( 1 ) SRI B. R. Srinivasulu Reddy, the Revision petitioner herein is the plaintiff in O. S. No. 109/2001 on the file of Principal Junior civil Judge Tirupati. The said suit was instituted as against Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams. Tirumala represented by its executive Officer. The Executive Authority, tirumala Gram Panchayat, Tirumala and the Health Officer, Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams, Tirumala, Tirupati, for the relief of perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from obstructing the petitioner/ plaintiff from carrying on tea and tiffin business in the plaint schedule property situate in North Mada Street, Tirumala. ( 2 ) THE Revision petitioner filed an application I. A. No. 166/2001 in O. S. No. 109/ 2001 on the file of Principal Junior Civil judge Tirupati under Order 39 Rule 1 of the code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter referred to as "code" in short, praying for the relief of temporary injunction and by an order dated 7-8-2001 the said Court had dismissed the said application. The Revision petitioner/ petitioner/plaintiff had relied upon Exs. P-1 to P-14 and on behalf of the respondents/ defendants. Exs. R-1 to R-5 were marked. Aggrieved by the order of dismissal of the application for temporary injunction, the petitioner herein preferred C. M. A. No. 32/2001 on the file of III Additional district Judge Tirupati and the learned Judge, after recording reasons, had dismissed the said Civil Miscellaneous Appeal by the order dated 30-10-2001. Aggrieved by the same, the Revision petitioner had preferred c. R. P. NO. 5286/2001 under Section 115 of the Code and in view of the amending provisions introduced to the Code of Civil procedure, the said Revision was dismissed on the ground that the same is not maintainable and consequent thereupon, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed. In c. M. P. No. l6787/2003,on8-8-2003,anorder of status quo was made. ( 3 ) SRI Govind Reddy, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner would submit that the Revision petitioner a petty business man had been running this business for sufficiently a long time and the fact remains that the petitioner had made an application to the 2nd respondent and also the 3rd respondent and the ground on which the relief was negatived is that the application submitted to the 3rd respondent is an unsigned application though the fact remains that the application submitted to the 2nd respondent is a signed application. The learned Counsel also pointed out that the discussion relating to the report also cannot be sustained in the light of the close proximity of time to the alleged date of inspection and also the date when this application was moved praying for the relief. The learned counsel also had drawn the attention of this court to Section 127 (3) of A. P. Panchayat Raj act, 1994, hereinafter in short referred to as "act" for the purpose of convenience, and had maintained that in the facts and circumstances of the case, prima facie the courts below should have arrived at a conclusion that there is deemed permission and vacating the temporary injunction and negativing the relief in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained. The learned Counsel also maintained that while exercising powers under Article 227, the scope being wider when compared to the jurisdiction of this court under Section 115 of the Code, this court can definitely interfere and make an order in equity to protect the possession of the Revision petitioner during the pendency of the suit. ( 4 ) PER contra Sri M. Adinarayana Raju, the learned Counsel representing the respondents made the following submissions. The learned Counsel would maintain that for invoking the deemed permission, presentation of a valid application to the competent authority is a sine qua non and in the absence of the same, the question of invoking the provision relating to deemed permission under the Act would not arise at all. The learned Counsel also contended that reasons in detail had been recorded by both the Courts below and such reasons need not be disturbed while exercising Revisional jurisdiction under article 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the reasons which had been recorded and had maintained that the application submitted by the petitioner to the 3rd respondent is an unsigned application and apart from this aspect there are several other defects. The learned Counsel also had taken this Court through the reasons which had been recorded and had maintained that the application submitted by the petitioner to the 3rd respondent is an unsigned application and apart from this aspect there are several other defects. The learned Counsel also while elaborating his submissions maintained that the 1st respondent - Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams, is more interested in protecting the public interest and in view of the same when concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts below, negativing the relief of temporary injunction, unless strong prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are established, this Court exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should be highly reluctant to interfere with such orders made by both the Courts below. ( 5 ) HEARD both the Counsel. ( 6 ) THE facts in brief are as hereunder: the Revision petitioner as plaintiff, as already specified supra, had moved an application for temporary injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his carrying on business in a suit filed byhim for the relief of permanent injunction. It is his case that he has been carrying on business in tea and tiffin sections at Door no. 1/47-A which is a portion of Door no. 1/47 belonging to him in North Mada street, Tirumala. It is stated that he is a permanent resident of Tirumala from the age of his ancestors and his title also had been declared by the Additional Subordinate judge Tirupati in O. S. No. 236/90 by its judgment dated 4-8-1997. It is further stated that Sri Swamy Hathiramji Mutt filed A. S. No. 118/97 which is pending disposal. It is further stated that the Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams, Tirupati had issued a notification in Vaartha daily that people who are doing business have to obtain licences from the authority and in addition to the same, even in Eenadu Daily, Chittoor Edition the same news was notified. In such circumstances, the petitioner made an application on 8-9-2000 requesting the respondents for grant of licence by receiving necessary fee. In such circumstances, the petitioner made an application on 8-9-2000 requesting the respondents for grant of licence by receiving necessary fee. The respondents 1 and 3 acknowledged the same on 14-9-2000 whereas the 2nd respondent acknowledged the same on 13-9-2000 and the respondents neither replied nor complied with the demand made by him, and hence in view of section 127 of the Act aforesaid it is stated that the petitioner is entitled to the deemed permission. Despite the same when there was an attempt by Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams to disturb his running of business, the petitioner was constrained to file the present suit and moved the application referred to supra for the relief of temporary injunction specified above. ( 7 ) THE respondents filed a counter in detail and no doubt relating to the collection of fee for the years 1980-81 and 1982-83, the same was admitted and it is stated that from 1983- 84 onwards, the respondents are not been collecting the licence fee since the petitioner is not doing business in the plaint schedule property. the respondents also had taken a stand that the notification referred to supra was issued by the Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams in the Telugu Dailies Vaartha and Eenadu calling for applications from the people having nativity, sufficient premises and permanent residence at Tirumala prior to 1988 for issuing licences to qualified persons in the relevant business to prevent unauthorized business in the interest of health, sanitation and safety of pilgrims and the said notification is not ipsofacto an offer to issue licence to any person to do any kind of business. It is further stated that issuing of licence to do hotel business is totally dependent on the owning and possessing of required area and nature of the building and condition of the premises and also the experience of the applicant in hotel business since the said business is concerned with the health of huge floating pilgrim population. Therefore, all the applicants who apply for licence to do hotel business are not automatically entitled for grant of licence unless the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams sanitary Inspector certifies the fitness and suitability of the place applied for hotel business. Therefore, all the applicants who apply for licence to do hotel business are not automatically entitled for grant of licence unless the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams sanitary Inspector certifies the fitness and suitability of the place applied for hotel business. It is further stated that the Sanitary inspector of the Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams inspected the premises and gave his report to the effect that the premises in question is not suitable for running of tiffin section or tea stall as there is no sufficient place for cleaning utensils, there is no place for toilets and no place to let out the used water from the plaint schedule premises. It is further stated that the plaint schedule property is required for a public purpose i. e. , for implementation of Master Plan at tirumala and a proposal for acquisition of plaint schedule property was already made by the respondents and issue of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition act/1894 is pending before the government and in this view of the matter also the petitioner is not entitled to seek any licence to start any business in the plaint schedule property. A further stand was taken that the application dated 10-9-2000 submitted by the petitioner to the 2nd respondent is not valid since it was not at all signed by the petitioner and hence Section 127 of the Act has no application at all to the case of the petitioner. ( 8 ) IT is no doubt true that the 3rd respondent is the competent authority under the delegation of powers to receive applications. An argument is put fourth that it is not in dispute that the 2nd respondent is the competent authority and since the application submitted to him is a signed application it can be taken thatan application in accordance with law had been presented to the competent authority which was denied by T. T. Devasthanams and hence the provision relating to Section 127 of the Act i. e. deemed permission, has to be made applicable. Section 127 of the Act deals with general provisions regarding licences and permissions. Section 127 of the Act deals with general provisions regarding licences and permissions. Section 127 (1) of the Act reads as hereunder:"every licence and permission granted under this Act or any rule or bye-law made under this Act shall specify period if any, for which, and the restrictions, limitations and conditions subject to which the same is granted and shall be signed by the Executive Authority or by some person duly authorized by him in this behalf. "section 127 (3) reads as hereunder:"every order of the authority competent under this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder to pass an order refusing, suspending canceling or modifying a licence or permission shall be in writing and shall state the grounds on which it proceeds. Provided that every application for a licence or permission under this Act shall be disposed of within fifteen days from the date of receipt thereof or from the date of receipt of approvals or completion of other formalities prescribed failing which it shall be deemed that licence or permission is granted. "placing strong reliance on the proviso, now a submission is made that in the present case, deemed permission is applicable and hence the Revision petitioner had made out a prima facie case and balance of convenience and if the interim order granted by this Court is vacated, the petitioner would be put to serious loss. In Vasi Reddy Rajya Laxmamma v. Hyderabad Urban Development Authority a division Bench of this Court, to which I am a party while dealing with Section 14 (1) (2) and (5) of A. P. Urban Area (Development) act, 1975 held:". . . . . . . . On a careful reading of subsections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 14 of the Act it is clear that the deemed provision referred to in sub-section (5) of Section 14 of the Act can be invoked where an application in writing was made to the authority in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be determined by Regulations. Hence, in the light of the specific stand taken by the respondent, inasmuch as a valid application as per Regulations had not been presented by the petitioner, the petitioner cannot take shelter under subsection (5) of Section 14 of the Act. In mohd. Ahmed Aliv. Commissioner, M. C. H. (1995 (1) An. Hence, in the light of the specific stand taken by the respondent, inasmuch as a valid application as per Regulations had not been presented by the petitioner, the petitioner cannot take shelter under subsection (5) of Section 14 of the Act. In mohd. Ahmed Aliv. Commissioner, M. C. H. (1995 (1) An. W. R. 462) it was held that where an application for sanction of revised layout plan of the petitioner for development of land submitted to the municipal Corporation was referred to huda for granting permission and the permission was not rejected within the stipulated time, the permission must be deemed to have been given under section 14 of the Act. It is pertinent to note that presentation of a valid application is definitely a sine qua non for invoking the benefit of the deemed provision under sub-section (5) of section 14 of the Act. Evidently keeping the same in view, the Division Bench while allowing the Writ Appeals had observed as already referred to supra. "hence the presentation of application for getting the benefit of deemed permission under a statutory provision must be an application in accordance with law. It is no doubt true that now an explanation is given that inasmuch as the 2nd respondent also is a competent authority a signed application was presented before the 2nd respondent it is needless to say that this is not the only ground. There are several other aspects involved in the matter. Though elaborate submissions were advanced relating to the report submitted by the concerned Sanitary inspector of the Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams, reasons in detail had been recorded by both the Courts below and in view of the public interest, the Court of first instance and also the appellate authority came to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. In N. V. V. Chowdary v. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Limited a division Bench of this Court at para 41 held:"the grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary remedy and in exercise of judicial discretion in granting or refusing to grant, the Court will take into reckoning the following as guidelines: (1) Whether the person seeking temporary injunction has made out a prima facie case. This is sine qua non. This is sine qua non. (2) Whether the balance of convenience is in his favour that is, whether it could cause greater inconvenience to him if the injunction is not granted than the inconvenience which the other side would be put to if the injunction is granted. As to that, the governing principle is whether the party seeking injunction could be adequately compensated by awarding damages and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them. (3) Whether the person seeking temporary injunction would suffer irreparable injury. It is, however, not necessary that all the three conditions must obtain. With the first condition as sine qua non at least two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioner conjunctively and a mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle a person to obtain temporary injunction. "in Shyama Kishore Bal v. Kishore Talkies it was observed:"in order to be entitled to an order in terms of Order XXXIX Rule 1 C. P. C, party claiming relief has to show existence of (a) prima facie case, (b) balance of convenience in his favour and (c) irreparable loss. An injunction is a judicial process whereby a party is ordered to be refrained from doing or to do particular act or thing. In the former case it is called a restrictive or prohibitory injunction and in the latter a mandatory injunction. Injunction may be either final remedy obtained by a suit or a preliminary or interlocutory relief granted while the suit is pending. In the first case it is a decree in the second an order or writ. An injunction is merely a process by which Court enforces equity. It is a form of equitable relief and they have to be adjusted in aid of equity and justice to the facts of each particular case. An interlocutory or interim injunction is to preserve matters "in suit" until the case can be tried it is not a violation of every legal right which justifies the grant of an injunctive remedy. Injunction can be issued where the right which is sought to be protected is clear, and unquestioned and not where the right is doubtful and there is no emergency and further where the injury threatened is positive and substantial is otherwise irremediable. The conduct of person seeking injunction must be free from the shadow of unfairness. Injunction can be issued where the right which is sought to be protected is clear, and unquestioned and not where the right is doubtful and there is no emergency and further where the injury threatened is positive and substantial is otherwise irremediable. The conduct of person seeking injunction must be free from the shadow of unfairness. The principal function of an injunction is to furnish preventive relief against immediate mischief. An injury is deemed to be irreparable when having regard to the nature of the act and from the circumstances relating to the threatened harm, the apprehended damage cannot be adequately compensated with money. The principles on which grant of injunction rests are: (i) In the facts and circumstances of each individual case there must exist a strong probability and that the petitioner has an ultimate chance of success in the suit. This concept is what is usually known as a prima facie case. (ii) As the injunction is granted during the pendency of the suit the Court will interfere to protect the plaintiff from injuries which are irreparable. The expression "irreparable injury" means that it must be material one which cannot be adequately compensated for in damages. The injury need not be actual but may be apprehended. (iii) The Court is to balance and weigh the mischief or inconvenience to either side before issuing or withholding the injunction. This principle is otherwise expressed by saying that the Court is to look to the balance of convenience. With the first condition as sine qua non other two conditions should be satisfied by the petitioner conjunctively and mere proof of one of the three conditions does not entitle a person to obtain temporary injunction. " ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter, on the slender ground that the application presented to the 2nd respondent was a signed application, I do not think that while exercising the revisional jurisdiction this Court can exercise its discretion in a different way and grant the temporary injunction prayed for by the petitioner which was refused by both the Courts below recording reasons in detail. While appreciating and deciding the grant of temporary injunction or refusal of temporary injunction in a matter of this nature always it is essential and desirable that the individual interest vis-a-vis pubic interest may have to be weighed carefully and inasmuch as the Tirumala Tirupati devasthanams, on the strength of the report of its sanitary Inspector, came to a conclusion. I do not think that it is a fit matter where this court can interfere with the order impugned in the present Civil Revision Petition. ( 10 ) VIEWED from any angle, the Civil revision Petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.