JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition, an elected Sarpanch, against whom Overwhelming majority of the Panchayat has expressed no confidence' desires to get that decision annulled through process of Court and it has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that No Confidence Motion meeting held against him was a meeting, which was not held in accordance 5 with the provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter 'the Act'). 2. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the Chief Executive Officer, after due formalities of presentation of the No Confidence Motion, -I appointed 9.10.2002 to be the date on which meeting to consider the Motion of No Confidence was to be convened, in terms of Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act. The Chief Executive Officer assigned duty of presiding over the meeting to the Tehsildar. 3. Up to process of issuance of notices of meeting, the objection raised by the petitioner in this respect is that while assigning duty of presiding to the Tehsildar, it has not been expressed by the Chief Executive Officer that he will be unable to preside the meeting and therefore, the Tehsildar will preside the meeting. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the Chief Executive Officer, in terms of provisions of Section 37(4) is required to preside the meeting, which is to be held for deciding on the Motion of No Confidence. A proviso has been added under sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the Act, to the effect that if he is unable to do so, an officer nominated by him may preside the meeting. In terms of this proviso, the Chief Executive Officer was required to record that he is unable to preside the meeting. He has not recorded this that he is unable to preside the meeting and therefore, he is nominating another officer to preside the meeting. Without so recording, no authority vest in the Chief Executive Officer to delegate the power of presiding the meeting itself. The very fact that the Tehsildar was nominated by him to preside the meeting, is an event which has annulled whole proceedings because an unauthorised officer, with improper delegation, presided over the meeting. 4. Without so recording, no authority vest in the Chief Executive Officer to delegate the power of presiding the meeting itself. The very fact that the Tehsildar was nominated by him to preside the meeting, is an event which has annulled whole proceedings because an unauthorised officer, with improper delegation, presided over the meeting. 4. Another argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the meeting was scheduled for 9.10.2002 but on that day, the Presiding Officer (the Tehsildar) was not likely to be available and therefore, it was desired by 25 the office that the meeting be scheduled for some other date, which came up to be 18.10.2002. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, when a meeting is convened in terms of Section 37(3)(ii) of the Act, the convening is final and there is no provision whereby the date on which the meeting is convened can be extended. Not only that, there is no provision for the change of date of the meeting, which is to be convened. There is a prohibition contained in sub-section (5) of Section 37 of the Act, which reads that a meeting convened under sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act, shall not be adjourned. Thus, there is a negative covenant contained in that section that a meeting, which has been convened, is not required to be adjourned and the prohibitory clause for adjournments is coupled with the expression "shall", which is used for expressing mandatory character of the provision. 5. Not only this, sub-section (8) of Section 37 of the Act says that a meeting convened shall stand automatically terminated after expiration of two hours. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the meeting which has been convened under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act, could not be adjourned and on that day, after the appointed hours, it stood automatically terminated. Therefore, the meeting held on 18.10.2002 was a meeting without jurisdiction. Thus, the Motion of No Confidence, which is said to be carried against the petitioner on 18.10.2002, can not be said to be 45 carried in view of aforesaid provisions of the Act. Therefore, the meeting held on 18.10.2002 was a meeting without jurisdiction. Thus, the Motion of No Confidence, which is said to be carried against the petitioner on 18.10.2002, can not be said to be 45 carried in view of aforesaid provisions of the Act. The election law being technical law and all powers thereunder flowing from the statute, can not be gone into by any other methodology and therefore, the meeting held on 18.10.2002 and the conclusion arrived at that meeting, passed against him, are of no consequence and stands annulled automatically. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also challenged the Motion of No Confidence on the ground that substance of no confidence' expressed by the members desirous of proceeding against the petitioner, does not communicate sufficient reasons and substance of allegation is not available to inform the petitioner as to what actually is the reason that has persuaded the members to feel aggrieved against him. Therefore, there being no communication of the substantial grounds of no confidence against the petitioner, the Motion of No Confidence by itself was a motion, which 5 communicated nothing and there can not be a no confidence' without reasons being communicated. Therefore also the Motion of No Confidence moved against the petitioner is bad in the eye of law. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents, per contra, contended that it is wrong to assert that the Chief Executive Officer, as and when find it inconvenient to attend the meeting, as per provisions envisaged under sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the Act, is always to record that since he is unable to preside the meeting itself, he is delegating the power of presiding the meeting to another officer. The very fact of nominating another officer shows his inability and that being the situation, it should be read that as and when it is recorded by the Chief Executive Officer that he has appointed a particular officer to preside such meeting then his expression of intention to appoint such officer should be read to in her in itself his inability and therefore, the expression of inability in words is not necessary. This can not be treated to be such a contingency that would annual a democratic process. No 20 prejudice is shown by the petitioner that by such inability having not been recorded by the Chief Executive Officer, the petitioner has suffered any prejudice. This can not be treated to be such a contingency that would annual a democratic process. No 20 prejudice is shown by the petitioner that by such inability having not been recorded by the Chief Executive Officer, the petitioner has suffered any prejudice. That being the position, it can not be said that inability having not been recorded, any infirmity has been incurred. This argument is supported by the petitioners on the strength of a decision of this Court rendered in the 25 matter of Suratram v. Addl. District Development Officer reported in AIR 1979 Raj. 186 . 8. Further, in the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 37 of the 'Act, it has been envisaged that if he is unable to do so, he may nominate another officer. It was not stipulated that in case of such inability, the same has to be 30 recorded also. Something which has not been specifically provided in the statute and has been omitted, by an amendment should be read that this omission is intentional omission and is causes omissus. Learned counsel for the respondents sought support in this regard from the observations by the Apex Court in AIR 1964 SC 358 , in the matter of State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh . Wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court has quoted with approval a rule enunciated in Britain and in the case of Taylor v. Taylor which reads as under: "The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch D 426 is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that the statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of an act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted." 9. Learned counsel for the respondents then came to the second point and urged that 'convening' of the meeting, as delineated in clause (ii) of Sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act means a 'meeting scheduled'. Within the language of clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act, meaning of term 'convening', whatsoever, is to be seen in the light of scheduling the meeting. Within the language of clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act, meaning of term 'convening', whatsoever, is to be seen in the light of scheduling the meeting. so When a meeting is scheduled for a particular date and on that particular date, if for some reason the meeting can not be held then it can not be said-1 that the meeting has been 'convened' in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 37 of the Act because this has itself been provided in the explanation appended to Section 37 of the Act that in case 'convening' of the meeting is not done due to any order of the Court then period of 30 days is not to be counted without computing those days which has elapsed due to Court order thus, this can be seen that in the Section itself, 'postponement' of a meeting has been conceived. 10. A passive Postponement having been conceived, the term 'convene' can not be interpreted to mean that once the date is fixed, it can not be adjourned. It only means that the meeting is scheduled and can not mean called to order, in terms of sub-section (5) of Section 37 of the Act. In fact. the term 'convene' is to be read to mean in sub-section (5) of Section 37 of the Act that a meeting, which has been called to order. The expression used is 'convened', a past tense of 'convene'. It means that after the day having been scheduled for convening of the meeting, when the meeting is convened i.e. meeting is called to order then thereafter, the meeting should not be adjourned. If this meaning is not given to this expression then it will lead to absurdity because a scheduled meeting, if not convened for any intervening circumstance, one of them having been delineated in Section 37 of the Act itself, other could be a calamity, a mishapping, which may happen to the Presiding Officer itself then the Presiding Officer or the Chief Executive Officer has to be substituted. Such contingencies may require a postponement. This postponement will mean 'adjournment', without the meeting being convened. 11. Such contingencies may require a postponement. This postponement will mean 'adjournment', without the meeting being convened. 11. Thus, in the background that a meeting 'convened' can not mean 25 an 'adjourned meeting after being scheduled', if meeting was rescheduled to be held from 9.10.2002 to 18.10.2002 then it was not hit by the mischief contained in sub-section (5) of Section 37 of the Act. To further explain the point of view, learned counsel for the respondents laid stress on sub-section (12) of Section 37 of the Act wherein a prohibition is envisaged that if a meeting could not be 30 held for want of quorum or the motion fails then a meeting for consideration of No Confidence can not be held within one year from the date of such meeting. That means a protection has been conferred on the elected representative for avoiding multiplicity of No Confidence Motions and this gives stability to the elected office. 12. Both the contingencies as delineated in Section 37(12) of the Act were not responsible for not holding the meeting on 9.10.2002. It was a particular contingency and it is not possible that every has to be provided for in the statute. Doing so would mean that the Legislation has to be so lengthy and exhaustive in form that it will lead to absurdity. 13. In that background, the term 'convene' in Section 37(3) of the Act can only be assigned a meaning of a meeting which is not convened and was only 'scheduled' and rescheduled for unforeseen circumstances. In these circumstances, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance and therefore, deserves to be rejected. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents further urged that argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that No Confidence Motion does not inform him of the reasons is an imaginative ingenuity of the petitioner. He knows in the core of his heart that majority is against him and when the majority is against the elected representative, he understands the reason for it and assigning of such reasons, is not provided in the Act itself. The confidence goes with the majority. The majority being the guiding factor in democracy, can not be bound by such technical factors which would have the effect of demolishing very foundation of democratic process The foundation of democratic process is that tie majority rule will prevail. The confidence goes with the majority. The majority being the guiding factor in democracy, can not be bound by such technical factors which would have the effect of demolishing very foundation of democratic process The foundation of democratic process is that tie majority rule will prevail. What is sought by the writ petitioner is to deny the majority its worth. It has right to throw away the elected representative, who has lost confidence. Technical requirements can not rescue the elected representative, overlooking wishes of the majority. 15. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and considered the material placed on record. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the validity of the assignment of duties to preside meeting to consider the No Confidence Motion, to the Tehsildar by the Chief Executive Officer. Learned counsel has to submitted that no doubt the Chief Executive Officer can assign the duty to preside the Tehsildar or any other officer, it he was unable to attend the meeting as delineated in Section 37(4) of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner. to reasons have been assigned and no reasons have been given to remain absent. Without their being a reason, assignment to other officer was not possible. 17. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has to be judged in the background that law in this regard has under gone some change. Section 37(4) of the Act as framed earlier had contained in itself a condition that before such assignment was made reasons were to be recorded. That requirement has been omitted by amendment. Recording of reasons for remaining absent was conceived in the first instance when the law was framed. It has since been given up. The reasons are now not required to be recorded. The reason is itself available in the Section 37(4) which reads that if CEO is unable to attend the meeting then he can assign the task to some officer. The very fact of assignment shows that the CEO is unable to preside over the meeting. It can be read into the order of assignment. Such an inability to be shown by reason to be recorded would add a requirement which is not provided in the section itself. The very fact of assignment shows that the CEO is unable to preside over the meeting. It can be read into the order of assignment. Such an inability to be shown by reason to be recorded would add a requirement which is not provided in the section itself. Requirement of recording the reasons being deleted from law, it cannot be said that but for this the 30 presiding of the meeting by the Tehsildar was an illegal act. When framers of law by a conscious amendment deleted the same, then reading of such requirement in section, will not do justice to the intention of law as expressed in sub-section (4) of Section 37. 18. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that having not mentioned, that CEO is unable to attend the meeting, has caused infirmity in the consideration of the No Confidence Motion. It is not considered a ground sufficient to impugn the consideration of No Confidence Motion. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further urged that the meeting was originally scheduled to be held on 9th October, the same was adjourned to 18th October because the officer who was assigned to preside it, was not available for this date due to unavoidable reasons. Thus, the meeting under his presidentship, could not be held on 9th October and, therefore, it was considered proper to adjourn the same to 18th October. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, such adjournment was not possible because a meeting convened for consideration of No Confidence Motion cannot be adjourned because of the prohibition contained in sub-section 5 of Section 37. It has further been emphasised that a meeting convened has automatically been terminated after expiration of two and a half hours. Thus, on 9th October, the meeting was required to be convened. The same could not be adjourned and after two arid a half hours, the meeting stood terminated. If the point of view as canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then every time, if a meeting is scheduled and the Presiding Officer remained absent for some reasons, then a meeting can always be frustrated. Giving such an interpretation would cause hardship to the elected representatives.21. It has been conceived that there may be an adjournment and deferring of meeting due to intervention of Court. Giving such an interpretation would cause hardship to the elected representatives.21. It has been conceived that there may be an adjournment and deferring of meeting due to intervention of Court. It has been provided that in such an eventuality, the time elapsed has to be excluded as per the proviso under sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Act. Thus, the contingency of not holding the meeting on the appointed day has been provided for. if such exclusion of time is practised, then re-schedulement of the meeting can be made. It may also be noticed that there is no allegation that the meeting has been postponed for ulterior motive to give time to gain support of the majority for the Sarpanch. In absence of mala fides an accidental missing has to be countenanced.22. This can be viewed from another angle that a meeting scheduled is not the meeting called to order prior to the actual holding of the meeting. If the meeting is re-scheduled then the rigor of Section 37(5) would not be effect because what has been provided in the law is that for one year after the motion is defeated or the meeting is not held for want of quorum, no second meeting should be held. This prohibition is on the count that an elective representative should not be put to hardship frequently.23. That being the position, the meaning sought to be assigned to the term convening has to be understood in the broader perspective. Convening of a meeting by notice is scheduling and convening the meaning in fact would be the meeting called to order. In this case, before the appointed date of meeting was postponed. Such postponement is not prohibited in law. It has otherwise been conceived when there is intervention of Court. It cannot be said that any convened meeting cannot be adjourned at all. It would be different if the re-schedulement was for some ulterior motives then the validity of re-schedulement can always be looked into. In the above mentioned circumstances, the meeting could has been re-scheduled and it was only in the contingency of lack of quorum or failure of enough support to the No Confidence Motion that such meetings have prohibited to be held before the prescribed time in Section 37. Thus, on this ground also, the argument of the learned counsel is not liable to succeed.24. Thus, on this ground also, the argument of the learned counsel is not liable to succeed.24. Consequently, the writ petition has no force and is hereby dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******