R. B. MISRA, J. In this petition prayer has been made to quash the discharge order contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition with a further prayer seeking direction to the respondents to pay the petitioner disability pension. 2. Heard Mrs. Anita Tripathi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Singh, Additional Standing Counsel for Union of India. 3. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the writ petition are that the Ex. No. 6303774 Sigmn Ram Kishun Yadav, the petitioner, joined the Indian Army on 2-5-1964 and was deputed to the Corps of Signals. He was discharged from service on 9-10- 1968 under item III (iii) of Rule 13 of the Army Rules 1954 after completion of 4 years and 161 days of regular service. The instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner in the year 1992 claiming only disability pension after an inordinate delay of 24 years, for a disability as alleged by the petitioner to have occurred during Betwa Scheme of War Training. 4. The petitioner was discharged w. e. f. 9-10-1968 by a duly constituted Medical Board held at Military Hospital, Babina on 22-7-1968 on account of his being suffering from Spondylo Arthrosis 738 and further the Medical Board having opined that the disease from which the petitioner was found to have been suffering had no relation with Army service, and also the C. C. D. A. (P), The Pension Sanctioning Authority, while rejecting the claim for disability pension, clearly opined that the disability of the petitioner was not attributable to the military service, being the primary condition for claim of disability pension as has been laid down in Para 173 of the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 (Part-1 ). An extract of the same is being filed herewith as Annexure R-1, which reads as below:- "pension REGULATIONS ARMY PART I (1961) 173. Unless otherwise specifically provided, a disability pension may be granted to an individual who is invalided from service on account of a disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service and is assessed at 20 per cent or over. The question whether a disability is attributable to or aggravated by military service shall be determined under the rules in Appendix II. " 5. The question whether a disability is attributable to or aggravated by military service shall be determined under the rules in Appendix II. " 5. The C. C. D. A. (P) had rejected the claim for disability pension of the petitioner on 10-10-1968 (photocopy of the order having been already filed as Annexure-1 to the C. A. ). Further the aforesaid fact of rejection of the disability claim had already been communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 17- 12-1968 of the Signal Records (already filed as Annexure-II to the C. A. ). The Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 (Part-1) clearly mention that under APPENDIX-II (Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards 1982) Regulation 25, against the decision of the Pension Sanctioning Authority an Appeal shall lie to the Defence Ministers Appellate Committee on Pensions as provided under Reg. 25 (a ). 6. The preliminary objections raised by the respondents are; (a) that the petitioner after having been invalided and discharged in the year 1968; chose to deliberately sit silent over the issue and then proceeded to file the instant writ petition after an inordinate delay of 24 years, that too filing the writ petition without any plausible explanation as to the long and inordinate delay. It would also not be out of place to mention here that the claim of disability pension of the petitioner too, had been rejected by the C. C. D. A. (P) on 10-10-1968 (Annexure-1 to the C. A.) and the same had been communicated to the petitioner on 17-12-1968 (Annexure-2 to the C. A.) wherefore the petitioner ought to have preferred an appeal against the said decision but he chose to sit quite over the issue in as much as he had been appointed as Civilian Switchboard Operator in the same Regiment and thereafter he filed the instant writ petition after a long unexplained delay of 24 years. (b) The remedy of Appeal under Regulation 23 is a statutory provision provided under the Pension Regulations for the Army 1961 (Part-1) under APPENDIX-II (The Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards 1981) and the petitioner could not have approached the Honble Court without having exhausted the Statutory remedy of Appeal. (b) The remedy of Appeal under Regulation 23 is a statutory provision provided under the Pension Regulations for the Army 1961 (Part-1) under APPENDIX-II (The Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards 1981) and the petitioner could not have approached the Honble Court without having exhausted the Statutory remedy of Appeal. (c) Since the rejection of his disability pension by the C. C. D. A. (P) in the year 1968, the petitioner since having been re-employed sat quiet over the issue and thereafter to construct a ground of challenge for filing of a writ petition, as a well orchestrated move, a sent a representation to the OIC Signal records Jabalpur on 7-3-1991 and thereafter on receipt of communication from the Record Officer, challenged the same in the year 1992, trying to make it a valid cause of action, whereas the communication was merely a repetition of the earlier communications by which the petitioner had already been informed of the rejection of his claim for disability pension by the Record Office as well as the C. C. D. A. (P) in the year 1968 itself. (d) The Supreme Court has clearly held in AIR 1976 SC 2617 (Para 6) State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantray, and AIR 1976 SC 1689 (Para 14) State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar, that "making of repeated representation after rejection does not exonerate the delay in moving the Court", and the Court refused to interfere even when there was invasion of fundamental right, on the ground of latches acquiescence or delay on part of the petitioner. (e) In AIR 1975 SC 2243 (Para 26) it has been held that "the consideration upon which the High Court refuses to exercise its discretion in case of delay is not limitation but the matter relating to the conduct of parties. (f) In AIR 1979 SC 1713 (Para 11) the Supreme Court has held that "the proper standard however seems to be whether in the circumstances of the case the time that has elapsed can be said to be reasonable" or as whether the delay the delay has been explained properly as held in AIR 1985 SC 482 , Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. S. E. Railway. Further in 1984 (3) SCC 362 (Para 8), Sri Vallabh Class Works v. U. O. I. , the Honble Supreme Court has held that" the reasonableness has to be assessed by the Court having regard to the fact and circumstances of the case, touching the conduct of the parties, the change in situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opp. parties etc. (g) On the above touchstone, it may be mentioned that the conduct of the petitioner is not at all bona fide in as much as he has tried to brow-beat and mislead the Honble Court concealing material fact of the rejection of his claim for disability pension by the C. C. D. A. (P) in the year 1968 itself and has tried to give it a colour as if his claim had been rejected in the year 1991 after his representation dated 7-3-1991 (Annexure-II to the writ petition ). Further, the writ petition does not have an iota of whisper and any explanation for the inordinate delay of 24 years since 1968 when his claim for disability pension was rejected by the C. C. D. A. (P) and thus the petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands. On the contrary, he has tried to mislead the Court under the garb of his representation dated 7-3-1991 (Annexure-II to the writ petition) and reply thereto by the Record Officer (Annexure-III to the writ petition) giving it the colour of immediate cause of action, and also suppressing the fact of his having not filed any appeal, which was a statutory provision and could not have been by passed in view the judgment in MLJ 1997 Alld. 166, Ram Singh v. U. O. I and others. 7. The medical Board has nowhere opined that the disease which the petitioner has suffered i. e. . Spondylo Arthrosis-738 was not due to aforesaid injury during his training. Therefore, rejection of claim of the petitioner for being granted disability pension is not only illegal but also the same is arbitrary and unsustainable under law. 8. At the time of recruitment the no disease was found or detected in the body of the petitioner by the recruitment Board. The petitioner suffered the said disease after he sustained the injuries during training. Therefore, the disease is aggravated by and attributable to the military service. 8. At the time of recruitment the no disease was found or detected in the body of the petitioner by the recruitment Board. The petitioner suffered the said disease after he sustained the injuries during training. Therefore, the disease is aggravated by and attributable to the military service. Even otherwise, the benefit of reasonable doubt shall always be extended in favour of the boarded out employee if a claim for disability pension is made and it is established that at the time of enrolment in service he was having any ailment of the type for which he has been invalided. The medical Board has not specifically mentioned that the disease which the petitioner has suffered was of such a type and latent in nature that it could not be detected by any means at the time of enrolment of such an employee. Therefore, it is to be presumed that the disability has come into existence by reason of the military service. 2001 (1) AWC 363 Mahavir Singh Rawat v. Union of India and others. 9. Unless the disease of the individual is noted at the time of acceptance of him into service it will be deemed to have arisen due to military service. In the present case no disease was noted at the time of acceptance of the petitioner in military service and, therefore, the disease which the petitioner has suffered and due to which he was boarded out is aggravated by and attributable to military service. 1991 (1) E. S. C. 675 (Kar) M. K. Joseph v. Union of India and others. 10. The petitioner after joining service was at first placed in category "a" after he sustained injury during training he was placed under category "eee" and thereafter he was discharged. As at the time of requirement at all stages, he was medically declared fit and as such no other inference can be drawn that he suffered aforesaid disease during the course of his duties when he was in service. Thus, the petitioner is entitled for getting the disability pension. 1996 (2) UPLBEC 761 Anil Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and others. 11. Thus, the petitioner is entitled for getting the disability pension. 1996 (2) UPLBEC 761 Anil Kumar Mishra v. Union of India and others. 11. The Regulation 173 of Pension Regulations for Army 1961 clearly provides that a disability pension may be granted to an individual who is invalided from service on account of a disability which is attributable to or aggravated by military service and is assessed at 20% or over. Therefore, in view of the above provisions the petitioner is legally entitled to be granted the disability pension as he is invalided from service on account of a disability which is attributable to and aggravated by military service Regulation 173 of Pension Regulation. 12. In paragraph No. 8 of the counter-affidavit the respondents have stated that the petitioner has been re-employed w. e. f. 7-1-1969. In this regard it is stated that the petitioner was not re- employed w. e. f. 1969. The contents of paragraph No. 8 of the counter-affidavit are totally false and incorrect. When the petitioner was boarded out from military service he got enrolled his name in employment exchange and his name was sent by the employment exchange. He appeared before the selection committee and qualified the written test and interview then on 7th January, 1969 he was appointed which is a fresh appointment and has no connection with his earlier military service. Therefore, the petitioner is fully entitled to his disability pension. 13. On the point of alternative remedy the petitioners Counsel stated that as the decision of the Chief Controller of Defence Accounts (Pension) Allahabad dated 23-11-1968 was not communicated to the petitioner and the petitioner came to know of the said order only by means of the letter dated 3-5-1991 and, therefore, due to non awareness of law the petitioner could not challenge the same in appeal. The petitioner was advised to file writ petition before this Honble Court. Moreover, the claim of the petitioner for grant of disability pension has been rejected in gross violation of the principles of natural justice against which the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition which had remained pending for last over 11 years before this Honble Court in which counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged. Therefore, the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy or latches. ( 2003 (1) AWC 322 , U. P. State Spg. Therefore, the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy or latches. ( 2003 (1) AWC 322 , U. P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R. S. Pandey and another, and 2003 (1) AWC 378 , Uma Shanker Rai v. Union of India and others. 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Chanan Singh and Sons v. Collector Central Excise and others, (1999) 9 SCC-17 Para-2, has held that instead of challenging the order of the Tribunal by filing the statutory alternative remedy of reference the writ petition was filed and the Apex Court has held as follows: "the High Court simply said that the appellant had a statutory alternative remedy and the appellant had to avail that statutory remedy instead of filing writ petition. Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The appellant instead of challenging the order of the tribunal by availing the statutory alternative remedy has filed this appeal by special leave challenging the order of the High Court. We are of the view that the High Court right in dismissing the writ petition directing the appellant to avail the statutory alternative remedy" 15. In the case of M/s Titagrah Paper Mills v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC Page 603, the Supreme Court has held in para 11 at page 607 as follows: "if the petitioners are dissatisfied with the decision in appeal they can prefer a further appeal to the Tribunal under sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the Act and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24 of the Act. . . . . . . . . Act provides for a complete measure to challenge an order of assessment. . . . . . . . . . . by mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. " 16. The said decision has been followed in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Limited and others, AIR 1985 SC page 330, at page 332 para 3 as follows:- "in Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 ; A. P. Sen, E. S. Venkataramiah and R. B. Misra JJ. " 16. The said decision has been followed in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Limited and others, AIR 1985 SC page 330, at page 332 para 3 as follows:- "in Titagarh Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 ; A. P. Sen, E. S. Venkataramiah and R. B. Misra JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were. . . . . . become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. . . . . . . . . . . We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged. " As mentioned earlier, reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act is maintainable against the order of the income Tax Appellate Tribunal, like a Reference against the order of the CEGAT under Section 35-H of the Act. 17. The Supreme Court has depicted the practice of filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution instead of filing a reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act in the case of the Commissioner Income Tax, Lucknow v. U. P. Forest Corporation, (1998) 3 Supreme Court Cases, page 530 at page 533 para 5, which is reproduced below - " (5) Instead of following the procedure prescribed by the Act by way of a reference under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act, the respondent chose to file three writ petitions in the Allahabad High Court challenging the orders of the Tribunal in respect to the Assessment years 1977-78 and 1980-81 and order of the Assessing Authority for assessment year 1984-85 which had been made by it. These writ petitions were entertained by the High Court which allowed the same by coming to the conclusion that the respondent was a local authority and therefore, its income was exempt from tax. " Taking note of the aforesaid fact in para 5 quoted above, the Supreme Court has observed as follows in para 14 at page 539 and 540:- "before concluding, we would like to observe that the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petitions when adequate alternative remedy was available to the respondent. . . . . . We, however, emphasise that the petitioners should not normally short-circuit the procedure provided by the taxing statute and seek redress by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950" 18. Admittedly the petitioners have filed recently Excise Reference Application No. 13 of 2002 on 16-5- 2002 under Section 35-H of the Act, hence he is pursuing a parallel proceedings in respect of the same subject-matter arising out of the same order of the Tribunal in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Singh v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1977 SC 898 , para 4 in which the Supreme Court has held as follows: ". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the appellant has filed a writ, in which he has agitated the same question which is the subject matter of the writ petition. In our opinion the appellant cannot pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same matter at the same time. 19. In the case of C. L. Jain Woolen Mills (1996) 84 Excise Law Times, page 17, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "while we agree with Mr. A. Subba Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that when the appeal before the Tribunal, preferred by the assessee himself, was pending, the High Court ought not to have interfered in the matter by way of a writ petition, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. " 20. A. Subba Rao, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that when the appeal before the Tribunal, preferred by the assessee himself, was pending, the High Court ought not to have interfered in the matter by way of a writ petition, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter. " 20. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of P. Vasu Babu v. Central Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate tribunal, reported in 2002 Volume 142 Excise Law Times, page 316, has dismissed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution only on the question that the petitioner has remedy of Reference under Sections 35-G and 35-H of the Act. 21. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd. , AIR 1952 SC 192 , held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained Code and itself provides for appelable/revisable forum, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in matters relating to its provision. 22. Similar view has been reiterated in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. , AIR 1985 SC 330 ; R. Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472 ; and Shivgovinda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 . 23. In C. A. Ibraham v. I. T. O. , AIR 1961 and H. B. Gandhi v. M/s Gopinath and Sons, 1992 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 312, the Supreme Court held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. 24. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K. S. Venkataraman and Co. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 , considered the Privy Council, AIR 1947 PC 78, and held that the writ Court can entertain the petition provided the order is alleged to be without jurisdiction or has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, or the provisions of the Act/rules is under challenge. 25. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Anr. 25. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Anr. , AIR 1983 SC 603 , the Supreme Court refused to extend the ratio of its earlier judgment in State of U. P. v. Mohammed Noor, AIR 1958 SC 86 , wherein the Court had held that prerogative writ can be issued to correct the error of the Court or Tribunal below even if an appeal is provided under the statute under certain circumstances, i. e. the order is without jurisdiction, or principles of natural justice have not been followed, and held that in case of assessment under the Taxing Statute, the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Raleigh Investment Col. Ltd. (supra) would be applicable for the reason that "the use of the machinery provided by the Act, not the result of that us, is the test. " 26. While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court placed reliance on large number of judgments, particularly New Water Works Co. v. Hawkes Ford, (1859) 6 CBNS 336; Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. 1919 AC 368, the Attorney General of Trinidad and Taboco v. Gordon Grant and Co. , 1935 Appeal Cases 532; and Secretary of State v. Mask and Co. , AIR 1949 PC 105, wherein it had consistently been emphasised that the remedy provided by the statute must be followed and writ should not generally be entertained unless the statutory remedies are exhausted. 27. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1999 SC 22 ; and in Tim Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1999 SC 74 the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that writ should not generally be entertained if statute provide for remedy of appeal and even if it has been admitted, parties should be relegated to the appellate forum. 28. In Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209, the Honble Supreme Court has held that if the statute itself provides for a remedy of revision, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. 29. In Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and others, AIR 2001 SCW 2993 , the Supreme Court while considering the issue of alternative remedy observed as under:- "the Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. 29. In Punjab National Bank v. O. C. Krishnan and others, AIR 2001 SCW 2993 , the Supreme Court while considering the issue of alternative remedy observed as under:- "the Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast tract procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless when there is an alternative remedy available judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act. " 30. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in K. S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission and Ors. , AIR 1954 SC 207 , held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers on all the High Courts a very wide power in the matter of issuing writs. The said power is limited. However, the remedy of writ is an absolutely discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. Similar view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kota, AIR 1955 SC 425 , holding that the power of issuing writs are purely discretionary and no limit can be placed upon that discretion. However, the power can be exercised alone with recognised line and not arbitrarily and the Court must keep in mind that the power shall not be exercised unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensure and in other cases the parties must be relegated to the Courts of appeal or revision to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense. 31. 31. Again a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Union of India and Ors. v. T. R. Verma, AIR 1957 SC 882 , held that it is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. The Supreme Court held that existence of an another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such remedy is exhausted, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless there are good ground therefore. 32. Yet another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in State of U. P. and Ors. v. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , considered the scope of exercise of writ jurisdiction when remedy of appeal was there and held that writ would like provided there is no other equally effective remedy. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of fundamental principles of justice. Therefore, in a proper case, powers of writ can be exercised, but should not be exercised generally where other adequate legal remedy is available through it may not be, per se, a bar to issue a writ of prerogative. The Supreme Court held that the remedy, being discretionary, cannot be asked as a matter of right, even if the order is a nullity, on the ground that it was passed by disregarding the rules of natural justice. The Court held as under:- ". . . . . . . . save in exceptional cases, the Courts will not interfere under Article 226 until all normal remedies available to a petitioner have been exhausted. The normal remedies in a case of this kind are appeal or revision. The Court held as under:- ". . . . . . . . save in exceptional cases, the Courts will not interfere under Article 226 until all normal remedies available to a petitioner have been exhausted. The normal remedies in a case of this kind are appeal or revision. It is true that on a matter of jurisdiction or on a question that goes to the root of the case, the High Courts can entertain a petition at an early stage but they are not bound to do so and a petition would not be thrown out because the petitioner had done that which the Courts usually ask him to do, namely, to exhaust his normal remedies before invoking an extraordinary jurisdiction. . . . . The petitioner would have been expected to pursue the remedies of appeal or revision and could not have come to the High Court in the ordinary way until he had exhausted them. " 33. In N. T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja and Ors. , AIR 1959 SC 442, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against the orders of the Tribunal is undoubted; but then, it is well settled that where there is another remedy provided, the Court must properly exercise its discretion in declining to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. 34. Another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai etc. etc. , AIR 1964 SC 1006 , held that the remedy provided in a writ jurisdiction is not intended to supersede completely the mods of obtaining relief by an action in a civil Court or to deny defence legitimately open in such actions. The power to give relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary power. Similar view has been reiterated in Municipal Board, Khurai and Anr. v. Kamal Kumar and Anr. , AIR 1965 SC 1321 . 35. In Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das and Ors. , AIR 1984 SC 653 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court must exercise its power under Article 226 with circumspection and while considering the matter of recovery of tax etc. , it should not interfere save under very exceptional circumstances. 36. In S. T. Mathuswami v. K. Natarjan and Ors. , AIR 1984 SC 653 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court must exercise its power under Article 226 with circumspection and while considering the matter of recovery of tax etc. , it should not interfere save under very exceptional circumstances. 36. In S. T. Mathuswami v. K. Natarjan and Ors. , AIR 1988 SC 616 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot be justified to exercise the power in writ jurisdiction if an effective alternative remedy is available to the party. 37. In Kerala State Electricity Board and Anr. v. Kurien E. Kalathil and Ors. , (2000) 6 SCC 293 , while dealing with a similar issue, the Supreme Court held that the writ petition should not be entertained unless the party exhausted the alternative/statutory efficacious remedy. 38. In A. Venkateshwaiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan and Ors. , (2000) 7 SCC 695 , the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of exercising the writ jurisdiction when efficacious alternative remedy is available. The Court observed as under:- "though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of Constitutional powers of the High Court, it is a well recognised principle which gives judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedy, one or other, before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy. " 39. Similar view has been reiterated in UPSRTC and Anr. v. Krishna Kant and Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 75 ; L. L. Sudhakar Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. , (2001) 6 SCC 634 ; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , (2001) 8 SCC 509 ; G. K. N. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer and Ors. , (2003) 1 SCC 72 ; and Pratap Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 481. 40. In the State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. v. Raja Mahendra Pal and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 1786 while dealing with a similar issue the Supreme Court has held asunder:- "it is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature and can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right. . . . . . . , AIR 1999 SC 1786 while dealing with a similar issue the Supreme Court has held asunder:- "it is true that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary in nature and can be invoked for the enforcement of any fundamental right or legal right. . . . . . . The constitutional Court should insist upon the party (to avail of the efficacious alternative remedy) instead of invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Court. This does not however debar the Court from granting the appropriate relief to a citizen in peculiar and special facts notwithstanding the existence of alternative efficacious remedy. The existence of special circumstances are required to be noticed before issuance of the direction by the High Court while invoking the jurisdiction under the said Article. " 41. In Government of A. P. and Ors. v. Sridevi and Ors. , (2002) 5 SCC 37 , the Supreme Court held that where a authority is competent to determine the issue, "the High Court in a writ jurisdiction should have directed the authority only to take an appropriate decision. When the statutory authority is vested with the power to determine the question as to the applicability of the provisions of the Act, it is ordinarily desirable to leave the question to be decided by such authority. The aggrieved party can file appeal against the decision within the framework provided under the statute and the ultimate decision also could be challenged under judicial review, if permitted in law. 42. In the State of Bihar and Ors. v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. , (2002) 1 SCC 216 , the Supreme Court held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ Court but it could be a good ground for not entertaining the petition. 43. 42. In the State of Bihar and Ors. v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. , (2002) 1 SCC 216 , the Supreme Court held that existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the writ Court but it could be a good ground for not entertaining the petition. 43. In Harbans Lal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. , (2003) 2 SCC 107 , the Supreme Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion and the Court must consider the pros and cons of the case and then may interfere if it comes to the conclusion that the writ seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; where there is failure of principle of natural justice or where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the virus of an Act is challenged. While deciding the said case, the Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors. , AIR 1998 SC 22 . 44. This Court in 2002 (1) UPLBEC 705 Honble S. K. Sen, C. J. and Honble R. K. Agarwal, J. , Pradeep Kumar Singh v. U. P. State Sugar Corporation and another, has referred in its judgment, the following cases (1991) 2 UPLBEC 898, Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U. P. Co-operative Union, AIR 1971 SC 33 ; Hridya Narain v. Income Tax Officer, Bareilly, 1995 All. LJ 454, Dr. Bal Krishna Agarwal v. State of U. P. and others, (1990) 1 UPLBEC 699, Ambika Singh v. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. and others, (1998) 8 Supreme Court Cases, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrate of Trade Markets, Mumbai and others, 2000 (1) ESC 504 (All.) Satya Ram Yadav v. Deputy Managing Director, U. P. State Ware Housing Corporation Lucknow, 2001 (2) ESC 619 (All.); State of U. P. and others v. Ali Abbas Abdi, AIR 1987 SC 2186 ; Dr. Smt. Kamta Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U. P.) and others, 2000 (89) FLR 1112; Sunil Kumar Pathak v. Chirman, Indian Oil Corporation, New Delhi and others, 1997 (76) FLR 372; J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. , Kanpur v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1972 SC 1031 ; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. , Kanpur v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1972 SC 1031 ; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. Ludh Budh Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1900 ; Cooperative Engineering Works Limited v. P. P. Munder, 2000 (7) SCC 529 ; Aligarh Muslim University and others v. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 1995 SC 1715 ; Rajasthan State Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, and has arrived at the conclusion as below:- "thus, from the various decisions referred to above the following principles emerge regarding maintainability of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950: (I) While exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,1950, the High Court may decline to grant relief until such statutory remedy is exhausted. However, this rule is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and not a rule of law nor it bars the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in granting relief in appropriate case and exceptional circumstances; (II) Alternative remedy is not a bar where a writ petition has been filed for enforcement of any fundamental rights; or where there is violation of principles of natural justice; or where the order of the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. 45. In my respectful consideration since in Pradeep Kumar Singh (supra) the question of violation of principal of natural justice was being tested in writ petition and therefore, in reference to the maintainability of the writ petition without resorting to alternative remedy available in the Industrial Disputes Act, therefore, this Court has take above view. However the present petitioner Union of India cannot taken protection of the decision of this Court (D. B.) in Pradeep Kumar Singh (supra) more so in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in reference to the alternative remedy. 46. The allegations and the averments as brought out in para 5 of the writ petition are totally misconceived in as much as reliance is being placed regarding the injury on Annexure-3 of the writ petition and a misconceived averment of acceptance on the respondents has been made in as much as no where has the injury been accepted as attributable to military service whereas it merely says. " As per your statement. . . . . . . ". " As per your statement. . . . . . . ". Whereas the averments have been totally denied in para 9 of the counter-affidavit in as much as it has been clearly stated that the petitioner had not given any date on which the alleged accident/injury took place. The fact of such accident/injury is recorded in the service documents of the individual but the same is nowhere recorded in the service document of the petitioner nor any injury report was ever initiated in the prescribed form IAFY -2006 nor the petitioner was hospitalised. Further, in para 13 of the counter-affidavit it has been clearly stated that the petitioners statement against question No. 4 of AFMSF-16 (Invalidating Medical Board Proceeding) was not supported by any hospitalization or injury report, and thus in view of the same the allegations of the petitioner regarding the accident/injury were not believed. As per opinion of the Medical Board the disease was not connected with the service and the onset of the course of the disease bears no relation with Army Service. This is basically conclusion of fact, which is based on relevant factors and material and is not open to challenge in writ jurisdiction. 47. Further, it may be stated that in 1996 Vol. XI SCC 315 U. O. I. and another v. Sh. Baljit Singh, the Honble Supreme Court has held that "in each case, when a disability pension is sought for and a claim is made, it must be affirmatively established, as a fact, as to whether the injury sustained was due to military service or was aggravated which contributed to invalidation from military service". That here in the instant case the accident/injury is not at all affirmatively established in the absence of any injury report or hospitalization, nor the fact of such injury or accident having been recorded in the service document of the petitioner, nor any injury report having ever been initiated in the prescribed form IAFY- 2006 as also there being no specified date of the accident or injury. 48. Following the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court in C. M. W. P. No. 24833 of 1992 was also of the same view and held that in the facts and circumstances the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in U. O. I and another v. Sh. 48. Following the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court in C. M. W. P. No. 24833 of 1992 was also of the same view and held that in the facts and circumstances the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in U. O. I and another v. Sh. Baljit Singh, (supra) was binding and thus dismissed the writ petition. 49. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties, perused the documents and have also analysed the different judgments submitted on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties. 50. In view of the above observations the prayers made in the merit petition cannot be granted as prayed for as the petitioners case was to be adjudicated by way of alternative remedy under the provisions of law, which the petitioner did not availed of. In these circumstances the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Petition dismissed. .