A. S. Baskaran v. Indian Finance and Factors Limited
2003-08-18
C.NAGAPPAN
body2003
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER :- In Application No. 3150 of 2003, the applicant has sought for revoking the leave granted to the respondent/plaintiff in order dated 11-10-1999 in Application No. 3582 of 1999. Application No. 281 of 2003 was earlier filed by him seeking for a direction to the Registry to return the plaint to the plaintiff to be presented before the Court having jurisdiction to try the suit. 2. The applicant is the first defendant in the suit and the suit has been filed under Order 37, Rule 2 of the Original Side Rules read with Order 34, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking for recovery of a sum of Rs.14,54,443/- together with interest and in default, to sell the properties mortgaged. According to the applicant, a suit pertaining to foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of mortgage or charge upon immovable property under Section 16(c), CPC as well as under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated and in the instant case, the plaintiff has admitted that the property, over which the mortgage is claimed, is situated at Pammal Village in Chengalpet District and not within the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, the suit before this Court for the relief prayed for is not maintainable. It is further stated by the applicant that under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the suit which is filed under Order 37 of Original Side Rules read with Order 34 of CPC could not be maintained and leave granted for the above suit has to be revoked and the plaint has to be returned since the suit is not within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 3. According to the respondent, the applicant availed finance from the respondent/ plaintiff and the wife of the applicant, namely, the second defendant, guaranteed due repayment of the amount and the defendants deposited the title deeds of the property described in the schedule as security for the loan availed by them.
3. According to the respondent, the applicant availed finance from the respondent/ plaintiff and the wife of the applicant, namely, the second defendant, guaranteed due repayment of the amount and the defendants deposited the title deeds of the property described in the schedule as security for the loan availed by them. It is further stated by the respondent that the defendants are residing at Mylapore, within the jurisdiction of this Court and in view of the default committed by the defendants, the suit has been filed for recovery of amounts due under documents and part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of this Court where the amount was borrowed by the first defendant by executing the documents and equitable mortgage was created by deposit of the title deeds as security for the loan availed. The respondent further stated that the mortgaged property is situated outside the jurisdiction and this Court by order dated 11-10-1999 in Application No. 3582 of 1999 granted leave to sue the defendants and hence the suit was filed in the Original Side of this Court invoking the provisions of Letters Patent and Original Side Rules. It is further stated by the respondent that the applicant cannot invoke Section 16, CPC and the suit is mainly for recovery of money and it is not a suit for land as held by this Court in the rulings. 4. The learned counsel for the applicant contends that a suit pertaining to foreclosure, sale or redemption in the case of a mortgage or charge upon immovable property shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the property is situated under Section 16(c), CPC as well as under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent and the plaintiff in the present case has admitted that the property over which the mortgage is created is situated in Chengalpet District, outside the jurisdiction of this Court and hence the suit for the relief prayed is not maintainable. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the suit is for recovery of money and only when there is default, decree may ensure permitting the recourse to the land in satisfaction of the money claim and hence the suit is not one for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 5.
Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contends that the suit is for recovery of money and only when there is default, decree may ensure permitting the recourse to the land in satisfaction of the money claim and hence the suit is not one for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant relies on the decision of Federal Court in Moolji Jaitha and Co. v. K. S. and W. Mills Co., AIR 1950 FC 83, and contends that the expression 'suit for land' covers three clauses of suit, namely, suit for determination of title to the land, suit for possession of land and other suits in which the reliefs claimed if granted would directly affect title to or possession of land and in the present case, the relief claimed by the plaintiff would directly affect the title to the land and hence it is a suit for land. 6. The attention of this Court is drawn in this regard to the latest decision of the Apex Court in Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Daulate, (2001 (4) CTC 39 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3712 ), in which the question as to what is meant by 'suit for land' within clause 12 of Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay was considered and their Lordships referred to and extracted in the judgment, the divergence of opinion among the learned Judges of Five-Judge Bench of Federal Court in M/s. Moolji Jaitha and Co. v. The Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.,- AIR 1950 FC 83 with regard to the import of expression 'suit for land' and held that they are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Mahajan, J. in that case and that view is as follows : "Justice Mahajan observed, "If an attempt is made to find a comprehensive definition of the phrase, it will eventually be discovered that it has created further complications.
I, therefore, content myself by saying that where the nature of the suit is such that in substance it involves a controversy about land or immovable property and the Court is called upon to decide conflicting claims to such property and a decree or order is prayed for which will bring about a change in the title to it, that suit can be said to be in respect of land or immovable property; but where incidentally in a suit, the main purpose of which or the primary object of which is quite different, some relief has to be given about land, the title to it not being in dispute in the real sense of the term, then such a suit cannot fall within the four corners of this expression". He added, "In my opinion, if the suit is for specific performance and a decree for possession of the land sold is claimed, such a suit would certainly be a "suit for land"; but if the suit is simpliciter for specific performance, i.e., for the enforcement of the contract of sale and for execution of a conveyance, in that event there can be no good ground for holding that such a suit is a suit for determination of title to land or that the decree in it would operate on the land." By agreeing with the above view, their Lordships of the Apex Court laid down that where the relief relates to adjudication of title to land or immovable property or delivery of possession of the land or immovable property, it will be a suit for land and the suit simpliciter for specific performance of contract for sale of land is a suit for enforcement of terms of contract and the title to the land as such is not the subject-matter of the suit and hence it is not a suit for land. 7. In fact, the above-referred Five-Judge Bench decision of the Federal Court was earlier considered by a Division Bench of this Court, while considering the expression "suits for land or other, immovable property" occurring in clause 12 of the Letters Patent of this Court with regard to the suits for recovery of money by enforcement of equitable mortgages, in the decision in Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Ltd. v. Durga Iron Works (1995) 2 CTC 602 , and the Division Bench held as follows : "6.
As we could see from the views of the learned Judges of the Federal Court, the relevant tests to be remembered and applied to find out as to whether the suit is one for land are : (1) Whether the suit involves determination of right, title or interest in land; or (2) whether the suit involves recovery of possession or control of land. In a suit to recover money due under a mortgage, when we apply the above tests, it is not possible to say that the suit will come within the mischief of any of the above tests. There may not be a determination of title to the land as such. Equally so, there may not be straightway a decree for recovery of possession of land. Primarily the decree will be one for recovery of money. Only when there is a default, a final decree may ensue permitting recourse to the land in satisfaction of the money claim. Even then, there is so determination of title to the land and there is no decree for recovery of possession." 8. In the present suit, the relief sought for is a money decree for a sum of Rs.14,54,443/- with interest against the defendants and in default, the properties in the schedule be sold. The maintainability of the suit on the Original Side of this Court is being challenged by the applicant/defendant on the ground that it is a suit for land within the meaning of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. This is resisted by the respondent/plaintiff on the ground that the suit is only for recovery of money and only when in default, recourse to the land in satisfaction of the money claim would be made and hence it is not a suit for land. The import of expression 'suit for land' is now well settled by the Apex Court in the decision referred to supra. 9. In the present case, primarily the decree will be one for recovery of money and only when there is default, afinal decree may ensue permitting recourse to the land in satisfaction of the money claim. There is no adjudication of title to the land or immovable property and there is no delivery of possession of the land or immovable property. The title to the land is not the subject- matter of the suit. Hence, the present suit is not one for land.
There is no adjudication of title to the land or immovable property and there is no delivery of possession of the land or immovable property. The title to the land is not the subject- matter of the suit. Hence, the present suit is not one for land. The contention of the applicant is devoid of merit and liable to be rejected. There is no need to revoke the leave granted to the respondent/plaintiff and the applicant is not entitled to the reliefs sought for in both the applications. 10. The applications are dismissed. No costs.