ORDER D.D. Sinha, J.— Heard Mr. M.R. Daga, learned counsel for the Appellant-accused and Mr. Majumdar, learned A.P.P. for the Respondent-State. 2. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed on 29-9-1999 by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur in Sessions trial No. 38 of 1998, whereby the appellant-accused is convicted for the offence punishable u/s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and was also directed to pay fine of Rs. 2000/-. 3. Mr. Daga, the learned counsel for the Appellant contended that, in the instant case, though prosecution has examined number of witnesses to unfold the prosecution case for the offence charged against the appellant, the trial Court has mainly relied on the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused to Alka w/o. Prabhakar Kawalkar (P.W.3). It is contended that the trial Court has, in para 10 of the judgment, clearly stated that Alka (P.W.3) was Village Officer and was an independent witness before whom the accused admitted guilt of the offence and her testimony is fully corroborated by Bablu s/o. Madhavrao Ingle (P.W.4), besides the circumstances on record disclosed from the testimonies of Sahebrao Wailaji Wasu (P.W.1) and Prabhakar s/o. Pralhadrao Kawalkar (P.W.2). Mr. Daga, the learned counsel states that the trial Court, therefore, mainly relied on the evidence of extra judicial confession coupled with the testimonies of other witnesses for recording conviction against the appellant for the offence punishable u/s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Mr. Daga, Adv. Further states that Alka (P.W.3), at the relevant time, was Police Patil of the village and therefore, she was a Police Officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and the confession made to her by the accused is inadmissible in evidence and could not have been relied on by the trial Court. It is contended that if the evidence of extra-judicial confession is deleted, there is no other evidence adduced by prosecution to independently prove the case of murder against present appellant beyond all reasonable doubts and therefore, the impugned order of conviction is unsustainable in law. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court reported in Vistari Narayan Shebe v. The State of Maharashtra1 as well as in Ram Singh v. State of Maharashtra2. 5. Mr. In order to substantiate the contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court reported in Vistari Narayan Shebe v. The State of Maharashtra1 as well as in Ram Singh v. State of Maharashtra2. 5. Mr. Mujumdar, learned A.P.P., on the other hand, contended that, in the instant case, prosecution has examined as many as eight prosecution witnesses to prove the charge of murder against the appellant and prosecution has succeeded in bringing home guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable u/s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It is contended by the learned A.P.P. that deceased Chhaya was wife of the appellant and was done to death by him by means of a sickle. It is contended that Sahebrao (P.W.1) is brother of deceased Chhaya who has lodged oral report (Exh. 30) immediately after the incident and on the date of incident itself, wherein he has disclosed that on 1-11-1997, at about 8.00 A.M., he was at his residence. At that time, brother of the accused namely Madhukar Bonde came to his house and informed him that accused Sanjay assaulted his wife. It is contended that Sahebrao (P.W.1) thereafter went to the house of appellant where he saw deceased Chhaya lying in the pool of blood. It is contended that in the examination-in-chief Sahebrao (P.W.1) has disclosed all these facts including that of taking deceased Chhaya to the hospital. It is contended that there are no material contradictions and omissions in the evidence of these witnesses. 6. Mr. Mujumdar, the learned A.P.P. further admits that, in the instant case, the entire prosecution case is primarily based on the evidence of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to Alka (P.W.3). It is contended that the testimony of Alka (P.W.3) reveals that on the day of incident, at the relevant time, Sahebrao (P.W.1) went to the house of Alka (P.W.3) and told her that accused Sanjay beat his wife and she was lying in her house and therefore, they should go to the house of accused immediately. Evidence of Alka further reveals that she, along with her husband, went to the house of accused. Accused was sitting in front of his house. Alka asked him about the incident and accused told her that he himself beat his wife by sickle. Evidence of Alka further reveals that she, along with her husband, went to the house of accused. Accused was sitting in front of his house. Alka asked him about the incident and accused told her that he himself beat his wife by sickle. This witness, thereafter, went inside the house of accused and saw injured Chhaya lying inside the house and was in the pool of blood. The learned A.P.P. states that Alka (P.W.3) is an independent responsible witness and therefore, her evidence about extra-judicial confession made by the accused to her is not only consistent with the material particulars of the prosecution case, but is also trustworthy and inspires confidence. It is submitted that the trial Court was justified in relying on the testimony of Alka (P.W.3) coupled with other circumstances brought on the record by prosecution. 7. Mr. Mujumdar, the learned A.P.P. states that Alka (P.W.3) though, at the relevant time, was Police Patil of the village, cannot be said to be the Police Officer as he is normally required to discharge duties under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act and therefore, the extra-judicial confession made to her by the accused is not hit by the provisions of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and is admissible piece of evidence and therefore, the trial Court was justified in placing reliance on the testimony of Alka (P.W.3) in this regard. It is further contended that the evidence of extra-judicial confession, if is truthful and consistent with the material particulars of the prosecution case, can be a ground for conviction and in appropriate case, even without corroboration. However, in the instant case, the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant is corroborated by the testimonies of Sahebrao (P.W.1) as well as Bablu (P.W.4) and the medical evidence and therefore, prosecution, in the instant case, has succeeded in bringing home guilt of the accused. 8. We have given our anxious thought to the various contentions canvassed by the respective counsel and carefully scrutinized the evidence adduced by prosecution. It is more or less not in dispute that the case of prosecution is primarily based on the evidence of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to Alka (P.W.3) who, at the relevant time, was police patil of the village. It is more or less not in dispute that the case of prosecution is primarily based on the evidence of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to Alka (P.W.3) who, at the relevant time, was police patil of the village. In the instant case, as far as the question as to whether the extra-judicial confession made to the police patil is admissible in law or is hit by section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned, the same is no more res integra and is concluded by this Court way back in vistari Narayan Shebe v. The State of Maharashtra (supra). Their Lordships, in para 11 of the Judgment, has observed thus:- “In our opinion, it is fairly well established that the police patil is a police officer within the meaning of Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. As early as in 1893 this Court held in Queen Empress v. Bhima (1893) ILR 17 Bom. 485) that a police patil is a police officer within the meaning of Ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. A confession made to a police patil is inadmissible in evidence. It must be remembered that the words” A police officer” found in S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act should not be read in any strict technical sense but according to its more comprehensive and more popular meaning.” 9. Similarly, relying on the proposition laid down in the case of Vistari Narayan Shebe v. The State of Maharashtra (supra), the Division Bench of this Court in Ram Singh v. State of Maharashtra (supra), in para 9, has held as follows : “Thus, it will be very clear that any confessional statement made by the accused before the Police Patil is not admissible in evidence.” 10. It is, therefore, well settled that Police patil is the Police Officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and the confession made to him is inadmissible in evidence. In the instant case, the Additional Sessions Judge has given complete go-bye to this settled position in law and totally erred in holding that confession made by the accused to Alka (P.W.3), who was Police Patil of the village at the relevant time, is admissible in law. This finding is not only misconceived and devoid of substance, but is totally unsustainable in law. This finding is not only misconceived and devoid of substance, but is totally unsustainable in law. We are surprised that though the law is settled in this regard way back in 1978, the learned Judge is so ignorant about this position. 11. So far as the judgment of the Apex Court in Pakkiriasamy v. State of T.N.3 is concerned, the Supreme Court was not required to adjudicate upon the situation which exists in the present case and therefore, the Supreme Court in the said case was not required to express its opinion as to whether the Police Patil is the Police Officer under the provisions of section 25 of the Evidence Act and therefore, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgment is not applicable to the case in hand. 12. In the instant case, so far as other evidence on record such as the testimonies of Sahebrao (P.W.1), Bablu (P.W.4) and Vishwanath (P.W.5) is concerned it, on its own, does not further the case of prosecution. Sahebrao (P.W.1) though lodged oral report (Exh. 30) on the basis of which the First Information Report (Exh. 31) was recorded immediately on the day of incident itself, however, the same is on the basis of the information received by him from one Madhukar who has not been examined by prosecution as prosecution witness rendering said information as hearsay and not admissible in evidence. It is no doubt true that Sahebrao (P.W.1), after receipt of such information, went to the house of accused and saw deceased Chhaya in injured condition. However, this fact does not throw any light as to who is the perpetrator of the crime and therefore, testimony of Sahebrao (P.W.1) is inadequate to prove as to who is the author of the injuries found on the person or deceased Chhaya. 13. In the instant case, Prabhakar (P.W.2) has not supported the prosecution case and therefore, permission was granted to the State to cross-examine him, consequently rendering his evidence of no use either to the prosecution of to the defence. We are surprised as to how the trial Court, without giving adequate reasons, has relied on the testimony of Prabhakar (P.W.2) for corroboration to the extra-judicial confession. We are surprised as to how the trial Court, without giving adequate reasons, has relied on the testimony of Prabhakar (P.W.2) for corroboration to the extra-judicial confession. Since Prabhakar (P.W.2) has not supported the case of prosecution, his testimony in the circumstances cannot be used for corroborating the material particulars of the prosecution case in absence of requisite reasons. 14. Bablu (P.W.4) is examined by prosecution to prove memorandum (Exh. 37) and seizure of weapon (Exh. 38) u/s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is no doubt true that the sickle, which is discovered by the accused had blood stains of human blood. However, for want of origin of blood group, this circumstance by itself would be hopelessly inadequate to prove the charge of murder against the appellant. So far as finding of blood on the clothes of the appellant of human origin is concerned, it also cannot be said to be a incriminating circumstance in the instant case, since Sahebrao (P.W.1) in his examination-in-chief itself has stated that accused helped him in putting deceased in the bullockart who was, at the relevant time, in the pool of blood and therefore, possibility of clothes of the accused having come in contact with the blood stained clothes of the deceased cannot be ruled out rendering this circumstance by itself completely adequate to prove the guilt of the accused. 15. So far as evidence of Vishwanath (P.W.5) is concerned, it is more or less on the point of ill-treatment alleged to have been meted out to the deceased by the accused and therefore, his testimony in the circumstances of the present case is of no help to the prosecution. 16. It is no doubt true that Dr. Vinod (P.W.7) conducted post mortem examination on the deceased and found incise and stab wounds on the person of deceased Chhaya, however, it is well settled that the medical evidence is always corroborative piece of evidence to the material particulars of the prosecution case and it, on its own, does not prove as to who is author of the injury and there-fore, in our considered view, said evidence also is of no help to the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. 17. 17. On the backdrop of above referred facts and circumstances as well as well settled legal proposition in respect of extra-judicial confession made to the Police Patil and for the reasons stated hereinabove. We are of the view that the finding of conviction recorded by the trial Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case are unsustainable in law. Hence, the impugned judgment and order dt. 29-9-1999 passed by the IInd Additional Judge, Achalpur is hereby quashed and set aside. The accused be set free forthwith if not required in any other criminal case. Appeal allowed. 1. 1978 Cri. L.J. 891. 2. 1999 Cri. L.J. 3763. 3. (1997) 8 Supreme Court Cases 158: 1997(2) Supreme(Cr.) 360: 1997(8) Supreme 466 :1997(4) Crimes 58(SC)