K. C. BHANU, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 24. 1. 2003 in Sessions Case No. 112/1997 on the file of IV Additional Metropolitan sessions Judge, Hyderabad. By the impugned judgment, the learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs. 100/- each in default of payment of which to suffer simple imprisonment for three months under Section 302 IPC, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years with a fine of Rs. 100/- each in default of payment of which to suffer simple imprisonment for three months under section 201 IPC, sentenced A1 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs. 100/- in default of payment of which to suffer simple imprisonment for three months under Section 404 IPC, with a direction to run the substantive sentences concurrently. By the very judgment, though the learned Sessions Judge convicted the accused under Section 120-B IPC, no separate sentence has imposed upon them. ( 2 ) THE Prosecution case is briefly narrated as follows. P. W. 4 is the nephew, p. W. 5 is the brother and P. W. 10 is the sister of the deceased. The deceased worked as Deputy Secretary in the A. P. Wakf board. A1, A2 and A5 were employees of the Wakf Board. P. W. 1 worked as the special Officer, P. W. 2 as Project Officer, p. W. 12 as Superintendent, Establishment, and P. W. 16 as Security Officer in the wakf Board. A1 worked as an orderly watchman at the residence of P. W. 1 situated at Chinthalabasti, Hyderabad. The said house was under demolition at the relevant time. A2 worked as Steno-Typist and A5 worked as the Car Driver under p. W. 1. On 21. 9. 1992 P. W. 15 met A1 and a2 and requested them to provide a job in the Wakf Board. P. W. 15 studied only intermediate. As there was heavy competition for jobs, A1 asked P. W. 1 to pay Rs. 20,000/- to provide a job, and finally after bargaining a2 agreed for Rs. 15,000/ -. On 10. 11. 1992 p. W. 15 paid Rs. 15,000/- to A2. A2 took p. W. 15 to the office of P. W. 1 and introduced him as his relative, and requested him to provide a job to him. 20,000/- to provide a job, and finally after bargaining a2 agreed for Rs. 15,000/ -. On 10. 11. 1992 p. W. 15 paid Rs. 15,000/- to A2. A2 took p. W. 15 to the office of P. W. 1 and introduced him as his relative, and requested him to provide a job to him. P. W. 1 asked them to meet the deceased. As the deceased was not available in the office on that day, a1 took an application form and other certificates of P. W. 15 and asked him to meet later. On 23. 10. 1992 A2 informed p. W. 15 that the deceased refused to provide job to him. P. W. 15 then demanded return of his money. A2 assured him that he would somehow arrange a job in the board. After some time, A1 approached p. W. 1 and requested him to provide jobs to a4 and A6 in any post in the Board. P. W. 1 again referred them to the deceased. Deceased did not oblige the request of A1. The deceased also turned down the request of A2 for higher scale of pay in preference to his seniors. He also turned down the request of A2 to provide job in the Board to his brother-in-law. On 9. 11. 1992, PW4 received a phone call at 7. 50 pm to send the deceased to the house of P. W. 1 at chintalbasthi. When the deceased reached home at 8. 10 pm she informed him about the telephone call. The deceased tried to contact P. W. 1 over phone but was not successful. Therefore, to meet him personally he left to the house of P. W. 1. As the deceased did not return on that day, on 10. 11. 1992 at about 7 am, P. Ws. 4 and 10 went to the house of P. W. 1 and came to know that he had never called the deceased to come to his house at Chintalbasti. Then they went to the house of P. W. 1 at Chintalabasti and enquired with A1. He told them that the deceased did come there on 9. 11. 1992 in the night but as P. W. 1 was not available in the house he returned home. He also told them that he saw the deceased talking to some strangers. Later P. W. 1 lodged a report. with the police. He told them that the deceased did come there on 9. 11. 1992 in the night but as P. W. 1 was not available in the house he returned home. He also told them that he saw the deceased talking to some strangers. Later P. W. 1 lodged a report. with the police. A case was registered. Investigation was taken up. During the investigation, P. W. 30 suspected A1 s involvement in the crime. He found A1 to a6 absconding. On 14. 11. 1992 he arrested a3 and in pursuance of his confession, he recovered the dead body of the deceased. He also recovered certain incriminating articles. He held inquest over the dead body. He sent the dead body for conducting postmortem examination. After completion of usual investigation, he filed a charge-sheet. Five charges were framed against the accused. They denied their guilt. To support its case, Prosecution examined 32 witnesses and marked 48 documents besides m. Os. 1 to 20. On appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid, challenging which the accused preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants contended that the circumstances relied upon by the Prosecution have not been proved. Even if they are held to have been proved, they do not form a complete chain. The Prosecution failed to examine the sole eyewitness. The motive alleged by the Prosecution cannot be said to be the motive for committing the murder of the deceased. P. W. 18 was examined by the police two months after the incident and therefore it was not possible for him to identify the persons who came to his telephone booth. The voice of the caller over telephone to the house of the deceased has not been established to be that of A1. P. W. 3 is totally a stranger to A1 and A2 and his identification in the Court after several years is valueless. No test identification parade was held. The arrest of a3 and recovery of the dead body at his instance cannot be believed because p. W. 20 knew the location even prior to the detection of the place by the police. The recoveries have been concocted. In the earliest opportunity no suspicion has been raised against any one of the accused. On the other hand, Ex. The arrest of a3 and recovery of the dead body at his instance cannot be believed because p. W. 20 knew the location even prior to the detection of the place by the police. The recoveries have been concocted. In the earliest opportunity no suspicion has been raised against any one of the accused. On the other hand, Ex. P1 shows that the informant suspected seven persons, but not the accused. The names of PWs. 3, 6, 21 and 29 have not been mentioned in any of the seven remand reports. There is no evidence that the deceased was done to death in the house of P. W. 1. No bloodstains were found in the car. There is absolutely no evidence to show where the murder took place. P. W. 10 did not identify that m. Os. 1 to 12 belonged to the deceased. The learned Counsel for appellants, therefore, prays that the impugned order should be set aside. On the other hand, learned public Prosecutor contended that there is clear motive for the accused to commit the murder of the deceased as he became obstacle for their activities. A1 and A2 used to collect monies from unemployed youth for securing jobs to them, but the deceased never co-operated with them. The deceased was made to come to the house of P. W. 1 in which A1 and his wife were living at Chinthalabasti by A1, by making telephone calls to the house of the deceased. A1 even admitted that the deceased visited the house. The physical features of the accused were imprinted in the minds of the Prosecution witnesses with the help of which they could identify the accused even after lapse of time, and, therefore, though test identification parade has not been held, it does not affect the case of the Prosecution. The witnesses have no enmity or grouse against the accused to implicate them falsely. A3 had exclusive knowledge about the place where the dead body of the deceased was concealed. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record properly came to the right conclusion, and there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with it. ( 4 ) EX. P24 is the inquest report. The inquest mediators found a ligature mark below the chin, a contusion on the chest, abrasion on the right chest below ankle, and an abrasion on the left calf, of the deceased. ( 4 ) EX. P24 is the inquest report. The inquest mediators found a ligature mark below the chin, a contusion on the chest, abrasion on the right chest below ankle, and an abrasion on the left calf, of the deceased. They opined that the deceased died as a result of strangulation. Dr. V. P. Patnaik conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and issued Ex. P35 according to which the cause of the death of the deceased was strangulation. Since this Doctor was in Botswana, P. W. 25 was examined to identify his signature on Ex. P35. His evidence remained unchallenged. From the evidence on record, we hold that the deceased met with homicidal death. ( 5 ) THERE is no direct evidence in this case. The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence. In State of Rajasthan v. Rajaram, 2003 AIR SCW 4097, the Apex Court has held as follows. "we may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy and others v. State of A. P. , 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 444 (SC) = (1996) 10 SCC 193 , wherein it has been observed thus:"in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. "in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A. P. and others, AIR 1990 SC 79 , it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:" (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. "in State of U. P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, 1992 Crl. LJ 1104, it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "will s circumstantial evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specifically to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence; (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond all reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilty; (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted. " there is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 343 , wherein it was observed thus:"it is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. "a reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Bidrichand Sarda v. State of maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 . Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in prosecution cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence must be fully established. They are: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and not may be established. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on only other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. " ( 6 ) FROM the ratio laid down by the apex Court it is clear that it is the duty of the Prosecution to prove the chain of circumstances as would fasten the guilt on the accused leaving no room for doubt. ( 7 ) THE first charge against the accused was that on 9. 11. 1992 between 2 and 3 pm, they agreed to do an illegal act or an act by illegal means to do away with the life of the deceased in pursuance of which they committed the murder of the deceased and thus they committed an offence punishable under Section 120-B IPC. 11. 1992 between 2 and 3 pm, they agreed to do an illegal act or an act by illegal means to do away with the life of the deceased in pursuance of which they committed the murder of the deceased and thus they committed an offence punishable under Section 120-B IPC. To convict the accused under Section 120-B ipc, the Prosecution has to establish that there was a criminal conspiracy and there was an agreement between them to do an unlawful act. The Apex Court in Hira Lal hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI, 2003 (2) ALD (Crl.) 292 (SC) = (2003) 5 SCC 257 , has held that to bring home the guilt of criminal conspiracy within the meaning of Section 120-B IPC, it is necessary to establish that there was an agreement between the parties for the doing of an unlawful act, and it is difficult to establish criminal conspiracy by direct evidence. ( 8 ) IN this case, there is no evidence on record to show that all the accused met between 2 and 3 pm. None of the prosecution witnesses spoke to that fact. There are no circumstances to indicate that all the accused conspired together or agreed to commit the murder of the deceased. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence, the accused cannot be convicted for the charge under Section 120-B IPC and hence the conviction is liable to be set aside. ( 9 ) BEFORE dealing with the circumstances relied upon by the Prosecution, it is necessary to narrate a few undisputed facts. The deceased was working as Deputy Secretary in the A. P. Wakf Board at the relevant time. P. W. 1 was the Special Officer at that time. A1 was working as an orderly watchman at the residence of P. W. 1. A1 was living with a woman in that residence. That building was under demolition at the relevant time. A5 was the car driver of p. W. 1 on shift duty from 2 pm onwards on 9. 11. 1992. P. W. 2 was working as the project Officer. The deceased was maternal uncle of P. W. 4. P. W. 5 is the brother of the deceased. P. W. 7 is another Driver working under P. W. 1. P. W. 10 is the brother of the deceased. P. W. 12 was Superintendent (Establishments) of the Wakf Board. 11. 1992. P. W. 2 was working as the project Officer. The deceased was maternal uncle of P. W. 4. P. W. 5 is the brother of the deceased. P. W. 7 is another Driver working under P. W. 1. P. W. 10 is the brother of the deceased. P. W. 12 was Superintendent (Establishments) of the Wakf Board. P. W. 16 was the Security Officer. The house in which a1 and his concubine were residing belonged to P. W. 1. ( 10 ) THE motive as per the Prosecution was that A1, A2 and A5 bore grudge against the deceased as he was not acceding to the result of A1 and A2. P. W. 1 stated that niyamathullah was working as President of district Wakf Committee, Nizamabad. He applied for extension as the President. A1 and A2 approached P. W. 1 to extend the term of Niyamathullah. A1 also approached p. W. 1 to appoint A4 in any post in the wakf Board. A5 requested P. W. 1 to provide employment to Abdul Salam in the Wakf board. A2 sought employment for his brother-in-law. A2 wanted higher scale of pay in preference to his seniors. P. W. 1 referred all these requests to the deceased. The deceased did not heed to any of the requests. It has been suggested to this witness that he identified A4 and A6 for the first time in the Court and that they never approached him for any favour, but he denied the suggestion. The statement of P. W. 1 with regard to his referring the candidates, for whom Al, A2 and A5 sought employment, to the deceased has not been specifically denied or disputed in the cross- examination. Simply because the deceased did not heed to the request of these accused persons to provide employment to the candidates sponsored by them, they would not resort to the extreme step of killing the deceased. Therefore, this does not appear to be the real motive for the accused to do away with the life of the deceased. There is evidence on record to show that these accused used to collect monies from the unemployed youth for securing them jobs in the Wakf Board. P. W. 15 is one of such unemployed youth who stated that on 21. 9. 1992 he met A2 and requested him to provide a job. There is evidence on record to show that these accused used to collect monies from the unemployed youth for securing them jobs in the Wakf Board. P. W. 15 is one of such unemployed youth who stated that on 21. 9. 1992 he met A2 and requested him to provide a job. A2 told him that there was stiff competition and it was difficult to get a job for him. However, A1 told him to pay rs. 20,000/ -. Finally on making some bargaining, A2 agreed for payment of rs. 15,000/ -. A5 told this witness to borrow the amount and pay them. Accordingly, this witness paid Rs. 15,000/- on 10. 11. 1992. A2 took him to the office of P. W. 1 and introduced him as his relative and sought employment for him. P. W. 1 advised A2 to meet the deceased. As the deceased was not available in the office on that day, a2 took an application and his S. S. C. and Intermediate certificates. Again on 23. 10. 1992 P. W. 15 met A2. A2 told him that the deceased refused to provide him job. Therefore, P. W. 15 insisted A2 to return his money, but on the assurance of A2 that he would somehow get a job, he left for his town, Nizamabad. It has been suggested to this witness that he never contacted the accused and paid the amount. He is a resident of Nizamabad and at the relevant time he was a student. There is no reason for him to speak false against the accused. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants contended that P. W. 15 passed Intermediate in the month of March 1993 and therefore the question of submitting the application and producing Ex. P15-photostat copy of the intermediate certificate in November 1992 does not arise, and it can only be said that somehow or the other to secure conviction the Prosecution pressed this document into service, because by the alleged payment of Rs. 15,000/- by P. W. 15, he did not pass intermediate. ( 12 ) P. W. 15 stated that he gave S. S. C. and Intermediate certificates. He might not have given the Intermediate certificate at that time, because by that time he did not pass Intermediate. However, he did not say the post he applied for. He paid Rs. 15,000/- only for a job. ( 12 ) P. W. 15 stated that he gave S. S. C. and Intermediate certificates. He might not have given the Intermediate certificate at that time, because by that time he did not pass Intermediate. However, he did not say the post he applied for. He paid Rs. 15,000/- only for a job. For a job suitable to his qualification, he must have paid this amount. If he really had not paid the amount, he would not have given evidence just to accommodate police. He has no enmity with A1, A2 and A5. His evidence reveals that these accused were in the habit of taking money from the unemployed youth for securing employment in the Wakf Board. Since the deceased was not accepting their requests, they seemed to have entertained grouse against him. This appears to be the real motive for the accused to commit the offence. From the evidence on record the motive has been established beyond all reasonable doubt. ( 13 ) P. W. 2 was the Project Officer. On 10. 11. 19992, P. Ws. 4 and 10 came to him at 7 a. m. , and informed them that on 9. 11. 1992, they received a telephone call that P. W. 1 wanted the deceased to come to his house at Chintalabasti and the deceased left for Chintalabasti at 8. 15 pm. They also told this witness that they received a telephone call at 8. 30 p. m. , to find whether the deceased had left for Chintalabasti. As the telephone of P. W. 1 was not working, the deceased left for the house of P. W. 1 at chintalabasthi. Thereafter, P. Ws. 1 and 2 went to the house of P. W. 1 at Chintalabasthi and enquired with A1. A1 informed them, that the deceased visited the house in the night on 9. 11. 1992 and he saw the deceased taking with some strangers near a blue ambassador car. P. W. 1 also stated that on 10. 11. 1992 at 8. 30 am, P. W. 2 came to his residence stating that P. Ws. 4 and 10 had come to his house and informed him that the deceased did not return home in the night on 9. 11. 1992. Along with P. W. 2, p. W. 1 went to Chintalabasthi at about 8 am on 10. 11. 1992. 1992 at 8. 30 am, P. W. 2 came to his residence stating that P. Ws. 4 and 10 had come to his house and informed him that the deceased did not return home in the night on 9. 11. 1992. Along with P. W. 2, p. W. 1 went to Chintalabasthi at about 8 am on 10. 11. 1992. Before them Al admitted that the deceased did visit the house at 8. 30p. m. , and as P. W. I was not there he went away. He also informed them that the deceased had a talk with some strangers. P. W. I then lodged a report with the police. In that report, he did not show any suspicion against any of the accused. He gave the names of seven persons as suspects. P. W. 1 is not an eye-witness to the incident or to any of the circumstances. Except that a1, A2 and A5 used to approach him for some favours, by that time he did not have any reason to entertain suspicion against any of A1, A2 or A5. A2 was working with him since 1990 and he was sincere, honest and obedient according to him. Therefore, the fact that he did not suspect any of the accused by the time of lodging the FIR is only natural. ( 14 ) AS a matter of fact P. W. 1 did not make any phone call on 9. 11. 1992 to the house of P. W. 1 inviting him to his house at Chintalabasti. His telephone was out of order from the afternoon of 9-11-1992 and he lodged a complaint with P. W. 8 to rectify the defect. His official telephone number was 226209. P. W. 8, who was the Junior telecom Officer, stated that he had directed p. W. 9 to rectify the defect. On 11. 11. 1992 at 7. 30 p. m. when P. W. 9 gave a ring to that telephone, one lady picked it up and stated that the telephone wire at the point of connection to the phone came out of the phone and on properly connecting the wire to the phone, the phone started working. Therefore, P. W. 9 did not effect any repairs. The statement of P. W. I that his telephone was out of order in the afternoon of 9. 11. 1992 remained unchallenged. Therefore, P. W. 9 did not effect any repairs. The statement of P. W. I that his telephone was out of order in the afternoon of 9. 11. 1992 remained unchallenged. Therefore, there was no possibility for P. W. 1 to call the deceased in the night to come to his house at Chintalabasti. So, some person must have called the house of the deceased to get him to the house of Chintabalasthi. As p. W. 1 was the superior office of the deceased, the deceased naturally obeyed the request and left for Chintalabasthi. The question now is who was that caller? ( 15 ) P. W. 4 is the niece of the deceased. According to her, on 9. 11. 1992 at about 7. 10 p. m. , she received a telephone call enquiring whether the deceased was available in the house. The caller stated that he was special Officer of the Wakf Board. He wanted the deceased to come to his house at Chintalabasthi and wanted P. W. 4 to convey this message to the deceased. Again at 7. 50 p. m. , P. W. 4 received a call from the same caller with the same request. At about 8. 15 p. m. , the deceased reached home and P. W. 4 informed him about the calls received by her. Then the deceased tried to contact P. W. 1 on telephone, but could not contact him. Therefore, he left for chintalabasthi at 8. 15 p. m. At 8. 30 p. m. , p. W. 4 received a call again from the same caller. She told him that the deceased tried to contact him over phone. Then the caller told him that his name was Ifran All. Then P. W. 4 told him that the deceased left for the house of P. W. 1. This question and answer show that since the same person made the previous two calls who in the first instance told her that he was the Special officer, on hearing the same voice she thought that it was the same Special Officer who was calling the third time also. Therefore, it is clear that it was Ifran All who made the previous two calls also. She admitted in her cross-examination that she did not answer any other calls on 9. 11. 1992. Therefore, it is clear that it was Ifran All who made the previous two calls also. She admitted in her cross-examination that she did not answer any other calls on 9. 11. 1992. She was a resident of Nizamabad and she came to the house of the deceased at hyderabad as he was her maternal uncle. She answered only these three calls, but it appears only natural, because all the three calls were received within a span of one hour, and there is no evidence on record to show that there were other calls made to this telephone during that time. Nothing has been elicited in her cross-examination to discredit her testimony, p. W. 10 is the brother of the deceased. P. W. 4 informed him that she received the aforesaid telephone calls and asked him to inform about the calls to the deceased. On reaching home the deceased was informed about the calls. He tried to contact P. W. 1 over phone, but since he could not do so, he left for Chintalabasthi in an auto. P. W. 10 also stated that when the third call was received P. W. 4 informed him that it was a1 who made that call. Nothing has been elicited from the evidence of this witness to discredit his testimony. Therefore, it is clear that it was Ifran Ali, who is A1 in this case, who made the calls and made the deceased go to the house of P. W. 1 at Chintalabasthi. A1 was not actually acting under the instructions of P. W. 1. Therefore, there must be something for which he wanted to get the deceased to the house in which he was residing. ( 16 ) P. W. 3 stated that he reached the deceased in his auto at 8. 30 p. m. , on 9. 11. 1992 at the house at Chintalabasti. The deceased asked him to wait for some time so that they would go back to his house. As this witness was waiting in front of the house in question, A2 came there and informed him that the deceased would go to his house by his official car. A2 paid him the charges for dropping the deceased at chintalabasthi. A1 took the deceased inside the building. As this witness was waiting in front of the house in question, A2 came there and informed him that the deceased would go to his house by his official car. A2 paid him the charges for dropping the deceased at chintalabasthi. A1 took the deceased inside the building. It has been suggested to this witness that he was a planted witness and whatever he stated in the cross- examination was at the instance of the police. This witness did not state that A1 and A2 were strangers to him. There is also nothing elicited in the cross-examination of this witness to show that A1 and A2 are strangers. There appears no reason for him to speak against A1 and A2. Therefore, his evidence would clearly go to show that the deceased went to the house of P. W. 1 in which A1 was residing and A2 was also present there. ( 17 ) THE next circumstance is the presence of all the accused at about 9 or 9. 30 p. m. , on 9. 11. 1992 in the house at chinthalabasthi. P. W. 6 is the maidservant in the house of Masood Ali which was situated opposite to the house in question. According to her she used to sleep in the house of Masood Ali whenever he was out of station. She stated that A1 was residing with his wife Ghousia Begum. On 7. 11. 1992 at about 9 or 9. 30 pm when she was sleeping in the house of Masood ali, she heard loud sound of Ghousia addressing A1 as to why he was beating like that. She also heard A1 asking his wife to shut up and abusing her. There were six male persons including A1 in that house. She further stated that a person who looked like almost dead was shifted by A1 and those five persons in a car. When A1 was about to sit in the car, a lorry came there. A1 conversed with the driver of the lorry for a few minutes. Later A1 came back and sat in the rear seat. When this witness enquired with the wife of A1 as to what was the matter, Ghousia told her that the Officer of the Wakf Board was not keeping good health and was being shifted in the car. A1 conversed with the driver of the lorry for a few minutes. Later A1 came back and sat in the rear seat. When this witness enquired with the wife of A1 as to what was the matter, Ghousia told her that the Officer of the Wakf Board was not keeping good health and was being shifted in the car. This witness identified all the accused in the court as the same persons whom she saw on 9. 11. 1992. She also stated that all the accused were regularly coming to the house of A1. She joined as maidservant on 1. 11. 1992. Though she did not ever visit the house of Al, the house was visible from the balcony of Masood Ali. She gave the descriptive particulars of the location. It has been suggested to this witness that as she worked under P. W. 10, she was a setup witness. The fact that the house of masood Ali was situated opposite the house in question has not been disputed. So also that P. W. 6 joined as maidservant on 1. 11. 1992 has not been denied or disputed. She also specifically stated that all the accused used to regularly come to the house of A1 which has remained unshattered. Therefore, all the accused are not strangers to this witness warranting the holding of test identification parade. P. W. 6 was working in the house of Masood Ali from 8 a. m. , to 8 p. m. , and whenever he was out of station she was even sleeping in his house in the night. Therefore, she was in a position to identify the accused even after lapse of time. There appears nothing unnatural or unusual in P. W. 6 identifying the accused. ( 18 ) THE evidence of P. W. 6 is corroborated by the evidence of P. W. 21 who was working as a labourer. According to him, he was engaged for loading granite in the lorry from the house at Chintalabasthi. He and his friend Habeeb went to chintalabasthi in the lorry. The gate of the house was locked. Habeeb asked A1 whether the lorry could be taken inside. A1 asked the lorry driver to give way to the car as his Officer was leaving the house. While the lorry was being driven back, the gate was opened and an ambassador car came out of the building. The gate of the house was locked. Habeeb asked A1 whether the lorry could be taken inside. A1 asked the lorry driver to give way to the car as his Officer was leaving the house. While the lorry was being driven back, the gate was opened and an ambassador car came out of the building. In the light of the lorry he saw A1 sitting with others in the car. Habeeb asked A2 whether the lorry could then be taken inside the building so that it could be loaded. A2 gave permission. They loaded the lorry till 12. 30 midnight. He came to know the names of A1 and A2 on the date of incident, but he stated that they used to come to the hotel in which he was working. It has been suggested to this witness that he did not go along with Habeeb and he deposed false at the instance of police. He denied the suggestion. Nothing has been elicited to discredit his testimony. As A1 and A2 used to visit the hotel for taking tea, there was every possibility for this witness to identify them. ( 19 ) THE next circumstance is that p. Ws. 1 and 2 went to Chintalabasthi on 10. 11. 1992. A1 informed them that the deceased visited the house at 8. 30 p. m. , on 9. 11. 1992. On coming to know that pw. 1 was not available there, the deceased went away. A1 also stated that a blue ambassador car was parked at the entrance of the lane from the main road and he saw the deceased talking with some strangers. The fact that the deceased came to the house at Chintalabasthi at 8. 30 p. m. , on 9. 11. 1999 has been admitted by A1 even when he was examined under Section 313 cr. P. C. ( 20 ) P. W. 18 stated that A1 made telephone calls from his telephone booth. He stated that A1 and A2 came in a white Ambassador car on 9. 11. 1992 at about 7 or 7. 30 p. m. , and made call to telephone no. 249563. He dialed the number and gave the receiver to them. At about 8. 00 p. m. , they came in an auto. He again dialed the number and gave the receiver to them. For the third time they came at 8. 11. 1992 at about 7 or 7. 30 p. m. , and made call to telephone no. 249563. He dialed the number and gave the receiver to them. At about 8. 00 p. m. , they came in an auto. He again dialed the number and gave the receiver to them. For the third time they came at 8. 30 p. m. , and he dialed the same number and handed over the receiver to them. From their conversation he came to know that they called the same person all the three time and asked that person to come to Chintalabasthi. On 11. 1. 1993 the police came to his telephone booth along with these accused and he identified the accused as the same persons who made the calls. It was not possible for this witness to identify A1 and a2 after lapse of two months and the number which was dialed, because several people make calls everyday to several phone numbers, is the contention of the learned counsel for appellants. ( 21 ) LEARNED Public Prosecutor relied upon a decision in Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2001 SCC (Crl.) 1384, wherein it has been held as follows:"anything which has any special or peculiar lineament can create an impact on the human mind lasting long after. While it is true that routine events in a man s day- today s life may not remain in his mind for being remembered later, any odd or bizarre happenings involving him or in front of him have the tendency to stick in his mind indelibly. If there is any cause for him to recollect such events again they get refreshed again. " ( 22 ) IF these accused persons made only one call, the contention can be accepted. This witness himself dialed the same number three times and handed over the receiver to the same persons all the three times. He also made an entry in ex. P20. It has been suggested to this witness that A1 and A2 did not come to his telephone booth and Ex. P20 was created for the purpose of this case, but he denied the suggestion. For the above reasons, it does not appear that it was impossible for this witness to identify these accused persons after two months. Therefore, his evidence can be relied upon. P20 was created for the purpose of this case, but he denied the suggestion. For the above reasons, it does not appear that it was impossible for this witness to identify these accused persons after two months. Therefore, his evidence can be relied upon. ( 23 ) P. W. 10 is the sister of the deceased. She stated that all the accused came to their house on 7. 11. 1992 and told them that they came there to attend a marriage in the adjacent "basthi". On her enquiry she came to know that no such marriage function had taken place in the locality. She informed the deceased on 8. 11. 1992 about the accused visiting the house on 7. 11. 1992. As A1, A2 and A5 were employees of the Wakf Board, they used to visit their house. A1, A2 and A5 along with the other accused visited the hospital in the month of November 1992 when her mother was admitted in the hospital. Therefore, there was every possibility for her to identify A1, A2 and A5. There was no reason for A1, A2 and A5 to visit the house of the deceased on 7. 11. 1992. There must have been something in their mind. To justify their visit, they falsely stated that there was a marriage in the locality which explanation was found to be false. ( 24 ) P. W. 5 is another brother of the deceased. He stated that the deceased told him that he was receiving threatening calls to resign from his job. He did not speak anything against the accused. P. W. 7 is a Driver in the Wakf Board. According to him, A5 took charge as Driver from 2 p. m. , 9. 11. 1992. His evidence is not of any help to the Prosecution case. P. W. 11 did not support the case of the Prosecution. P. W. 13 is the Mason who closed the windows of the ground floor of the house in question on receipt of Rs. 100/- from A1 to A6. He saw a1 and A6 for the first time when they approached him. P. W. 14 is one of the mediators for the seizure of the vehicle. The evidence of all these witnesses does not incriminate anything against the accused. ( 25 ) P. W. 16 was the Security Officer. He knew A1, A2 and A5. He saw a1 and A6 for the first time when they approached him. P. W. 14 is one of the mediators for the seizure of the vehicle. The evidence of all these witnesses does not incriminate anything against the accused. ( 25 ) P. W. 16 was the Security Officer. He knew A1, A2 and A5. According to him, a3, A4 and A6 accompanied by A1, A2 and A5, were frequently visiting the Wakf board for securing jobs and he saw A3 and A4 in the company of A1, A2 and A5 for about six times. He did not state this fact to the police and, therefore, his evidence does not incriminate anything against the accused. P. W. 19 effected repairs to the ambassador Car AHX 7660 in the garage. A5 and P. W. 7 brought the vehicle for repairs. It took two hours for this witness to complete the repairs. He did not say the date on which the vehicle was brought to his work shop. P. W. 29 saw the deceased entering into the house of A1. He was returning after making "daily collections" from vegetable vendors on 9. 11. 1992 at 9 p. m. He used to sell vegetables to the vendors situated near the house of P. W. 1, and on the way he used to see A1, A2 and A5. On the date of incident the deceased got down from the auto and went to the house of A1 and saw A1 coming out of the house and receiving the deceased. He further stated that 10 or 15 minutes later, A2 came out the house and paid the amount to the auto driver. He also spoke about the lorry. A1 asked the lorry driver to give way to the car. The lorry took reverse, A1 opened the gate of the building and a white Ambassador car came out of the building which was used by P. W. 1 in his official capacity. A5 was driving the vehicle and the car went in the direction of the jubilee hills. A6 and two other accused went away in the auto. Though he had no friendly terms with A1, a2 and A5, he said that he used to go to the Wakf Board, as there was a possibility of allotment of a house situated near Wale-Jah-Masjid in his favour. A6 and two other accused went away in the auto. Though he had no friendly terms with A1, a2 and A5, he said that he used to go to the Wakf Board, as there was a possibility of allotment of a house situated near Wale-Jah-Masjid in his favour. In that connection he came to know about P. W. 1 and the deceased. He was unsuccessful in getting a house allotted in his favour. Though he stated that A3, A4 and A6 were employees of the Wakf Board, it is not correct. But, A3, A4 and A6 were present along with a1, A2 and A5 and, therefore, he thought that they were also employees of the Board. There appears nothing unusual for this witness to identify the accused. His evidence inspires confidence. Furthermore, nothing has been elicited to discredit his testimony. ( 26 ) P. W. 27 is the Sub-Inspector who registered the case on the basis of Ex. P1. He examined P. Ws. 1 and 2 and recorded their statements. On the next day, he examined the suspects named in the F. I. R. and found that they were not connected with the crime. On 12. 11. 1992, he handed over the case to P. W. 30. P. W. 30 took up further investigation. He examined P. W. 4 and recorded her statement. He then suspected a1 and during the search for A1, he found a2 to A6 also. On 14. 11. 1992 he arrested a3 at 9. 30 p. m. A3 made a confession in the presence of P. W. 20. P. W. 20 stated that in pursuance of the confession of A3, they went to an open place in Kukatpally. A3 led them to a manhole there and showed the dead body in the manhole. Ex. P21 is the rough sketch. Ex. P22 is the Panchanama with regard to the discovery of the dead body. It shows that after A3 made the confession, he led the police to the manhole located in an uninhabited and waste land of vasanth Nagar, IDPL Colony, Hyderabad. The entire area was dark and there were no lights. A3 pointed out the dead body secreted in the manhole built with cement. It shows that after A3 made the confession, he led the police to the manhole located in an uninhabited and waste land of vasanth Nagar, IDPL Colony, Hyderabad. The entire area was dark and there were no lights. A3 pointed out the dead body secreted in the manhole built with cement. Learned Counsel for appellants contended that this witness stated that the son of p. W. 5 informed him that the dead body was located in that place and therefore he had to attend the recovery proceedings, and hence it shows that the police had already known the place where the dead body was concealed and so the recovery proceedings cannot be acted upon because it was not a recovery within the meaning of section 27 of the Evidence Act. A stray admission in the cross-examination cannot be taken as true to disbelieve the evidence of P. Ws. 20 and 29. A perusal of Ex. P21 shows that the place where the dead body was concealed was secluded and was not a public place. Further the dead body was concealed in the manhole. Unless the person who secreted the dead body in the manhole showed it, no one would have found the dead body there . Considering the averments in Ex. P21 and the evidence of p. W. 29, it is clear that only on A3 pointing out the place, the dead body was recovered from there. Therefore, it is a discovery within the meaning of Section 27 of the Evidence act and is admissible. ( 27 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants relied upon a decision in Ravula Sarangam v. State of A. P. , 1995 (2) APLJ 298 (HC ). In that case, on hearing the cries of the accused therein, neighbours went there and saw the dead body of the deceased; the accused led the police to his house to show the dead body of the deceased; and under these circumstances it has been held in that case that these circumstances are hardly sufficient to warrant conviction. The facts of the present case are entirely different. None of the witnesses saw the dead body of the deceased before it had been pointed out by A3. Therefore, the above decision has no application to the facts of this case. The facts of the present case are entirely different. None of the witnesses saw the dead body of the deceased before it had been pointed out by A3. Therefore, the above decision has no application to the facts of this case. ( 28 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants also relied upon a decision in Bakshish Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1971 SC 2016 , in which it has been held as under. "therefore the only incriminating evidence against the appellant is his pointing the place where the dead body of the deceased had been thrown. This, in our opinion, is not a conclusive circumstance though undoubtedly it raises a strong suspicion against the appellant. Even if he was not a party to the murder, the appellant could have come to know the place where the dead body of the deceased had been thrown. Further, as mentioned earlier, at the bank of the river where the dead body was thrown into the river, there were broken teeth and parts of the human body lying. Hence anyone who saw those parts could have inferred that the dead body must have been thrown into the river about that place. " ( 29 ) THE facts in the above case are also entirely different. In the present case, the accused pointing out the dead body is not the only circumstance appearing against them. There are other incriminating circumstances against them. Therefore, that decision has no application to the present case. Furthermore, in the present case, the dead body was concealed in a secluded place which could be known only on A3 pointing out the place. ( 30 ) P. W. 30 stated that A3 led the police party and P. W. 20 to the place where the dead body was concealed. At the instance of police, P. W. 17 took out the dead body from the manhole on 15. 11. 1992. P. W. 30 conducted observation of the panchanama-cum-sketch under Ex. P21 at the house at chintalabasthi in the presence of PW20 and others. He also seized M. Os. 13 and 14 shirt and pant which belonged to the deceased under Ex. P39 Panchanama. He seized the measurement register and bill book from gopal under Ex. P40 in the presence of p. W. 22. P. W. 22 turned hostile. At the instance of A3, P. W. 30 seized M. O. 16-knife under Ex. He also seized M. Os. 13 and 14 shirt and pant which belonged to the deceased under Ex. P39 Panchanama. He seized the measurement register and bill book from gopal under Ex. P40 in the presence of p. W. 22. P. W. 22 turned hostile. At the instance of A3, P. W. 30 seized M. O. 16-knife under Ex. P25. As seen from Ex. P25, A3 led the Police and Panchas to his house at agapura and opened an almirah with a key and took out the knife therefrom. The knife was seized and exhibited as m. O. 16. M. O. 18-foot rest mat in the car was seized which was having seven hairs. Ex. P44-application form of the brother-in- law of A2 was seized. At the instance of p. W. 1, the drawer of the table of A2 was broken open and Exs. P7 to P17, which were the letters addressed by A2 and the xerox copies of the certificates of the brother-in-law of A2 were seized. M. 0. 18- foot rest mat with the hairs along with the hair of the deceased collected during inquest was sent to the Forensic Science laboratory. As per Ex. P45-report of the laboratory both hairs were of the same person. Therefore, it can be said that the official car of P. W. 1 was used for carrying the dead body. ( 31 ) ON 11. 1. 1993 P. W. 30 arrested A1 and A2. Ex. P28 is the admissible portion of the confession of Al in pursuance of which a leather bag and a ring belonging to the deceased were recovered. A2 also made Ex. P46-confession in pursuance of which the wrist watch and a money- purse which belonged to the deceased were seized. P. W. 23 also stated that he was present when A1 and A2 made confessions. In pursuance of the confessions, A1 led the police and the mediators to his house and a leather bag, 12 visiting cards of the deceased, a silver ring, were seized from the almirah in the house of A1. At the instance of A2, a note book containing various telephone numbers was seized. So also, one money purse and some visiting cards of the deceased were seized besides a wrist watch. On 2. 8. At the instance of A2, a note book containing various telephone numbers was seized. So also, one money purse and some visiting cards of the deceased were seized besides a wrist watch. On 2. 8. 1993, P. W. 30 arrested a4 in the presence of P. W. 24 and at the instance of A4 M. O. 15 nylon rope was seized from the almirah of A4 in his house. ( 32 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants contended that the recoveries made at the instance of these accused persons were not identified by any one that the objects recovered thereunder belonged to the deceased. P. W. 10 stated that M. Os. 8 to 12 were shown to her on 12. 1. 1993. If those articles did not belong to the deceased, there was no necessity for the police to show them to her. It is not the case of the accused that these articles belonged to them. Therefore, the recoveries can be taken as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. ( 33 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants also contended that Ghousia Begum, who was the concubine of A1, was the sole eyewitness in this and she was not examined. We are unable to accept the said contention, because even if examined she would never support the Prosecution being the concubine of A1. Learned Counsel for appellants further contended that the names of PWs. 3, 6, 21 and 29 were not mentioned as witnesses in any one of the seven remand reports filed by the police, and therefore these witnesses are only planted witnesses for the purpose of this case. According to P. W. 30, he filed 7 remand reports and the last remand report was dated 3. 8. 1993. He mentioned most of the names of the witnesses in the remand reports. It has not been specifically brought to his notice that the names of these witnesses were not mentioned in the remand reports. Being the investigating Officer he would be in a position to explain for not doing so. He was not cross-examined on this point at all. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for appellants is wholly untenable. ( 34 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants contended that there is no common intention for A2 to A6 to do away with the life of the deceased. He was not cross-examined on this point at all. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for appellants is wholly untenable. ( 34 ) LEARNED Counsel for appellants contended that there is no common intention for A2 to A6 to do away with the life of the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge observed that unless these accused shared common intention with A1, they would not have been present at the scene of occurrence and would not have present in the car along with A1, and there was clinching evidence to show that A2 to A6 participated in the commission of the offence, and perhaps that was the reason why some of them went in the car and some of them followed them on scooter. If really A3 had not shared common intention, he would not have known the place where the dead body was concealed and so also, the objects which were in the possession of the deceased would not have come into the custody of the accused. The accused were absconding from the date of incident. This fact has been spoken to by the Investigating Officer. Further A1 gave false information. All these aspects can be taken as additional links in the chain of circumstances which when taken cumulatively point only to the guilt of the accused. ( 35 ) AS regards the specific acts committed by each of the accused, the learned Sessions Judge discussed in detail from paragraphs 123 to 129 in his judgment. After going through the evidence on record and the discussion made by the learned sessions Judge, we have no hesitation in holding that the learned Sessions Judge appreciated the evidence in a right perspective and has not committed any manifest error in arriving at the conclusions. After elaborate discussion of the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge has reached the correct conclusions except insofar as the charge under Section 120-B ipc is concerned, which as we have already held above has not been proved by the prosecution. ( 36 ) IN the result, the conviction under section 120-B IPC is set aside. The order of conviction and sentence in respect of the other charges is confirmed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.