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2003 DIGILAW 1281 (PNJ)

Mohd. Zakir Hussain v. State of Haryana

2003-09-11

M.M.KUMAR

body2003
JUDGMENT M.M. Kumar, J. - This petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity, Criminal Procedure Code) prays for quashing F.I.R. No. 190 dated 29.8.2003 registered under Sections 419, 420, 465, 466, 471 506, 120, 124-A, 153-A 295 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for brevity, Indian Penal Code) at Police Station Mahesh Nagar, Ambala Cantt. on the basis of a complaint filed by one Anuj Sharma son of Ashok Kumar Sharma, resident of 29, Shankar Park, Ambala Cantt. The complaint was presented to the Judicial Magistrate who ordered investigation by the Police by exercising his powers under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code The petitioner has also prayed for staying of further proceedings on the basis of the FIR. It has also been prayed that arrest of the petitioner be stayed in the interest of justice. Another prayer made is that the police be directed to strictly observe and follow the directions issued by this Court in Criminal Misc. No. 31071-M of 2003 whereby Police protection has been provided to him and his wife Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy and the arguments raised, it would be necessary to refer to the FIR based on the complaint made by complainant- respondent 2 extenso and the same reads as under :- "First Information Report under Section 154 Criminal Procedure Code 1. District Ambala Police Station Mahesh Nagar Year 2003, F.I.R. No. 190 Dated : 29.8.03 2. (1) Act: Indian Penal Code U/s : 419, 420, 465, 467, 471, 506 (2) Act----------- U/s : 124-A, 153-A, 295, 120-B Indian Penal Code (3) Act----------- U/s :- --------------------------- (4) Other Act & Sections :- ------------U/s---------- 3. (a) xx xx xx xx xx (b) Date of receipt of information in the Police Station : 29.8.03 Time : 10.30 AM (c) Sr. No. of Rapat Roznamcha : 7 Time : 10.30 A.M. xx xx xx xx xx xx xx Sir, The complainant submits as under :- 1. That the complainant is a permanent resident of 29 Shankar Park, Ambala Cantt. The complainant is running Cottage business of Scientific Instruments in Ambala. The sister of the complainant Avedna was married on 13.7.2003 with Sh. That the complainant is a permanent resident of 29 Shankar Park, Ambala Cantt. The complainant is running Cottage business of Scientific Instruments in Ambala. The sister of the complainant Avedna was married on 13.7.2003 with Sh. Amit Thakur of Delhi according to Hindu rites and ceremonies and parents of complainant had performed of marriage of Avedna with all pump and show and had given all the dowry articles including jewellery, furniture and clothing, car and the marriage ceremony was attended by 500 persons. The parents of the complainant had spent a sum of Rs. 12.00 lac on marriage of Avedna, the sister of complainant. The invitation cards of the marriage and a few photographs are attached herewith the complaint. 2. That accused Zakir Hussain who is already married and is blessed with children was having evil eye upon the sister of the complainant Avedna and to this effect Avedna had informed the complainant and mother and father. The complainant along with the father and other family members had complained in the office of Punjab Wakf Board, Ambala Cantt. against the accused. The above said accused Zakir Hussain and co-accused Sayed Sahit Ali, Moh. Sardar Wani who are employees of Punjab Wakf Board, Ambala Cantt. instead of giving ear to the request of complainant and his father, on different occasion stated that we are Muslim and we enjoy with the bodies of Hindu Girls, outraging their modesty and our fore-fathers, who were Muslim Emperors have also enjoyed with the Hindu Girls after outraging their modesty and committing rape upon them and the Muslims Community is strong enough to kidnap and commit rape and to enjoy with the Hindu Girls and even the complete Hindu nation cannot stoop Muslims to enjoy with the modesty of Hindu Girls and the Muslim Nation will rather challenge Hindu Nation if any challenge is made to Muslims to this effect. An thousands of Hindu shall be slaughtered and will be cut into pieces. The blood of Hindus will shed like river. 3. That the above said Zakir Hussain kidnapped the sister of complainant Avedna on 15.7.2003 and inspite of the fact Avedna was married and was leading matrimonial life at Delhi. Avedna had come to Ambala for her visit to Mata Vaishno Devi when she was kidnapped by accused Zakir Hussain in conspiracy with other co-accused. 4. 3. That the above said Zakir Hussain kidnapped the sister of complainant Avedna on 15.7.2003 and inspite of the fact Avedna was married and was leading matrimonial life at Delhi. Avedna had come to Ambala for her visit to Mata Vaishno Devi when she was kidnapped by accused Zakir Hussain in conspiracy with other co-accused. 4. That thereafter, the complainant and his parents had complained to the accused Syed Sahit Ali and Mohd. Sardar Wani regarding the kidnapping the sister of complainant Avedna by Zakir Hussain and accused Syed Sahit Ali and Moh. Sardar Wani are so seditious persons that they openly stated like previous instances after coming in the police station that they kidnapped Hindu Girls being Musalman and it is present in Muslims. Muslims kidnapped Hindu girls and they enjoy with the modesty and with the body of Hindu Girls and abovesaid accused Syed Ali and Mohd. Sardar Wani further stated that Zakir Hussain accused will come after four days, after enjoying with the modesty of Avedna and then Syed Ali accused again repeated that accused Wani is stating right and they also previously have kidnapped and raped so many Hindu Girls and if Zakir Hussain has kidnapped a Hindu girl, then what has happened ? And they further stated that they consider the Hindu ladies their foot-Juti (Chappal) and then they also spoke sedious language for Hindu religion. 5. That accused-Zakir Hussain in conspiracy with co-accused named above, prepared a fake affidavit dated 30.5.2003 in the name of Avedna Sharma regarding the change of her religion from Hindu to Islam and above said accused persons while conspiring together also forged an affidavit regarding performing of the marriage by Alia Hussain (changed Muslim name of sister of complainant-Avedna) was forged attestation having without any identification and without complying with any legal requirement. The affidavit was fraudulently shown to be attested by Executive Magistrate, Delhi, with fake address of sister of complainant Avedna with fake name. The abovesaid affidavit was also fraudulently shown to be purchased from the Stamp Vendor with fictitious entries in it. Thereafter to show the marriage of the sister of complainant, abovesaid accused person then forged a Nikahnama dated 4.6.2003 on which the above said accused are the witnesses. The abovesaid affidavit was also fraudulently shown to be purchased from the Stamp Vendor with fictitious entries in it. Thereafter to show the marriage of the sister of complainant, abovesaid accused person then forged a Nikahnama dated 4.6.2003 on which the above said accused are the witnesses. The abovesaid accused persons while conspiring together have forged and fabricated the affidavit showing the change of religion by the sister of complainant Avedna as well as regarding matrimonial alliance by Avedna and Zakir Hussain on the very same day i.e. the same day all the things i.e. change of relation, matrimonial alliance of Avedna with Zakir Hussain alleged took place on the same. As a matter of fact, all the affidavit in this regard is after thought and are fabricated and forged documents to spoil the life of the sister of complainant. 6. That under threat and black mailing reasons, the sister of complainant Avedna is forced to speak in favour of above said accused before different authorities and several times the sister of complainant has telephonically talked with the complainant and his family members and wept bitterly that her life is destroyed and kindly save me, otherwise she will commit suicide. 7. That the abovesaid accused while conspiring together have kidnapped the sister of the complainant Avedna. The abovesaid accused persons on the pretext raised by the complainant and his parents even prior to 15.7.2003, when Zakir Hussain was having evil eye upon the sister of complainant and after 15.7.2003 have challenged the Hindu community stating that Muslims kidnapped, rape, enjoy with the modesty and bodies of Hindu Girls and similarly they have done the same which usually done by the Muslims with the Hindu Girls and in case the complainant, or his any member of his family raise any protest, they will have a Muslim community war against Hindu community and even the Govt. of India will be shaken by the Muslims on this score, by raising a big protest throughout country and in Muslim nations. Above said accused persons have also produced differences between two communities and have promoted enmity between the two Hindu and Muslim communities on the basis of religion. The above said accused persons for fulfilling their illegal motive have forged the documents i.e. affidavits and Nikahnama etc. etc. Above said accused persons have also produced differences between two communities and have promoted enmity between the two Hindu and Muslim communities on the basis of religion. The above said accused persons for fulfilling their illegal motive have forged the documents i.e. affidavits and Nikahnama etc. etc. And have threatened the complainant and his family members to murder them in case any protest is raised by them. And thus have committed offence under section 419/420/465/467/471/506 read with 124-A, 153-A, 295 read with 120-B Indian Penal Code. It is, therefore, prayed that the above complaint may kindly be forwarded to SHO PS : Mahesh Nagar, Ambala Cantt. under section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code for investigation and registration of the case or in the alternative accused may kindly be summoned, tried and punished according to law. Complainant Anuj Sharma through counsel D.K. Bansal, Advocate Dated 26.8.03 Anuj Sharma v. Zakir Hussain etc. Present : Complainant in person with Sh. D.K. Bansal, Adv. The present complaint has been got filed under Sections 419/420/465/467/471/506 read with Sections 124-A, 153-A, 295 read with Section 120-B Indian Penal Code. Heard. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances narrated in the complaint, I am of the considered view that the complaint is required to be sent to Police Station concerned for registration and investigation of the case under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code Accordingly, the present complaint is sent to the Police Station, concerned for registration and investigation. Sd/- JMIC 26.8.2003. Police Proceedings: Upon receipt of above application under Section 156(3) in the Police Station, offence of above Sections was registered in the register and thereafter police file alongwith original application, I ASI alongwith Head Constable Ranbir Singh 813 in Government Vehicle PCR 2, whose driver is C. Sarnam Singh 695 proceed at the spot. The copies of the First Information report will be sent to the officer through post. Entries have been made in the record of the police station in accordance with law. 13. Police proceedings : because in view of the above report, the offence of above sections mentioned at Sr. No. 2 has been committed, therefore, case registered, investigation started and it was directed to get it presented through Sham Lal, ASI. within jurisdiction of Police Station Mahesh Nagar. 14. xx xx xx xx 15. xx xx xx xx Sd/- Sham Lal, ASI" 3. No. 2 has been committed, therefore, case registered, investigation started and it was directed to get it presented through Sham Lal, ASI. within jurisdiction of Police Station Mahesh Nagar. 14. xx xx xx xx 15. xx xx xx xx Sd/- Sham Lal, ASI" 3. Notice of the petition was issued to Advocate General, Haryana as well as to complainant-respondent No. 2 on 8.9.2003. Mr. G.P.S. Nagra, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana accepted notice in the Court on behalf of respondent No. 1 and Mr. Sunil Rana, instructing counsel to Mr. O.P. Goyal, Senior Advocate accepted notice on behalf of respondent No. 2. Both the counsel requested for a short adjournment to enable them to seek instructions and file reply. Reply by respondent No. 2 has been filed and the same has been adopted by respondent No. 1. 4. Mr. N.K. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that already two FIRs have been registered, namely, FIR No. 161 dated 18.7.2003 under Sections 323 and 506 Indian Penal Code and FIR No. 163 dated 19.7.2003 under Sections 295-A and 298 Indian Penal Code at Police Station Mahesh Nagar, Ambala Cantt. against the petitioner and others. In both the FIRs, the petitioner as well as others have been granted the concession of pre-arrest bail by Sessions Court, Ambala. In the present FIR, two other persons arrayed as accused, have already been named as accused in the FIRs registered in July, 2003. The learned counsel has pointed out that liberty of a citizen cannot be put to peril by the police by registration of series of FIRs and enlarging threat of arrest. According to the learned counsel, such an attempt would defeat the provisions of Section 167(3) Criminal Procedure Code as the period of 90 days would never come to an end. For the aforementioned proposition, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala and others, 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048. The learned counsel has also raised the argument concerning territorial jurisdiction of ambala police to investigate the alleged offence because none of the offence could be considered to have been committed within the jurisdiction of Ambala Cantt. The learned counsel has further submitted that even if the petitioner is not considered to he legally wedded husband of Ms. The learned counsel has also raised the argument concerning territorial jurisdiction of ambala police to investigate the alleged offence because none of the offence could be considered to have been committed within the jurisdiction of Ambala Cantt. The learned counsel has further submitted that even if the petitioner is not considered to he legally wedded husband of Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma, no commission of offence is made out because a man and woman can live under one roof. Lastly, Mr. Sanghi has argued that the FIR has been registered with a mala fide intention because the marriage of Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma with the petitioner is against the wishes of her parents. 5. Mr. Naresh K. Joshi, learned State counsel has argued that there is no truth in the allegations that the FIR is based on malicious intention especially when it is remembered that the complaint was presented to the Magistrate under Section 190(1) Criminal Procedure Code who has directed the police to investigate by exercise of power under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code Referring to the adopted reply filed by respondent No. 2, the learned counsel has also pointed to the statement of Mr. Abdul Kayum recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code on 1.9.2003. It may be pertinent to mention that Mr. Abdul Kayum is resident of Shahi Masjid, Pinjore where the petitioner is claimed to have entered into a matrimonial alliance with Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma by solemnising Nikah. The gist of the statement as read out by the learned State counsel is that no Nikah was solemnized by Mr. Abdul Kayum on 4.6.2003 as has been claimed by the petitioner in paragraph 2 of this petition as well as before this Court in Criminal Misc. No. 31070-M of 2003, decided on 18.7.2003 (Annexure P-2) and Criminal Writ Petition No. 869 of 2003, decided on 30.7.2003 (Annexure P-4). The learned State counsel has also pointed out that threats have been held out to Mr. Abdul Kayum insisting on him that he should make an entry in his register with regard to solemnization of Nikah of the petitioner with Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma. He has further referred to photographs Annexures R-2/2 to R-2/6 to emphasize that Ms. Avedna Sharma was married to one Mr. Amitabh Thakur on 13.7.2003 as is apparent from the Invitation Card Annenxure R-2/7. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma. He has further referred to photographs Annexures R-2/2 to R-2/6 to emphasize that Ms. Avedna Sharma was married to one Mr. Amitabh Thakur on 13.7.2003 as is apparent from the Invitation Card Annenxure R-2/7. The Ladies Sangeet was fixed on 10.7.2003 and there was a Ring Ceremony earlier to that. The marriage was solemnized on 13.7.2003. The learned State counsel has further pointed out that in order to establish that the marriage of the petitioner with Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma had already taken place on 4.6.2003, forgeries have been committed after 13.7.2003 and statement of Mr. Abdul Kayum Maulvi of Shahi Masjid, Pinjore establishes the aforementioned truth. The learned State counsel has also made a reference to the payment of bill i.e. Annexure R-2/9 to the hotel where marriage of Ms. Avedna Sharma with Mr. Amitabh Thakur was solemnized. The State counsel has referred to forgery committed in the affidavit sworn at Delhi with regard to conversion of religion by Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma. Accordingly, the learned State counsel has submitted that the allegation that the present FIR has been registered with a mala fide intention to arrest the petitioner is unsustainable. If forgery has been committed with the object of marrying an already married Ms. Avedna Sharma, there is apparently substance in the allegation and the FIR cannot be quashed nor the order Annexure R-2/10 passed by the Judicial Magistrate could be questioned. 6. Mr. O.P. Goyal, learned senior counsel appearing for complainant- respondent No. 2 has argued that the petitioner has committed grave offences in order to succeed in his evil design of marrying Ms. Avedna Sharma, sister of complainant-respondent No. 2. The learned counsel has pointed out that record has been forged by the petitioner in order to ante-date his wedding and to prove that his marriage was solemnized on 4.6.2003, whereas the truth is that Ms. Avedna Sharma was married on 13.7.2003 and after her marriage evidence has been forged to show that she was already married to the petitioner by solemnization of Nikah and conversion of her religion to Islam. The learned counsel has pointed out that the petitioner is already married and having children and has coerced Ms. Avedna Sharma to convert to Islam. Avedna Sharma was married on 13.7.2003 and after her marriage evidence has been forged to show that she was already married to the petitioner by solemnization of Nikah and conversion of her religion to Islam. The learned counsel has pointed out that the petitioner is already married and having children and has coerced Ms. Avedna Sharma to convert to Islam. The learned counsel has pointed out that the orders/statement Annexures P-2, P-4 and P-4 dated 18.7.2003, 30.8.2003 and 30.7.2003 have been passed by this Court without issuing any notice to the complainant-respondent No. 2 or the parents of the girl who were impleaded as party. The counsel has submitted that in the absence of the parents of the complainant all the facts were not brought before this Court resulting into mis-carriage of justice. 7. After hearing the learned counsel and perusing the record, I am of the considered opinion that this petition is liable to be dismissed because there are well established principles which may constitute the basis for quashing an FIR. When the FIR is recorded on the basis of the orders passed by the Magistrate exercising power under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code, then there is added prohibition from quashing such an FIR. It is well established that non- existence of basic ingredients of a substantive offence alleged by have been committed may constitute a basis for this Court to interfere and quash an FIR. This proposition of law has been repeatedly considered and amplified in various judgments like State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 949. In this case it has been held that if bare perusal of the FIR fails to disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, then power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code or Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the FIR could be exercised. In the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 Privy Council 18 it has been laid down that no investigation can ever be quashed. In that case Lord Porter delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee had pointed out the role of the judicial courts vis-a-vis the duty of the police in the following words :- "In their Lordships opinion however, the more serious aspect of the case is to be found in the resultant interference by the Court with the duties of the police. Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships thinks, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus...." (emphasis added) 8. The aforementioned view has been followed and approved in Swapan Kumar Guhas case (supra). The observations of their Lordship in Swapan Kumar Guhas case (supra) read as under :- "The position which emerges from these decisions and the other decisions which are discussed by Brother A.N. Sen is that the condition precedent to the commencement of investigation under Section 157 of the Code is that the F.I.R. must disclose, prima facie, that a cognizable offence has been committed. It is wrong to suppose that the police have an unfettered discretion to commence investigation under Section 157 of the Code. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. Their right of inquiry is conditioned by the existence of reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence and they cannot, reasonably, have reason so to suspect unless the F.I.R., prima facie, discloses the commission of such offence. If that condition is satisfied, the investigation must go on and the rule in Khwaja Nazir Ahmed will apply. The Court has then no power to stop the investigation, for to do so would be to trench upon the lawful power of the police to investigate into cognizable offence, the Court would be justified in quashing the investigation on the basis of the information as laid or received. There is no such thing like unfettered discretion in the realm of powers defined by statutes and indeed, unlimited discretion in that sphere can become a ruthless destroyer of personal freedom. The power to investigate into cognizable offence must, therefore, be exercised strictly on the condition on which it is granted by the Code. I may, in this behalf, usefully draw attention to the warning uttered by Mathew J. in his majority judgment in Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. The District Magistrate, Kamrup, (1974) 2 SCR 12 at pp. 22-23 : (AIR 1974 SC 183 at p. 199), to the following effect : "We say, and we think it necessary to repeat, that the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of a citizen, except in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution and the laws. The history of personal liberty is largely the history of insistence on observance of procedure. Observance of procedure has been the bastion against wanton assaults on personal liberty over the years. Under our Constitution, the only guarantee of personal liberty for a person is that he shall not be deprived of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law." 9. In State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, the Supreme Court critically analysed large number of earlier judgments and cautioned that the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code for quashing an FIR should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. In State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, the Supreme Court critically analysed large number of earlier judgments and cautioned that the power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code for quashing an FIR should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court concretised some of those cases where power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code or Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an FIR could be exercised and observations of their Lordships in this regard read as under :- "In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised : 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice." (emphasis added) 10. It is also well established that power of the Courts to interfere in the investigation to be carried by the police is limited. The Court cannot interfere in the investigation but at the time, the investigating agencies do not have a final word with regard to the conclusion reached by them in their reports submitted to the Courts. It has been repeatedly held that the police under Section 156 Criminal Procedure Code enjoys a free hand to investigate an allegation disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. It has been repeatedly held that the police under Section 156 Criminal Procedure Code enjoys a free hand to investigate an allegation disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. It can investigate without even the order of a Magistrate. The power to investigate neither can be interfered with or controlled by the Courts as has been held by the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmeds case (supra) which has been followed, applied and reiterated in Abhinandan Jha and others v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 Supreme Court 117; S.N. Sharma v. Bipin Kumar, (1970) 1 SCC 653 and H.S. Bains v. The State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1883. It has been observed that both streams i.e. power of the police to investigate and that of the Court to take cognizance by issuing process run side by side but their water never intermingles. In this regard, the observations of their Lordships in H.S. Bains case (supra) make it further clear that the opinion expressed by the police by submitting a report is not a final word. Although the Magistrate cannot direct the filing of a challan by the investigating agency but yet the Magistrate can issue process by exercising power under Section 204 Criminal Procedure Code Even the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code resulting into submission of a report under Section 173(1) Criminal Procedure Code would not constitute a bar for the Magistrate to issue process and take cognizance. The observations of their Lordships in H.S. Bains case (supra) read as under :- "It is seen from the provisions to which we have referred in the preceding paragraphs that on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate has several courses open to him. He may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding he may issue process under Section 204. He may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding he may issue process under Section 204. However, if he thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He may then issue process if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding or dismiss the complaint if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, in the first instance, on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate may, instead of taking cognizance of the offence, order an investigation under Section 156(3). The police will then investigate and submit a report under Section 173(1). On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) and straightaway issue process. This he may do irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report whether an offence has been made out or not. The police report under Section 173 will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police and the conclusions drawn by the police therefrom. The Magistrate is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the police and he may decide to issue process even if the police recommend that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. The Magistrate after receiving the police report may, without issuing process or dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him and proceed to record the statements upon oath of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200 Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter decide whether to dismiss the complaint or issue process. The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156(3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Sections 200, 203 and 204. The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156(3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Sections 200, 203 and 204. Thus, a Magistrate who on receipt of a complaint, orders an investigation under Section 156(3) and receives a police report under Section 173(1), may, thereafter, do one of three things : (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; (3) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(a) on the basis of the original complaint and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under Section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be." 11. When the facts of the instant case are examined in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various judgments referred to above, no doubt is left that a bare perusal of the FIR, which is based on the complaint filed by complainant-respondent No. 2, would show that it disclose the allegations which may constitute various offences under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code. Reference may be made to the allegations levelled in paragraphs 2 to 7 of the FIR reproduced above which sufficiently discloses the commission of offences of forging Nikahnama and the affidavits with regard to conversion of religion. The allegations further disclose the commission of offences of kidnapping and abduction. It is also clear that the allegations satisfy the ingredients of provoking enmity between different groups on the grounds of religion and race. The allegation of criminal conspiracy have also been substantiated. Therefore, it cannot prima facie be concluded that the basic ingredients of substantive penal laws alleged to have been committed under Sections 419, 420, 465, 467, 471, 506, 148, 153-A, 295 and 120-B Indian Penal Code have not been satisfied. The allegation of criminal conspiracy have also been substantiated. Therefore, it cannot prima facie be concluded that the basic ingredients of substantive penal laws alleged to have been committed under Sections 419, 420, 465, 467, 471, 506, 148, 153-A, 295 and 120-B Indian Penal Code have not been satisfied. It is further relevant to mention that the photographs Annexures R-2/2 to R-2/6 show the performance of Ring Ceremony and marriage of Ms. Avedna Sharma with Mr. Amitabh Thakur. The statement of Mr. Abdul Kayum recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code before the Magistrate on 1.9.2003 would further show that the allegations are not totally without substance. Therefore, if any of the propositions laid down in Bhajan Lals case (supra) and other cases is applied to the facts of the present case, then the FIR cannot be quashed. I am further of the view that since FIR has been recorded by the police on the orders issued by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Ambala on 27.8.2003, Annexure R-2/10, there is added prohibition because the Magistrate in his order states that after hearing the complainant and keeping in view the facts and circumstances narrated in the complaint, it was required to be sent to the police station concerned for registration and investigation of the case under Section 156(3) Criminal Procedure Code Therefore, I do not find any valid reason to order quashing of the FIR. 12. The argument that the FIR is the result of some mala fide intention because the Nikah of the petitioner with Ms. Avedna Sharma (Aalia Hussain) has been solemnized against the wishes of her parents has not impressed me because firstly there is sufficient material indicating that the marriage of the petitioner with Ms. Avedna Sharma (Aalia Hussain) is after her marriage with Mr. Amitabh Thakur. The allegations disclosed in the complaint which constitute the basis of the FIR adequately show that the Nikahnama may be a forged document, especially when the statement of Mr. Abdul Kayum Maulvi of Shahi Masjid Pinjore recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code is kept in view. Similarly, the affidavit concerning conversion of religion of Ms. Avedna Sharma to Islam also prima facie is shown to be a forged document. Abdul Kayum Maulvi of Shahi Masjid Pinjore recorded under Section 164 Criminal Procedure Code is kept in view. Similarly, the affidavit concerning conversion of religion of Ms. Avedna Sharma to Islam also prima facie is shown to be a forged document. Moreover, the machinery of criminal justice put in motion by the recording of instant FIR cannot be said to be manifestly attended with mala fide or maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to humiliate him on account of private and personal grudge. If the police investigation reaches the conclusion that the petitioner had married an already married girl and has presented forged documents before various authorities, then it could not be considered that there is any mala fide in the registration of the instant FIR. Reference to earlier FIR No. 161 dated 18.7.2003 under Section 323/506 Indian Penal Code and FIR No. 163 dated 19.7.2003 registered under Sections 295-A and 298 Indian Penal Code do not disclose commission of any offence like forgery of Nikahnama or affidavit shown conversion of religion of Ms. Avedna Sharma (Aalia Hussain). Moreover, it has been argued that neither the complainant-respondent No. 2 nor his parents have been granted hearing at the time of passing orders in Criminal Misc.No. 31070-M of 2003 (Annexure P-2) and Criminal Writ Petition No. 869 of 2003 (Annexure P-4). Therefore, I have no hesitation in rejecting the contention with regard to mala fides raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. The other argument based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antonys case (supra) that no second FIR on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same occurrence could be recorded has also not persuaded me to concluded that the instant FIR suffers from any legal malady. There is no material placed on the record to show that the incidents mentioned in the earlier FIRs constitute part of one and the same transactions, namely, the activities of the petitioner showing that he is alleged to have indulged in forgery for the purposes of showing that his marriage with Ms. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma is earlier to the marriage solemnized by the parents of Ms. Avedna Sharma with Mr. Amitabh Thakur on 13.7.2003. The earlier FIRs are dated 18.7.2003 and 19.7.2003. Aalia Hussain @ Avedna Sharma is earlier to the marriage solemnized by the parents of Ms. Avedna Sharma with Mr. Amitabh Thakur on 13.7.2003. The earlier FIRs are dated 18.7.2003 and 19.7.2003. The allegations levelled in those FIRs have not been shown to establish that the allegations levelled in the instant FIR are identical to that of the earlier FIRs. Therefore, I do not find that the benefit of the judgment of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antonys (supra) could be extended to the petitioner. 14. I have also no hesitation in rejecting the argument raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that a man and woman may live under one roof who may not be husband and wife because according to the allegations disclosed in the FIR, the petitioner would not be simply living with a woman but living with a married woman. Furthermore, the allegations of forgery in creating Nikahnama and the affidavit concerning the conversion of religion of the girl would also require to be kept in view. The personal liberty of the petitioner can always be regulated in accordance with law as has been provided by Article 21 of the Constitution. An accused cannot raise the argument of absolute personal liberty when he is subjected to investigation of a crime alleged to have been committed by him. A perusal of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution makes it absolutely clear that no person could be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Similarly Article 22 provides for various safe-guards against the accused and detention in various specified cases. The fundamental right of freedom of movement granted under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution is also not absolute as reasonable restriction on the exercise of any of those rights could be imposed in the interest of general public. Therefore, mere registration of an FIR and investigation of the same cannot by any stretch of imagination could result into violation of any fundamental right. The argument with regard to jurisdiction cannot also constitute the basis for quashing an FIR because in case of any mistake with regard to territorial jurisdiction, there are sufficient powers with the police to shift the investigation to the concerned police station. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the aforementioned argument. 15. The argument with regard to jurisdiction cannot also constitute the basis for quashing an FIR because in case of any mistake with regard to territorial jurisdiction, there are sufficient powers with the police to shift the investigation to the concerned police station. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the aforementioned argument. 15. For the reasons recorded above, this petition fails and the same is dismissed. Petition dismissed.