Judgment INDU PRABHA SINGH, J. 1. These two appeals have been heard together and this judgment will govern both of them. Both these appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 23rd August, 2002 passed by Shri Ram Prabhu Pandey, Addl. District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No. 1) Aurangabad in S.T. No, 324/1999/152/2002. Both these appellants were accused in the said sessions trial. Both of them were convicted under Sections 304-B and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years each and rigorous imprisonment fqr one year each under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indain Penal Code respectively. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that the deceased, Rita Devi, full sister of PW 1, Mahendra Prasad Singh and cousin sister of the informant Ajay Kumar (PW 5} was married to the appellant Shree Singh about two years before the alleged occurrence in accordance with Hindu custom and rites. Appellant Shree Singh had got the hidai of the deceased performed a;bout one month before the alleged occurrence. At that time the deceased was pregnant. On 28.6.1999 PW 1 got an information that the deceased was not available at her house (sasural) and on the following day he went there in search of his sister. There she could neither find her nor any member of her in laws family. He found the house locked from outside. He started searching for his sister in course of which he went to different places. In the meantime on 30.6.1999 PW 5 got an information that a dead body of a female was lying in a well in a place known as Kanap Tand. On receipt of this information PW 5 went there and found a dead body kept in a plastic bag which was floating in the water. Two legs of the dead body were protruding from the bag which disclosed that the dead body was of a female. It was taken out from the well and PW 5 identified the dead body as that of his cousin sister, Rita Devi (deceased). This dead body was taken out in presence of the S.I. of Police (PW 13) who was present there. He proceeded to record the Fardbeyan (Ext. 2) of PW 5 at the spot on 30.6.1999 on the basis of which a formal FIR (Ext. 3) was drawn up. This dead body was taken out in presence of the S.I. of Police (PW 13) who was present there. He proceeded to record the Fardbeyan (Ext. 2) of PW 5 at the spot on 30.6.1999 on the basis of which a formal FIR (Ext. 3) was drawn up. The police after completing the investigations submitted charge-sheet. The cognizance of offence was taken and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Session. It was ultimately heard by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge named above who convicted the appellants in the manner indicated above. 3. In Cr. Appeal No. 41 of 2003 the appellant Shree Singh has contended that a false case has been lodged against him. He has not denied the fact that he happens to be the husband of the deceased, Rita Devi. He has taken the plea of false implication and his innocence. He has further contended that in the course of trial 13 PWs were examined out of whom PWs 2, 3, 8 and 10 were declared hostile and PWs 4, 11 and 12 are witnesses of formal nature. PWs 1, 5, 6 and 7 are close relations of the deceased and only hearsaay witnesses and the learned Court below should not have convicted this appellant on the basis of their hearsay evidence. From the perusal of the fardbeyan (Ext 2) it would appear that there was no demand for any dowry. As such no case under Sections 304-B or 201 of the Indian Penal Code was made out. The judgment and order of conviction of this appellant is perverse, illegal and against the weight of the evidence on record. On these grounds amongst others he has prayed that the judgment of conviction of the learned Court below be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of the charges framed against him. 4. Similar grounds have been taken in Cr. Appeal No. 526 of 2002 filed by the appellant, Sajjan Singh, the father-in-law of the deceased in this appeal also the appellant has contended that he has been falsely implicated in this case and is completely innocent. There is also sic statement about PWs 2, 3 , 8 and 10 having been declared as hostile and the impugned judgment has been said to be based on the hearsay evidence of the witnesses who are family members of the deceased. There is also sic statement about PWs 2, 3 , 8 and 10 having been declared as hostile and the impugned judgment has been said to be based on the hearsay evidence of the witnesses who are family members of the deceased. On these grounds it has been contended that the impugned judgment of conviction be set aside and this appellant be acquitted. 5. The parties have been heard at length on the various submissions made by them. On behalf of the appellants it has been contended that except for the family members of the deceased the other witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. No case of cruelty or harassment has been made out in the fardbeyan (Ext. 2). These allegations have been only subsequently added and as such it has been submitted that the appellants fully deserve their acquittal. The APP has challenged these submissions. In view of these submissions made by the parties I will proceed to examine the same in detail. 6. So far as the allegation of hearsay evidence is concerned obviously in a case like this the case has to proceed on the basis of hearsay evidence supported by the materials on record since obviously any such murder is not likely to take place in presence of the brother, father or the close relations of the deceased. In this connection my attention has been drawn to the evidence of PW 9, Ram Bhajan Singh who happens to be uncle of the appellant, Shree Singh. He was examined on behalf of the prosecution to state that the marriage of the deceased have taken place two years prior to the alleged occurrence. No doubt to this case some of the PWs have been declared hostile but their evidence is to be considered in the manner as prescribed by law. I will, however, firstly take up the law on the subject. The appellants have been convicted under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code runs as follows: "304B. Dowry death. I will, however, firstly take up the law on the subject. The appellants have been convicted under Sections 304-B and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code runs as follows: "304B. Dowry death. (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, on in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.For the purpose of this sub-section"dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less then seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for Life." 7. I will next proceed to examine Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to find out the meaning of word "Dowry". "2. Definition of "dowry" In this Act "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person : ©HANG = at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dowery or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies." In Section 304-B the words used are "cruelty or harassment". The two words namely "cruelty or "harassment" have not been explained in this Section. It has been submitted that it is not clear what is meant by those two words. The two words namely "cruelty or "harassment" have not been explained in this Section. It has been submitted that it is not clear what is meant by those two words. However, on the examination of the Indian Penal Code explanation appended to Section 498-A as follows : "Explanation.For the purpose of this Section, "cruelty" means (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, or death (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or in on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 8. Now the question that may arise for consideration in this connection would be whether this definition of "cruelty" or harassment as given in the explanation appended to Section 498-A with the observation that it was only for the purpose of this Section also apply to Section 304-B of the Indiana Penal Code? The answer to this question can easily be found in Section 7 of the Indian Penal Code which runs as follows:- "7. Section of expression once exained Every expression which is expained in any part of this Code is used in every part of this Code is conformity with the explanation." 9. From this Section it would become clear that the explanation appended to Section 498-A and stated that it will apply only to the said Section will also apply as explanation to Section 304-B by virtue of Section 7 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus the expression "cruelty" and harassment as mentioned in Section 304-B will have the same meaning as given in explanation appended to Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. 10. I will next proceed to refer to Section 113(b) of the Evidence Act which read as follows: "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and this shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.For the purpose of this Section "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code." 11. I have examined the law on the subject. I will now proceed to examine the facts of this case in order to find out whether the prosecution has been able to prove the charges against the appellants or not. It has been seriously contended that in the fardbeyan (Ext. 2) there is no allegation of any cruelty or harassment against the deceased. The only observation made in Ext.2 is that this murder had taken place on account of any internal matter. However, in Ext. 2 also it has clearly been alleged that the deceased was done to death by the two appellants as also the mother-in-law and the Debar of the deceased. On behalf of the appellants it has been seriously contended that since no case under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code of any cruelty or harassment has been made out against the appellants the charges against them under Section 304-B must fail. As against this on behalf of the prosecution it has been stated that this fardbeyan (Ext. 2) was lodged by the cousin brother of the deceased and not by his full brother. The circumstances of lodging of Ext. 2 has been stated by P.W. 5 (informant) in his evidence. He has stated that on 28.6.1999 he could learn that his cousin sister Rita Devi (deceased) was not available at her house. On 30.6.1999 he could learn that the dead body of a female was floating in a well in Kanap Tand. When he reached there the S.I. of Police (PW 13) was also present and in their presence the dead body was taken out and identified to be that of the deceased. Ext.2 itself shows that it was recorded at Kanap Mauja at 12.30 hours by S.I. of Police Sheo Shanker Prasad Sah (PW 13) and it was under this circumstance that PW 13 immediately proceeded to record the fardbeyan of PW 5. From the evidence of PW 5 it would appear that PW 1, Mahendra Prasad Singh the full brother of the deceased had come to her Sasural and finding the housse locked he had gone out in her search to different places. From the evidence of PW 5 it would appear that PW 1, Mahendra Prasad Singh the full brother of the deceased had come to her Sasural and finding the housse locked he had gone out in her search to different places. So far as the demand of dowry is concerned it is obvious that PW 5 being cousin brother of the deceased may not be knowing about such demand. It was only the full brother (PW 1) who was aware of the same. It was under this circumstance that on Ext. 2 no allegation of any demand of dowry or cruelty or harassment meted out to the deceased find mention. 12. So far as the evidence of the full brother (PW 1) is concerned he has clearly stated in his evidence that the accused persons used to demand dowry from them. Whenever his sister used to come to her brothers place she used to tell her brother that her husband was demanding dowry and she has been asked to fetch dowry from her brother. He has further stated that the mother of appellant, Shree Singh, was living in Delhi and she wanted to marry her son with a girl of Delhi so that she may get sufficient dowry. He has spoken about the harassment meted out to his sister (deceased). Under this circumstance when deceased had died of an unnatural death within a period of two years or so naturally the presumption under Section 113(B) would arise to the effect that she died of dowry death. 13. In this connection learned counsel for the appellants has drawn my attention to the expression "soon before her death " used in Section 113 (B) of the Evidence Act. According to him there is no material on record to show that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry "soon before her death" hence the presumption under Section 113 (B) will not arise. It was his submission that only in cases when it is shown that crueley or harassment had immediately preceded the death that the presumption under Section 113 (B) will arise and not otherwise. In this connection the important question that will arise would be what would be the meaning expression "soon before her death". 14. It was his submission that only in cases when it is shown that crueley or harassment had immediately preceded the death that the presumption under Section 113 (B) will arise and not otherwise. In this connection the important question that will arise would be what would be the meaning expression "soon before her death". 14. In this connection my attention has been drawn to a Single Bench decision of Orissa High Court in the case of Keshab Chandra Pande V/s. The State, 1995 Cr LJ 174 in which it has been held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would arise only proof of cruelty or harassment soon before the death of the victim. This was a case in which there was a reconciliation between the husband and wife after which they were both living together. Before her death the wife did not complain of any ill-treatment or assault by the husband. It was under this circumstance it was held that there was absence of cruelty or harassment "soon before her death" and the husband could not be convicted under Section 304-B of 498-A of the Indian Penal Code since the cruelty subsequent to their reconciliation was not proved. The facts of the present case are, however, different. Here there is no case that there was any reconciliation between the husband and wife soon before the alleged occurrence. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants has also placed reliance on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chandra Rai and Ors.The State of Bihar, 1998 (1) East Cr C 642 : 1998 (1) PLJR 295. In this case the allegation against the husband was that he killed his wife after setting her on fire. However, the post-mortem report did not show any external anti-mortem injury on the body of the deceased nor any smoke was detucted or found in the trachea nor any sign of throttling was found. It was held that merely because death was caused by burn injuries within seven years of marriage was not enough to attract application of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code because in a case like this the prosecution must prove the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband of any relative soon before the death of the deceased. It was under this circumstance the appeal was allowed. It was under this circumstance the appeal was allowed. In this decision also a reference has been made to the case of Keshab Chandra Panda (supra) and the explanation given of the expression soon before the occurrence as occurring in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. 16. However, the matter has been set at rest by Honble Supreme Court in the case of Kans Raj V/s. State of Punjab and ors., 2000(3) PLJR 68 : 2000 (2) East Cr C 698 (SC). The Honble Supreme Court has taken into consideration Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and expression "soon before" used in it. In this decision it has clearly been laid down that the expression "soon before" is a relative term and it can not be laid down by fixing of time limit "soon before" is not synonymous with the term "immediately before". Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the woman. Thus as per this decision no time framed can be fixed for the expression "soon before" and this decision being of Apex Court of the land has to be followed by all concerned. In this decision a reference has also been made to the case of Sham Lal V/s. State of Haryana. 1997(9) SCC 579 whose facts were different. There also was an attempt made to patch up the differences between the parties for which a panchayati was held and it was decided that the deceased was to go back to the nuptial home pursuant to which she was taken by her husband to his house. Holding that this decision will not apply to the facts of the case of Hans Raj (supra) the expression "soon before" has properly explained in it. 17. In this connection also a reference may be made to the case of Bishundeo Podaar and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar, 2002 (3) Cri East Cases 176 (Patna)). This is a bench decision of this Court in which the dead body was found at a different place from nuptial home of the deceased and that also in a mutilated condition. V/s. The State of Bihar, 2002 (3) Cri East Cases 176 (Patna)). This is a bench decision of this Court in which the dead body was found at a different place from nuptial home of the deceased and that also in a mutilated condition. Even under such circumstances it was held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act will arise in this case. 18. From the detailed discussions made above it becomes clear that unnatural death of the deceased had taken place within seven years of her death. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment and I find that the learned Court below has properly analysed the facts and circumstances of this case and has come to the correct conclusion by convicting the appellants in the manner indicated above. Under the circumstance I see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. I do not find any merit in these two appeals. They are accordingly dismissed and the judgment of conviction of the learned Court below is hereby confirmed.