N. V. RAMANA, J. ( 1 ) THE District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Medak at Sanga Reddy, represented by its General Manager, has filed this writ petition to call for the records and quash the orders dated 7-5-1999 in LGC No. 137 of 1998 on the file of the 1st respondent-Special Court under the A. P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 by issuing a writ of certiorari, and to further issue a writ or other directions holding that respondent Nos. 2 to 5 are land grabbers and direct their eviction from the application schedule land after removing the structures, illegally constructed, or in the alternative to direct the 1st respondent to order such eviction after due consideration of the matter in accordance with such directions, as may be given by this Court. In the concise statement filed before the Special Court it was stated that out of a total extent of 6-01 guntas of land in Sy. No. 212 of Kalavakunta sivar, Rangareddy Municipality, one Yousuf Hussain, was the pattedar of an extent of Ac. 4-26 guntas, which was assigned separate Sy. No. 212/a. The remaining extent of Ac. 1-16 guntas belonged to the PWD (R and B ). The land abuts the Hyderabad-Nanded highway. Yousuf Hussain sold his entire extent of Ac. 4-26 guntas of land to one Butchi Reddy under registered sale deed dated 11-5-1970 (Ex. A1) for a consideration of Rs. 2,000/ -. ( 2 ) THEREAFTER, out of the total extent of Ac. 4-26 guntas, Butchi Reddy, under a registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A2), sold an extent of 1600 Sq. yds. to the then Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank, Sangareddy, for a sum of rs. 10,400/-, specifying the boundaries clearly with peg markings. It is stated that Butchi Reddy did not retain any land abutting the highway. Though Butchi reddy delivered possession of the land to the Bank, the Bank did not make use of it and kept it vacant. While so, it is stated that Butchi Reddy sought 20 feet wide road for access to his remaining part of the unsold land on the western side of the land sold to the Bank. Though Butchi reddy delivered possession of the land to the Bank, the Bank did not make use of it and kept it vacant. While so, it is stated that Butchi Reddy sought 20 feet wide road for access to his remaining part of the unsold land on the western side of the land sold to the Bank. As the Bank was lost some part of its land for providing access 20 feet access road, Butchi Reddy compensated the extent of loss by giving some part of land from his unsold land, which is shown in yellow colour in the sketch, marked as AHKL. Thereafter, Butchi Reddy sold the remaining extent of unsold land to different people by making plots. ( 3 ) THE Primary Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank was redesignated as Agricultural development Bank, and it constructed a small office building in the purchased land. With effect from1-4-1987, Agricultural Development Bank, was abolished, and all its assets came to be vested in the petitioner. In the year 1988, the petitioner obtained permission from the Municipality and constructed a compound wall around the office building, and left the other area for future use. It is stated that that the unofficial respondents started raising constructions in the property in question by grabbing the same from the petitioner, and when questioned, the 5th respondent stated that he has a sale deed dated 7-9-1977 (Ex. B2), executed by Butchi Reddy in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 4, and as their GPA holder, he is constructing the building after obtaining permission from the Municipality. Contending that the sale deed dated 7-9-1977 (Ex. B2), alleged to have been executed by Butchi Reddy in favour of respondents 2 to 3, does not convey any title to the property inasmuch as the same has been sold to them under a registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3), and even otherwise the alleged sale deed is void for the reason that the same has been executed in violation of section 4 of A. P. Vacant Land in Urban Area (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1972, petitioner moved the Special Court, by filing an application seeking a declaration that the schedule mentioned land in an extent of 771-38 Sq. yds. In sy. yds. In sy. No. 212 of Kalavakunta Sivar, Sanga Reddy Municipality, specified by boundaries and marked in red colour in the sketch appended to the application, belongs to the petitioner, being part of the property purchased by them under sale deed dated 11-5-1970 (Ex. A1), and for a further declaration that the respondents are land grabbers, and consequently direct them to remove the pillars raised by them and to stop further construction, and to delivery possession of the same to the petitioner after evicting the respondents from the said land. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to 5 resisted the application before the Special Court by filing separate counters. The 2nd respondent in his counter stated that he sold the property which fell to his share in the settlement to respondents 3 to 5, and that he alongwith his co-sharers, have been in possession and enjoyment thereof for more than 50 years. ( 4 ) IN their counter, respondent Nos. 3 to 5 while denying the allegations made in the concise statement, stated that as alleged by the petitioner, Butchi Reddy out of an extent of Ac. 4-26 guntas, purchased by him from Yousuf Hussain, sold an extent of 1600 Sq. yds. , to the then Primay Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank, having 70 feet from South to North and 226. 6 feet from East to West. The claim set up by the petitioner is false, and in fact, the land in question forms part and parcel of the land purchased by them from Butchi Reddy, who is the common vendor, under registered sale deed dated 7-9-1977 (Ex. B2 ). ( 5 ) IT is stated that the then Primary Co-operative Land Mortgagte Bank purchased the property shown in the sketch in blue and yellow colours, and the disputed land is not covered under the sale deed. The averment made by the petitioner that the land covered by yellow colour was given by Butchi Reddy in lieu of 20 feet wide road provided by them, as shown in the sketch, is denied. No exchange whatsoever has taken place. The portions of the land purchased by the petitioner under the sale deed is shown in blue and yellow colours, and they have no right to claim the land in question, which is marked in red colour. No exchange whatsoever has taken place. The portions of the land purchased by the petitioner under the sale deed is shown in blue and yellow colours, and they have no right to claim the land in question, which is marked in red colour. The petitioner having obtained permission from the Municipality by submitting plans, constructed the building as also compound wall around it in the year 1988. The plan submitted by the petitioner to the Municipality shows the dimensions as 70 feet North to South and 226. 6 feet East to West, which is in accordance with the sale deed dated 11-5-1970 (Ex. A1 ). ( 6 ) THE plan submitted to the Municipality at the of obtaining permission for construction of compound wall, does not disclose whether it left any land on the north of the compound wall. Even the complaint lodged by the petitioner to the municipality and revenue authorities, does not disclose whether it has any land on the North side of the compound wall. Even in the suit O. S. No. 13 of 1998, the petitioner has not stated that exchange of land has taken place. The land enclosed in the compound wall constructed by the petitioner is nearly 1919 Sq. yds, which is over and above 1600 Sq. yds. purchased by them from Butchi Reddy. A reference is made in the counter that a Commissioner was appointed in the suit. ( 7 ) IT is stated that out of an extent of 1548 Sq. yds. purchased by respondents 3 to 5, they sold an extent of 340 Sq. yds of land to Janapriya Hotel, and retained the remaining extent of 1200 Sq. yds. That they applied for conversion of the user of the land from commercial to residential to the Government, which was granted, and permission for construction of building was also granted by the municipality, and the objection raised by the petitioner thereagainst, rejected. It is stated that Municipal Number was assigned to their building, and water connection also obtained in the year 1992. They also erected wire fencing around their building. Till 1998 they enjoyed the property peacefully, when the petitioner raised the dispute. It is stated that Municipal Number was assigned to their building, and water connection also obtained in the year 1992. They also erected wire fencing around their building. Till 1998 they enjoyed the property peacefully, when the petitioner raised the dispute. The subsequent sale deed executed by Butchi reddy in favour of Kista Reddy in respect of the land situated on the western side and shown in yellow colour in the sketch, established the fact that the property purchased by the petitioner in the year 1970 is with 70 feet width facing the road and 226. 6 feet depth from the East to West. After the petitioner purchased the land on 11-5-1970 (Ex. A1), a foundation-stone stone for construction of the building, was laid by late Sri. K. Brahmananda Reddy, the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, in and around 1971. The foundation-stone was laid in a depth of 111 feet from the road from east to West, which itself established that that the land purchased by the petitioner under the sale deed in the year, is covered by the portions marked in blue and yellow, and which the petitioner is presently in possession. Even the plan submitted to the Municipality by the petitioner at the time of seeking permission for construction of the building, discloses the same. It is lastly stated that they are bonafide purchasers of the land in question, and their predecessors-in-title were also in possession and enjoyment thereof. The land purchased by the petitioner is surrounded with boundary stones. The petitioner has no title or interest over the property in question, and therefore, they cannot be termed land grabbers, and the application filed by the petitioner, be dismissed. Considering the rival pleadings, the Special Court framed the following issues for determination:1. Whether the applicant has title to the application schedule property? 2. Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is true, valid and binding? 3. Whether the sale deed executed in favour of the respondents is hit by the provisions of A. P. Vacant Land in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act xii/1972? 4. Whether the respondents are land grabbers? 5. To what relief? 2. Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is true, valid and binding? 3. Whether the sale deed executed in favour of the respondents is hit by the provisions of A. P. Vacant Land in Urban Areas (Prohibition of Alienation) Act xii/1972? 4. Whether the respondents are land grabbers? 5. To what relief? ( 8 ) THE Special Court also framed the following additional issue suo motu: whether the respondents and their predecessors-in-title, in any event perfected title to the application schedule property by adverse possession no oral evidence was adduced by the parties. However, with the consent of the parties, documentary evidence was marked on either side. The Special Court having considered the aforementioned issues in the light of the documentary evidence placed before it, held Issue Nos. 1 and 2 against the petitioner and in favour of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 holding that the petitioner has failed to establish title to the application schedule property and that the rival title set up by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 is genuine. In view of its findings arrived at by it on issue No. 1, the Special Court felt it not necessary to consider issue no. 3. The Special Court answered issue No. 4 in favour of respondent Nos. 3 to 5 holding that they are not landgrabbers. The Special Court having regard to the findings arrived by it on issue No. 1, held additional issue against the petitioner, and consequently, it dismissed the case of the petitioner, without granting any relief under issue No. 5. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respondents made elaborate submissions, in sum and substance, they argued the following: the principal contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition is that when the registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3) explicitly described the survey number, the name of the village, the extent of land and the boundaries, the Special Court without giving effect to the same, has erroneously taken into consideration the subsequent conduct for negativing the case of the petitioner. A3) explicitly described the survey number, the name of the village, the extent of land and the boundaries, the Special Court without giving effect to the same, has erroneously taken into consideration the subsequent conduct for negativing the case of the petitioner. The Special Court has improperly appreciated the evidence inasmuch as it has taken irrelevant material (subsequent events) and excluded relevant material namely the report of the mandal Revenue Officer and the provisions of Sections 91 to 95 of the Indian evidence Act, 1872 with respect to construction of the terms of a document between the parties, into consideration, for the decision arrived by it. The special Court has erroneously disbelieved the exchange of land that has taken place between the petitioner and his vendor. The findings of the Special Court to the effect that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Evidence act, 1872, Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Indian Registration Act, have no application to the proceedings before the Special Court, are erroneous, irrational and illegal. Inasmuch as there is error apparent on the face of the judgement of the Special Court, the learned counsel submits that this is a fit case where this Court should interfere with the same in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and reappreciate the evidence to come to correct findings. ( 9 ) ON the opposite, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no error of law apparent on the face of the judgement of the special Court, warranting interference therewith by this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The whole case of the petitioner rests on the registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3), which was considered by the Special Court in detail, and therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the Special Court has not given effect to Ex. A3 is incorrect. On the strength of the registered sale deed (Ex. A3), which does not disclose the dimensions, the petitioner obtained permission from the Municipality for construction of compound wall in the year 1988, and accordingly constructed it. Ex. A3 only specifies the boundaries. The registered sale deed dated 7-9-1997 (Ex. B2), under which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 under purchased the land, clearly mentions the dimensions and the boundaries. A3), which does not disclose the dimensions, the petitioner obtained permission from the Municipality for construction of compound wall in the year 1988, and accordingly constructed it. Ex. A3 only specifies the boundaries. The registered sale deed dated 7-9-1997 (Ex. B2), under which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 under purchased the land, clearly mentions the dimensions and the boundaries. The theory of exchange of land between the petitioner and his vendor putforth by the petitioner was rightly disbelieved by the Special Court, for the petitioner with a view to deprive enjoyment by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 of their land, has invented such a theory. The Commissioner appointed by the Court reported that the petitioner is in possession of 1997 Sq. yds. of land, which is far in excess of an extent of 1600 Sq. yds of land purchased by them under registered sale deed dated 11-5-1970 (Ex. A3 ). Though the Special Court observed that the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 it had in fact followed the principles of natural justice, and also the provisions of Sections 91 to 96 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 scrupulously. He, thus sought dismissal of the writ petition. ( 10 ) THE law is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of certiorari is only supervisory and not that of an appellate Court. Only an error of law, and not an error of fact, which is apparent on the face of the record, can be corrected. The findings of fact reached by the Court on appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or corrected. The adequacy or inadequacy of evidence on a point, and the inference to be drawn thereon, is exclusively within the domain of the Tribunal, which cannot be reagitated before a writ Court. If it is manifestly clear from the record that the conclusions or findings arrived at by the Tribunal are based on misinterpretation of statutory provisions, or something in ignorance of it, or is expressly found on reasons that are wrong in law, then the conclusions or findings can be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari. If it is manifestly clear from the record that the conclusions or findings arrived at by the Tribunal are based on misinterpretation of statutory provisions, or something in ignorance of it, or is expressly found on reasons that are wrong in law, then the conclusions or findings can be corrected by issuing a writ of certiorari. ( 11 ) IN a very recent judgement in Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao1 the apex Court considered the scope, power and certiorari jurisdiction of the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and held thus: in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently, Article 226 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or order to be made. But notwithstanding the same, on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior Tribunal, if the High Court comes to the conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the inferior Tribunal or the inferior Tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible, then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior Tribunal. ( 12 ) IN view of the fact that this Court while exercising its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exercises only supervisory jurisdiction and does not sit in appeal over the decisions of the inferior Court or Special Court, it becomes necessary for us to consider whether the judgement of the Special Court reflects any error of law apparent on the face of it, and whether it has arrived at the conclusions other than those which a prudent man could have arrived at, and whether it has ignored to take into consideration relevant material or has taken into consideration material which is irrelevant to the case, resulting in miscarriage of justice, so as to justify our interference. As the case of the petitioner is entirely based on the registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3), under which it purchased an extent of 1600 Sq. yds. of land from one Butchi Reddy, the Special Court read into the recitals of Ex. A3 to ascertain the extent of the land purchased by the petitioner thereunder and its location. The Special Court while looking into Ex. A3 observed that an extent of 1600 Sq. yds of land was sold under Ex. A3 and nothing more and nothing less, that the property was bounded as follows: East - sangareddy-Hyderabad Tar Road, North - P. W. D Office (R and B Section), South - p. W. D. (I. B. Section) and West - Remaining land of Butchi Reddy. Neither site plan is attached to the sale deed, nor the dimensions of the land purchased is given. As the petitioner itself stated in the concise statement that the property purchased by them under Ex. A3 was pegmarked and delivered to them, the special Court disbelieved the contention of the petitioner that the land in which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are raising the constructions belonged to them. To fortify the above view, the Special Court proceeded to consider the subsequent acts and conduct of the petitioner with regard to their possession. The Special Court observed that the then Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh laid foundation stone for the construction of bank building in the land of the petitioner (marked in yellow colour) in a depth of 111 feet inside the eastern side compound wall, giving an indication that the petitioner purchased the land alongside I. B. Office compound wall upto the plot of one L. Kista Reddy. This averment, which was made by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in their counter was not denied by the petitioner by filing any reply affidavit. Thus giving an indication that the width of the eastern boundary facing Hyderabad-Nanded Tar road is 71 feet and the east-west depth roughly measured 212 feet. Therefore, the disputed area of 771. 38 Sq. yds. marked in red colour was not covered under ex. A3. The Special Court also referred to the civil litigation between Butchi reddy and his relatives in O. S. No. 44 of 1976, which ended in a compromise decree dated 26-11-1976 (Ex. Therefore, the disputed area of 771. 38 Sq. yds. marked in red colour was not covered under ex. A3. The Special Court also referred to the civil litigation between Butchi reddy and his relatives in O. S. No. 44 of 1976, which ended in a compromise decree dated 26-11-1976 (Ex. B10), in which Butchi Reddy, the vendor of the petitioner retained an extent of 1200 Sq. yds facing Hyderabad-Sangareddy Road to the north of the land sold to the petitioner under Ex. A3, leaving 20 feet wide road abutting compound wall of R and B building. No evidence was let in to prove that the compromise decree was obtained to defraud the petitioner of the property purchased by them under Ex. A3. ( 13 ) THE Special Court considered the act of possession of the land by the petitioner. In the year 1988, the petitioner under Ex. B37 applied for permission along with a plan to the Municipality for construction of a compound wall around the property purchased by it under Ex. A3. The plan as submitted by the petitioner and approved by the Municipality gives the measurements of the boundaries - 76 feet, Eastern boundary facing the Hyderabad-Sangareddy Tar Road, the depth is given as 226. 6 feet. It also mentioned that the property is near i. B. Office. It is pertinent to note that subsequent to the compromise decree in the suit, Butchi Reddy sold the land retained by him on the western side to private parties in the year 1977 under various sale deeds. The Special Court having taken those sale deeds into consideration, came to the conclusion that the boundary of Plot No. 1 purchased by one Kista Reddy under Ex. B11 is the property purchased by the petitioner under Ex. A3, and that it does not extend to the eastern boundary of Ex. B. 13. That the measurement of the western boundary of the land covered by Ex. A3, which is enclosed by the compound wall is 70 feet. B11 is the property purchased by the petitioner under Ex. A3, and that it does not extend to the eastern boundary of Ex. B. 13. That the measurement of the western boundary of the land covered by Ex. A3, which is enclosed by the compound wall is 70 feet. ( 14 ) THE contention of the petitioner that the yellow marked portion in the sketch was obtained by the bank in exchange for the land given to Butchi Reddy for laying a road, which is marked in light green colour, was disbelieved by the special Court holding that if really there was an exchange of land between the petitioner and its vendor, it would have produced a document, evidencing to that effect, but no such document was produced. It further observed that the though the petitioner purchased an extent of 1600 Sq. ys. of land, it was already in possession of an extent of 1997 Sq. yds. , which is enclosed by a compound wall, constructed by the petitioner in the year 1988, and that apart it was claiming an extent of 77. 38 Sq. yds. of disputed land. In the compromise decree Ex. B10, it is stated that Butchi Reddy retained 1200 Sq. yds. of land, leaving 20 feet towards the compound wall of P. W. D. Office, R and B Building, and that apart, in the suit O. S. No. 13 of 1998 filed by the petitioner on the file of the I additional District Judge, Sangareddy, it never pleaded the theory of exchange. The plea of exchange is also belied by the registered sale deed dated 7-9-1977 (Ex. B2), under which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 purchased the land. Ex. B2, which was executed much prior to the construction of the compound wall by the petitioner, recites the boundaries - Hyderabad-Nanded Road on the East, Open land of the vendor on the West, Internal Road and PWD (I and B) Office, Sangareddy on the North, and Open land belonging to Agricultural Development (LMB), Sanga reddy. ( 15 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner purchased an extent of 1600 Sq. yds. of land from Butchi Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3 ). The contention of the petitioner that the Special Court has failed to look into the contents of Ex. ( 15 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner purchased an extent of 1600 Sq. yds. of land from Butchi Reddy under a registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3 ). The contention of the petitioner that the Special Court has failed to look into the contents of Ex. A3 and has proceeded to consider subsequent events, cannot be accepted for the reason that the registered sale deed Ex. A3 though describes the extent of land and the boundaries, it does not mention the dimensions. The absence of dimensions in the registered sale deed, created confusion in the identification of the land purchased by the petitioner under Ex. A3 from that of the land purchased by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 under Ex. B3. This confusion, which is the own making of the petitioner, has warranted the Special Court to consider the subsequent acts and conduct of the petitioner, namely laying of foundation stone by then Chief Minister for the bank building in the year 1971, the petitioner applying and obtaining permission for construction of the compound wall from the Municipality, which they have constructed in the year 1988. To repel the above contention of the petitioner, the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 5 contended that when the whole case is found on a document, which is vague and ambiguous and is capable of rendering varied meanings, the Court can look into the subsequent conduct of the parties, and the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 do not prohibit the court pursuing such a course. To support this proposition, he pressed into service, the decision of the apex Court in Raj Kumar Rajindra Singh v. State of himachal Pradesh2, wherein it was held: if the terms of the document are clear and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence to ascertain true intention of the parties is inadmissible because S. 9 mandates that in such a case the intention must be gathered from the language employed in the document. But if the language employed is ambiguous admits of a variety of meanings, 6th proviso to the section can be invoked which permits tendering of extrinsic evidence as to acts, conduct and surrounding circumstances to enable the Court to ascertain the real intention of the parties. In such a case such oral evidence may guide the Court in unravelling the true intention of the parties. In such a case such oral evidence may guide the Court in unravelling the true intention of the parties. The object of admissibility of such evidence in such circumstances under the 6th proviso is to assist the Court to get to the real intention of the parties and thereby overcome the difficulty caused by the ambiguity. In such a case, the subsequent conduct of the parties furnishes evidence to clear the blurred area and to ascertain the true intention of the author of the document. In the case before us, as observed supra, the registered sale deed dated 10-11-1970 (Ex. A3), under which the petitioner purchased an extent of 1600 Sq. yds. of land, is unclear. Though it mentions the extent of land and the boundaries, it does not mention the dimensions of the boundaries, and no plan is annexed thereto. In the absence of any oral evidence adduced by both the parties to identify the land, the Special Court, was compelled to consider the subsequent act and conduct of the petitioner, as narrated supra. Therefore, no fault could be found with the Special Court in taking into consideration the subsequent acts and conduct of the petitioner, to ascertain the location of the land. ( 16 ) THE petitioner submitted plan for construction of compound wall around the plot purchased by them under Ex. A3 in the year 1988 by showing the dimensions of the plot width of the plot is 70 feet and its length is 226. 6 feet. Having obtained permission from the Municipality, the petitioner constructed the compound wall in accordance with the said plan. However, when respondent Nos. 3 to 5 started making construction, the petitioner raised objection contending that the land in which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are making construction belongs to them. We fail to comprehend as to how the petitioner after constructing the compound wall around its land way back in the year 1988, claim that the land in which the respondent nos. 3 to 5 are making construction belongs to them. Further, the petitioner in the concise statement filed before the Special Court stated that the land purchased by them under Ex. A3 was delivered to them pegmarked. The petitioner having said and done so, cannot no be allowed to take a different stand that the land in which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are making constructions, belong to him. Further, the petitioner in the concise statement filed before the Special Court stated that the land purchased by them under Ex. A3 was delivered to them pegmarked. The petitioner having said and done so, cannot no be allowed to take a different stand that the land in which respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are making constructions, belong to him. Be that as it may, the Commissioner appointed by the Court in O. S. No. 13 of 1998 between the parties, along with the Mandal Surveyor after conducting enquiry in the presence of the officials of the petitioner and the respondents, reported that the land around which the petitioner constructed the compound wall measured 1997 Sq. yds. , which is over and above the land purchased by them under es. A3. The petitioner has not explained as to how it is in possession of more land than what is reflected under Ex. A3. Further, the boundaries of the land, purchased by the petitioner under Ex. A3 and the boundaries of the land, purchased by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 under Ex. B2, are different. Ex. B2 mentions the dimensions, whereas Ex. A3 is silent with respect to the dimensions. The theory of exchange of land that took place between the petitioner and his vendor also cannot be believed for the reason that no document was produced by the petitioner in support thereof. The cumulative effect of the above narration, clearly goes to show that the land in question does not belong to the petitioner, as the Special Court has rightly held so. ( 17 ) THE learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 5 in support of his contention that the concern of the Court should be to do justice and misapplication of law or violation of law by an inferior Tribunal or Court in arriving at a decision, which did not result in injustice or miscarriage of justice, should not be interfered by this Court in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, relied upon the decision of the apex Court in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal3, wherein it was held:. . . The High Court non-suited him in exercise of a supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution. . . The High Court non-suited him in exercise of a supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution. Time and again this court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide State of U. P. v. District Judge, Unnao4 ). The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court, is therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law, the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law. ( 18 ) IN the instant case, no doubt the Special Court has made an observation that the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are not applicable to the facts of the case, but we should not lose sight of the fact that the Special Court has followed the principles of natural justice following the decisions of this Court in T. Surya Rao v. Dr. G. Ramakrishnan Rao5 and Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam v. B. Lalita devi6. Though the Court made such an observation, it had more or less followed the procedure laid down under the CPC, and inasmuch as the parties failed to produce any oral evidence before it, it had no other alternative but to look into the documents placed before it and also the subsequent acts and conduct of the petitioner, which itself negatived their plea, to arrive at just conclusions, and inasmuch as no injustice has been done to the petitioner, no interference is called for by this court in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India, on the mere observation of the Special Court that the provisions of CPC are not applicable. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 5 submitted that Ex. A3 was never contradicted, and the Special Court in order to remove the inconsistencies with respect to the dimensions and to identify the land purchased by the petitioner under Ex. ( 19 ) THE learned counsel for respondent Nos. 3 to 5 submitted that Ex. A3 was never contradicted, and the Special Court in order to remove the inconsistencies with respect to the dimensions and to identify the land purchased by the petitioner under Ex. A3, proceeded to look into the subsequent acts and conduct of the petitioner. In support of his contention that the Special Court by looking into the various documents for arriving at its conclusions, did not commit any violation of the provisions of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972, placed reliance upon the decision of the apex Court in Viswanathan v. Abdul wajid7, wherein it was held: admissibility of evidence to contradict the recital in the documents was not precluded by S. 92 as the dispute in the suit did not arise between the parties to the documents but between persons who claimed under the executant of the document. ( 20 ) IN the instant case, Ex. A3 was neither contradicted by respondent Nos. 3 to 5 nor they are parties thereto, nor the Special Court made any attempts to interpret the terms and conditions thereof, but only with a view to ascertain the location of the lands under Exs. A3 and Ex. B2 of the petitioner and respondent Nos. 3 and 5 respectively, it felt the necessity to consider the other documents, and more so when no oral evidence was adduced to clear the ambiguities and inconsistencies. Viewed from any angle, the order of the Special Court, does not in any manner, suffer from any injustice having been done to the parties or has resulted in miscarriage of justice, or suffers from exclusion of relevant material or consideration of irrelevant material, warranting interference by us in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition lacks merit, and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.