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2003 DIGILAW 1302 (SC)

KESHA V (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. v. DEVI SINGH

2003-10-14

body2003
ORDER 1. The facts in brief are that the suit property consists of agricultural land described as Khewat Khatauni No. 51/85-86, Khasras Nos. 19-25 situated in Muhal Khilra, Tehsil Sundemagar, District Mandi. Undisputedly, one Paddu was the owner of the land who inducted Keshav, the appellant herein as tenant in cultivating possession of the land sometime in the year 1945. Keshav has died during the pendency of these proceedings and is represented by his legal representatives. However, for the sake of convenience we will refer to the late Keshav as "the appellant". Paddu died sometime in the year 1950. He was survived by his widow Smt Achhari Devi and also sons of his cousins who will be referred to hereinafter as "the reversioners". On 7-121950 Smt Achhari executed a registered deed of sale in favour of Keshav and one Titia. Under the sale deed alienation was to the extent of 3/4 in favour of Keshav and to the extent of 1/4 in favour of Titia. Keshav continued in possession of land as before. On 17-6-1956 the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. On 9-8-1956 the reversioners filed a suit for declaration that the sale deed dated 7-12-1950 executed by Smt Achhari in favour of Keshav and Titia was void inasmuch as what vested in Smt Achhari on 7-12-1950 was only life estate of a widow and she was not entitled to alienate ownership in the suit property to anyone. The trial court dismissed the suit but the suit was decreed in first appeal by the District Judge vide judgment and decree dated 26-11-1958 whereby the sale deed dated 7-12-1950 was adjudged to be null and void. 2. In 1969, Smt Achhari died. On 4-5-1970 the reversioners filed another suit for recovery of possession over the suit land from Keshav. Keshav defended himself by pleading all the relevant facts including the plea that in the event of the sale deed dated 7-12-1950 falling to the ground, he shall continue to hold the land as tenant from late Paddu which tenancy would continue to bind the legal heirs and successors of late Paddu. The trial court decreed the suit for possession. The first appeal preferred by Keshav was allowed and the suit was directed to be dismissed holding that Keshav would continue to remain in possession of the suit land as tenant. The trial court decreed the suit for possession. The first appeal preferred by Keshav was allowed and the suit was directed to be dismissed holding that Keshav would continue to remain in possession of the suit land as tenant. The reversioners preferred second appeal to the High Court which has been allowed. The High Court has restored the decree for possession setting aside the judgment of the first appellate court. The singular reasoning which has prevailed with the High Court is that by virtue of sale dated 7-12-1950 the pre-existing tenancy of Keshav was extinguished by the ownership and tenancy having come to vest in the same person at the same time and by the doctrine of merger the a tenancy would stand wiped out and merge into the ownership. The High Court held that once the tenancy had come to an end by merger, it would not revive and, therefore, the tenant Keshav was liable to be evicted. No other aspect of the case has been considered by the High Court. 3. Keshav has filed this appeal by special leave. 4. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the view taken by the High Court of the doctrine of merger is erroneous which deserves to be set aside and as there has been no determination by the High Court of all the issues arising for decision, the case deserves to be remanded to the High Court for decision on all the relevant issues. The learned counsel submitted that the doctrine of merger is not applicable to the facts of the case and that finding of the High Court deserves to be set aside. We find merit in the submission so made. 5. As held by this Court recently in T. Lakshmipathi v. P. Nithyananda Reddyl: (SCC p. 159, para 14) "The doctrine of merger, as statutorily recognised in India, contemplates (i) coalescence of the interest of the lessee and the interest of the lessor, (ii) in the whole of the property, (iii) at the same time, (iv) in one person, and (v) in the same right. There must be a complete union of the whole interests of the lessor and the lessee so as to enable the lesser interest of the lessee sinking into the larger interest of the lessor in the reversion." 6. There must be a complete union of the whole interests of the lessor and the lessee so as to enable the lesser interest of the lessee sinking into the larger interest of the lessor in the reversion." 6. Smt Achhari possessed only a life estate in the suit property which is not disputed. She could not have, therefore, transferred full ownership rights. Similarly, the transfer was not in favour of Keshav alone; he had purchased only 3/4 of the alienable interest in the property and remaining 1/4 was purchased by Titia. The High Court is, therefore, not right in holding that the ownership and tenancy had come to vest fully in favour of one person and at the same time; more so, when the sale deed dated 7-12-1950 by Smt Achhari came to be annulled subsequently in the suit filed by the next reversioners. The tenancy of Keshav did not come to an end and was not extinguished. 7. The suit property is an agricultural land. Several tenancy laws have been enacted having material bearing on legal effect of several factual events noted hereinabove. The question which would arise for decision would be what will be the effect on tenancy rights of Keshav: whether by effect of tenancy laws the tenancy rights would stand enlarged into full ownership or other higher rights and whether the successors of the owners creating the tenancy would be entitled to restoration of possession from the tenant. So also, a question may arise, which would be the proper forum for initiating such legal proceedings and seeking adjudication rights? All these aspects have not been gone into by the High Court. 8. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for hearing and decision a afresh. The second appeal shall stand restored on the file of the High Court. No order as to the costs in this Court. 9. The parties through their respective counsel are directed to appear before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla on 24-11-2003.