ORDER 1. Leave granted. 2.The appellant manufactures desiccated coconut and coconut in powder form from raw coconuts purchased by it. An assessment was made m respect of Assessment Year 1986-87 seeking to impose sales tax on the desiccated coconut powder sold by the appellant. The Assessing Officer found that the appellant had not paid any tax on the coconut purchased for manufacturing purposes and that, therefore, it was liable to pay tax on the finished products under Section 12 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The appellants appeal filed before the Department was rejected. The further appeal to the Tribunal was also dismissed. The Tribunal referred the following question under Section 24(2) of the Act to the High Court for its opinion: "Whether desiccated coconut is covered under Serial No. 14 of Notification No. 12528-CTA-62/82/F dated 22-3-1982?" 3. The High Court came to the conclusion that the desiccated coconut was not covered under Sl. No. 14 of Notification No. 12528-CTA-62/82/F a dated 22-3-1982 and accordingly, answered the reference against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. 4. The appellant has impugned the decision of the High Court before us. It has been contended that the courts below had wrongly come to the conclusion that desiccated coconut was not covered by the said notification and that the decision of the High Court was contrary to the decision of this Court in State of Kamataka v. Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries1. 5. Before we determine the scope of the said notification it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act, particularly, Section 3-B and Section 5(1) which are as follows: "3-B. Goods liable to purchase tax.-The State Government may from time to time by notification, declare any goods or class of goods to be liable to tax on turnover of purchases: Provided that no tax shall be payable on the sales of such goods or class of goods declared under this section. 5. Rate of tax.-(1) The tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be levied on his taxable turnover at such rate, not exceeding twenty-five per cent and subject to such conditions as the State Government may from time to time, by notification, specify." 6. 5. Rate of tax.-(1) The tax payable by a dealer under this Act shall be levied on his taxable turnover at such rate, not exceeding twenty-five per cent and subject to such conditions as the State Government may from time to time, by notification, specify." 6. On 22-3-1982 a notification was issued under Section 3-B in which the State Government declared various goods mentioned in the Schedule as being liable to tax on purchase turnover with effect from 1-4-1982. Item 14(vi) of the said Schedule reads as follows: "14. Oilseeds that is to say- (i)-(v) (vi) Coconut (i.e. copra excluding green coconut) (cocas nucifera)." 7. Therefore, by virtue of this declaration, in terms of Section 3-B of the Act no sales tax would be payable on the sale of any of the declared goods including "coconut (i.e. copra excluding green coconut) (cocas nucifera)". The question then arises whether desiccated coconut manufactured by the appellant would come within the definition of the word "coconut" as contained in Item 14( vi) of the Schedule to the said notification. 8. This Court in the decision of State of Kamataka v. Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries1 while construing an identical entry in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1956 Act") came to the conclusion that desiccated coconut did fall within the definition of copra. It would be useful to consider the reasoning of the Court in support of its conclusion. The Court said: (SCC pp. 622-23, paras 2, 5-7) "2. The issue turns, basically, upon the interpretation of Section 14 entry (vi), sub-entry (viii). Section 14 declares the goods therein stated to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. Entry (vi) therein refers to oilseeds, that is to say ... (viii) Coconut (i.e. copra excluding tender coconuts) (cocas nucifera). 5. Emphasis has been laid by learned counsel for the appellant upon the fact that Section 14 entry (vi) refers to oilseeds and goes on to specify what these oil seeds are. It is submitted that the desiccated coconut that is produced by the respondents is not an oilseed and, therefore, it falls outside the scope of entry (vi). For the purposes of entry (vi) coconut is defined by sub-entry (viii) to include copra, excluding tender coconuts. Copra, therefore, is, for the purpose of stib-entry (viii), coconut and, for the purposes of entry (vi), oilseed. 6. For the purposes of entry (vi) coconut is defined by sub-entry (viii) to include copra, excluding tender coconuts. Copra, therefore, is, for the purpose of stib-entry (viii), coconut and, for the purposes of entry (vi), oilseed. 6. The only question now is whether the desiccated coconut that is produced by the respondents falls outside the scope of copra within sub-entry (viii). Having regard to the fact that there is material on the record, which has been accepted by the High Court, to show that copra is produced by breaking the coconut, it is difficult to hold that desiccated coconut, which is shredded copra, is not copra within the meaning of sub-entry (viii). It is not in dispute, as the High Court has noted, that coconut oil can be extracted from watery coconuts, copra and desiccated coconut. The main object of the coconut for use in the kitchen is met as well by the shredded copra as it is by the coconut itself. The distinction that is sought to be made on behalf of the appellant that shredded coconut would not be considered as appropriate an offering on an auspicious occasion as the coconut is not an acceptable reason for holding that desiccated coconut is not coconut. The emphasis on the fact that the Encyclopedia Britannica states that it is the fresh meat of the coconut which is shredded and dried which results in the desiccated coconut appears to us to be misplaced for copra is also the result of drying the fresh meat of sections of the coconut. 7. All things considered, it appears to us that the judgment of the High Court requires no interference and, accordingly, the appeals are dismissed, with no order as to costs." 9. As the decision of this Court, although in connection with a different statute was in respect of an identically worded provision and the reasoning was rendered dehors the context of the particular statute in which it was contained and was based on general principles of interpretation, there is no reason for us to take a different view as far as the interpretation of the same provisions in the said Act are concerned. What is being manufactured by the appellant is desiccated coconut in powdered form. No distinction can be drawn between copra (whole) and copra in powdered form. The notification does not qualify the word copra. What is being manufactured by the appellant is desiccated coconut in powdered form. No distinction can be drawn between copra (whole) and copra in powdered form. The notification does not qualify the word copra. Both would be desiccated coconut and there is no material to show that both would not serve the same purpose viz. yield oil. 10. The learned Solicitor General, appearing for the respondent State of Orissa sought to rely upon a decision of this Court in Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Assn. v. State of Rajasthan2 to contend that the words "that is to say" prior to the mentioning of the different items would mean that anything which generally fell within the definition must be excluded except to the extent specified. This argument does not answer the case of the appellant, namely, that copra had been specified and copra and powdered copra are the same. When this Court has already, as narrated earlier, come to the conclusion that the desiccated coconut in whatever form comes within the definition of copra, we see no reason to restrict the meaning of copra to exclude copra in the powdered form. The submission of the learned Solicitor General that regard must be had to the fact that the itemisation was in respect of oilseeds also does not take us much further. It is nobodys case that copra is an oilseed as generally understood. It has been deemed to be an oilseed for the purposes of Act by statutory definition. If copra is an oilseed according to the statutory definition, then powdered copra can also be an oilseed, for the purposes of the notification. 11. The next decision on which the respondent had relied is CST v. Popular Trading Co.3 That case dealt with the provisions of the M.P. Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976. Contrary to what is being contended by the appellant in this case, the assessee had claimed that copra and coconut were commercially two different commodities and that watery coconut was not liable to payment of entry tax. This Court rejected the submission and held that watery coconut was the same as copra and not a commercially different item. The decision is not relevant and in any event far from supporting the case of the respondent, it appears to run counter to the contention of the respondent. This Court rejected the submission and held that watery coconut was the same as copra and not a commercially different item. The decision is not relevant and in any event far from supporting the case of the respondent, it appears to run counter to the contention of the respondent. The decision does not in any way water down the principles as enunciated in the case of State of Karnataka v. Sri Lakshmi Coconut Industries1. 12. The final decision relied upon by the respondent is in the case of Tvl K.A.K. Anwar and Co. v. State of T.N.4 In this case there was a question of interpretation of an entry in the Second Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The relevant entry made a distinction between "raw hides and skins" on the one hand and "dressed hides and skins" on the other. The contention of the assessee in that case was that both the items were the same and could not be considered to be separate. The submission was negatived on an interpretation of the relevant entry. The decision is as such not relevant. 13. It was also sought to be argued before us by the respondent that in any event irrespective of the definition of coconut in the said notification under Section 3-B, the appellant would not be entitled to any relief because he had not made any payment of purchase tax for the coconut purchased out of which the powdered coconut had been sold during the year relevant to the assessment year in question. It is further submitted that each of the authorities below had concurred with this finding of fact. 14. The submission of the respondent appears to proceed on a misinterpretation of Section 3-B. As we have already indicated, Section 3-B states that if a declaration is made in respect of certain goods subjecting them to tax on purchase turnover then no tax would be payable on the sales of such goods. Once we have held that the declaration made in the said notification covered the goods sold by the appellant, that declaration having been issued under Section 3-B, no sales tax was payable in respect of those goods. Once we have held that the declaration made in the said notification covered the goods sold by the appellant, that declaration having been issued under Section 3-B, no sales tax was payable in respect of those goods. If the appellant has not made any payment of purchase tax, the authorities should have recovered the same from the appellant and not subjected it to sales tax which they were incompetent to do under Section 3-B. It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the event the authorities do take proceedings to recover the purchase tax in respect of the assessment year in question he will not raise any question of limitation. 15. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the decision of the High Court is set aside and the question which had been formulated before the High Court is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.