JUDGMENT 1. - The brief facts of the case are that the petitioners sought direction against the respondent that the petitioners may be treated as teachers as defined under Section 2(j) of the Mohonlal Sukhadia University Act, 1962 for all purposes and respondents may be directed to fix the petitioners in the prescribed U.G.C. pay scale for the University Coaches with effect from the date of their initial appointment. The corresponding revised pay scales prescribed by the U.G.C. may also be allowed to the petitioners. The arrears accruing as a consequence of their fixation in the pay scales prescribed by the U.G.C. may also be paid to the petitioners. In addition to above, the petitioners sought relief which is in alternative, and that is order dated 5.12.1990 denying actual cash payment of the U.G.C. prescribed pay scales with effect from 1.9.1976 to 31.3.1980 may be quashed and set aside. It is also prayed that the respondent may be directed to fix the petitioners in a pay scale of Rs. 700-1300 with effect from 1.9.1976 and, thereafter the corresponding revised pay scales prescribed by U.G.C. 2. The writ petition of the petitioner was allowed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 16.3.1990. The operative part of the judgment is as under:- "In the result, this writ petition is allowed and the order Annexure R.9 dated 9/11.7.1994 passed by the Vice Chancellor of Mohanlal Sukhadiya University, Udaipur is set aside and quashed. The respondents are directed to make compliance of the order (Annexure/1) dated 5.12.1980 within a period of three months from today." 3. The petitioner as well as the respondent-University both preferred appeals against the above judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 16.3.1990. 4. The grievance of the respondent-University was against allowing the writ petition of the petitioners and against the directions to make compliance of the order dated 5.12.1990. Against this, grievance of the private petitioners-appellants, is that the learned Single Judge has not decided the status of the petitioners and had the learned Single Judge decided the status of the petitioners, the petitioners would have become entitled for U.G.C. pay scales from the date of their initial appointments. The Division Bench vide judgment dated 25.9.2002 dismissed the appeal of the respondent-University, whereas allowed the appeal of the petitioners. 5. The Division Bench vide judgment dated 25.9.2002 dismissed the appeal of the respondent-University, whereas allowed the appeal of the petitioners. 5. The Division Bench, while allowing the appeal of the private petitioners, held that the petitioners are included in the definition of the teachers and, therefore, they are entitled to the respective scales. Therefore, the petitioners were in fact entitled for the full relief on the basis of declaration of the status. The learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners agreed for some concession from the side of the appellants. The concession recorded by the Division Bench in the operative portion is as under:- "Accordingly the appeal filed by the University is hereby dismissed. The appeal filed by the writ petitioners succeeds. However, learned counsel for the appellant in the said appeal has fairly conceded that the payment be restricted with effect from the date of Annex. I dated 5.12.1990." 6. The petitioners-appellants' Advocate submitted an application under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code seeking correction in the judgment dated 25.9.2002. This application was filed immediately just on the third day of the passing of the judgment of the Division Bench. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the learned counsel for the appellants conceded to the relief that the petitioners-appellants will be satisfied even if they are granted relief as mentioned in the order Annexure-1 dated 5.12.1990. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, inadvertently instead of restricting relief "with effect from the date mentioned in the order Annexure-1 dated 5.12.1990", it has been mentioned "payment be restricted with effect from the date of Annexure-1 dated 5.12.1990." 7. Reply has been filed by the University. The respondent-University submitted that once counsel for the petitioners had conceded that payment be restricted from with effect from 5.12.1990 then they cannot withdraw this concession. It is also submitted that the order is unambiguous and the appellants-petitioners are bound by it. It is also submitted that the effect of the order of the Division Bench is that the petitioners are entitled for the benefit from 5.12.1990 and in case the order is amended, the petitioners will be entitled for the benefit of payment from 1.4.1980 and it cannot be done by way of clarification. It is also submitted that appellants No. 2 and 3 have received the payments in full and final settlement of their claims without raising any objection. It is also submitted that appellants No. 2 and 3 have received the payments in full and final settlement of their claims without raising any objection. Not only this but even petitioner No. 1 also submitted in writing before the respondent-University that University shall not be liable for any sort of proceeding and the judgment of the High Court shall be deemed to have been fully compromised/complied with and settled once for all times to come. The respondent also placed on record the copy of the application submitted by all the three petitioners-appellants and the orders passed by the respondent- University. The appellants No. 2 and 3 also submitted application subsequently on 19.8.2003 stating therein that application for amendment in the order dated 25.9.2002 may be dismissed as they have settled their claims with the respondent. 8. The appellants No. 1 Udai Raj Dhabai submitted an additional affidavit on 4.9.2003 and submitted that he did not relinquish his claim. It is also submitted that rather the offer given by the petitioner-appellant No. 1 was rejected by the respondent-University itself. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 10. The question involved in this application is only to the effect that whether the concession shown by the learned counsel for the appellant- petitioner was the same which is mentioned in the judgment dated 25.9.2002 and if it is not then whether this can be corrected on the application of the appellant despite the fact that the appellants No. 2 and 3 are not interested in the relief. 11. So far as the relinquishment of the claim of the appellants No. 2 and 3 is concerned, they have right to relinquish their claim even after getting the favourable decision from the court. The question of relinquishment of claim comes only after when there is right in existence. Acceptance of judgment of the court as it conveys is also a different matter because even after holding entitlement of the party for a major relief, the court if grants a lesser relief and is accepted by the party, the party can accept it. By these acts of other parties, the right of the person who is seeking relief of corrections in the order to get larger benefit cannot be denied because of the reason that relinquishment of rights or benefits by one of parties cannot take away the right or benefit of other party. 12. By these acts of other parties, the right of the person who is seeking relief of corrections in the order to get larger benefit cannot be denied because of the reason that relinquishment of rights or benefits by one of parties cannot take away the right or benefit of other party. 12. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this application is that the judgment was delivered on 25.9.2002. The copy was delivered to the learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner on 27.9.2002. The present application has been filed in court on the next day only on 28.9.2002. The application is supported by affidavit of appellant No. 1 Udai Raj Dhabai. It appears from the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition of the petitioners and granted relief to the petitioners- appellants by directing respondent to make compliance of the order Annexure-1 dated 5.12.1990. The petitioners were not satisfied with the said relief and to get more relief than the granted by the learned Single Judge, preferred appeal. The appeal was allowed by the Division Bench of this court and if the concession as recorded in the order dated 25.9.2002 is kept as it is then the petitioners will be denied the relief which was even granted by the learned Single Judge. This could not have been an intention of the appellant or appellant's counsel to prefer appeal, contest it, succeed in it and, thereafter, lose even the benefit which was allowed to them by the learned Single Judge. 13. It appears more just and probable that the intention of the learned counsel for the appellants even after succeeding in the appeal was to settle the matter by not claiming the benefit of the payment for the period prior to the date mentioned in Annexure-1 and concession is for the period from 1.9.1996 to 1.4.1980. By the full relief, the petitioners-appellants would have got the benefit of actual cash payment for the period prior to 1.4.1980 and that benefit has been relinquished by the petitioners-appellants only and, therefore, by this concession, the respondent-University is benefitted and the respondent-University is not liable to pay any arrears in actual cash as claimed by the petitioners-appellants which is from the year 1976. Therefore, it is not a case of withdrawal of concession by the petitioners-appellants to pointing out from wrong phrase used in the order by which the petitioners are put in a position of depriving the benefit of the judgment of the learned Single Judge despite the fact that the petitioners were found by the Division Bench for more benefits than the benefits granted by the learned Single Judge. 14. In view of the above the application deserves to be allowed and hence allowed and the operative portion of the order dated 25.09.2002 may be read as under:- "Accordingly the appeal filed by the University is hereby dismissed. The appeal filed by the writ petitioners succeeds. However, learned counsel for the appellant in the said appeal has fairly conceded that the payment be restricted with effect from the dates mentioned in order Annexure-1 dated 5.12.1990." Appeal allowed. *******