JUDGMENT : 1. - These batch of writ petitions, the number and particulars of which have been given in the annexed Schedule, have been filed by the petitioners seeking direction to the respondents to consider their case for appointment on the post of Teacher Grade III from the date on which the persons junior to the petitioners/less meritorious than petitioners were appointed. Petitioners also claimed consequential benefits including the arrears of salary with interest etc. A relief has also been sought to the effect that if the vacant posts are not available then the respondent State Government be directed to sanction the posts and, in the alternative, to consider petitioners' case in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case. All these batch of writ petitions involve identical questions of facts and law and, therefore, they are being disposed of together by this common Order taking SBCWP No. 3512/2003, Madhu Soni v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. , as a leading case. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that in pursuance of the advertisement No. 18/98, petitioner applied for the post of Teacher Grade III; she secured 60.74% marks in the select list Annx.2; bonus marks had been wrongly awarded by the respondents and the same was declared illegal and unconstitutional by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand's case and after deducting the bonus marks, a fresh merit list of the candidates having placed in the merit list dated 25-6-99 only was issued and the fresh merit list was not issued as per rule 274(i) of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996 (for short, "the Rules 1996"); the number of post increased from 407 to 520 and after giving appointment to 407 candidates, 113 posts remained vacant; persons lower in merit than the petitioner have been given appointment and she has been refused appointment; she made the representations Annx. 4 and 5 but to no avail. Hence this writ petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 4. 4 and 5 but to no avail. Hence this writ petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the grant of bonus marks has been declared illegal and unconstitutional by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case and as such the respondents were duty-bound to chalk-out a fresh merit list and consider the case of the petitioners for appointment; after such deduction, petitioner gets 60.74% marks whereas respondent No. 3 Shri Ishwar Bharti secured 59.64% marks; Shri Ishwar Bharati and other less meritorious persons have been provided appointment ignoring the merit of the petitioner; the merit list dated 25-6-99 included bonus marks and as such fresh merit list should have been prepared after deducting the bonus marks provided to the candidates who names have been shown in the earlier merit list dated 25-6-99; the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case have wrongly been interpreted; and there is a hostile discrimination qua the petitioners on account of inaction, omission, apathy and non-exercise of jurisdiction by the respondents. 5. As per the Circular issued by the State Government with regard to selection of Teachers Grade III, ten bonus marks were provided for the residence in the district where selections were to be made and further five bonus marks were provided for the residence in the rural area of the district concerned. This Circular providing bonus marks came to be challenged before this Court and a Larger Bench of this Court, in Deepak Kumar Suthar v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1999(2) RLR 692 , vide judgment dated 21-10-1999, held that no appointment can be made by giving the advantage of bonus marks on the basis of residence of a candidate in the concerned district and rural area of that district and as such the Circular, to the extent of providing bonus marks, was held to be unconstitutional. 6. 6. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2002)6 SCC 562 , held that when no guideline at all is discernible from the impugned Circular as to the identification of residence of applicants, specially having regard to the indefinite nature of the concept of residence, the provision giving benefit of bonus marks to the rural residents will fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships, having due regard to the rival contentions, adverted and keeping in view the factual scenario and the need to balance the competing claims in the light of acceptance of prospective overruling in principle, considered it just and proper to confine the relief only to the petitioners who moved the High Court and to make appointments made on or after 18-11-1999 in any of the district subject to the claims of the petitioners. The controversy raised before the Apex Court on the factual background was categorised by the following categories of the persons:- (1) Those filed by the original writ petitioners who were aggrieved by the direction in the judgment either confining their application prospectively or denying relief on the ground that the writ petitioners would not have been selected even if 10 or 15 bonus marks are excluded. The appellant in the first of these appeals - Kailash Chand Sharma belongs to this category. He hails from the district of Korouli and he applied for the job in Barmer district. (2) Those candidates who have not been offered appointment, though selected on the strength of the weightage accorded for residents of the district and rural areas comprised therein. (3) Those selected on the basis of weightage and appointed after 21-10-1999, whose appointments were likely to be cancelled in view of the directions in the impugned judgments. (4) Official respondents in the writ petitions viz. the State of Rajasthan and the Zila Parishads. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the controversy involved in the case of Kailash Chand Sharma (supra), issued the following directions in para 46 (pp. (4) Official respondents in the writ petitions viz. the State of Rajasthan and the Zila Parishads. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the controversy involved in the case of Kailash Chand Sharma (supra), issued the following directions in para 46 (pp. 592-592) of the judgment:- "Having due regard to the rival contentions adverted to above and keeping in view the factual scenario and the need to balance to competing claims in the light of acceptance of prospective overruling in principle, we consider it just and proper to confine the relief only to the petitioners who moved the High Court and to make appointments made on or after 18-11-1999 in any of the districts subject to the claims of the petitions. Accordingly, we direct : (1) The claims of the writ petitioners should be considered afresh in the light of this judgment vis-a-vis the candidates appointed on or after 18-11-1999 or those in the select list who are yet to be appointed. On such consideration, if those writ petitioners are found to have superior merit in case the bonus marks of 10% and/or 5% are excluded, they should be offered appointments, if necessary, by displacing the candidates appointed on or after 18-11-1999. (2) The appointments made upto 17-11-1999 need not be reopened and reconsidered in the light of the law laid down in this judgment. (3) Writ Petition No. 542 of 2000 filed in this Court under Article 32 is hereby dismissed as it was filed nearly one year after the judgment of the High Court and no explanation has been tendered for not approaching the High Court under Article 226 at an earlier point of time." Reiterating the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra), the Apex Court, in Harshendra Choubisa & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2897 , held that the judgment of the High Court has to be given prospective effect so that its impact may not fall on the appointments already made prior to the date of judgment. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 2897 , held that the judgment of the High Court has to be given prospective effect so that its impact may not fall on the appointments already made prior to the date of judgment. Their Lordships inclined to confine the relief only to the parties who moved the High Court for relief under Article 226, subject, however, to the application of the judgment prospectively.Thus, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra), confined the relief only to the "petitioners" who moved the High Court and to make appointment made on or after 18-11-99 in any of the district subject to the claims of the petitioners. The expression "petitioners" has been emphasised very specifically even while giving directions. The Apex Court directed to consider the claims of the writ petitioners afresh in the light of the judgment of Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra) vis-a-vis the candidates appointed on or after 18-11-1999 or those in the select list who were yet to be appointed on such consideration. The appointments made upto 17-11-1999 were not required to be reopened or reconsidered in the light of the law laid down in that judgment. Thus, a perusal of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra), it is empathetically clear that in the light of acceptance of prospective overruling in principle, the Apex Court confined the relief only and only to the petitioners two moved the High Court and none else. Not only this, even while considering the identical controversy in Harshendra Choubisa's case (supra) also, the Apex Court confined the relief only to the parties who moved the High Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Indisputably, the petitioners in the batch of writ petitions did not move the High Court within reasonable time challenging the Circular by which the bonus marks were provided on the basis of residence in the district or rural area of the district. But after lapse of about more than four years, the petitioners in the batch of writ petitions, claimed appointment on the basis of select list, which is no more in existence in view of the fact that select list was prepared in pursuance of the advertisement in the year 1998 and as such even otherwise, it stood expired after elapse of one year in 1999. Learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon a judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Ashutosh Mathuria v. State & ors., 2003 WLC (Raj) UC 377 , wherein this Court held that from the aforesaid it is apparent that all the writ petitions, which were pending before the High Court, claiming relief on the basis of implementation of the policy of giving bonus marks on the ground of residence in the district concerned, by issuing direction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Apex Court had confined the relief only to the petitioners who moved the High Court and by issuing directions to make appointment on or after 18-11-1999 in any of the district subject to the claims of the petitioners before the High Court; the Court held that no further directions are required to be issued except to clarify that the petitioners' case shall also be considered and dealt with by the respondents in terms of the directions issued by the Apex Court, as aforesaid. 8. In B. Ramanjini & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., 2002 AIR SCW 2069 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the matters on which Supreme Court had already expressed its view and which the Supreme Court is seized of, the High Court should not issue any direction in that regard and should leave the matter to the Supreme Court. The Apex Court further held as under:- "Having said it, the High Court found that they do not want to disturb the present selection process which has already been completed. In that event, there was no need for the High Court to have given any directions for future merely on the basis of hypothetical situation as to how the selection had to be made and provide for the manner in which it should be given effect to. As and when fresh selections are made, the same could be sorted out whether they are in conformity with the appropriate provisions of law and the correct reservation policy has been followed or not. For future no particular principle could be set out in a judgement of this nature where nothing had been decided. In the first place, the High Court held that the question does not arise for consideration and in the second place, the selections made are not being disturbed. For future no particular principle could be set out in a judgement of this nature where nothing had been decided. In the first place, the High Court held that the question does not arise for consideration and in the second place, the selections made are not being disturbed. Therefore, it is wholly uncalled for for the High Court to have given directions regarding reservations." In the case of Ashutosh Mathuria (supra), the petitioner therein filed the writ petition, ventilating the grievances against the advertisement and the Circular by which bonus marks on the ground of residence were provided, in the year 1999 itself without any delay. Hence, the judgment in Ashutosh Mathuria's case (supra) turns on its own facts and is of no help to the petitioners. Moreso, a perusal of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra) reveals that obviously no such direction to consider and deal with the cases of persons other than the petitioners who moved the High Court, were given. In the instant writ petitions, the challenge made by the petitioners is almost after more than four years from the date of the advertisement. Thus, the instant writ petitions are otherwise also liable to be rejected on the ground of delay as well as on the ground of acquiescence. Petitioners want to avail the benefit of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Kailash Chand Sharma (supra), which is confined to certain persons who moved the High Court with due diligence. 9. In State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayaya & Ors., (1996)6 SCC 267 , a contention was raised for ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that the petitioners filed the writ petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case. The Apex Court rejected the contention holding that the same is not proper explanation and such a plea is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring the delay and laches. 10. In Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366 , reiterating the same view, the Apex Court held as under:- "Suffice it to state that appellants may be sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had impetus from Veerpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh's ratio....... 10. In Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366 , reiterating the same view, the Apex Court held as under:- "Suffice it to state that appellants may be sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had impetus from Veerpal Chauhan and Ajit Singh's ratio....... desparate attempts of the appellants to re-do the seniority, held by them in various cadre.... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage." 11. In M/s. Roop Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1989 SC 674 , the petitioners wanted to get the relief on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. While rejecting the petition on the ground of delay and laches, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:- "There is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and close (Chose ?) to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided." 12. An identical writ petition came to be considered by Jaipur Bench of this Court in Duli Chand v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., SBCWP No. 1401/2003 decided on 17-2-2003 and the same stood dismissed in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case as also on the grounds of delay and laches.Thus, from the aforesaid, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra) granted the relief only to those persons who had approached the High Court and that judgment was in personam and not in rem. In the instant matters, the petitioners neither filed the writ petitions nor joined the proceedings before the High Court or Hon'ble Apex Court, therefore, they are not entitled for any benefit on the basis of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Chand Sharma's case (supra). 13. Moreso, as the select list had expired, no relief can be granted to the petitioners at such a belated stage in view of the settled legal proposition. Rules 270 to 273 of (sic) the provide procedure for direct recruitment. 13. Moreso, as the select list had expired, no relief can be granted to the petitioners at such a belated stage in view of the settled legal proposition. Rules 270 to 273 of (sic) the provide procedure for direct recruitment. Rule 274 of the Rules, 1996 deals with the preparation of a merit list by the Committee and provides that the Committee shall prepare a merit list of candidates considered suitable for appointment to each grade or category of posts in the district and shall on receipt of requisition from the Panchayat Samitis or Zila Parishads allot candidates from the list in the order in which their names occur in the list, provided that (i) the number of candidates in the merit list prepared by the Committee shall not exceed one and a half time the number of vacancies actually available at the time such merit list was prepared; and (ii) the merit list of candidates so prepared shall remain valid for a period of one year in general and upto end of academic session for teachers. After expiry of such period, it will be deemed to have lapsed. 14. In State of Bihar & Ors. v. Mohammed Kalimuddin & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1145 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "The life or duration of the panel of list was, therefore, of one year. It, therefore, expired on 18-1-1992 by the force of the afore-quoted rule. The Rule having been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, therefore, had statutory force. The appellant-State was, therefore, right in contending that continuance of the panel or list beyond one year would be a violation of the statutory rule and, therefore, illegal. Even the Court could not stop it from lapsing in exercise of judicial discretion unless its constitutional validity was questioned. There is no doubt that the petition was filed after the damage was done, i.e. after expiry of the period of one year. This contention of the State is unexceptionable." In State of U.P. & Ors. Even the Court could not stop it from lapsing in exercise of judicial discretion unless its constitutional validity was questioned. There is no doubt that the petition was filed after the damage was done, i.e. after expiry of the period of one year. This contention of the State is unexceptionable." In State of U.P. & Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2173 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rules and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandate can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory Rules contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4-4-87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, if any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority. Even though we are persuaded to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents that on some occasion appointments have been made by the Appointing Authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the date of selection but such illegal action of the Appointing Authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules." 15. Last but not the least, the writ petitions are also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Hence the petitioners are not entitled for any relief under the equitable jurisdiction.In view of the aforesaid, I do not find any merit in these writ petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.Petitions dismissed. *******