Judgment This is an application made for review of the judgment and order dated 26th of July, 2000 passed by the Division Bench comprising of Justice Vinod Kumar Gupta (as His Lordship then was) and my learned brother the Hon'ble Justice Arunava Barua in Appeal No. 781 of 1993. 2. The application has now been assigned to us. Admittedly the order was passed of which the review is sought for on July 26, 2000 and it appears that the application for review has been filed on 5th March, 2001, that is long after the expiry of the period of limitation. 3. In the application although a prayer has been made for condonation of delay after going through the application we do not find any satisfactory explanation as to such delay in preferring the application beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 4. The explanation which has been sought to be offered by the applicant is that after the impugned order was passed, a Special Leave Petition was filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in January, 2001. It has been pleaded in Paragraph 37 of the application when the Special Leave Petition came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court for hearing the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that instead of preferring the Special Leave Petition an application for review of the impugned judgment and order ought to have been preferred and, accordingly, the learned Counsel for the petitioner was asked to withdraw the said appeal with instruction to file an application for review before this Hon'ble Court. It has been pleaded further in Paragraph-38 of the application after receipt of the copy of the said order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in January 2001 along with a copy of the forwarding letter of the learned Advocate, the review application has been filed. 5. It has been further pleaded that during the pendency of the Special Leave Petition in the Hon'ble Supreme Court the petitioner was reasonably prevented from filing the said application for review. 6. The explanation which has been offered for the delay in filing the application for review not only is tenable at all but is wholly misconceived. 7. The pendency of a Special Leave Petition cannot be a bar for preferring an application for review. 6. The explanation which has been offered for the delay in filing the application for review not only is tenable at all but is wholly misconceived. 7. The pendency of a Special Leave Petition cannot be a bar for preferring an application for review. Therefore, it cannot be said that as the Special Leave Petition was pending, the petitioner was reasonably prevented from filing the review application. 8. That apart, although it has been stated that the application was withdrawn as the Supreme Court was of the view that the proper course of action would be for the petitioner to apply for review before this High Court. It does not appear from the copy of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court annexed to the affidavit-in-reply that any such observation was made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, on the contrary it appears from the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the Special Leave Petition that the petitioner himself after arguing the matter for some time withdrew the petition and, accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition as withdrawn. The order of Supreme Court dated 2nd January, 2001 is quoted hereunder :- Item No. 21 Court No 7 Section XVI SUPREME COURT OF INDIA RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 469446 Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 20299/2000 (From the judgment and order dated 26.7.2000 in APO 781 of 1993, of the High Court of Calcutta) Sri Sri Iswar Sridhar Jew & Anr. Kamala Bala Mustaphy. (With prayer for interim relief) (With Appln(s) for exemption from filing of the impugned judgment) Date: 02/01/2001. This petition was application for hearing today. CORAM: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Rajendra Babu Hon'ble Mr. Justice Balakrishna For Petitioners Dr. Sumant Bharadwaj, Advocate Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Advocate Upon hearing Counsel the Court made the following ORDER After arguing the matter for some time learned Counsel for the petitioners seeks leave of the Court to withdraw the petition. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn. Charanjit (Meena Trikha) Court Master 9. It is somewhat surprising that the part of the application where it has been stated that such observation was made by the Supreme Court for which the application was withdrawn has been affirmed by the deponent as true to his knowledge, who is present before us today. Charanjit (Meena Trikha) Court Master 9. It is somewhat surprising that the part of the application where it has been stated that such observation was made by the Supreme Court for which the application was withdrawn has been affirmed by the deponent as true to his knowledge, who is present before us today. He, however, admits that he was not present before the Hon'ble Supreme Court when such order was passed. 10. It was sought to be submitted that such was the instruction of the learned Advocate. 11. No such instruction as allegedly given by the learned Advocate of the Supreme Court is either annexed to the present application. 12. Such being the position, we are of the view that the petitioner failed to explain the delay satisfactorily in preferring the application for review beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 13. It is pertinent to record in this connection also that reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party/plaintiff in the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chunilal Basu v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice High Court at Calcutta reported in AIR 1974 Calcutta page 326 where it has been held. Inter alia in Paragraph-8 of the judgment that if the application is withdrawn on the allegation that the same has been done on the advice of the Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court unless the same is recorded in the order of the Supreme Court. The same cannot be accepted. 14. The application for review being time barred is rejected. 15. Before parting with the matter we may record when this matter was called on the learned Advocate-on-Record appearing for the petitioner prayed for adjournment on the ground that both the learned Senior Counsel and the learned Junior Counsel are not available. 16. Such prayer was very much opposed and it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the opposite party that the plaintiff is approximately ninety years old and the present application is pending from March 2001. 17. Considering such facts and considering also the fact that the application ex facie appeared to be time barred, we did not think it fit and proper to grant adjournment to such an old matter. 18. We may further record that the opposite party No.2 Shri Debabrata Ghosh is personally present and he did not oppose the application. 19. 17. Considering such facts and considering also the fact that the application ex facie appeared to be time barred, we did not think it fit and proper to grant adjournment to such an old matter. 18. We may further record that the opposite party No.2 Shri Debabrata Ghosh is personally present and he did not oppose the application. 19. It is not, however, material whether any party has opposed or not the prayer of the applicant. 20. As the application is ex facie time barred and we are of the view that the delay has not been explained satisfactorily, we cannot hold that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the application within the prescribed period of limitation and in such view of the matter. We have rejected the application. 21. There will be no order as to costs. 22. All interim orders, therefore, stand vacated. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking.