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2003 DIGILAW 1262 (JHR)

Arunoday Rabidas v. Satyabala Dasi

2003-11-03

GURUSHARAN SHARMA, HARI SHANKAR PRASAD

body2003
ORDER 1. Admittedly, Arunoday Rabidas was married with Satyabala Dasi on 8.3.1980 according to the Hindu religion and rites at Gandhinagar, Dhanbad. 2. At the time of marriage, the husband was a student of Intermediate class. After marriage the couple lived together at village Barketni, P.S. Tundi, District Dhanbad and led conjugal live. Unfortunately, some time in March, 1981, the first pregnancy of the wife was destroyed on abortion and thereafter in respect of the second pregnancy, some time in the month of December, 1984, she had to undergo surgery and thereby she delivered a dead child. Her ovary was said to have been removed and thereafter she became incapable to bear a child in future. 3. Some time in the year 1987, the husband was employed as a teacher in the Government Primary School and thereafter from village Barketni she came to Nirsa and lived with her husband in a rented house. 4. On 11.1.1991, the husband filed Title Matrimonial Suit No. 5 of 1991, under Section 13(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground of her changed behaviour towards him, which amounted to cruelty. 5. In the plaint various allegations of her changed behaviour were mentioned, including quarreling and using filthy languages against husband and his parents, avoiding preparing food and cleaning the house. It was also alleged that she had poured Kerosene oil on her body on the pretence to kill herself and had also mixed poison in the food of her mother-in-law. 6. On 14.12.1990, the husband sent a lawyers notice (Exhibit 1) to his father-in-law and it was alleged that his wife left him and went to her parents house at Gandhinagar on 16.12.1990. 7. In the suit the wife appeared and filed written statement denying the allegation aforesaid and stating, inter alia that after her husband joined Government service as teacher, he fell in love with another lady teacher and wanted to marry her. Her husband or any other member of the family never disclosed to her that her ovary was either completely damaged or was removed and became incapable of bearing a child. 8. Her husband or any other member of the family never disclosed to her that her ovary was either completely damaged or was removed and became incapable of bearing a child. 8. According to her, as her husband wanted to marry another woman, he brought her to her parents house at Gandhinagar on 16.12.1990 on false pretext and left her there and threatened her not to disclose to her parents about the ill treatments, done by him during her stay at Nirsa. 9. In course of hearing of the matrimonial suit, the parties adduced both oral and documentary evidence. Altogether six witnesses, including the husband himself were examined as AWs 1 to 6 and three witnesses, OWs 1 to 3, including the wife herself were examined by her. 10. The learned Principal Judge, family Court, Dhanbad, on perusal of the deposition of husband. AW 1 recorded a finding that in his evidence on oath he did not state about any specific instance of her misbehaviour with him in order to test without finding. We also perused the deposition of AW 1 and found the said finding to be absolutely correct. The husbands witness, AW 5, who was a co-tenant in the same house at Nirsa, where the couple was living as tenant, deposed to the effect that quarrel used to take place between wife and husband and both used to abuse each other. He further deposed that he did not know as to why both of them used to quarrel. 11. A perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that learned Principal Judge while scanning the evidence on record regarding the alleged cruelty on the part of the wife decided it into six categories and considered in detail separately in paragraphs 10 to 15 and came to the conclusion that the husband failed to establish that due to changed behaviour of his wife, after the year 1984, it had became impossible for him to live together with her. 12. There was no legal evidence brought on record by the husband to substantiate his case that the wife had treated him and his family members with cruelty during her stay in her matrimonial home at Barketni and/or with him and his nephew at Nirsa. The solitary instance of the wife going to her parents house without husbands permission, in our opinion, did not amount to cruelty as per settled principles of law. The solitary instance of the wife going to her parents house without husbands permission, in our opinion, did not amount to cruelty as per settled principles of law. Further, in view of specific denial of the wife that she had not gone to her parents house on 30.11.1990 coupled with the absence of any other evidence on record in that regard, the alleged cruelty was not substantiated. The wife denied the occurrence dated 8.12.1990, wherein she was alleged to have picked up quarrel with her husband at village-Barketni, broken/ damages the small transistor and torn the sweeter of his nephew, Nirmal Das, AW 3 and thereafter the husband failed to substantiate the same. Except the husband, neither any other family member nor any neighbor came to say that the wife had ever poured kerosene oil and attempted to set herself on fire, when she had flatly denied any such incident. The allegation of mixing poison in the food of the husbands mother by the wife on 11.12.1990 made in paragraph 14 of the plaint was also not established. The husband in his evidence as A.W 1 in paragraph 3 changed the date of the alleged incidence from 11.12.1990 to 30.11.1990 and further said that poison was mixed in tea and not in the food of his mother. No information of such incident was given to the police. 13. In Sobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1998) 1 SCC 105, it was observed as under : "Section 13(1)(ia) uses the words "treated the petitioner with cruelty". The word "cruelty" has not been defined. Indeed it could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is aversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical intentional or unintentional. If it is physical the Court will have no problem to determine it. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. It is a question of fact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulty. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of the cruel treatment. Second the impact of such treatment on the mind of the spouse. Whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the other. Ultimately, if it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. There may, however, be cases where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or the injuries effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. It will be necessary to bear in mind that there has been marked change in the life around us. In matrimonial duties and responsibilities in particular, we find a sea change. They are of varying degrees from house to house or person to person. Therefore, when a spouse makes complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the Court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatized as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life, the parties and accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance. We, the Judges and lawyers, therefore, should not import our own notions of life. We may not go in parallel with them. There may be a generation gap between us and the parties. It would be better if we keep aside our customs and manners. It would be also better if we less depend upon precedents. Because as Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon, (1966) 2 All ER 257 and 259, "the categories of cruelty are not closed." Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. Because as Lord Denning said in Sheldon v. Sheldon, (1966) 2 All ER 257 and 259, "the categories of cruelty are not closed." Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among the human beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty." 14. Following the aforesaid ratio, the Apex Court in V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710 , observed as under : "Mental cruelty in Section 13(1)(ia) can broadly be defined as that conduct which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. The situation must be such that the wronged party cannot reasonably be asked to put up with such conduct and continue to live with the other party. It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. It is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made." 15. It appears to us that the husbands Matrimonial suit against his wife for dissolution of marriage was filed only to get rid of her wife and to resolemnise marriage with another lady. 16. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree. There is no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. No costs.