Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This is plaintiffs appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity, the code) challenging the judgment and decree dated 19.1.1983 passed by the learned District Judge, Amritsar reversing the findings recorded by the Senior Sub-Judge, Amritsar in his judgment and decree dated 26.3.1982. 2. Brief facts of the case are that defendant-respondent 1 filed an application before the Collector, Amritsar under Section 4 of the Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act, 1913 (for brevity, the Act) for redeeming the land mortgaged vide mortgage deed dated 10.10.1946 (Ex.D1). The Collector dismissed the application on 27.6.1969. The order passed by the Collector was challenged by filing a suit in accordance with his rights conferred by Section 12 of the Act. The suit of defendant-respondent 1 Jarnail Singh was partially decreed and in the appeal, the cross-objections filed by defendant-respondent 1 were allowed by Additional District Judge, Amritsar in his judgment and decree dated 1.5.1975. The operative part of the order dated 1.5.1975 reads as under:- "In view of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal of the appellants fails and the cross-objection filed by the respondent Jarnail Singh are accepted. I, therefore, modify the decree of the trial court and grant a declaration to the plaintiff that he is entitled to get the land redeemed that may be proved to have been allotted in lieu of the land contained in Ex. DC mortgage deed on payment of Rs. 12,200/- and I also declare that the order of the Collector dated 27.6.1969is illegal and void and set the same aside..." 3. Thereafter, on 10.6.1975 the defendant-respondents filed an application before the Collector, Amritsar praying for delivery of possession of the mortgaged land. The Collector, Amritsar vide his order dated 27.2.1980 came to the conclusion that the application was liable to succeed and passed the following order:- "I have weighed the arguments of the learned counsels. The applicant had moved an application for redemption which was dismissed by the then Collector on 27.6.69. Consequently, the applicant had filed a civil suit which was decreed in his favour by Shri Pyare Lall, Sub Judge, Ist Class, Amritsar on 2.11.1973, which was also upheld by Shri T.S. Cheema, Additional District Judge, Amritsar vide his order dated 1.5.75. The applicant then moved an application for the delivery of possession on 10.6.75 in this court. Consequently, the applicant had filed a civil suit which was decreed in his favour by Shri Pyare Lall, Sub Judge, Ist Class, Amritsar on 2.11.1973, which was also upheld by Shri T.S. Cheema, Additional District Judge, Amritsar vide his order dated 1.5.75. The applicant then moved an application for the delivery of possession on 10.6.75 in this court. In view of the facts and the circumstances of the case and Rule 10 of the Punjab Tenancy Rules framed under Section 85 of the Punjab Tenancy Act and ruling 1978 P.L.J. Page 329 para 6 which authorise this court to deliver the possession after the decision of the civil court. I hereby order that the possession of the suit land be delivered to the applicant on payment of Rs. 12,200/- to the respondent. The applicant has been directed to deposit the sum of Rs. 12,200/- into the Treasury within a period of two months. This amount shall be paid to the mortgagee after delivery of the possession to the applicant." 4. The plaintiff-appellant field Civil suit No. 130 of 1980 on 26.4.1980 challenging the aforementioned order dated 22.2.1980 passed by the Collector claiming the same to be illegal, void and without jurisdiction. A further prayer was also made seeking permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from enforcing the order dated 27.2.1980 by executing the same in the Court of the Collector and dispossessing the plaintiff-appellant. The trial Court decreed the suit on 26.3.1982 by holding that the plaintiff-appellant was entitled for a declaration to the effect that the order dated 27.2.1980 passed by the Collector, Amritsar was illegal, void and without jurisdiction and defendant-respondents 1 and 2 were not entitled to take possession from the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondents 3 to 11. A decree for permanent injunction was also passed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant restraining defendants-respondents 1 and 2 from dispossessing the plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondents 3 to 11 from the suit land. However, the lower appellate Court on appeal filed by defendant-respondent 1 set aside those findings by holding that once the judgment and decree has been passed by the Additional District Judge on 1.5.1975, then the right of defendant-respondent 1 to redeem the land stood crystalized and order of the Collector to deliver possession of the suit land on payment of Rs. 12,200/- was absolutely in order. 12,200/- was absolutely in order. The operative part of the order passed by the learned lower appellate Court reads as under:- "The undisputed facts are that Sadhu Singh son of Mehar Singh, defendant-appellant mortgaged the agricultural land measuring 62 kanals 18 marlas to Sadhu Singh son of Shian Singh vide mortgage deed dated October 10, 1946 for Rs. 12,200/-(Copy Ex.D1). It is not disputed that the land in suit represents the land mortgaged subsequent to the consolidation and to the similar effect was the finding of Shri T.S. Chima, learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar affirming the findings of the trial- Court on issue No. 3(c) in that case. The application of Jarnail Singh for redemption of the land was dismissed y the Collector which order was however, upset by Shri T.S. Chima, learned Additional District Judge, Amritsar, in appeal against the decree of Shri P. Lal, Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Amritsar, in a suit under Section 12 of the Redemption of Mortgages Act. Shri T.S. Chima, Additional District Judge, Amritsar, by his judgment Ex.P3 held that Jarnail Singh, defendant-appellant was entitled to get the land redeemed and the order of the Collector dated June 27, 1969 was held to be illegal. It was, thereafter, that Jarnail Singh moved an application Ex.D11 before S.D.O. (Civil), Amritsar to get possession on deposit of Rs. 12,200/-. Shri H.S. Pawar, S.D.O. (Civil) Amritsar, therefore, directed the delivery of possession on deposit of Rs. 12,200/-. The decree passed by Shri T.S. Chema, Additional District Judge, Amritsar, is final between the parties. The suit under Section 12 of the redemption of Mortgages Act is in the nature of appeal from the order of the Collector under Section 4 of the Redemption of Mortgages Act. The Collector was duty bound to direct the delivery of possession. Shri T.S. Chema, Additional District Judge, Amritsar, judicially recognised the right of Jarnail Singh to get the land redeemed and the order of the Collector directing the delivery of possession on payment of Rs. 12,200/- was only implementing the same. It is doubtful if the suit challenging the order of the Collector lay. Setting aside the order of the Collector would mean setting aside the order passed by the appellate court. There was no such power in the trial court. 12,200/- was only implementing the same. It is doubtful if the suit challenging the order of the Collector lay. Setting aside the order of the Collector would mean setting aside the order passed by the appellate court. There was no such power in the trial court. I have not been able to find out any illegality in the order of the Collector whereby the possession was directed to be delivered. No suit for redemption lay much less second application for redemption. The only remedy was to get possession in the application for redemption of the mortgage which has been previously dismissed and in the order of the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, it was held that Jarnail Singh was entitled to the possession. I hold the order to be legal and as such no suit for injunction lay." 5. Mr. H.S. Giani, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that the suit filed by defendant-respondent-1 ultimately culminated in the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, dated 1.5.1975. According to the declaration given the defendant-respondent 1 was required to prove before a competent court of jurisdiction that the suit land was the same and had been allotted after consolidation in lieu of the land mortgaged by virtue of mortgage deed dated 30.10.1946. The learned counsel has pointed out that in the absence of any proof to that effect, the learned lower appellant Court could not have passed the decree upholding the order of the Collector dated 27.2.1980. The learned counsel has further pointed out that the prayer made in the earlier suit was not for redemption and it was only for a declaration. Therefore, order dated 27 2.1980 directing delivery of possession passed by the Collector to the plaintiff-appellant is liable to be set aside. 6. Mr. A.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant-respondents on the basis of para-graph 7 of the Trial Court judgment has submitted that there was no dispute regard to the fact that the suit land was the land allotted under Ex.D1 dated 10.10.1946. 6. Mr. A.C. Jain, learned counsel for the defendant-respondents on the basis of para-graph 7 of the Trial Court judgment has submitted that there was no dispute regard to the fact that the suit land was the land allotted under Ex.D1 dated 10.10.1946. According to the learned counsel had there been a dispute, then the order of the Collector dated 27.2.1980 Ex.P4 could have been disputed on the ground that in terms of the judgment dated 1.5.1975 passed by the District Judge, Amritsar, there was no proof furnished by the defendant-respondents showing that the suit land was the same land which was subject matter of mortgage deed dated 10.10.1946. Mr. Jain has also pointed out that it is a pure question of fact and no question of law would arise and the appeal itself is not competent under Section 100 of the Code. He has urged that this Court should not interfere in pure findings of facts. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sadhu v. Mst. Kishni, A.I.R. 1980 Punjab and Haryana 85. 7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, I am of the considered view that this appeal is liable to be dismissed. A perusal of order dated 27.2.1980 would show that there was no dispute raised by the plaintiff-appellant with regard to identity of the land. Defendant-respondents in their application has specifically sought possession of land bearing Killa Nos. 9/24, 12/5/2-8-14-4-6-7-13-17 as entered in the Jamabandi for the year 1959-60 situated in the revenue estate of Jheeta Khurd, Tehsil and District Amritsar on payment of Rs. 12,000/- being the mortgage money. In the reply filed by Sadhu Singh, the plaintiff-appellant, it was asserted that the application did not disclose as to how it was maintainable and that the first application made by the defendant-respondents was dismissed on 27.6.1969. It was further averred that the defendant-respondents withdrew the money deposited by him after the application was dismissed. No review of the order dated 27.6.1969 would be available. In view of the fact that no dispute was raised before the Collector with regard to identity of the land, it would not now be permissible for the plaintiff-appellant to raise this argument. No review of the order dated 27.6.1969 would be available. In view of the fact that no dispute was raised before the Collector with regard to identity of the land, it would not now be permissible for the plaintiff-appellant to raise this argument. Moreover, the question of facts cannot be raised at he stage of second appeal under Section 100 as rightly contended by the counsel for defendant-respondents. In this regard the Supreme Court has taken the consistent view in the cases of Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, (1998)3 S.C.C. 331; Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998)6 S.C.C. 423; Chandrabhagabai v. Ramakrishna, (1998)6 S.C.C. 207; Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar and Bros. and Anr., (1998)6 S.C.C. 748; M.G. Hegde v. Vasudev, (2000)2 S.C.C. 213; State of Rajasthan v. Harpholl Singh (dead) through L.Rs., (2000)5 S.C.C. 652; M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar v. Narayanan Nadar Kunjan Nadar, (2000)10 S.C.C. 244; Baidyanath Bhattacharya v. S. Karmakar, (2000)9 S.C.C. 505; Manorama Thampuratti v. C.K. Sujatha Thampuratti, (2000)9 S.C.C. 233; Chandragouda and Anr. v. Shekharagouda S. Pittanagoudar, (2000)10 S.C.C. 617; Thimmaiah v. Ningamma, (2000) S.C.C. 409; Mohd. Abdul Muqtedar v. S.K. Fakruddin, (2000)9 S.C.C. 384; G. Thankamma Amma v. N. Raghava Kurup, (2000)9 S.C.C. 517; Ananta Kalappa Jaratakhane v. Krishtappa, (2000)9 S.C.C. 60; Mohd. Hadi Hussain v. Abdul Hamid Choudhary, (2000)10 S.C.C. 248 and Ajit Chopra v. Sadhu Ram, (2000)1 S.C.C. 114. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also held that for the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 100 of the Code the existence of substantial question of law is a sine qua non. It has further been held that where the findings of fact of the lower appellate Court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own finding on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. Even in the cases concerning title and ownership, the findings of fact as recorded by the courts below are considered by their Lordships to be the final. The same view has been reiterated in the recent judgment rendered in the case reported as Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh, (2001)4 S.C.C. 262 wherein Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 has been declared ultra vires of Section 100 of the Code. 8. The same view has been reiterated in the recent judgment rendered in the case reported as Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh, (2001)4 S.C.C. 262 wherein Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 has been declared ultra vires of Section 100 of the Code. 8. I do not find any substance in the argument raised on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that mere suit for declaration was not maintainable because this point has also not been raised before the Courts below and the same is not permissible to be raised for the first time before this Court. Moreover, the application under Section 4 of the Act was firstly made before the Collector which was dismissed on 27.6.1969 and thereafter a suit was filed as it is permissible under Section 12 of the Act. The defendant-respondents came back to the Collector by moving a fresh application for redemption. As such, there is no illegality committed by the defendant-respondents in following the procedure for redeeming the land from mortgage. The contention is wholly misconceived and, hence, liable to be rejected. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed.