D. P. SINGH, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and they agree that the writ petition itself may be finally disposed off under the Rules of the Court. 3. This writ petition is directed against an order dated 12th January, 1995, allowing a revision filed by the respondent No. 3 and remanding the matter back for decision afresh. 4. The facts as stated in the writ petition are that one Manzoor Ahmad held Zamindari rights over the disputed land, expired in 1947 leaving behind his heirs. Out of the heirs two migrated to Pakistan in 1947, thus their shares in the land vested in the custodian. The petitioner moved an application on 23rd May, 1981 before the Assistant Custodian that since she was a co-sharer with her evacuee sisters and was in possession of their shares in plot No. 169 it should be transferred to her. The said share, it appears, was transferred to the petitioner and a sale certificate dated 16-4-1982 was issued. It appears that on 8-2-1990 the contesting respondent No. 3 filed a revision petition under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), inter alia, on the ground that he was a co-sharer in the disputed plot and the consolidation authorities have wrongly prepared a chak without including his name thereon and in fact no right or title could be passed on to the petitioner and he had a preferential right. It was also alleged that prior approval of sale by the Custodian General under Section 10 of the Act has not been obtained and neither any notice was issued to him before the transfer of the land, thus, the sale be set aside. The petitioner filed detailed objections, inter alia, claiming that the respondent had no right to file the revision. It was also contended that the requirement of Section 10 was complied with. The revisional Court after considering the case of both the parties came to the conclusion that the contesting respondents had a prima facie case and he should be given an opportunity to prove the same before the Custodian, which could examine the matter again and thus by the impugned order he set aside the sale certificate and remanded the matter for decision afresh. 5. 5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order was without jurisdiction, inasmuch as, the Judge Small Causes, who had passed the revisional order had been divested of the power of Assistant Custodian General by different Government orders. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon three Government orders which are annexed as Annexures-9, 10 and 11 to the writ petition. However, learned counsel for the contesting respondent has urged that this ground was never raised before the revisional authority and thus, it cannot be raised here for the first time. However, he also urged that an identical challenge was raised in another matter before the revisional Court. After a detailed judgment and relying upon different Government orders, the authority came to the conclusion that in fact Judge Small Causes had been authorized to act as Assistant Custodian. In support the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon two decisions which are annexed as Annexures-C. A. 1 & 2 to the counter affidavit. 6. Having considered the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner and also those raised before the revisional Court, it is apparent that this point was never raised by the petitioner before the Courts below. At this belated stage, he should not be allowed to raise a new technical plea, especially so when the order is only an order of remand and the petitioner would be given full opportunity to establish his case. 7. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the consolidation operations had intervened and Consolidation Courts have already carved out chaks, therefore, no proceeding under the Act could be carried on. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision in the case of Nandha and others v. Deputy Custodian General and others, 1979 A. L. J. 1044. However, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Section 48-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act to urge that the Consolidation Courts cannot determine the title of evacuee property. In support he has relied upon a decision of this Court in Smt. Masoom Bano v. Hari Singh and others, A. I. R. 1974 Allahabad 462. However, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Section 48-A of the Consolidation of Holdings Act to urge that the Consolidation Courts cannot determine the title of evacuee property. In support he has relied upon a decision of this Court in Smt. Masoom Bano v. Hari Singh and others, A. I. R. 1974 Allahabad 462. In Nandha case (supra) it has been held that if the dispute does not relate to the title of the evacuee property and the dispute is only with respect to shares between the co-sharers, the orders passed by the consolidation authority will prevail. But in the present case, the title itself is an issued and it has been vehemently urged that the sale being in violation of Section 10 of the Act, no title could pass. There is nothing on record to prove that any approval was taken by the Custodian General under Section 10 of the Act. Thus, the ratio laid in Nandhas case (supra) would not apply. This Court in the case of Smt. Masoom Bano (supra) has held that questions of title in relation to evacuee property cannot be settled under the provisions of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is apparent that the very title of the petitioner is under challenge and thus, any order of a Consolidation authority would not bind the Authority under the Act. Thus, the ratio laid down in Smt. Masoom Bano case fully applies to the facts of the present case. In any view of the matter, the impugned order is only an order of remand and this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very loathe to interfere in such orders except where it has resulted in patent illegality or is unjust. The counsel for the petitioner has been unable to convince me with some reason to exercise my extra- ordinary jurisdiction in the present case. 8. In view of the foregoing discussions, I am of the opinion, that it is not a fit case for invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to cost. Petition dismissed. .