 226 or the power of a civil court. No such delegation or conferment can ever be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law. When we expressed this view during the hearing mr. Hidayatullah requested that in such a case the matter be remitted to the high Court and the High Court be left free to dispose of the writ petition according to law. " ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the same judgment the argument made was rejected by the supreme Court. ( 10 ) ANOTHER judgment of the Supreme court to which reference has been made is Director of Settlements, A. P. v. M. R. Apparao2. But, in our view, this judgment has no relevancy to the controversy in question. ( 11 ) THE only argument made by the learned counsel for the appellants is that since the writ petition itself was filed beyond the limitation, therefore the petitioner could not be given liberty to approach the authority under Section 17 of the Act. The learned single Judge has merely given a period of three weeks time to the petitioner to approach the District Judge under Sec. 17 of the Act, whereas the fact of the matter is that the petitioner need not require any liberty from the court for seeking a statutory remedy available to her under law, because it was open to the District Judge to decide the question of limitation in terms of Section 17 of the Act. But in any case we do not find fault with the judgment of the learned single judge who has merely stated what the law is. The learned Single Judge declined to hear the matter on merits because questions of fact were involved with which we agree, the questions of fact which are disputed have been enumerated hereinabove and the writ petitioner does not even need permission from, this court to approach the district Judge u/s. 17 of the Act. The learned single Judge merely wanted to maintain status quo for a period of three weeks to enable the petitioner to approach the District judge. Now it is strenuously contended that the judgment of the learned single Judge was not stayed, but the petitioner did not approach the District Judge, therefore this liberty could not be given to the petitioner now. We do not agree with such a proposition. Since the writ appeals were filed against the judgment of the learned single judge, it is normal to wait for the disposal of these writ appeals. ( 12 ) FOR these reasons, the writ appeals are dismissed. From today a period of three weeks is given to the writ petitioner to approach the District Judge in terms of section 17 of the Act. The respondents who are appellants herein are at liberty to take any defence that may be available to them including the plea of limitation before the district Judge who may decide the matter on merits. ( 13 ) AT this stage learned counsel for the writ petitioner submits that the writ petitioner has already approached the District Judge and he has filed a petition before him being o. P. No. 32 of 2003. The District Judge may dispose of the OP expeditiously preferably within six months from today. All questions raised are kept open and any observations made in this judgment shall not be construed to be an expression of opinion by this court on any matter which is in controversy between the parties.