Judgment :- Jawahar Lal Gupta, C.J. Is the decision given by the Bench on Jan.20, 2003 in the two petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution not in conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M.A.Pai's case? This is the core of the controversy in the five Review Petitions filed by the respondents in the two cases. The other Review Petitions have been filed by persons who were not parties in the Original Petitions. Thus, they have sought the leave of the Court to file the Review Petitions. Hence, the two Misc. Petitions. The facts as emerging from the records of O.P.No.39420 of 2002 (Pushpagiri Medical Society v. State of Kerala and Others) may be briefly noticed. 2. In March 2002, the State of Kerala issued a prospectus for admission to the medical colleges in the State for the year 2002-03. In pursuance to the stipulation in the prospectus, an entrance examination was conducted. The selected candidates were admitted to the institutions existing at that time. 3. On October 11, 2002 the State of Kerala accorded sanction for the admission of 100 candidates at the Pushpagiri Institute of Medical Sciences, Thiruvalla for the academic year 2002-03. Before the admission could be actually made, Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India decided the case relating to the admission to private medical colleges, viz., T.M.A.Pai Foundation v. State of Karanataka ((2002) 8 SCC 481:AIR 2003 SC 355). As a sequel to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the State of Kerala issued an order dated December 18, 2002 notifying its approval of the Kerala Unaided Professional Colleges (Admission of Students and Fixation of Fees) Regulations, 2002. A copy of the order along with the Regulations is on record as Ext.P9. On December 19, 2002 it issued a further order providing inter alia for the fixation of fees. Copy of this order is Ext.P10. This order related to the payment of fees by the candidates sponsored by the Commissioner. 4. The writ petitioners had felt aggrieved by these two orders. Thus, they had approached this Court. Notice was issued. Counter affidavit was filed. Counsel for the parties were heard. Both the petitions were allowed vide order dated January 20, 2003. It was inter-alia held that the government was not entitled to claim 50% of the total seats in each of the two Institutes being managed by the petitioners. Thus, they had approached this Court. Notice was issued. Counter affidavit was filed. Counsel for the parties were heard. Both the petitions were allowed vide order dated January 20, 2003. It was inter-alia held that the government was not entitled to claim 50% of the total seats in each of the two Institutes being managed by the petitioners. It was only entitled to 25% seats. The government was given two weeks' time to forward the names of the selected candidates for admission failing which the petitioners were held entitled to make the admissions from the merit list prepared by them. It was further held that the fee structure as laid down by the government was unfair. The petitioners were entitled to charge at the rate of Rs.1.5lakhs per year, as this was the per capita cost assessed by the government itself. This arrangement was to last till the fee was fixed by the government in accordance with the Regulations. It was directed that the Committee shall decide the matter of fee within three months. 5. The government did not forward the list of candidates for admission. Instead it filed the Review Petitions. These had initially come up for hearing on 31.1.2003. However, the hearing was adjourned on different occasions at the request of the counsel for the applicants. Thereafter, periodically, additional affidavits have been filed. 6. We had not yet issued any notice to the writ petitioners. However, when the cases were taken up, the Counsel were present. Consequently, we heard counsel for both sides. Despite the limited scope of a Review Petition, the counsel were heard at length. The matter was virtually argued afresh. 7. Mr.Retna Singh, learned Advocate General for the State of Kerala, has contended that the Court has erred in holding that the State was not entitled to a share of 50% of the seats in each of the two privately managed unaided medical colleges. He also submitted that the State is entitled to a 50% share in the seats out of which 25% shall be filled up on the basis of merit and against the remaining 25%, the claims of candidates belonging to the weaker sections shall be considered. He further pointed out that the writ petitioners have admitted candidates who are low in merit. Substantial amount of fees have been charged. Thus, the colleges are indulging in profiteering. 8. He further pointed out that the writ petitioners have admitted candidates who are low in merit. Substantial amount of fees have been charged. Thus, the colleges are indulging in profiteering. 8. On behalf of the other applicants, it was contended that the State of Kerala had special needs. The action of the State Government in fixing its share at 50% was in conformity with observations in paragraph 68 of the Judgment in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra). The fee as fixed by the Government was reasonable. Full facts regarding the exclusion of creamy layer in respect of the candidates belonging to the weaker sections had not been brought to the notice of the Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) was only prospective. It could not have been applied to the admission of the students in the two Institutions being managed by the writ petitioners. Thus, the reservations as well as the fee structure deserve to be sustained. 9. The claim as made on behalf of the applicants was controverted by Mr.Rajiv Dhawan and Mr.Kurien George, learned counsel for the writ petitioners. It was pointed out that in pursuance to the decision of the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai's case (supra), the State had itself modified the prospectus. It had issued regulations for fixation of fee and admission of students. The regulations/orders had to be followed by the institutions where admissions had yet to made. Thus, the argument that the decision was not applicable cannot be sustained. It was further contended that the fee as fixed by the State was even below the cost as assessed by it. It was wholly arbitrary. Thus, the court had rightly undone the wrong. Still further, it was submitted that the unaided colleges had complete autonomy in the matter of admission and administration of the institutions. The State Government could not nationalize education under the grab of maintaining standards. The colleges were entitled to evolve their own system of selection and admission. They were not required to surrender their freedom. In case of unaided professional colleges, the State had no right to claim a share of 50%. The candidates admitted by the college were eligible. They fulfill the prescribed qualifications. The colleges were entitled to evolve their own system of selection and admission. They were not required to surrender their freedom. In case of unaided professional colleges, the State had no right to claim a share of 50%. The candidates admitted by the college were eligible. They fulfill the prescribed qualifications. Merely because some of the candidates had not done well in the entrance examination conducted by the Government, cannot mean that they were incapable of doing well in another test. The admission was made on the basis of the merit as determined after the test. The candidates were not only tested for their knowledge in the relevant subjects, but also for their aptitude etc. So far as the fees are concerned, counsel submitted that the deposit had been made by the candidates voluntarily. It was in conformity with the prevailing practice. However, the institution would abide by such directions as may be considered appropriate by the court. 10. The two questions that primarily arise for consideration are:- (i) Does the State Government have a right to claim a share of 50% in the seats in the private unaided medical colleges? (ii) Was the fee structure as laid down by the State Government just and fair? Regarding (i): Does the State Government have a right to claim a share of 50% in the seats in the private unaided medical colleges? 11. A perusal of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai's case (supra) shows that the private educational institutions are a necessity. Their "choice in matters, inter alia, of a selection of students and fixation of fees" cannot be taken away. The State Government or the Universities cannot impose unreasonable terms "as a condition for grant of affiliation or recognition." A system of "students selection would be unreasonable if it deprives the private unaided institutions of the right of rational selection, which it devised for itself, subject to the minimum qualification that may be prescribed". The right to establish and administer educational institutions embodies the right to "admit students; set up a reasonable fee structure; appoint staff (teaching and non-teaching); and take action if there is dereliction of duty on the part of any employees." It was further observed that "the governmental domination of the education process must be desisted." The State's right to "prescribe qualifications necessary for admission" was undoubtedly, recognized. However, it was held that the "private unaided colleges have the right to admit students of their choice, subject to rational procedure of selection and the compliance of conditions, if any, requiring admission of a small percentage of students belonging to weaker sections of the society by granting them free ships or scholarships if not granted by the government." It was emphasized that "in the case of unaided private schools, maximum autonomy has to be with the management with regard to administration, including the right of appointment, disciplinary powers, admission of students and the fees to be charged." In the case of the professional institutions, it was categorically observed that "it would be unfair to apply the same rules and regulations regulating admission to both aided and unaided professional institutions." 12. Still further, to put the matter beyond any shadow of doubt, it was observed that in case of the professional institutions receiving aid, the government is competent to prescribe by rules or regulations, the parameters for admission "coupled with the reservation policy of the State." Once aid "is granted to a private professional educational institution, the Government or the State agency, as a condition of the grant of aid, can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution." 13. The decision embodies a departure from the earlier view. It is clearly calculated to aid the unaided. It recognize the rights of those who invest their oven money vis a vis the others who thrive on the taxpayer's money and the state patronage. The court's mandate is calculated to free the unaided private institutions from the fetters of the state machinery. 14. Learned Advocate General contended that the right of the government to fix the percentage according to the local needs has been recognized. The action of the State Government squarely falls within the ambit of the observations in paragraph 68 of the judgment. In view of the decision, the State government was entitled to reserve 50% seats for itself. Is it so? 15. It is no doubt true that in paragraph 68 the government has been permitted to prescribe the percentage "according to the local needs." However, while fixing the number of seats, the government cannot act arbitrarily. It just cannot take out a figure from the hat and insist upon its observance by the institutions. Is it so? 15. It is no doubt true that in paragraph 68 the government has been permitted to prescribe the percentage "according to the local needs." However, while fixing the number of seats, the government cannot act arbitrarily. It just cannot take out a figure from the hat and insist upon its observance by the institutions. It has to disclose a rational basis for the figure it fixes. In the present case, we find that in none of the affidavits as filed on behalf of the State Government or any of the other applicants, the 'local needs' have been even remotely indicated. It has not been stated as to what are the peculiar facts that justify the State's demand for 50% seats in private unaided medical colleges, which are not receiving a penny from the state funds. Even on principle, it was not indicated as to how the state government was entitled to claim half the loaf as a fair share. In lieu of what? For the grant of a mere permission to start the Institution which was needed and undeniably costs a packet? The questions to the counsel elicited no response. It was on a consideration of the matter that we had felt that, in the circumstances of the case, 25% share for the Government would be just and fair. We still find no infirmity in the view taken by us. 16. In this context, it deserves mention that if freedom from governmental control is the goal of the unaided institutions, the government cannot fix an arbitrary price. There is an essential difference between the aided and the unaided colleges. In case of the aided institutions, the government bears a substantial burden. Thus, it is legally and morally entitled to lay down its terms for providing the aid. However, such is not the position in case of the unaided institutions. Those who do not impinge upon the State's resources have a better right than those who look to the Government for their bread and butter. While it is true that the Government can lay down the minimum conditions of eligibility so as to ensure maintenance of educational standards, it surely cannot claim that it is entitled to fill up 50% of the total seats on its own. That would virtually amount to ignoring the apparent difference between the aided and the unaided institutions. 17. While it is true that the Government can lay down the minimum conditions of eligibility so as to ensure maintenance of educational standards, it surely cannot claim that it is entitled to fill up 50% of the total seats on its own. That would virtually amount to ignoring the apparent difference between the aided and the unaided institutions. 17. It was sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Court had erred in fixing the Government's share at 25%. Is it so? 18. A perusal of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court shows that "a small percentage" of seats can be given to the Government. In paragraph 68, the Government has been allowed to fix the percentage according to the local needs. If the State Government had disclosed any local needs to justify its action, the Bench would have considered it. Nothing was disclosed. In this situation, the Court had to weigh the equities. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners had contended that the Government should have no share while the Government was demanding half of the seats. The Court was confronted with a situation where immediate decision was necessary. Delay of even a few days could have defeated the purpose of setting up the institutions. In this situation the Court had taken the view that 25% of the total seats would be more than a "small percentage." At the same time, it was felt that it would give the weaker sections of the society, a fair share. This would provide the Government with a reasonable number of seats so as to ensure that the weaker sections of the society were duly represented. We find no wrong in the judgment, which may need to be rectified. 19. It was contended by the Advocate General that the provision in the Regulations relating to reservation had not been correctly appreciated and projected by the respondent-applicants at the time of the hearing of the Writ Petitions. Actually, reservation for various sections was only to the extent of 50% of the government's share. In other words, the contention was that out of the 50 seats reserved for the State Government, only 25 would be allotted to the members of the weaker sections. On the other hand, Mr.Rajiv Dhawan, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, submitted that the contention had not been raised at the hearing of the petitions. In other words, the contention was that out of the 50 seats reserved for the State Government, only 25 would be allotted to the members of the weaker sections. On the other hand, Mr.Rajiv Dhawan, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, submitted that the contention had not been raised at the hearing of the petitions. There was not even a "whisper" that the government would fill up only 25 seats from amongst the members of the weaker sections. Thus, the contention cannot be allowed to be raised. 20. The case as pleaded by the respondents in the Writ Petitions (the present applicants) in the counter affidavit was certainly not as is now sought to be projected. In the opening part of the counter affidavit, it was inter alia stated as under: "2. The Regulation makes it clear that for the admission for the professional colleges, merit shall be the prime criteria and that 50% of the seats are earmarked to the management and the remaining 50% should be filled up based on the counseling conducted by the Commissioner of Entrance Examination and the same have to be filled up in accordance with the communal reservation applicable to the backward classes as stipulated by the guidelines." The regulation makes it clear that for the admission for professional colleges, merit shall be the prime criteria and that 50% of the seats are earmarked to the management and the remaining 50% should be filled up on the basis of the counseling conducted by the Commissioner of Entrance Examination. It was categorically pleaded by the applicants in the counter-affidavit that the 50% seats "have to be filled up in accordance with the communal reservation applicable to the backward classes as stipulated by the guidelines." Thus, it is clear that the case of the State in their counter affidavit was clearly that 50% seats had to be filled up on the basis of communal reservation applicable to the backward classes. It was in view of this plea in the written statement that the matter had been argued by the counsel and considered by the Court. It was in view of this plea in the written statement that the matter had been argued by the counsel and considered by the Court. However, even if the plea as sought to be raised by the learned Advocate General is considered and it is assumed that only 25% of the total seats had to be filled up under Regulation 18, the Bench has already held that the Government shall be entitled to a total of 25% seats. Thus, even on the basis of the plea as now sought to be raised, which appears to be in conformity with he Regulation, no modification in the judgment is called for. 21. Learned Advocate General submitted that the College had admitted candidates with very low merit. It was emphasized that one of the candidates had a score of as low as 8.9% in the entrance examination conducted by the Commissioner. This contention was based on the affidavit filed by Mr.K.Mohandas, Principal Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Kerala. Since this affidavit was filed on Feb.13, 2003, during the course of the hearing of the Review Petitions, learned counsel for the Writ Petitioners did not have complete instructions in the matter. However, on the next day viz.Feb.14, 2003, while the case was being argued, the lists of students admitted by both the Colleges were produced by the learned counsel. The institution or the board etc. from which the candidates had qualified, the marks in the relevant subjects, viz., Physics, Chemistry and Biology were indicated. It was pointed out that the candidates had high scores in their qualifying examinations. These scores range from the lowest of 52% to 88.4%. All of them fulfill the conditions of eligibility. They had appeared in the test conducted by the institution. They had been tested not only for their knowledge of the essential subjects but were also examined for their aptitude. They were even interviewed. Thereafter a merit list was prepared. On this basis, learned counsel submitted that the allegation as made on behalf of the applicants was totally untenable. 22. On a consideration of the matter, we find that the students admitted by the institutions were not ineligible. Still further, the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) recognizes the right of the unaided colleges to conduct their own entrance test. 22. On a consideration of the matter, we find that the students admitted by the institutions were not ineligible. Still further, the decision in T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (supra) recognizes the right of the unaided colleges to conduct their own entrance test. In any event, the respondents had not even raised their little finger against the process of selection as followed by the institutions during the course of the hearing of the Writ Petitions. No question about the merit of the candidates admitted by the institutions had been raised. Even at the hearing of the Review Petitions, it was not suggested that they were ineligible. Thus, at this stage, especially when the students are not even parties in the cases before us, it cannot be said that there was any irregularity or illegality in their admission. 23. In this context, it may be mentioned that in a recent issue of the Newsweek (January 27, 2003), there is an interesting article - "Getting Past the Gates". At page 27, it has been said as under: "In judging admissions policies, it is important to remember that schools aren't looking just to reward past achievement. They want to attract students who will create the richest academic and social communities, and who have the best odds of success in college and later life. As a result, admissions officers say, what they really look for are signs of intellectual energy and personal enthusiasm - qualities that can show up in grades, scores, essays, recommendations, extracurricular activities or a mix of all these. "Merit" has become particularly difficult to define in an era when elite colleges are getting many more well qualified applicants than they can possibly accept, and when distrust of standardized admissions tests is growing. And making hard and fast distinctions based on race isn't going to get any easier as the growing trend toward racial mixing increases over the next century and people choose to identify with more than one group. The only thing educators who have struggled with these issues agree on is that there is no magic formula, not even for the Supreme Court." The above observations clearly indicate that the Courts have to be slow to enter academic thickets. It is best to leave the matters of inter-se merit to the educationists and experts in the field. Resultantly, the first question as noticed above, is answered against the applicants. It is best to leave the matters of inter-se merit to the educationists and experts in the field. Resultantly, the first question as noticed above, is answered against the applicants. It is held that the State does not have a right to claim 50% seats in the unaided professional colleges. Regarding (ii): Was the fee structure as fixed by the State Government just and fair? 24. So far as the question of fee is concerned, the Bench had found that the action of the government in fixing the fee at Rs.28,750/- was wholly unfair as according to its own assessment, the "expenses involved in training one MBBS student per year would be Rs.1.5 lakhs." Learned Advocate General stated that the matter is still under consideration of the Government in accordance with the directions given by the Bench. Resultantly, no direction is necessary at this stage. 25. Mr.Dhawan, learned counsel for the writ petitioners, however, pointed out that in the affidavits filed on behalf of the applicants it has been stated that the fee for the first year has been fixed at Rs.1.5 lakhs. He contended that this was totally contrary to the regulations and the directions given by this Court. 26. The contention of the counsel is not without merit. Some of the affidavits are certainly not happily worded. However, learned Advocate General categorically stated before us that the figure of Rs.1.5 lakhs per annum is only tentative. The matter shall be decided in accordance with the directions of the Bench. Resultantly, it is clear that the applicants are not pressing their claim for review of the judgment insofar as the fee structure is concerned. 27. It was, however, contended on behalf of the applicants that the Pushpagiri Medical College had charged fee at the rate of Rs.4.38 lakhs and even more from the students already admitted by it. Deposits had been taken from the candidates. One of the candidates had paid as much as Rs.22 lakhs. Thus, there was an element of profiteering on the part of the institution. On the other hand, Mr.Dhawan had pointed out that the amounts collected by the institution are not a secret. The figures had been given to the Government by the institution itself. The figures had been given to the Government by the institution itself. The students have been given receipts. The amounts are entered in the record books. On the other hand, Mr.Dhawan had pointed out that the amounts collected by the institution are not a secret. The figures had been given to the Government by the institution itself. The figures had been given to the Government by the institution itself. The students have been given receipts. The amounts are entered in the record books. Still further, he pointed out that in certain cases the institutions insist on advance deposits of full term fee so as to ensure that the candidates do not leave the course half way and that the institution does not lose a seat for the rest of the term. He also pointed out that the action was in strict conformity with the practice being followed by the private unaided institutions. In any case, the counsel stated that the institution shall give an option to all the candidates in such a way that it does not get any undue benefit. The money beyond the fee for the first year shall be placed in a separate account and the credit for the interest shall be given to the students concerned. 28. In view of the undertaking given on behalf of the writ petitioners, we do not find it necessary to say anything more. It may only be observed that the Institution/the writ petitioner shall be bound by the above statement made on their behalf. 29. In view of the above, it is held that the claim made on behalf of some of the applicants that the fee of Rs.1.5 lakhs is excessive cannot be sustained. However, the matter has to be finally considered and decided by the committee as constituted under the Regulations. The present arrangement is only an interim measure. 30. It was contend by the learned counsel for one of the applicants that the judgment in T.M.A Pai's case was only prospective. It could not have been applied in the case of the writ petitioners. 31. This contention is mis-conceived. The Government itself had chosen to follow the judgment and framed the regulations. The terms of the Prospectus were modified. The contention, as now sought to be raised, was considered. It was held that the Government could not be faulted for following the decision of the Supreme Court. In fact, under Article 141 of the Constitution, it was bound to do so. We find no ground to take a different view. 32. The terms of the Prospectus were modified. The contention, as now sought to be raised, was considered. It was held that the Government could not be faulted for following the decision of the Supreme Court. In fact, under Article 141 of the Constitution, it was bound to do so. We find no ground to take a different view. 32. It was suggested on behalf of the applicants that under Regulation 18, the seats had not been reserved for candidates from different communities only on the basis of caste. According to the Counsel, the instructions issued by the Government from time to time, provide that the creamy layer has to be excluded. 33. So far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, nothing was pleaded or argued on behalf of the respondents in the writ petitions by any of the counsel. It there was any criterion laid down by the Government for excluding the creamy layer, it should have been brought to the notice of the Court. No order was referred to during the hearing the hearing of the Review Petitions in any event that is a matter, which has to be kept in view while considering the claims of candidates from different sections for admission against the 25% seats. We have no doubt that the government shall follow its won orders while forwarding the names of the candidates to the Medical Colleges. No ground for review of the judgment is made out on this score. 34. Mr.Rajiv Dhawan, learned counsel for one of the writ petitioners contended that despite the directions given by the Court, the Government had failed to forward the lists of 25 candidates to each of the two institutions. He pointed out that the Government had acted in defiance of the clear directions of the Court. At one stage, it had forwarded a list by fax. It was immediately withdrawn. No explanation was given. He submitted that on having come to know about the pendency of the Review Petitions and despite the fact that there was no stay, the institutions had resisted the temptation to fill up the seats. Since the Government had not complied with the directions, the Colleges should be permitted to fill up the seats from the merit lists prepared by them. 35. Since the Government had not complied with the directions, the Colleges should be permitted to fill up the seats from the merit lists prepared by them. 35. On the other hand, learned Advocate General submitted that the Court may give the State Government two weeks more to forward the lists. 36. On consideration of the matter, we find that the state should have forwarded the lists within the time fixed by the Court. It had failed to do so. There was no justifiable reason. Insistence on 50% was not a legally valid excuse. Yet, in the circumstances of these cases, we consider it appropriate to direct that the State Government may forward a list, if it so wishes, to the institutions within one week from the date of the pronouncement of this order. In case it fails to do so, the colleges shall be at liberty to admit the students against the remaining seats. The interests of the weaker sections shall be kept in view. We are not accepting the request of the Advocate General fro the grant of two weeks as any further delay is likely to jeopardize the interests of the students. They may not be able to attend the requisite percentage of lectures. 37. Lastly, Mr.Rajiv Dhawan pointed out that the State Government was giving open threats to the writ petitioner that in case it does not fall in line, it shall have to leave the State. Learned Counsel produced Press cuttings and submitted that the Chief Minister had been quoted by the newspapers. The Counsel contended that the statement amounted to interference with the process of law. He was bringing the facts to the notice of the court for such action as may be considered appropriate. 38. At this stage, it does not appear to be necessary to go into this matter as really no action has been taken against any of the institutions. However, if at any later stage the petitioner has any cause for complaint, the matter shall be considered and decided. We may, however, mention that tin various cases it has been stated on behalf of the government that it is facing an acute financial crunch. It has no funds. It is also admitted that there is need for setting up professional institutions. In such a situation, the government should consider the desirability of encouraging rather than discourage the private enterprise. We may, however, mention that tin various cases it has been stated on behalf of the government that it is facing an acute financial crunch. It has no funds. It is also admitted that there is need for setting up professional institutions. In such a situation, the government should consider the desirability of encouraging rather than discourage the private enterprise. People trust their eyes more than what the Public Relations Officers might make them hear. If an intending entrepreneur sees that one institution has been badly treated, he may be reluctant to stake his funds in Kerala. 39. Mr.George Poonthottam, learned counsel for the applicants in C.M.P.Nos.8752 and 8753 of 2003 drew our attention to the order of reference to a larger bench passed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shahal H.Musaliar and another vs. The State of Kerala reported as (1993) 4 SCC 112. On this basis, it was contended that the case of the State of Kerala was distinct from others. The contention is mis-conceived. On an examination of the matter, we find that the State Government had not mentioned the peculiar local needs to justify the claim as made by it. The order of reference, which does not contain any findings or enunciation of law, cannot be the basis for review. It may also be mentioned that nothing was pointed out to show that the rights of unaided institutions were determined. 40. No other point was raised. 41. In view of the above, it is held that: 1. The claim of the State for reservation of 50% seats in private unaided colleges is wholly untenable. It has failed to point out any local needs, which may justify its demand for 50% of the total seats. If the State was to be treated as an equal partner, the distinction between an aided institution and an unaided medical college would be rendered almost nugatory. The State must realize that after it had granted the No Objection Certificates to the Writ Petitioners, the decision of the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai's case has brought about a sea change in the legal position. The State cannot shut its eyes to the hard reality in the post T.M.A. Pai era. 2. The State must realize that after it had granted the No Objection Certificates to the Writ Petitioners, the decision of the Apex Court in T.M.A. Pai's case has brought about a sea change in the legal position. The State cannot shut its eyes to the hard reality in the post T.M.A. Pai era. 2. The claim made on behalf of the State that the writ petitioner in O.P.No.38420 of 2002 had admitted students who were lacking in merit in support of their plea for review of the order cannot be sustained. In fact, in view of our findings as recorded above, the suggestion that the process of selection was not fair is wholly unfounded. 3. The fee of Rs.1.5 lakhs as mentioned in the order is not excessive. In any case, the matter being pending before the Government, no ground for review is made out. It is, however, clarified that the petitioner in OP.No.39420 of 2002 shall be bound by the undertaking as recorded above. 4. The plea raised on behalf of some of the applicants that the Judgment of the Supreme Court was prospective and could not have been applied to the admission in question is wholly untenable. Resultantly, we find no ground to review the order. The Review Petitions are accordingly dismissed. Even the C.M.P.Nos.8752 and 8753 of 2003 for grant of leave to seek review are dismissed. No costs.