Bidasaria Brothers v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Tax
2003-11-28
A.M.SAPRE
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment ( 1. ) BY filing this writ under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to assail the two orders, both dated February 7, 2003 annexures H and H-II), passed by the Upper Commissioner, Commercial Tax, Indore in two revisions being No. 74/2002/indore/state and 36/2002/indore/ Central. Both these revisions which arose out of an order, passed by the Assistant Commissioner on September 26, 1997 in case Nos. 33 and 31 of 1994 have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. ( 2. ) THE dispute in these two cases relates to the period April 1, 1993 to March 31, 1994. It is relating to imposition of penalty under Commercial Tax Act (formerly as M. P. G. S. T. Act) and Central Sales Tax Act. In the opinion of revisionary authority, the revision filed by the petitioner against the order imposing penalty was barred by time and hence, those revisions were dismissed as being barred by limitation. As a consequence, the question involved in the revision on the merits of the issue namely, whether penalty was rightly imposed or in other words, whether a case for imposing penalty on the facts of the case was made out or not ? could not be gone into in these revisions. As stated supra, it is against these orders (common though separately passed), the petitioner has come up in this writ. ( 3. ) HEARD Shri G. M. Chakekar, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Pancholia, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S. Mukati, learned Government Advocate for the respondents. ( 4. ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties and having per used record of the case, I am inclined to allow the writ and while setting aside of the two aforementioned revisionary orders (annexures H and H-II), remand the case to the revisionary authority to decide the revision on its merits. ( 5. ) INDEED, I am of the view that this was a fit case where the revisionary authority should have condoned the delay in filing revisions and should have heard and decided the revisions on merits. ( 6. ) IN the facts emerging from the record of the case, a case for condonation of delay in filing revision had been made out. There is nothing to show that the order of imposition of penalty passed by the assessing authority was actually served on the petitioner.
( 6. ) IN the facts emerging from the record of the case, a case for condonation of delay in filing revision had been made out. There is nothing to show that the order of imposition of penalty passed by the assessing authority was actually served on the petitioner. In any event, what was more material was that assessment order on the strength of which, the impugned penalty order was founded was later set aside by the revisionary court and as a consequence, fresh order of assessment was passed thereby granting certain benefits to the petitioner. All these facts which were matter of record cumulatively if taken into account did make out a case for condonation of delay and justified in not filing the revision in time. The condonation of delay advances cause of justice rather than to defeat. The approach of the courts/authorities to whom the power to condone the delay is conferred by the statute should be liberal in condonation. It is only in exceptional cases where the cause is not even disclosed, the delay be not condoned. Such does not appear to be a case of that nature. ( 7. ) IN view of aforesaid discussion, I am inclined to allow the writ and quash the order, dated February 7, 2003 (annexures H and H-II ). I accordingly, condone the delay in filing revisions by the petitioner against the order, dated September 26, 1997, passed by the Assistant Commissioner in case No. 33 of 1994 and 31 of 1994. As a result, the revisions are held to be within limitation. They have to be heard and decided on merits. Let it be so decided by the revisionary authority (the respondent No. 1) within a period of six months uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court and strictly on its merits after granting adequate opportunity to the petitioner.