P. S. NARAYANA. ,J. ( 1 ) THIS is an unfortunate long drawn litigation wherein the petitioners are claiming property rights over the subject matter of controversy and the government and the local body denying the same. ( 2 ) THE Civil Revision Petition is preferred by the petitioners as against an order made by the Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool in I. A. No. 245/99 in A. S. (CFR) no. 858/99, dated 10-11-2000. Though the factual details are too numerous, the question involved in the present Civil Revision Petition is simple i. e. , Whether there is sufficient cause to condone the delay of 1210 days or 1178 days as the case may be, in preferring the Appeal. The facts in nutshell which had paved the way for the petitioners filing the present Civil Revision Petition are as hereunder: smt. Rangamma and Smt. Lakshmamma who are no more and are being represented by the legal representatives, shown as petitioners 4 to 8 and petitioners 11 to 15 in the present Civil Revision Petition filed O. S. No. 96/73 on the file of Junior civil Judge, Nagarkurnool against the State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the Collector, Mahaboobnagar as 1st defendant and the Secretary, Zilla Parishad, as the 2nd defendant and the Block Development Officer, Nagarkurnool as the 3rd defendant, praying for a decree of separate possession of Acs. 2-02 guntas out of acs. 9-22 guntas of land in S. No. 369 of Nagarkurnooll town, Mahaboobnagar district. The 3rd plaintiff had purchased Ac. 1-00 out of Acs. 2-02 guntas from the aforesaid plaintiffs 1 and 2. The stand taken by the plaintiffs was that one late Srinivas Rao was the original owner of an extent of Acs. 9-22 guntas in s. No. 369 of Nagarkurnool town and during the year 1350 Fasli the Government had acquired an extent of Acs. 7-20 guntas out of the total extent of Acs. 9-22 guntas. But however the said area of Acs. 7-20 guntas was not demarcated on the site and thus the plaintiffs and the defendants therein have been in joint possession of Acs. 9-22 guntas and in spite of repeated demands since the defendants had not separated the extent of Acs. 2-02 guntas, the plaintiffs were left with no other option except to institute the aforesaid suit. 7-20 guntas was not demarcated on the site and thus the plaintiffs and the defendants therein have been in joint possession of Acs. 9-22 guntas and in spite of repeated demands since the defendants had not separated the extent of Acs. 2-02 guntas, the plaintiffs were left with no other option except to institute the aforesaid suit. ( 3 ) THE 1st defendant in the suit filed a written statement taking a plea that acs. 2-02 guntas of land had been demarcated on 25-11-1972 itself and hence the suit as framed itself is not maintainable. The 3rd defendant also filed a separate written statement pleading that the Gram Panchayat, Nagarkunrool by resolution dated 16-5-1957 had gifted Acs. 2-00 to the Head Master, Junior Basic school Nagarkurnool and possession was delivered to him on 24-5-1957. The trial court passed a preliminary decree on 18-3-1974 and the defendants preferred a. S. No. 93/74 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Mahaboobnagar and the same was dismissed on 26-2-1976. The unsuccessful appellants/defendants had made yet another attempt by filing S. A. (SR) No. 33805/76 with an application for condonation of delay in presenting the Appeal and the delay was condoned on terms and since the costs had not been paid, the said Second Appeal was dismissed on 26-12-1976. The plaintiffs filed I. A. No. 198/80 in O. S. No. 96/73 for passing of final decree and the same was allowed on 6-5-1981. As against the said final decree, defendants 1 and 2 filed A. S. No. 60/82 on the file of district Judge, Mahaboobnagar and the learned District Judge had made an order of remand for equitable division making certain observations. The plaintiffs filed C. M. A. No. 1010/84 as against the order of remand and at this stage, it appears, a serious attempt was made to settle this dispute amicably. However, the fact remains that the plaintiffs had withdrawn C. M. A. No. 1010/84 on 14-10-1988. When the matter was taken up by the trial Court for passing final decree, an objection was raised by the defendants that the suit land is an inam land and hence both the preliminary decree and the final decree proceedings are null and void. The said objections were held to be untenable by an order dated 1-8-1995. An Advocate-Commissioner was appointed for separation of acs. 2-02 guntas and a report also was filed. The said objections were held to be untenable by an order dated 1-8-1995. An Advocate-Commissioner was appointed for separation of acs. 2-02 guntas and a report also was filed. Though specific objections had been raised on the ground that the land is inam land and hence the preliminary decree and the final decree are null and void, the said contentions were not accepted and the trial Court passed final decree on 8-3-1996. The plaintiffs aforesaid interse had compromised the matter and filed I. A. No. 110/96 before the trial court for passing final decree in terms of compromise and the said application was rejected and aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed c. M. A. No. 42/96 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool wherein the defendants also were made parties and the said C. M. A. was allowed on 4-10-1996 and in view of the same, the trial Court passed a final decree on 6-10-1996. ( 4 ) PENDING the suit, the original plaintiffs 1 and 2 died and the legal representatives were brought on record. The plaintiff No. 3 filed E. P. No. 21/97 for maintaining his possession relating to the land allotted to him in the aforesaid compromise decree. The 3rd defendant had raised an objection relating to the executability of the final decree on the same ground that these are inam lands and had been vested in the State and hence execution cannot be maintained. ( 5 ) THE executing Court by the order dated 25-9-1998 had arrived at the conclusion that the said objection is unsustainable in view of the Judgment of the Apex court in STATE OF MAHARASHTRA se objections and directed to put the decree-holder in separate possession. The matter was again carried by way of c. R. P. No. 3261/99 raising the self-same grounds and no doubt the said grounds were resisted both on the doctrine of merger and the doctrine of res judicata and accordingly C. R. P. No. 3261/99 was dismissed by an order dated 1-10-1999. Subsequent thereto, as against the final decree dated 8-3-1996, the defendants filed appeal on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkunrool on 2-7-1999 with an application I. A. No. 245/96 to condone the delay of 1210 days in filing the said appeal, but however, ultimately it had turned out to be the delay of 1178 days. Subsequent thereto, as against the final decree dated 8-3-1996, the defendants filed appeal on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkunrool on 2-7-1999 with an application I. A. No. 245/96 to condone the delay of 1210 days in filing the said appeal, but however, ultimately it had turned out to be the delay of 1178 days. Though the question involved in the said application was very simple, elaborate affidavit placing the whole historical background of the litigation had been narrated and a lengthy counter affidavit also was filed raising all the grounds inclusive of doctrine of merger and the doctrine of res judicata. The learned senior Civil Judge ultimately allowed the said application on certain terms and aggrieved by the same, the present petitioners had filed C. R. P. No. 5613/2000. Though costs had not been received, the same had been deposited and in view of the said order, the Appeal was numbered as A. S. No. 38/2000 on the file of Senior civil Judge, Nagarkunrool and this Court in W. A. No. 321/2001 on 12-3-2001 made the following order: "having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that interests of justice will be subserved if A. S. No. 38/2000 on the file of Senior civil Judge, Nagarkurnool and C. R. P. No. 5613/2000 are heard together by this court. For the above mentioned purpose we in exercise of our jurisdiction under article 228 of the Constitution of India withdraw A. S. No. 38/2000 from the file of Senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool to this Court. In the meanwhile, the parties are directed to maintain status quo obtaining as on today. Consolidated informal paper book to be filed by the appellant. As soon as the records in a. S. No. 38/2000 are received by this Court, the parties shall be at liberty to mention for early hearing of the matter. " ( 6 ) THUS, the Transfer A. S. also is before this Court. Sri Mahipathi Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners in a systematic way had made his submissions by taking this Court through the important dates commencing from the filing of the suit O. S. No. 96/73 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool, the series of litigations and also explained the scope and ambit of pending litigations at present. Sri Mahipathi Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners in a systematic way had made his submissions by taking this Court through the important dates commencing from the filing of the suit O. S. No. 96/73 on the file of Junior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool, the series of litigations and also explained the scope and ambit of pending litigations at present. The learned counsel would maintain that the learned Senior Civil Judge had entered into unnecessary discussion about the maintainability of the suit, the jurisdictional aspects, doctrine of res judicata and the doctrine of merger. According to the learned Counsel, these aspects are in no way relevant to the simple question whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 1210 days or 1178 days in presenting the Appeal. The learned Counsel also pointed out the uncharitable allegations made by the Government and the local body against the petitioners in this regard. The learned Counsel also had taken us through the contents of the affidavit filed in support of the application, counter and the findings recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge in this regard and had contended that definitely this will not constitute sufficient cause and the learned Judge had totally erred in allowing the application on the ground of involvement of public interest. The learned Counsel also cited a catena of decisions in support of his contentions. The learned Counsel also had taken us through the additional affidavit, counter filed at Revisional stage and contended that it is not permissible and even otherwise it will not in any way improve the situation since even if reliance is placed on this material, sufficient cause is not established. The learned Counsel also had explained that costs awarded by the learned Senior Civil Judge had not been accepted and the same had been deposited in Court. The learned Counsel also had explained that costs awarded by the learned Senior Civil Judge had not been accepted and the same had been deposited in Court. ( 7 ) THE learned Additional Advocate General Sri Ramesh Ranganathan, in his usual cool way submitted that discretion had been exercised by the learned Senior civil Judge in a particular way which needs no interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C. P. C. The learned Counsel also would maintain that these lands being inam lands, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction at all and since it is a question of inherent lack of jurisdiction, the earlier proceedings will not operate as res judicata and since valuable property is involved and Government has an excellent case on merits, it should be taken as at least one of the grounds for condoning the delay. It is contended that at the best the opposite party may be compensated with costs and in fact that was done in the present case and costs had been deposited and the Appeal also was numbered and the same was transferred to this Court. The learned Counsel also maintained that reasons had been well explained both before the learned Senior civil Judge and also before the Revisional Court and keeping the value of the subject matter of the litigation and the facts and circumstances and also the stand taken by the Government and the local body and in the light of the views expressed by the Apex Court on the aspect of liberal approach and consideration in cases of condonation of delay relating to Government, the impugned order needs no disturbance at the hands of this Court. Elaborate submissions were made in relation to the averments made in the affidavits filed in support of the application for condonation of delay, both before the appellate Court and also before this Court. To substantiate his contentions reliance was placed on certain decisions. Heard both the Counsel on record. ( 8 ) AT the outset, it may be stated that this Court is concerned with the question whether the impugned order is liable to be set aside or to be confirmed. The question involved is plain and simple, i. e. , whether the learned Senior Civil judge in the facts and circumstances is justified in law in condoning the delay of 1178 days holing that there is sufficient cause. The question involved is plain and simple, i. e. , whether the learned Senior Civil judge in the facts and circumstances is justified in law in condoning the delay of 1178 days holing that there is sufficient cause. At the outset, we may observe that all the other aspects may not be relevant for the present purpose. Strong reliance was placed on LOKRAJ AND OTHERS It may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant portion of the affidavit filed in support of I. A. No. 245/99. It is averred at paras 5 and 6 of the affidavit filed in support of I. A. No. 245/99:"that the petitioners herein have contested all the time. After passing final decree the counsel for the petitioners have obtained the copies of the final decree and handed over in the office of the Zilla Parishad, Mahabubnagar. There were frequent transfers in the concerned section including the officers. So the office could not peruse the matter for preferring the appeal. The affairs of the case used to lookafter by the petitioners No. 3 but it is very unfortunate that there was no permanent officer posted to the post of MPDO Nagarkurnool and officers who were posted to the post were not placed this matter before them for taking timely action. So the delay was accrued in preferring the appeal in time. The work of the Govt. is sub-divided and the various officers are to take decision in preferring the appeal. So this resulted in non-coordination of the officers to take final decision in preferring the appeal in time. That the delay caused in preferring the Appeal is not intentionally, wanton nor negligence. But the result of the procedural administrative delay only. Meanwhile the respondents herein have taken the advantage of the accidental delay when the respondent No. 2 along with a group of people have come on the spot and to take possession of the land within the premises covered with compound wall. Then I got the knowledge and I made enquiry about the stage of the proceedings. Then I have approached the District Administrative authority and obtained copies of the final decree from the Zilla Parishad Office and subsequently consulted the counsels at Mahabubnagar and Nagarkurnool and the counsels advised me to prefer appeal in final decree proceedings passed by the district Munsif, Nagarkurnool. Then I have approached the District Administrative authority and obtained copies of the final decree from the Zilla Parishad Office and subsequently consulted the counsels at Mahabubnagar and Nagarkurnool and the counsels advised me to prefer appeal in final decree proceedings passed by the district Munsif, Nagarkurnool. " ( 9 ) THE delay mentioned in the affidavit is 1210 days. But, ultimately it had turned out to be 1178 days. The learned Senior Civil Judge in I. A. No. 245/99 had concluded:"it is undisputed fact that school children are using portion of the land covered under final decree as play ground and officers of government departments. Keeping the judicial precedents cited by the learned Counsel for petitioners to cause substantial justice and avert the school boys and girls of deprivation of their basic necessities in education and to save public exchequer out of proposed demolition of the public offices, hostels of boys and girls, the court feels that golden scale of justice would tilt in favour of the petitioners that it is a fit case to condone the delay by taking ground mentioned by the petitioner as sufficient cause U/s. 5 of Limitation Act. Accordingly i. A. No. 245/99 is allowed and delay of (1178) days is condoned subject to condition that the petitioners shall pay sum of Rs. 5000/- (Rs. Five thousand only) to the respondents together towards costs within a period of one month from today. On payment or deposit of the said costs the appeal shall be numbered if it is otherwise in order. " ( 10 ) IT is brought to our notice that Rs. 5000/- costs had not been received, but the same had been deposited and the Appeal numbered thus as A. S. No. 38/2000 was withdrawn and numbered as Tr. A. S. No. 213/2002. The conduct of Officials and the delay caused thereby by a Government Office was made the ground for condonation of delay. The delay is 1178 days and it is needless to say that this is an inordinate delay. No doubt, serious allegations suggesting collusion had been made. The main ground of attack is that the government and the local body have been fighting this litigation so seriously and in view of the said fact the non-filing of the Appeal in time definitely can be inferred due to the circumstances explained in the affidavit. No doubt, serious allegations suggesting collusion had been made. The main ground of attack is that the government and the local body have been fighting this litigation so seriously and in view of the said fact the non-filing of the Appeal in time definitely can be inferred due to the circumstances explained in the affidavit. In STATE OF haryana "it is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining everyday s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis--vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis--vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. " ( 12 ) IN STATE OF A. P. "the State just as a private party is not relieved of its obligation to satisfy the Court of the existence of sufficient cause in preferring the appeal belatedly. The expression sufficient cause being a word sufficiently elastic and flexible, the approaches of the Court while considering the question of sufficiency of the cause shown could differ, depending upon the accepted position in which the litigant is placed. When the State or its agent is the applicant, the concept of sufficient cause should be viewed, having due regard to the practical realities of Governmental functioning and peculiar handicaps afflicting the system. Strict insistence on the traditional principle of explaining every day s delay is not warranted. A wider latitude in the matter of exercise of discretion to condone the delay in keeping in view the said peculiar features is therefore called for, otherwise, if those peculiar characteristics and features are eschewed from consideration and the Court proceeds to apply the same yardstick, it would amount to adopting a pedantic or mechanical approach and that would lead to miscarriage of justice. It would then be a case of not adopting the classification where there is a need for one a facet of Article 14. Uniformity in approach in dissimilar situations would amount to application of law in an uneven manner. It would then be a case of not adopting the classification where there is a need for one a facet of Article 14. Uniformity in approach in dissimilar situations would amount to application of law in an uneven manner. The spirit and philosophy underlying Section 5 of the Limitation Act would then be defeated. The public interest may irretrievably suffer. The Court has to properly balance the considerations of public interest on the one hand and public policy that lies at the root of the law of limitation on the other. But, there is a limit to which the Court can go. It must be remembered that the difference in approach does not mean that any explanation given by the official of the State should be glibly swallowed and the Court should stretch a point to bring the explanation within the ambit of sufficient cause at any cost. The factors and causes contributing to the delay should bear reasonable nexus to the concept of sufficient cause and should pass the test of reasonableness and genuineness. Where the delay is too long just as in the present case cogent and convincing reasons are expected from the petitioner-State, because the burden to satisfactorily explain the delay would then be heavier. The Governmental authorities cannot shrug off the responsibility by merely pleading endless and long winding correspondence and Office notes. There must be some end to the correspondence and interaction and decision making. The process cannot go on as in the instant case for ten years unless of course, there is a reasonable ground to believe that there was fraud or collusion on the part of Government Officials and the private party. " ( 13 ) IN P. K. RAMACHANDRAN "in the instant case, the appellant tried to explain the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree as is evident from his application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act accompanied by his own affidavit. Even though the appellant appears not to be a vigilant as he ought to have been, yet his conduct does not, on the whole, warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. He should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. He should have been more vigilant but his failure to adopt such extra vigilance should not have been made a ground for ousting him from the litigation with respect to the property, concededly to be valuable. While deciding the application for setting aside the ex parte decree, the Court should have kept in mind the judgment impugned, the extent of the property involved and the stake of the parties. We are of the opinion that the inconvenience caused to the respondent for the delay on account of the appellant being absent from the Court in this case can be compensated by awarding appropriate and exemplary costs. In the interests of justice and under the peculiar circumstances of the case, we set aside the order impugned and condone the delay in filing the application for setting aside ex parte decree. To avoid further delay, we have examined the merits of the main application and feel that sufficient grounds exist for setting aside the ex parte decree as well. Consequently, the appeal is allowed by setting aside the orders impugned. The appellant s application for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree shall stand allowed subject to payment of exemplary costs of rs. 50,000/- to be paid to the opposite side within a period of 30 days. If the costs are not paid within the time specified, this appeal shall be deemed to have been dismissed and the ex parte decree passed against the appellant revived. We may clarify that the costs awarded by this order are in addition to the amount of Rs. 10,000/- deposited in this Court for payment to the respondent vide order dated 3-11-2000. " ( 14 ) IN GORDI SADASIVAN "having heard both the Counsel and having perused the affidavit filed in support of the application and also the counter and the impugned order made in this case, I am of the opinion that the impugned order is liable to be set aside for more than one reason. The affidavit filed in support of the application does not disclose any valid reasons constituting sufficient cause. In fact the allegations made in the affidavit are as vague as vagueness can be. Even in the case of Government, when an affidavit is filed in support of an application seeking condonation of delay, if allowed, it will virtually amount to extending period of limitation. In fact the allegations made in the affidavit are as vague as vagueness can be. Even in the case of Government, when an affidavit is filed in support of an application seeking condonation of delay, if allowed, it will virtually amount to extending period of limitation. The affidavit should disclose valid and cogent reasons constituting sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of Limitation Act. In the absence of the same I am of the opinion that mere fact that the party is Government will not make any difference as far as this aspect is concerned. In the present case, the affidavit filed in support of the application does not disclose any valid reasons for condoning the inordinate delay of 406 days and the Court below had adopted an erroneous approach in allowing such application which in my considered opinion is definitely an illegal exercise of jurisdiction which warrants interference under Section 115 of C. P. C. by this Court. " ( 15 ) IT is no doubt true that when Government is a party, since the Governmental machinery operates through Officials and it servants, it is but natural that the courts may have to decide the applications for condonation of delay liberally, keeping in view the said aspect also. But, liberality cannot be stretched too wide and while deciding an application for condonation of delay, all the aspects are to be taken into consideration. The mere fact that the Government and the local body had been fighting the litigations cannot by itself be suggestive of explaining the inordinate delay and putting the same on the ground of sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The averments made in paras 5 and 6 of the affidavit filed in support of i. A. No. 245/99 had been specifically denied by way of an elaborate counter. Only a vain attempt was made to suggest some collusion at the lower cadre. This, in our opinion, will not improve the case of the respondents in any way. It is also pertinent to note that before this Court - the Revisional Court, additional affidavit was filed and in our considered opinion, the same is not permissible. Only a vain attempt was made to suggest some collusion at the lower cadre. This, in our opinion, will not improve the case of the respondents in any way. It is also pertinent to note that before this Court - the Revisional Court, additional affidavit was filed and in our considered opinion, the same is not permissible. But however, we have given our anxious consideration and had gone through the additional affidavit and the counter filed before this Court and this material also will not improve the situation any further. The learned senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool had discussed several other aspects and had ultimately allowed the application being satisfied that public interest is involved, but the reasons recorded by the learned Senior Civil Judge are wholly unsustainable and totally unconvincing and thus the very approach adopted by the learned Senior Civil Judge is too a liberal approach which in our considered opinion is impermissible in law. The imposition of terms always as a matter of rule cannot be a reason for affirming an order, if otherwise the same cannot stand to the test of legal scrutiny. Viewed from any angle, the inordinate delay caused in preferring the Appeal cannot be condoned since the reasons explained definitely will not constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Hence, the impugned order cannot be sustained and consequently the petitioners are bound to succeed and accordingly the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court makes no order as to costs. W. P. No. 1718/2001 ( 16 ) THE petitioners - legal representatives of Rangamma and others, filed the Writ petition praying for calling of the records pertaining to proceedings no. V2/850/98, dated 18-12-2000 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad - the 2nd respondent in the Writ Petition, and quash the same by issuing appropriate writ, order or direction preferably one in the nature of certiorari and pass such other suitable orders. The factual matrix which had been narrated in detail supra had been repeated again by the petitioners in the lengthy affidavit filed in support of the present Writ Petition. The factual matrix which had been narrated in detail supra had been repeated again by the petitioners in the lengthy affidavit filed in support of the present Writ Petition. The 1st respondent is the District Development Officer, now the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Mahaboobnagar District and the 2nd respondent is the Commissioner (Appeals), Office of the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. The relevant facts, in short compass are as hereunder: it is stated that in view of the fact that the land was recorded as inam in revenue records, the petitioners filed application before the Revenue Divisional officer, Nagarkurnool in IA/3856/75 for grant of occupancy rights certificates in their favour in so far as Acs. 2-02 guntas in S. No. 369 is concerned and after due enquiry and notification, occupancy certificate was granted to the petitioners on 20-7-1977 in view of the decree of the Civil Court. Ramalakshmamma, one of the petitioners who is no more, filed Appeal before the collector, Mahaboobnagar in File No. B2/2/78 questioning the said occupancy rights certificate in favour of the petitioners and claiming a share. Ramalakshmamma was also given a share in the said appeal modifying the occupancy rights certificate dated 20-7-1977 and the order of the Revenue Divisional officer dated 20-7-1977 stood merged with the order passed by the collector in File No. 132/2/78. As already referred to supra, the other factual details need not be repeated again. Subsequent to remand and during the pendency of I. A. No. 198/80, the 1st respondent in the Writ Petition filed Appeal on 19-8-1988 before the Collector in File No. B2/7361/88 challenging the occupancy rights certificate issued by the revenue Divisional Officer dated 20-7-1977 and during the pendency of the said appeal before the Collector, Rangamma, the 1st respondent in the Appeal died and memo dated 27-10-1988 was filed before the Collector intimating the death of rangamma and about the surviving legal heirs. Soon thereafter, Lakshmamma and ramalakshmamma also died and the petitioners filed an application in i. A. No. 198/80 (final decree proceedings) to bring on record the legal representatives, during the year 1988 and hence it is stated that the 1st respondent was aware of the death of the said persons. Subsequent thereto, i. A. No. 198/80 was allowed on 8-3-1996. Soon thereafter, Lakshmamma and ramalakshmamma also died and the petitioners filed an application in i. A. No. 198/80 (final decree proceedings) to bring on record the legal representatives, during the year 1988 and hence it is stated that the 1st respondent was aware of the death of the said persons. Subsequent thereto, i. A. No. 198/80 was allowed on 8-3-1996. The matter was carried in Revision in c. R. P. No. 3261/99 and the same was dismissed by this Court on 1-10-1999. It is further stated that the petitioners filed W. P. No. 17473/98 challenging the validity of entertaining of Appeal by the Collector, Mahaboobnagar on various grounds, but this Court by an order dated 15-7-1996 transferred the proceedings from the Office of the Collector, Mahaboobnagar to the Commissioner, Land revenue, to decide the Appeal after hearing all the objections raised by the petitioners. The Appeal was taken up by the 2nd respondent for hearing and memo dated 18-1-2000 was filed to the effect that the Appeal stood abated totally in view of the fact that legal representatives of the deceased respondents 1, 2 and 4 in the Appeal were not brought on record within 90 days of their death in spite of being put on notice by memo dated 27-10-1988 as well as the proceedings on civil side i. e. , I. A. No. 198/80. It is further stated that the 1st respondent filed Civil Revision Petitions against the orders in E. P. No. 21/97 and e. P. No. 1/91 by knowing the death of Rangamma, Lakshmamma and Ramalakshmamma. At this stage, the 1st respondent filed an application in the month of March 2000 to implead the legal representatives without assigning any reasons and a counter was filed opposing the same. But however, ultimately, the 2nd respondent by an order dated 18-12-2000 simply allowed the application bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondents in the said Appeal on the ground that the memo dated 18-1-2000 filed by the petitioners shall be taken as the date of knowledge. ( 17 ) THE 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit in detail denying all the allegations and explaining the circumstances in which the impugned order was made. ( 17 ) THE 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit in detail denying all the allegations and explaining the circumstances in which the impugned order was made. Sri Mahipathi Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioners had submitted that though the 1st respondent had ample knowledge about the death of these parties, having kept quiet for sufficiently a long time without filing an application for condoning the delay or an application for setting aside the abatement, when remedy is hopelessly barred by limitation, the filing of the application to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased respondent cannot be sustained and hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The learned Counsel also made elaborate submissions about the essentials of a Court and also of a Tribunal and the learned Counsel would maintain that even in the case of a Tribunal, to these proceedings under the a. P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Act, 1955, hereinafter referred to as "act" for the purpose of convenience, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable, and hence in stead of recording total abatement of the Appeal the 2nd respondent totally erred in permitting the legal representatives of the deceased respondents to come on record and hence the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The learned counsel had placed reliance on a catena of decisions to substantiate his submissions in this regard. ( 18 ) PER contra, the learned Additional Advocate General Sri Ramesh Ranganathan had submitted that it is no doubt true that the 2nd respondent -appellate authority is expected to exercise quasi-judicial functions, but however in the light of the scheme and object of the Act, it cannot be said that all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Limitation Act, 1963 are to be made applicable to the Appeals under the Act. The learned Counsel in a meticulous fashion had taken us through different provisions of the Act and also the A. P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Inams Rules 1975, hereinafter referred to as "rules" in short, and had contended that the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure and the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 in all rigour cannot be made applicable to the proceedings under the Act just like before the ordinary civil Courts. The learned Counsel also had taken us through Sections 4, 10, 24 and 35 of the Act and also Rules 5 and 17 of the Rules. The learned Counsel also would maintain that the Appeal has to be heard on merits and the validity of the main certificate has to be gone into in the Appeal. The learned Counsel also submitted that in case the Government succeeds before the appellate authority, there is no question of acquisition of its own land. The learned counsel also had taken us through the impugned order. The object of Order 22 rule 10-A of the Code of Civil Procedure also had been pointed out in this regard. The learned Counsel further submitted that in a writ of certiorari, the court will not sit as appellate authority and from the date of knowledge the application was filed in time and the appellate authority had recorded reasons why it was inclined to allow the application to bring on record the legal representatives and except deciding the matter on merits, nothing else will happen and no prejudice is caused to the other side and hence the impugned order is not liable to be quashed. No doubt, the learned Counsel pointed out several defects in the memos filed and also the occupancy certificates issued in this regard. Reliance also was placed on certain decisions in support of his contentions. Heard both the Counsel. ( 19 ) THE 2nd respondent - appellate authority in the impugned order had stated :"on 18-1-2000, after receipt of appeal papers from District Collector a memo has been filed by Sri Narasimha Reddy, 5th respondent stating that the respondents 1, 2 and 4 died long back and the legal representatives were not brought on record. In this memo, he has given the names of the legal representatives of rangamma, Laxmamma and Ramalaxmamma. In pursuance of this memo, the present l. R. petition was filed by D. D. O. on 16. 3. 2000. That means within 90 days from the date of knowledge. The Collector could not do anything because the Hon ble high Court in W. P. M. P. No. 22300/88 in W. P. No. 17473 of 88 dt. 23. 11. 88 stayed all further proceedings. Perhaps that is the reason why no L. R. petition could be filed before the District Collector. The memo dated 18. 1. The Collector could not do anything because the Hon ble high Court in W. P. M. P. No. 22300/88 in W. P. No. 17473 of 88 dt. 23. 11. 88 stayed all further proceedings. Perhaps that is the reason why no L. R. petition could be filed before the District Collector. The memo dated 18. 1. 2000 can be taken as the date of knowledge and the petition now filed can be treated as one within the period of limitation. Therefore, accordingly there is no question of abatement or delay. More over as I found from the memos and counters filed, the fifth respondent did not give dates of death of respondents 1, 2 and 4. In 1996 (4) Supreme Today 509 (Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur "state is not expected to keep a watch over the survival of the respondents and lapse of the counsel to intimate to the counsel appearing in this Court cannot be construed knowledge of death. Even if it is assumed that abatement was caused, since application was filed under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC within 30 days from the date of knowledge, there is no delay in making application to bring the legal representatives on record. " ( 20 ) THEREFORE, I feel because in WPMP 22300/88 in WP 17473/88 dt. 23. 11. 88, the hon ble High Court granted stay of all further proceedings and because the DDO who is the Govt. official can not be expected to keep track of death or survival of the respondents 1, 2 and 4 and since the L. R. petition is filed within 90 days from the date of Memo i. e. , 18. 1. 2000, it can be taken as knowledge and therefore, there is no question of either abatement or delay. Therefore, the contention of the respondents is untenable and devoid of merits. The L. R. petition is, therefore, allowed and the Legal representatives of deceased respondents 1, 2, and 4 shall be brought on record. Main appeal is posted for hearing on 5th February, 2001 at 2. 30 PM. " ( 21 ) THE effect of this order is that the legal representatives of the deceased respondents in the appeal referred to supra are brought on record and a date was fixed for hearing of the appeal on merits. Main appeal is posted for hearing on 5th February, 2001 at 2. 30 PM. " ( 21 ) THE effect of this order is that the legal representatives of the deceased respondents in the appeal referred to supra are brought on record and a date was fixed for hearing of the appeal on merits. This order is impugned on the ground that there is no separate application for condonation of delay and there was total abatement of the appeal itself by virtue of the death since within the permissible period of limitation the legal representatives of the deceased respondents were not brought on record. Strong reliance was placed on MANGURAM section 3 of the Act deals with Abolition of vesting imams and the consequences thereof. Section 4 of the Act deals with Registration of inamdars as occupants. Section 6 of the Act deals with Registration of permanent tenants as occupants. Section 10 of the Act deals with Enquiry by Collector in certain cases. Section 11 of the Act deals with Savings of rights in certain cases. Section 24 of the act deals with Appeals from orders under Section 10 to Prescribed Authority. Rule 5 of the Rules deals with Application for the purpose of registration of inamdar and the like and Rule 17 deals with Proceedings of the Special Tribunal to be summary, and it simply specifies that the proceedings of the Special tribunal shall be governed, as far as practicable, by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is well settled that a writ of Certiorari is a discretionary writ and the same is not issued merely because it is lawful to do so. That a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the findings the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit the admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted the inadmissible evidence and the same has resulted in influencing the impugned finding. At this stage, this Court is not concerned with merits or demerits of the Appeal pending before the 2nd respondent. No doubt, certain submissions were made by both the Counsel relating to those aspects and we refrain from expressing opinion relating thereto inasmuch as the Appeal is pending before the 2nd respondent-appellate authority. At this stage, this Court is not concerned with merits or demerits of the Appeal pending before the 2nd respondent. No doubt, certain submissions were made by both the Counsel relating to those aspects and we refrain from expressing opinion relating thereto inasmuch as the Appeal is pending before the 2nd respondent-appellate authority. In view of the limitations of this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in issuing a writ of Certiorari, we are thoroughly satisfied that in the light of the reasons recorded by the 2nd respondent, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality warranting interference at the hands of this Court. Hence, the Writ Petition is bound to fail and accordingly the same is dismissed, without costs. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is made clear that since the litigation is a long drawn litigation, in the interest of justice, the 2nd respondent - appellate authority is hereby directed to dispose of the Appeal after giving reasonable opportunity to all the parties concerned as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. W. P. No. 2669 of 1997 ( 22 ) THE petitioner filed the Writ Petition to declare the action of the respondent - gram Panchayat, Nagarkurnool, Mahaboobnagar District in interfering with the construction work of the petitioner in S. No. 369 of Nagarkurnool in pursuance of the deemed permission in Record No. 184/96 of the respondent - Gram Panchayat as illegal and for other appropriate directions. ( 23 ) THE petitioner had stated that he is the owner of an extent of Ac. 1-00 in s. No. 369 by virtue of the decree of the Civil Court in O. S. No. 96/73 and with a view to construct shops on an area of 1452 sq. yards, the petitioner submitted plans to the respondent/gram Panchayat on 26-8-1996 for according permission as required under Section 121 of the A. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, hereinafter referred to as "act for the purpose of convenience. It is stated that along with the application, the petitioner had enclosed original plan and copies of ammonia prints of the plans and also copy of the decree of the Court. It is stated that along with the application, the petitioner had enclosed original plan and copies of ammonia prints of the plans and also copy of the decree of the Court. The respondent/gram Panchayat though received the plans and the application as record No. 184/96, did not issue any receipt and for sufficiently a long time, the respondent/gram Panchayat neither granted permission nor rejected the application and on 19-12-1996 the petitioner met the respondent and enquired about the sanction and requested the respondent to give him an acknowledgement regarding the application for permission on 26-8-1996 for construction of shops in accordance with the plans and the respondent issued acknowledgement on 19-12-1996 about the receipt of the application of the petitioner on 26-8-1996 in Record. No. 184/96. The petitioner paid the necessary fee of Rs. 2471/- by way of demand draft. It is stated that though the petitioner waited for sufficiently a long time, since absolutely there was no response from the other side, in view of the deemed permission, the petitioner proceeded with the constructions and when there was interference the present Writ Petition is filed. ( 24 ) A counter affidavit and additional counter affidavit were filed narrating all the details and explaining the circumstances under which the permission could not be granted. Specific stand was taken that a dispute is pending before the senior Civil Judge, Nagarkurnool and also before the Commissioner and inasmuch as these are all disputed questions of fact, the same cannot be gone into in the writ Petition and the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. The other factual details and the internal correspondence also had been referred to. It is stated in the counter affidavit that on receipt of the application of the petitioner seeking permission for construction, the Gram Panchayat had requested the Mandal Parishad Developlment Officer, Nagarkurnool vide proceeding lr. No. 184/96, dated 5-9-1996 to furnish the connected documents, if any in their office, but the Mandal Parishad Development Officer had not furnished any such documents at that time and subsequently the Mandal Parishad Development Officer had furnished the particulars with regard to land vide his proceedings no. M4/210/95, dated 26-12-1996 stating that A. Narasimha Reddy, son of Papireddy has no right on the said land as since 1972 Sy. M4/210/95, dated 26-12-1996 stating that A. Narasimha Reddy, son of Papireddy has no right on the said land as since 1972 Sy. No. 369/1 is under the control of the then Panchayat Samithi, Nagarkurnool and the present Mandal Parishad Office and also requested that permission shall not be granted. It is further stated that when the petitioner made application for permission for construction of the shopping complex, the matter is placed before the Gram Panchayat and by their resolution dated 15-11-1996 it is resolved to keep the matter in abeyance till information is received from the Mandal Parishad Development officer and the said fact is intimated to the petitioner vide Office letter dated 18-11-1996 to his residential address at Malakpet, Hyderabad. It is further stated that the petitioner made representation to the Gram Panchayat on 26-8-1996 to accord permission for construction and the matter was placed before the Gram Panchayat and the Gram Panchayat passed resolution dated 15-11-1996 and the matter is kept in abeyance till information is received from Mandal Parishad development Officer. The petitioner sent a letter dated 30-1-1996 by registered post along with Bankers Cheque for Rs. 2471/- by saying that since the 60 days time is over, he is proceeding with the construction. Subsequent thereto, the gram Panchayat by the resolution dated 25-2-1997 rejected permission on the ( 28 ) THE learned Counsel also submitted that absolutely there is no ambiguity at all in the averments in these paras and all the evidentiary details need not be narrated at this stage. The Counsel also would maintain that the principles applicable relating to the material facts and the pleadings under the representation of People Act, 1951 cannot be as such extended to Election petitions under the A. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, hereinafter in short referred to as "act", and the Rules framed thereunder and the Election Tribunals while dealing with an application of this nature should have seen whether Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules had been complied with or not and nothing more and nothing beyond. The learned Counsel also maintained that the evidentiary details to be adduced in relation to the Government servant and further allegations made as against the acts of such Government servant appointed as counting agent definitely cannot be decided at the threshold since it would amount to touching the merits of the matter which ultimately may have to be decided while deciding the main election O. P. The learned Counsel also had explained the provisions of the present Act and the corresponding provisions under the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964 and the difference of language employed in the relevant provisions. The learned Counsel would submit that at any rate these are aspects to be ultimately adjudicated at the time of final disposal of the Election O. P. and not at the threshold. The learned Counsel concluded that the power to be exercised by the election Tribunal under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code being discretionary, the concerned Election Tribunal definitely had totally erred in striking out the pleadings in stead of directing the parties to further proceed with the matter by adducing necessary evidence to substantiate the respective contentions. Per contra, Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, the learned Counsel representing the 1st respondent would maintain that in the light of the Constitutional provisions under Part IX of the Constitution of India dealing with Panchayats - Articles 243 to 243-O, the elections relating to these Panchayats, the local bodies, also may have to be treated on par with the elections governed by the Representation of People Act, 1951. The learned Counsel in all fairness submitted that no doubt there is some difference in the language of Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules when compared with Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. The learned counsel would maintain that what is to be seen is whether the allegations made in paras which had been struck off confirm to Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules. The learned Counsel further made elaborate submissions relating to the material facts and material particulars and also had drawn the attention of this Court to section 11 of the present Act and Section 14 of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964. The learned Counsel further made elaborate submissions relating to the material facts and material particulars and also had drawn the attention of this Court to section 11 of the present Act and Section 14 of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964. The learned Counsel also had explained the language employed in Section 211 (7) of the Act and further contended that since the facts pleaded are not in conformity with Section 211 of the Act r/w. Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules, the election Tribunal is well justified in striking out the portions of the pleadings. The learned Counsel also had pointed out that certain allegations are just vague allegations and totally devoid of any particulars or details and hence definitely such allegations cannot answer the test of "material facts". Reliance was placed on certain decisions to substantiate his contentions. ( 29 ) THE dispute is in relation to the election of Sarpanch of Chennupalli Gram panchayat held on 14-8-2001. The 1st respondent herein, the successful candidate, filed an application under Order 6 Rule 16 r/w. Section 151 of the code to strike out the pleadings in paras 3 (b) to 3 (f) of the Election Petition on the ground that the allegations are vague, untenable and devoid of particulars. The 1st respondent as petitioner filed O. P. No. 7/2001 on the file of Election Tribunal/principal Junior Civil Judge, Addanki, alleging corrupt practices and other allegations. It was pleaded that the 1st respondent/successful candidate bribed voters by offering and making payments to voters Rs. 1000/- per vote, hired and secured votes from several places, got bogus voters and got such votes polled in her favour and had not allowed the voters to exercise their electoral franchise exercising undue influence on voters and engaged the services of one Veeraiah, a Government employee working in Water Works Department in Visakhapatnam. Allegation had been made against the Election Officer in respect of counting votes. Allegation had been made against the Election Officer in respect of counting votes. Allegation also had been made against one Khambampati Samson coming to the counting hall at the behest of the successful candidate and snatching of four votes from the Election Officer and putting marks on the said four votes in favour of the successful candidate and putting them in ballot box and the same being witnessed by several members including Ward members and in spite of protest by agent, the Election Officer not taking any action in view of the influence the successful candidate was commanding by virtue of the support of the local M. L. A. , apart from several such allegations. ( 30 ) THE 1st respondent herein/successful candidate, denied all the allegations and respondents 2 to 5 had not filed any counter. Part IX and IX-A of the Constitution of India deal with Panchayats and municipalities respectively. Pleadings in the Election Petitions no doubt may stand slightly on a different footing when compared to pleadings in the ordinary civil proceedings. It is no doubt true that the pleadings in the Election petition should be in conformity with the provisions of the relevant Act and the rules framed thereunder. However, the general Rules relating to pleadings also cannot be totally ignored even while dealing with striking off the pleadings in the Election Petitions. Too a technical approach may not be justifiable and too a liberal approach also no doubt is impermissible in law. A balance may have to be maintained in between the two while dealing with striking off the pleadings in the Election Petitions. Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code reads : striking out pleadings:- the Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading - (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. In view of the provision, the Court may have to exercise the power of striking out the pleadings with due care and caution. Apart from it, this power is discretionary. In view of the provision, the Court may have to exercise the power of striking out the pleadings with due care and caution. Apart from it, this power is discretionary. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge/election Tribunal, addanki, at para-53 had observed : "after considering the entire material on record and after discussing the various averments elaborately, I am of the view that the following averments in the election petition are not either material facts or does not contain material particulars and are to be struck out under Order 6 Rule 16 C. P. C. " ( 31 ) THE learned Judge was of the view that the averments in paras 3 (c), 3 (d) and 3 (f) of the Election Petition are to be struck off under Order 6 Rule 16 of the code on the ground that these averments do not satisfy the test of "material facts" or "material particulars". The expressions "material facts" and "material particulars" are not defined either under the Act or under the Rules framed thereunder. It may be appropriate to have a look at the relevant paras - para 3 (c), 3 (d) and 3 (f), in the Election Petition and these paras read as hereunder : 3 (c) The 2nd respondent herein is the Presiding Officer appointed by the election Officer. The polling was held in the premises of Upper Primary School, chennupalli and also Teachers' Training Class Centre, abutting to the U. P. School of Chennupalli. The total No. of votes for Chennupalli gram panchayat is 1366. Votes polled is 1188. Out of them 15 votes are bogus votes got polled by the 1st respondent by securing them from Visakhapatnam, Addanki and Piduguralla. A separate list is herewith appended with respect to the bogus votes mentioned above and it may be kindly read as part of this petition. Even at the time of voting also the 1st respondent and her men entered into polling booths and openly canvassed in their favour against the rules. After casting process of votes are over by 1. 00 P. M. on 14. 8. 2001 the election personnel availed lunch from 1 to 3 P. M. and the counting of votes started at about 3. After casting process of votes are over by 1. 00 P. M. on 14. 8. 2001 the election personnel availed lunch from 1 to 3 P. M. and the counting of votes started at about 3. 30 P. M. The petitioner appointed one Elchuri Ravindra Babu son of Venkateswarlu as her counting agent and one Kunchala Veeraiah son of Ankamma was appointed as counting agent by the 1st respondent. The counting agent of the 1st respondent is working in Water Works Department at Visakhapatnam and he has got political influence and he came to the village along with his family members at the instance of the 1st respondent and supported the 1st respondent in election process by influencing his caste people to vote in favour of 1st respondent by taking heavy amounts from the 1st respondent as bribe. The appointment of agent by the 1st respondent who is an employee in Government department is opposed to conduct of election rules. 3 (d) The second respondent while counting votes separated the invalid votes 29 in number. But he invalid votes are only 26. The other 3 votes declared as invalid are valid votes which are casted in favour of the petitioner. The 2nd respondent did not allow the counting agent of the petitioner to inspect the votes before its invalidation. The counting of votes for the surpanch post was started at 6 P. M. The entire election process was video graphed by one Koti who is working in Ravichandra Video and Photo studio, Martur, at the instance of the sub-Inspector of Police of Ballikurava P. S. and the said video tape was with him (S. I. of Police ). At the time of counting of votes the power supply was cut. One petromax light was arranged which is not even sufficient to give sufficient lighting. Only one table was arranged and the polling personnel six (6) in number sat in the chairs around the table. The votes were counted by bundling them in the first instance and after wards opening the bundles under the supervision of the 2nd respondent. The counting was completed by 8 P. M. After completion of the counting of votes the 2nd respondent was formally announced that the petitioner has won for the post of sarpanch. The votes were counted by bundling them in the first instance and after wards opening the bundles under the supervision of the 2nd respondent. The counting was completed by 8 P. M. After completion of the counting of votes the 2nd respondent was formally announced that the petitioner has won for the post of sarpanch. Immediately after the announcement, the 1st respondent and her agent intervened, picked up quarrel with the 2nd respondent and in that connection severe tension prevailed in the counting hall. The 2nd respondent having afraid of her life in the hands of 1st respondent was forced to put one doubtful vote in the box in favour of the 1st respondent and declared that both the petitioner and the 1st respondent got equal votes. The said declaration of the 1st respondent is contrary to her announcement in the first instane and the second respondent acted adversely to the conduct of election rules at the behest of 1st respondent and her counting agent. The 2nd respondent has not followed the procedure contemplated under the act and rules by putting a doubtful vote voluntarily in the box and declaring both the petitioner and the 1st respondent got equal votes. Questioning the acts of the 2nd respondent the counting agent of the petitioner gave a written application to the second respondent for recounting with an assertion that the petitioner alone won in the election and requested the 2nd respondent to order 'recounting'. The copy of the written application is herewith filed and the same may kindly be read as part of the petition. It is the duty of the presiding officer to order recounting when there is a request by the contesting party when the difference of votes in counting were equal. But the 2nd respondent instead of ordering recounting at the polling station represented that it is not possible for her to have the recount of votes at the polling station in view of the tension prevailed in the area and also felt that there is every likelihood of breach of peace if the recounting took place at the polling station it will lead to breach of peace as rioting and the police people also advised the 2nd respondent that there is no sufficient police protection to avert breach of peace. The 2nd respondent also stated that there is no sufficient lighting and requested both to the petitioner and the 1st respondent in the presence of their agents and also in the presence of the elected Ward members that the recounting will be held in R. D. Os. office Ongole by 11 A. M. on 15. 8. 01 and put up seals on the box (ballot box) and allowed the agents also to put their seals and both the agents also put their seals on the ballot box and requested both the candidates and agents to be present at R. D. O. office, Ongole by 11 A. M. on 15. 8. 2001 at the time of recounting. On behalf of the petitioner her agents accepted the same and the polling personnel left the village along with ballot boxes. 3 (f) The petitioner also submits that the 1st respondent secured bogus voters from various places from Visakhapantam, Piduguralla and got polled the votes by way of impersonation. The 1st respondent also brought persons from Addanki who are having votes at Addanki as well as Chennupalli and those voters voted at first instance of Addanki and later came in a jeep arranged by 1st respondent and polled their votes at Chennupalli also. The petitioner is annexing separate list along with this petition with full description of the bogus votes polled and the votes polled in two polling stations i. e. , Addanki and Chennupalli and they may kindly be read as part of this petition. The petitioner is also reserving her right to file a separate application before this Hon'ble Court for recounting. Apart from the above one Kambhampati Sampson of Chennupalli who is a powerful person in the village, came to the counting hall at the behest of the 1st respondent and forcibly snatched four (4) votes from the possession of the 2nd respondent and pujt marks on the said four votes in favour of the 1st respondent and put them in the ballot box. The said fact was witnessed by several persons including the ward members. In spite of protest by the agent, the 2nd respondent has not taken any action. The 1st respondent also engaged 6 jeeps in number to collect voters from several places by using the name and power of the local M. L. A. and violated the conduct of election rules. In spite of protest by the agent, the 2nd respondent has not taken any action. The 1st respondent also engaged 6 jeeps in number to collect voters from several places by using the name and power of the local M. L. A. and violated the conduct of election rules. There are several irregularities in conducting the election and also counting by the election personnel. The 1st respondent dishonestly by all means of corrupt practices like giving gratification to the voters, inducing the votes by caste wise, forcibly refraining real voters from voting, getting bogus votes polled, interfering with the free exercise of electoral rights of voters, procuring voters by making payments, bringing vehicles against the rules for collection of voters, purchasing of votes at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- each, incurring high expenditure in controvention of the limit of authorizing expenditure and she herself is made liable to setting aside her election as sarpanch of Chennupalli village Gram Panchayat. " ( 32 ) IT is pleaded in para 3 (c) that a separate list is herewith appended with respect to the bogus votes. Likewise, in para 3 (f) also it is pleaded that the petitioner is annexing separate list along with the petition with full description of bogus votes polled in two polling stations i. e. , Addanki and chennupalli and they may kindly be read as part of the petition. Placing reliance on the decisions in KODURI PICHIRAJU Vs. SK. MAHABOOB BASHA AND ANOTHER 1 and PAVALURI RAJYA LAKSHMI Vs. ALAPARTHI VENKATA SUBBAMMA AND ANOTHER 2 an argument is built up that since voting by the same voters at two Panchayats is not prohibited, these allegations need no longer be enquired into in the present election Petition. In this context, both the Counsel had drawn the attention of this Court to the language employed in Section 11 of the present Act in general and sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) in particular and also the language in section 14 of the A. P. Gram Panchayats Act, 1964. While deciding an application under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code, the Election tribunal may have to go into, prima facie, whether the Act or the Rules are satisfied or not, but however cannot virtually decide those questions entering upon the merits of the matter at the threshold itself. While deciding an application under Order 6 Rule 16 of the Code, the Election tribunal may have to go into, prima facie, whether the Act or the Rules are satisfied or not, but however cannot virtually decide those questions entering upon the merits of the matter at the threshold itself. While deciding such applications, the Election Tribunals are expected to act with due care and caution and the evidentiary details, as far as possible, are to be left untouched at that stage. Not only the form, the substance of the pleading also may have to be looked into. The averments cannot be read in isolation and they are to be read as a whole so as to satisfy whether it is a fit matter to exercise discretion of striking out the pleadings and permit the party to adduce evidence. The Election Tribunals, unless they are clearly satisfied that the pleadings or portions of the pleadings are to be struck off due to non-confirmity with the test of material facts, normally should permit the parties to prove the facts pleaded by adducing necessary evidence. It may not be possible to set out all the evidentiary details since they may be numerous and the Election Tribunals may have to see whether furnishing of material facts, in substance, had been complied with. In AMAR NATH Vs. JANARDAN PRASAD, while dealing with striking out pleadings under the Representation of People Act, 1951 it was held that where in the application filed by respondent in election petition for striking out pleadings, or in the affidavit filed in support of the application there is no allegation to the effect that the allegations in the petition or for that matter in any para thereof were either unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or tended to prejudice, embarrass or delay fair trial of election petition or constitute abuse of process of Court, no part of election petition can be directed to be struck of. Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules reads :"the petition shall contain a statement in concise form, the material facts on which the petitioner relies and the particulars of any corrupt practices which he alleges and shall, where necessary, be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively. It shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner prescribed for the verification of pleadings in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". It shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner prescribed for the verification of pleadings in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 reads as hereunder: (1) An election petition- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall the signed to the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for the verification of pleadings : provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars, thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules specifies inter alia ". . . . . . . . . . . shall contain a statement in concise form the material facts on which the petitioner relies. " section 83 (1) (a) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 says that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies. Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules further specifies: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . particulars of any corrupt practices which he alleges". Whereas section 83 (1) (b) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 specifies: "an election shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice. " rule 3 (ii) further specifies : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . shall, where necessary, by divided into paragraphs. " rule 3 (ii) further specifies : ". . . . . . . . . . . . . shall, where necessary, by divided into paragraphs. " A careful examination of the language employed in Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules and Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 would clearly disclose some difference and hence though upto some extent the expressions are similar, they are not exactly in pari materia. Hence, the rigor of Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 as such cannot be imported into the Election Petitions under the Act though the principles laid down in the Representation of People Act, 1951 in this regard cannot be totally ignored. At any rate, this is a significant deviation. In S. B. NORONAH Vs. PREM KUMARI while dealing with pleadings, in the context of delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the Apex Court observed at para 6 as hereunder :"pleadings are not statutes and legalism is not verbalism. Common sense should not be kept in cold storage when pleadings are construed. It is too plain for words that the petition for eviction referred to the lease between the parties which undoubtedly was in writing. The application, read as a whole, did imply that and we are clear that law should not be stultified by courts by sanctifying little omissions as fatal flaws. The application for vacant possession suffered from no verbal lacunae and there was no need to amend at all. Parties win or lose on substantial questions, not 'technical tortures' and courts cannot be 'abettors'. " ( 33 ) IN RAJ KRUSHNA Vs. BINOD, Justice S. R. Das, J, delivering the Judgment on behalf of Mahajan - Chief Justice, Mukherjee, J, and Ghulam Hasan, J, held at paras 17 to 19 as hereunder :"we wish to record our disapproval of the way in which this Tribunal shirked its work and tried to take a short cut. It is essential that these Tribunals should do their work in full. They are 'ad hoc' bodies to which remands cannot easily be made as in ordinary courts of law. Their duty under Section 99 is, "where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt or illegal practice having been committed at the election" to record "a finding whether any corrupt or illegal practice has or has not been proved to have been committed. . Their duty under Section 99 is, "where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt or illegal practice having been committed at the election" to record "a finding whether any corrupt or illegal practice has or has not been proved to have been committed. . . . . and the nature of that corrupt or illegal practice. " also, "to give the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that practice. " their duty does not end by declaring an election to be void or not because section 99 provides that in addition to that "at the time of making an order under Section 98 the Tribunal shall 'also' make an order etc. . . . "a number of allegations were made in the petition about corruption and illegal practices, undue influence and bribery. It was the duty of the Tribunal not only to enquire into those allegations, as it did, but also to complete the enquiry by recording findings about those allegations and either condemn or clear the candidate of the charges made. " bose, J, while agreeing on all Points expressed some doubt about the reason given based on the definition of "candidate" in the Representation of People act, 1951 and preferred not to express any opinion on the said point. In dhartipakar Vs. RAJIV GANDHIthe Apex Court held :"on a combined reading of Sections 81, 83, 86 and 87 of the Act, it is apparent that those paras of an election petition which do not disclose any cause of action, are liable to be struck off under O. VI R. 15, C. P. C. as the Court is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike out or delete pleading which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or suit. It is the duty of the Court to examine the plaint and it need not wait till the defendant files written statement and points out the defects. If the Court on examination of the plaint or the election petition finds that it does not disclose any cause of action it would be justified in striking out the pleadings. It is the duty of the Court to examine the plaint and it need not wait till the defendant files written statement and points out the defects. If the Court on examination of the plaint or the election petition finds that it does not disclose any cause of action it would be justified in striking out the pleadings. Order VI, Rule 15 itself empowers the Court to strike out pleadings at any stage of the proceedings which may even be before the filing of the written statement by the respondent or commencement of the trial. If the Court is satisfied that the election petition does not make out any cause of action and that the trial would prejudice, embarrass and delay the proceedings, the Court need not wait for the filing of the written statement instead it can proceed to hear the preliminary objections and strike out the pleadings. If after striking out the pleadings the Court finds that no triable issues remain to be considered, it has power to reject the election petition under O. VI, Rule 11. " ( 34 ) IN V. NARAYANASWAMY Vs. C. P. THIRUNAVUKKARASUa three Judge Bench of the Apex court while dealing with allegations of corrupt practice in an Election Petition under the Representation of People Act, 1951 and the rejection thereof at the threshold held :"an election petition is based on the rights, which are purely the creature of statute, and if the statute renders any particular requirement mandatory, the court cannot exercise dispensing powers to waive non-compliance. For the purpose of considering a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the election petition the averments in the petition should be assumed to be true and the Court has to find out whether these averments disclose a cause of action or a triable issue as such. Sections 81, 83 (1) (c) and 86 read with Rule 94-A of the Rules and Form 25 are to be read conjointly as an integral scheme. When so read if the Court finds non-compliance it has to uphold the preliminary objection and has no option except to dismiss the petition. There is difference between "material facts" and "material particulars". While the failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition the absence of material particulars can be cured at a later stage by an appropriate amendment. There is difference between "material facts" and "material particulars". While the failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition the absence of material particulars can be cured at a later stage by an appropriate amendment. "material facts" mean the entire bundle of facts, which would constitute a complete cause of action and these must be concisely stated in the election petition, i. e. , Cl. (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. Then under Cl. (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 the election petition must contain full particulars of any corrupt practice. These particulars are obviously different from material facts on which the petition is founded. A petition leveling a charge of corrupt practice is required by law to be supported by an affidavit and the election petitioner is obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of corrupt practice. He must state which of the allegations are true to his knowledge and which to his belief on information received and believed by him to be true. It is not the form of the affidavit but its substance that matters. To plead corrupt practice as contemplated by law it has to be specifically alleged that the corrupt practice were committed with the consent of the candidate and that a particular electoral right of a person was affected. It cannot be left to time, chance or conjecture for the court to draw inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning. Where the alleged corrupt practice is open to two equal possible inferences the pleadings of corrupt practice must fail. Where several paragraphs of the election petition challenging practices remain unaffirmed under the verification clause as well as the affidavit, the unsworn allegation could have no legal existence and the Court could not take cognizance thereof. Charge of corrupt practice being quasi-criminal in nature the Court must always insist on strict compliance with the provisions of law. In such a case it is equally essential that the particulars of the charge of allegations are clearly and precisely stated in the petition. It is the violation of the provisions of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance. In such a case it is equally essential that the particulars of the charge of allegations are clearly and precisely stated in the petition. It is the violation of the provisions of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance. The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act on the other hand can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the code of Civil Procedure. Non-compliance with the provisions of Section 83 may lead to dismissal of the petition if the matter falls within the scope of O. 6 rule 16 and O. 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where neither the verification in the petition nor the affidavit gives any indication of the sources of information of the petitioner as to the facts stated in the petition which are not to his knowledge and the petitioner persists that the verification is correct and affidavit in the form prescribed does not suffer from any defect the allegations of corrupt practices cannot be inquired and tried at all. In such a case petition has to be rejected on the threshold for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to pleadings. It is no part of duty of the court suo motu even to direct furnishing of better particulars when objection is raised by other side. Where the petition does not disclose any cause of action it has to be rejected. Court however, cannot dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. Petition has to be considered as a whole. There cannot be a partial rejection of the petition. " ( 35 ) IN HARDWARI LAL Vs. Court however, cannot dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. Petition has to be considered as a whole. There cannot be a partial rejection of the petition. " ( 35 ) IN HARDWARI LAL Vs. KANWAL SINGH while dealing with the aspect of seeking assistance of Government servants for furthering election prospects of a candidate under the Representation of People Act, 1951, the Apex Court held :"an election petition which merely alleges corrupt practice against successful candidate "of obtaining and procuring or attempting to obtain and procure the assistance of certain named Government servants for the furtherance of the prospects of his election" by writing letters under his own signature without giving the material facts and the necessary particulars as to the nature of the assistance, the time and place where it was sought from each of the persons mentioned, does not furnish any cause of action and it is no election petition in the eye of law. As such it is not maintainable. The gravamen of the charge of corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 (7) of the Act is obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure any assistance other than the giving of vote. In the absence of any suggestion as to what that assistance was the election petition is lacking in the most vital and essential material fact to furnish a cause of action. " ( 36 ) WHILE explaining the distinction between material facts and material particulars in S. N. BALAKRISHNA Vs. FERNANDEZ, it was held by the Apex Court :"section 83 is mandatory and requires the election petition to contain first a concise statement of material facts and then requires the fullest possible particulars. The word 'material' shows that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. There may be some overlapping between material facts and particulars but the two are quite distinct. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. There may be some overlapping between material facts and particulars but the two are quite distinct. The material facts will show the ground of corrupt practice and the complete cause of action and the particulars will give the necessary information to present a full picture of the cause of action. In stating the material facts it will not do merely to quote the words of the section because then the efficacy of the words 'material facts' will be lost. The fact which constitutes the corrupt practice must be stated and the fact must be correlated to one of the heads of corrupt practice. An election petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is no election petition at all. A petition which merely cites the sections cannot be said to disclose a cause of action where the allegation is the making of a false statement. That statement must appear and the particulars must be full as to the person making the statement and the necessary information. " ( 37 ) IN SATYA DEV BUSHAHRI Vs. PADAM DEV, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court while dealing with the aspect of Government servants subscribing nomination paper as proposer and seconder and the effect thereof under the Representation of People Act, 1951 held :"the appointment of a Government servant as a polling agent does not per se contravene Section 123 (8 ). So long as the polling agent confines himself to his work as such agent of merely identifying the voters, it cannot be said that section 123 (8) has in any manner been infringed. If it is made out that the candidate or his agent has abused the right to appoint a Government servant as polling agent by exploiting the situation for furthering his election prospects, then the matter can be dealt with as an infringement of Section 123 (8 ). If it is made out that the candidate or his agent has abused the right to appoint a Government servant as polling agent by exploiting the situation for furthering his election prospects, then the matter can be dealt with as an infringement of Section 123 (8 ). " ( 38 ) AS already referred to supra, I have pointed out the difference of language employed in Section 83 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 and Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules under the Act and in the light of the substantial difference of language relating to full particulars, the principle relating to the striking of the pleadings in toto as such under the Representation of People Act, 1951 cannot be made applicable in its rigor to the fullest extent to election petitions to be tried under the Act and the Rules. It is suffice to state that though the Election Tribunals take into consideration the underlying principle, the striking off the pleadings in case of election petitions under the Act and the Rules may have to be examined carefully and cautiously in the light of the language of Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules and the provisions of the Act only though the principles relating thereto under the Representation of People Act, 1951 may be taken as guiding factors. On a careful reading of the paras which had been specified supra, it is clear that the learned Principal Junior Civil judge/election Tribunal, Addanki, virtually had gone into the merits to be decided ultimately while disposing of the main Election O. P. and had arrived at a conclusion that those allegations are to be struck off. In my considered opinion, this approach adopted by the learned Principal Junior Civil judge/election Tribunal, Addanki is not in accordance with law. Having carefully gone through the allegations made, I am of the opinion that as far as the allegation in para 3 (f) which is to the following effect :"the 1st respondent also engaged 6 jeeps in number to collect voters from several places by using the name and power of the local M. L. A. and violated the conduct of election rules",is no doubt a vague allegation because no particulars relating to the same had been furnished. Hence, definitely it can be said that this allegation is devoid of the material facts and hence it does not answer the test specified in Rule 3 (ii) of the Rules. Except this allegation, as far as other allegations are concerned, they are matters to be decided after the evidence is let in or questions to be decided at the time of the final disposal of the Election O. P. Hence, striking out such pleadings at the threshold would be definitely non-suiting the party who approached the Court without enquiring into the allegations, which is impermissible in law. Hence, the impugned order, so far as it relates to the striking off the allegation : "the 1st respondent also engaged 6 jeeps in number to collect voters from several places by using the name and power of the local M. L. A. and violated the conduct of election rules" ( 39 ) IS hereby confirmed. Inasmuch as the striking off the rest of the portions of the paras cannot be sustained, the impugned order, to the said extent, is accordingly set aside. The Civil Revision Petition is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. --- *** --- .