Judgment B.N.P.Singh, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia petitioner seeks to challenge the validity and propriety of communique issued by Registrar General, Patna High Court on 16th July, 2002, by which negativing extension of two years term beyond normal age of superannuation of 58 years of age and hence, he shall cease to be a member of Judicial Service of the State on completion of 58 years of age. 2. Petitioner states that refusal of extension for a further term of two years of age was patently illegal and against weight of his service dossier. It is also submitted that denial of extension of two years age to the petitioner was founded on extraneous consideration and also contrary to the guidelines given by the Apex Court in case of All India Judges Association V/s. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1992 SC 165 and AIR 1993 SC 2493 . 3. Facts necessary for disposal of the present writ application appearing from pleadings of the parties are that the petitioner joined Bihar Subordinate Judicial Service on 6.6.1975 and was posted at Giridih in pursuance of communication issued by the Registrar General, Patna High Court vide memo no. 6672 dated 28th May, 1975. He was confirmed on the post of Munsif on 9th March, 1983 with effect from 24.6.1977. He was promoted to the rank of Subordinate Judge in due time. The case of the petitioner thereafter was considered by Patna High Court for promotion to the post of Additional District & Sessions Judge, when considering his entire service records, he was promoted to Bihar Superior Judicial Service in the rank of Additional District & Sessions Judge. According to the petitioner though he had earned certain adverse remarks, on due consideration, those remarks were expunged by the High Court and should not have been considered to be a bar for granting extension for two years terms in service tenure. It is stated that while he was posted in the Judgeship of Siwan, adverse remarks recorded by the then District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda for the period from 11th April, 1989 to 14th December, 1990 were communicated to him by the District Judge, Siwan vide Annexure-7 to the writ petition. Adverse remarks were recorded by Hon ble Judge also against him. Adverse remarks were recorded by Hon ble Judge also against him. The adverse remarks recorded by the District Judge, Nalanda and also Hon ble Inspecting judge or tne court, however, came to be considered by the High Court, on representation made by the petitioner, when these adverse entries were expunged except that petitioner shifted from duty and was inefficient in service. While petitioner was posted in the Judgeship of Dumka, his Court and offices were inspected by Inspecting Judge of the High Court, pursuant to which communication of confidential remarks recorded by the Hon ble Inspecting Judge were made to the petitioner vide Annexure 11 to the writ petition. In the matter of grant of bail in BP No. 1862 of 2000, arising out of Khijersarai P.S. Case No. 73 of 2000, on an allegation petition, purportedly received from one Parmanand Singh, expressing grievance over grant of bail to the accused, though he was warned to the careful in future, assertions made in the writ petition referring to order dated 2.8.2001 passed in Cr. Misc. No. 36680 of 2000 vide Annexure 14, is that when said Parmanand Kumar Singh moved High Court in Cr. Misc. No. 36680 of 2000 for cancellation of bail granted to the accused in B.P. No. 1862 of 2000, 2105 of 2000 and 2110 of 2000, Cr. Misc. No. 36680 of 2000 was dismissed holding that there was no merit in the said cancellation application. 4. Ugly events in the career of the petitioner, however, took turn when he was posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge at Gaya. It so happened, it is stated, that though 10 Sessions Trial cases under direction of the District & Sessions Judge, Gaya, were to be transferred to other Court from his file, but since trial had already commenced, petitioner considering that premature transfer will adversely affect his outturn, he wrote a letter to the District & Sessions Judge, Gaya, bearing No. 571 dated 17.12.2002 raising objection to withdrawal of these cases from his file. In the said letter withdrawal of cases were opposed by the Petitioner also on the ground that it was not within the scheme of the provision of law contained under section 409 (2) Cr.P.C. and hence the District Judge was suggested either to recall the order of transfer or to refer the matter to the High Court for guidance. 5. In the said letter withdrawal of cases were opposed by the Petitioner also on the ground that it was not within the scheme of the provision of law contained under section 409 (2) Cr.P.C. and hence the District Judge was suggested either to recall the order of transfer or to refer the matter to the High Court for guidance. 5. The District Judge, in his turn, it is stated, brought the matter to the notice of the High Court vide letter no. 13C dated 31.1.2000, pursuant to which, the high Court sought an explanation from him. The show cause had been filed on 1st June, 2001 vide Annexure 16, and the grievance of the petitioner is that no communication pursuant to submission of show cause had been made to him and it came as surprise to him when communication about refusal of extension of two years in service tenure, was communicated to him by the Registrar General by the letter referred to above. That was not the only tragedy that had befallen on the petitioner but initiation of a departmental proceeding too was communicated to the petitioner vide memo no. 6334 dated 8.8.2002 issued from the officer of the Registrar General, Patna High Court, which was evidently on the materials placed before the High Court in the letter of the District Judge, sent to the High Court in the matter of withdrawal of cases from his file. 6. In the charges for initiation of departmental proceeding, there was also inclusion of other charges about petitioner exhibiting dithering approach and taking nwarranted interest in often directing the Jail authority to make arrangement for proper escort to an undertrial prisoner, namely, Sardar Mathura Yadav to attend religious functions of Kapildhara Ashram. The defence of the petitioner with regard to such direction issued by his Court in respect of the said undertrial prisoner is that said Mathura Yadav was Professor of a College and social worker and even the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gaya, had given him status of intellectual and directed the Jailor for provision of facility available to the intellectuals. Even the Superintendent of Police, Gaya had provided such escort to Sardar Mathura Yadav for his production before the Court separately from other accused persons. Even the Superintendent of Police, Gaya had provided such escort to Sardar Mathura Yadav for his production before the Court separately from other accused persons. The defence of the petitioner is that it was under these circumstances that said Mathura Yadav was given privileged treatment by the Court and these facilities had been extended by his Court to other undertrial prisoners also. The said direction issued by his Court is also sought to be justified on the premises that these are discretionary powers of the Court and since judicial orders were passed by him, that can be challenged only in a judicial proceeding. 7. Denial of extension of two years term was also challenged by the petitioner on the ground of authority, for such direction having been vested only in the State Government which was the appointing authority of the petitioner. Other contentions are that as refusal of two years terms retiring the petitioner on completion of age of 58 years was virtually compulsory retirement from service, that could not have been done without following procedures prescribed in the service rules. The petitioner also seeks to persuade the Court to take into consideration service dossier of other Addl. District Judges, (names of those persons need not be mentioned here) who notwithstanding adverse remarks earned by them, getting advantage of extension of two years terms in their service tenure, have been retained in service beyond 58 years of age. 8. The respondent High Court has filed counter affidavit through the Joint Registrar (Judicial) stating, inter alia, that Hon ble the Chief Justice had constituted an eight-member evaluation committee including himself in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court of India in All India Judges Association case (supra) for assessment and evaluation of service records, and to find out whether the officers under consideration, had potential to continue on the post so as to be retained in service beyond 58 years of age. The evaluation committee, on evaluation of the entire service records had found that continuation in service of 8 Judicial officers including the petitioner was not in public interest, as they had no potential for continuing in service and the decision of the evaluation committee also came to be ratified by the Full Court in a meeting held on 13th July, 2002. 9. 9. Referring to the service records, High Court in its counter affidavit, has stated that CRs. of the petitioner recorded during period from 1975-76 to 1996-1997 reflects that during the year 1976-77, not only that his relationship with Bar was not found good, but in the year 1977-80 his outturn was thrice found poor. In the year 1989-90 too his disposal was found poor and orders not judicious. Orders passed in some of the bail petitions were found not judicious and his performance needed watch by the District Judge. Yet in the year 1990-91, the District Judge in the C.R. recorded by him found his knowledge of law and procedure to be poor and, to crown all, found him even of highly doubtful reputation. He was found short-tempered and had tendency to show insubordination. These remarks, it is stated in the counter affidavit, were, however, expunged. But in the year 1992-93, he was found by the District Judge to be not industrious and his disposal to be low. 10. During the year 1996, a report against the petitioner was received from the District Judge, Jehanabad and when the matter was processed, it was further reported by the District Judge that allegations were attributed to the petitioner by the lawyers that he was adopting unfair practice in cases, through his bodyguard, who was got transferred by the petitioner from Aurangabad. 11. In the counter affidavit, it is also stated that even though information of Ghosi P.S. No. 187 of 1995 moved the petitioner while he was working as Chief Judicial Magistrate, in view of his unfair practice, for transfer of Bail applications to other Court, he granted bail to the accused persons. Though on inquiry grievance of the informant did not find favour with the Court, an inquiry was proposed to be initiated against the petitioner in the matter of getting his body guard transferred along with him from Aurangabad. When the matter was placed before Hon ble the Chief Justice, his Lordship had disapproved conduct of petitioner. 12. Again in the matter of Arwal P.S. Case No. 44 of 1996 and Mehadia P.S. Case No. 83 of 1996 petitioners working came under cloud but when matter was processed, on explanation, furnished by him, chapter was closed. 13. When the matter was placed before Hon ble the Chief Justice, his Lordship had disapproved conduct of petitioner. 12. Again in the matter of Arwal P.S. Case No. 44 of 1996 and Mehadia P.S. Case No. 83 of 1996 petitioners working came under cloud but when matter was processed, on explanation, furnished by him, chapter was closed. 13. Though another matter about grant of bail to accused in Jehanabad P.S. Case No. 430 of 1996 relating to serious scam in L.P. Gas came to notice of the Court, the District Judge on inquiry reported that allegation was not substantiated. Yet another allegation was received against the petitioner from one Smt. Putul Devi alleging that order in Cr. Misc. No. 69 of 1995 (a proceeding under section 125 Cr.P.C.) was passed by the petitioner for extraneous consideration. No action, however, was further taken in the matter. On receipt of allegation petition, purported to have been filed by Advocates of Dumka attributing extraneous consideration for passing orders, the Hon ble Inspecting Judge noticed that bail applications were disposed of by the petitioner without mentioning the prosecution case and materials collected during investigation, and simply relying on submissions advanced on behalf of the accused in haste manner, which appeared to be improper, and it was acknowledged by petitioner also that in matter of allegation with respect to B.P. No. 1862 of 2000, he was warned to be careful in future. The matter of refusal in withdrawal of cases by the District Judge of Gaya was also reiterated in the counter affidavit of the High Court, pursuant to which, finding explanation of the petitioner unsatisfactory, a departmental proceeding was contemplated to be initiated against him. Yet during the year 2002, the Hon ble Inspecting Judge found petitioner not industrious or prompt in disposal of cases and he was not found an efficient officer. He was not found enjoying good reputation and was finally judged as officer of category C. 14. Since rival contentions were raised at Bar on behalf of the parties, their merits are required to be judged in the backdrop of the guidelines reiterated by the Courts in a number of decisions. He was not found enjoying good reputation and was finally judged as officer of category C. 14. Since rival contentions were raised at Bar on behalf of the parties, their merits are required to be judged in the backdrop of the guidelines reiterated by the Courts in a number of decisions. The focal point canvassed on behalf of the petitioner was that since normal age of retirement, in terms of the guidelines flowing from the judgment of the Apex Court in All India Judges Association Case (supra) was that since normal age of superannuation of a judicial officer was 60 years, shortening the tenure of service of the petitioner for two years was ex facie compulsory retirement in legal sense of terms, but notwithstanding his compulsory retirement, the procedure prescribed under the statute for taking recourse to such action was not followed, and that apart, though some adverse entries were recorded in his C.R., since these adverse entries were not communicated to the petitioner, that cannot form basis to scuttle the normal age of superannuation of 60 years. Yet, contentions are raised that once petitioner was promoted to the rank of Sub Judge from the post of Munsif and also to the rank of Additional District & Sessions Judge from the post of Sub Judge, even if there be adverse entries in his C.R., stale matter of remote past could not have been taken into consideration by the High Court in evaluating performance of the petitioner, as once promotions in normal course was given, all adverse entries recorded in his C.R. preceding the day of promotion looses all its significance and shall not adverse operate to him. 15. 15. It seems that almost similar fallacious contentions about concept of "compulsory retirement" were canvassed also before the Supreme Court in case of Vishwanath Singh V/s. State of Bihar and others reported in (2001) 2 SCC 305 , when those contentions were repelled by the Apex Court with the following observations : "Use of the words "compulsory retirement" for the judicial officers allowed to superannuate at the age of 58 years and the expression such as "compulsory retirement" on attaining the age of 58 years according to the procedure for compulsory retirement under the rules in the decision of All India Judges Association Case (1993) 4 SCC 298 have emboldened the petitioner to raise the plea that subsequent to the judgment in that case, retirement of a judicial officer at the age of 58 years, was not retirement in ordinary course, but compulsory retirement, and, therefore, the procedure for compulsory retirement had to be followed. Such a submission can not be entertained on an overall reading of the judgment." 16. We may also refer to the observation of the Apex Court in All India Judges Association Case (supra) which are in the following terms and that may help to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner in its correct perspective. "Direction with regard to enhancement of superannuation age of Judicial Officer, given in the said case, does not result in automatic enhancement of the age of superannuation. By force of the judgment, a Judicial Officer does not acquire a right to continue in service upto extended age of 60 years. It is only a benefit conferred on judicial officers subject to evaluation as to their continued utility in the judicial system to be carried out by the respective High Court before attaining the age of 58 years and formation of an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service. Else the judicial officers retire at superannuation age appointed in the service rules governing conditions of service of the judicial officers. Direction given in the said case is by way of ad hoc arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum, commencing from the date of judgment and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State Government, once service rules governing superannuation age have been amended, the practice ceases to operate." 17. Direction given in the said case is by way of ad hoc arrangement so as to operate in the interregnum, commencing from the date of judgment and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State Government, once service rules governing superannuation age have been amended, the practice ceases to operate." 17. Consideration for compulsory retirement of a judicial officer and consideration for not granting extension for further two years for continuing in service are neither akin nor identical, as compulsory retirement on attaining the age of superannuation, stands on altogether different footing than non-extension of service for a further period of two years. Though consideration for extension of service for a further period of two years may depend on variety of factors, his potential for continued useful service to the system is of prime significance. The High Court may before or after the normal age of superannuation may compulsorily retire a judicial officer subject to formation of an opinion that compuisory retirement in the public interest was needed. The decision to compulsory retirement must be in accordance with the relevant service rules independent of the exercise for evaluation of continued utility of the officer to the judicial system, and that apart, while recommendation for compulsory retirement has to be sent to the State Government for necessary orders, no such guidelines are required to be followed in case of superannuation of judicial officer at normal age of retirement of 58 years, in case the High Court is of the opinion that said judicial officer ceases to be of continued utility for the system, and such retirement as such is not compulsory retirement in the sense of this being either by way of penalty in the disciplinary proceeding or even by way of compulsory retirement in the public interest. The Apex Court has, however, sounded a note of caution that if the High Court chooses to communicate the order of non-grant of extension of two years of age, it is better advised not to use them in expression "Compulsory retirement" which creates confusion. The Apex Court has, however, sounded a note of caution that if the High Court chooses to communicate the order of non-grant of extension of two years of age, it is better advised not to use them in expression "Compulsory retirement" which creates confusion. This court in Satya Narain Singhs case (CWJC No. 985 of 2002), on noticing the ratio of decision in All India Judges Association case and that of Vishwanath Singhs case, had occasion to observe that the order of retaining a judicial officer at the age of 58 years after assessment and evaluation of his potential for continued useful service was no doubt a new concept of compulsory retirement, or put differently species of concept of compulsory retirement simpliciter, evolved to weed out the indolent and infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility, when they are about to cross the normal age of superannuation of 58 years, in addition to the compulsory retirement at the earlier stage of service in service rules. 18. The grievance of the petitioner was also that confidential entries in his C.R. by Hon ble inspecting Judge, while he was posted as Additional District Judge at Dumka, recorded, were not communicated to him, for which he was handicapped to file an effective representation before the High Court for expunction of those remarks, and on these premises contentions are raised that uncommunicated adverse entries cannot be used or utilised against him for refusing enhancement of two years of age for his superannuation, and on this score too we find that the submission was fallacious and also misconceived, since refusal of extension of two years term in the continued service was not in true sense a "compulsory retirement". Had there been a "compulsory retirement" in true sense of the term, as we have noticed earlier, the grievance of the petitioner to some extent would have been genuine. But in case like this, we are of the view that communicated or uncommunicated entries can be taken into consideration by the High Court while evaluating his total performance of the service tenure. Even if there be a stray incident in the past, which largely reflects on the conduct of the judicial officer, the Court would be quite justified in taking into consideration those matters also while evaluating his total performance during service tenure. Even if there be a stray incident in the past, which largely reflects on the conduct of the judicial officer, the Court would be quite justified in taking into consideration those matters also while evaluating his total performance during service tenure. The past events in the service tenure of a judicial officer, if they badly reflect on his conduct, may well be a ground for assessment of his continued utility to the system. Time and again, it has been reiterated by Courts that evaluation has to be made on the basis of judicial officers past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgment and other relevant matters, and we feel tempted again to quote some observations made by the Apex Court : "The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to ail judicial officers, irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who in the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by appropriate committee of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of judicial officers past records of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters." (Emphasis supplied). 19. The omissions/commissions noticed in service dossier of the petitioner do not reflect well for consideration of his retaining in service for a further period of two years beyond superannuation age of 58 years. The officer was found not industrious in disposal of cases, his relation with Bar was not found to be cordial, his outturn of disposal of cases was found thrice inadequate, his orders were found not judicious, his performance was needed to be watched, his knowledge of law and procedure was considered to be poor, he was found to be shirking from duty and also that he had tendency to show insubordination. Though we are not oblivious that these remarks, on representation made by the petitioner were expunged, but can it be said that for total assessment of his performance, these materials stood entirely washed away? Though we are not oblivious that these remarks, on representation made by the petitioner were expunged, but can it be said that for total assessment of his performance, these materials stood entirely washed away? And our answer would be in the negative. The High Court was not considering the case of the petitioner for his compulsory retirement in true sense of the term, as what was considered by the Court, was his total performance during his service tenure for consideration of his potential for continued utility to the system, and for such an exercise, the entire service records, character, conduct and other things including future utility had to be considered by the Court. 20. On a number of occasions during his service tenure, petitioners performance/ conduct was not found befitting of a judicial officer. While the petitioner was posted as Chief Judicial Magistrate at Jehanabad, accusations were attributed to him for adopting unfair practice in cases through his body guard. It was reported that the body guard namely, Sunil Kumar, was previously posted with the petitioner at Aurangabad and when the petitioner came on transfer to Jehanabad, he also got his body guard transferred to the said place. Accusations affecting integrity of the officer and his unfairness continued to pour in, while he was posted at Jehanabad. Notwithstanding objections raised by" the party, attributing unfairness, the petitioner disposed of Bail Application in Ghosi P.S. Case No. 187 of 1995, granting bail to the accused though the High Court did not consider fit to proceed in the matter. Similar accusations were attributed to the officer in a matter pending before him in connection with Arwal RS. Case No. 44/ 96, Mehadia P.S. Case No. 83 of 1996 and Jehanabad P.S. Case No. 430 of 1996. In the matter of getting his Body guard transferred from Aurangabad to Jehanabad on consideration of the report of the District Judge, the Hon ble the Chief Justice was pleased to record following observations which largely reflects on conduct of the petitioner : "The Bodyguard of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in the present case is efficient is certainly not a ground for him to get the body guard transferred from Aurangabad to Jehanabad. Let the District Judge inform the Chief Judicial Magistrate politely of my view." 21. While petitioner was posted at Dumka. Let the District Judge inform the Chief Judicial Magistrate politely of my view." 21. While petitioner was posted at Dumka. accusations were attributed to him by one Smt. Putul Devi that he had passed orders in Cr. Misc. No. 69 of 1995 (a proceeding under section 125 Cr.P.C.) for extraneous consideration. The matter was processed, though no action was taken further. 22. Yet during his posting at Dumka as Additional District & Sessions Judge, on receipt of allegation, made by an advocate about petitioner passing orders for extraneous consideration, the matter was processed in Vigilance Cell File No. XXI-24-98 and during inspection, the Hon ble Inspecting Judge found that the petitioner had disposed of bail matters without mentioning prosecution case and the materials collected, and bail petitions were disposed of in hasty manner which appears to be improper. This was not end of the matter, as when petitioner came on transfer to Gaya in the same capacity, accusations continued to pour in against him about his unfairness and considering the matters pending before him on extraneous consideration. When such accusations were attributed to the petitioner in disposing of B.R No. 1862 of 2000, having noticed impropriety in granting bail in case of double murder, the petitioner was cautioned by the Court to note down the case carefully in the order and was also warned to be extra careful in future. During the year 2002 entries were recorded in CR. of the petitioner by Hon ble Inspecting Judge on 16.5.2002 that he was neither industrious and prompt in disposal of cases nor he was efficient, enjoying good reputation. The officer as such was judged in category C. 23. Yet an instance of insubordination also came to notice of the Court. The District & Sessions Judge, Gaya, vide order no. 25 dated 24.11.2000 withdrew ten Sessions Cases from file of the petitioner which was not responded to by him taking recourse to provisions of Section 409(2) Cr.P.C. The matter was processed in the High Court, when considering insubordination exhibited by the petitioner, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him which we have been given to understand, was still pending. 24. 25 dated 24.11.2000 withdrew ten Sessions Cases from file of the petitioner which was not responded to by him taking recourse to provisions of Section 409(2) Cr.P.C. The matter was processed in the High Court, when considering insubordination exhibited by the petitioner, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him which we have been given to understand, was still pending. 24. From the charges served on the petitioner for initiation of departmental proCeeding against him, yet it would appear that he took unwarranted interest in often directing the Jail Superintendent, Gaya, to make arrangement under proper escort to enable Mathura Yadav, an undertrial prisoner, to attend religious functions of Kapil Dhara Ashram, of which he was founder, despite the fact that civil disputes with regard to Ashram were going on. Since the matter of petitioner not responding to the order of the District & Sessions Judge, Gaya, about withdrawal of cases from his file and also the matter of extending privileged treatment to an undertrial prisoner is under consideration of the Court in the disciplinary proceeding initiated against him, we do not want to make any comment, else that may prejudice the matter pending for consideration in the departmental proceeding. 25. There is no stray instance but they are numerous which largely reflects on conduct and working of the petitioner. Though it was also grievance of the petitioner that other judicial officers with more chequered career had been granted extension by the Court, we are of the view that neither comparison of records of the petitioner with that of other judicial officers was permissible nor judicial ethics woufd require us to do so, and that apart, when case of individual judicial officer has been considered by Full Courts on its own merit, any exercise or venture for such comparison would not yield any positive result. However, we may hasten to add that if there has been any flaw in the decision making process of the Court, an interference on judicial review of the matter would be amply justified by the Court on the judicial side. Interference on judicial review of the matter would be equally justified when there are allegations about arbitrariness, mala fide, perversity and on collateral grounds. Interference on judicial review of the matter would be equally justified when there are allegations about arbitrariness, mala fide, perversity and on collateral grounds. If the petitioner could succeed that the order passed by the Court refusing extension of two years term in the service tenure to the petitioner betrays its motivated action and the order is ex facie illegal then too an interference would be justified. In other words, in the matter of judicial review, consideration should be whether the order was mala fide based on no material or is on collateral grounds. Though in cases of hearing appeal, jurisdiction is conferred on the appellate court for appreciation of evidences, we are afraid that when order passed by the Full Court is challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, we can enlarge the scope of review which extremely narrows down approach of the Court, its ambit being not unduly wide for interference. Though petitioner had a lot of grievances, that it would be unreasonable and unjust to consider adverse entries of remote past and to ignore good entries of recent past, we have noticed that while evaluating performance of a judicial officer rendered during the entire service tenure, what merits consideration by the Court is his potential for his continued useful service to the system. His outturn of disposal of cases at times was considered to be inadequate and accusations continued to pour in against him about his unfairness and impropriety in the orders. Since neither mala fide nor arbitrariness nor the order being based on collateral grounds had been brought to our notice, we shall not be justified in substituting our own views. We are unable to find any perversity in the matter and we cannot even say that the order passed by the High Court was illegal, on administrative side, since Evaluation Committee constituted under orders of the Chief Justice evaluated performance of the petitioner objectively on strength of evidences available in the service dossier, in its correct perspective, which was also ratified by the Full Court, we are of the view that the High Court was amply justified in not extending the normal superannuation age of the petitioner, after taking into consideration the complete service record with requisite emphasis even on his recent performance. We need not reiterate that the subordinate judiciary is under administrative control of the High Court and if the High Court after taking into consideration the totality of circumstances and overall performance of the incumbent comes to a conclusion about refusal of extension of two years terms beyond normal superannuation age to the judicial officer, hardly any ground for interference was called for. 26. Hence, there being no merit, this application is dismissed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs. R.S.Garg, J. 27 I agree.