I. M. QUDDUSI, J. ( 1 ) THESE are three revisions under Section 11 (1) of the U. P. Trade Tax Act (hereinafter, referred to as "the Act" ). The first two revisions, i. e. , Revision No. 2 of 1997 (assessment year 1983-84), and Revision No. 5 of 1997 (assessment year 1988-89) are by M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , and the third Revision No. 147 of 1999 (assessment year 1983-84) is by M/s. Deys Medical stores (Mfg.) Ltd. Both are sister concerns and have their registered and head offices at Calcutta, where they have their factories in which medicines are manufactured and then sold through their various sales offices throughout India. ( 2 ) IN Revision Nos. 2 of 1997 and 5 of 1997 there is one common question of law as to whether keo Karpin brand hair vitaliser and baby oil manufactured by the applicants are medicines or cosmetics. Another common question of law involved in Revision No. 2 of 1997 filed by M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. and Revision No. 147 of 1999 filed by M/s. Deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. , both of which are in respect of assessment years 1983-84 is whether quantity discount claimed by the applicants under Rule 44 of the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act is allowable to them or not. In the two revisions filed by M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , another question raised by them is whether they were liable to pay tax on a turnover of Rs. 27,268 in respect of credit notes for the assessment year 1983-84 and whether the Trade Tax Tribunal was legally competent to re-impose tax on a turnover of Rs. 8,642. 98, which was quashed by the first appellate authority but who did not allow only additional tax thereon, when no second appeal was filed by the department against it in the Tribunal. Similarly, in Revision No. 147 of 1999 filed by M/s. Deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. , the first question of law raised is in respect of quantity discount as in Revision No. 2 of 1997 of M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , and also that they were entitled to reduction of tax on a turnover of Rs. 10,128. 16 in respect of "refused consignments", which was not allowed to them at all levels. 10,128. 16 in respect of "refused consignments", which was not allowed to them at all levels. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the applicant Sri V. N. Tandon, Advocate, vehemently argued these revisions along with other seven revisions of these applicants, and invited my attention to a number of rulings on the points and has also given written submissions. The learned Standing counsel Sri Rajeev Sharma, who appeared for the opposite party, also has given written submissions, which all have been perused and considered by me. ( 4 ) SO far as the rates of tax on hair vitaliser and baby oil are concerned, I have already decided this point in the other revisions filed by these applicants, i. e. , in Revision No. 3 of 1997 and other three revisions of M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , and Revision No. 144 of 1999 and other two revisions filed by M/s. Deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. , and have already decided that they are medicines and are liable to be taxed as such. Thus, there is no question of deciding this point again in these revisions. ( 5 ) SO far as the question of quantity discount is concerned, the learned counsel for the applicants invited my attention to the facts of the case, and it was vehemently argued that in the cases of both the applicants, this point was for the first time raised in the assessment proceedings by the assessing authority, and the applicants gave full details of the discounts so allowed by them to their purchasers. In the case of Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , the assessee in its reply to the show cause notice by the assessing authority, fully explained the manner and the details of the quantity discount allowed by him to the assessing authority which is contained in annexure No. 7 to revision No. 2 of 1997, and a statement showing the total value of the discount of Rs. 94,631. 70 was allowed by the assessee, but the assessing authority paid no heed to the said reply and the statement of details attached thereto, and mentioned in the assessment order (annexure No. 8)that the assessee could not tell on what basis the said discount was given, and fixed a turnover of rs. 10,00,000 as quantity discount which was fixed in the earlier assessment before remand. 10,00,000 as quantity discount which was fixed in the earlier assessment before remand. Similarly, he also argued that in the case of Deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. , in reply to the show cause notice by the same assessing authority, the position was explained in the reply to the show cause notice as in the earlier case which is annexure No. 8 to Revision No. 147 of 1999, and a statement of similar nature was also filed in this case which showed total discount of Rs. 1,75,653 but the assessing authority in the same manner rejected the said figure of the applicant and again fixed the turnover at Rs. 10,00,000. It was further argued that in both the cases the tribunal, however, though did not agree with the turnover determined by the assessing authority, has remanded the case back to the assessing authority for a fresh determination of the claim of the applicants. It has been further argued by the learned counsel appearing for the applicants that similar claims were made by both the applicants and in all the subsequent years on production of the lists on similar lines in which they were filed in respect of the assessment year 1993-94 in the cases of both the applicants, the said claim was allowed even by the assessing authorities, which fact is quite apparent from the assessment orders for the year 1984-85, 1985-86, 1987-88 and 1989-90 of M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , and from the assessment orders for the year 1987-88, 1989-90 and 1990-91 of M/s. Deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. , in Revision Nos. 3, 4 and 6 of 1997 of M/s. Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , and revision Nos. 144, 145 and 146 of 1999 of M/s. Deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. The learned counsel for the applicants also invited attention of this Court to the provisions contained in Rule 44 of the Rules framed under the Act, and to several rulings of various High Courts including the ruling of this Court, and submitted that no tax is payable by the applicants on the alleged such sales, as they were not sales for a valuable consideration, but were given to purchasers in addition to the quantity of goods which were sold to them, free of cost, more especially, when such a plea in the case of the same applicants has already been accepted in all the following years. ( 6 ) NOTHING has been said in this regard by the learned Standing Counsel in the written submissions, but it has been argued that under Rule 44 discount is allowed when it is given in cash and not otherwise. ( 7 ) I have gone through the assessment orders of these applicants filed in other revisions, from which it is quite clear from those orders that on production of lists of such discounts given to the purchasers no tax has been imposed on the applicants on this score. It is not known when such a discount has already been allowed by the assessing authority himself at his level, then what was the point in remanding the case and entailing multiplicity of proceedings. In this regard, the provisions of Rule 44 are important which read as under: "the tax under Section 3 and Sub-section (2) of Section 3-D shall be computed on the net turnover of sales. In determining the net turnover of sales, the amount specified below shall be deducted if they are included in the gross turnover-All amounts allowed as discount, provided that such discount is allowed in accordance with the regular practice of the dealer or is in accordance with the terms of the contract or agreement entered into a particular case and provided also that the accounts show that the purchaser has paid only the sum originally charged, less the discount. " ( 8 ) THE book version of the applicants has already been accepted. It was contented that two bottles were given on the purchase of 10 bottles of a commodity under the directive of the head office to all the purchasers which is also reflected in the invoices. This provision has been interpreted in various rulings. In the case of Shri Baidya Nath Ayurved Bhawan (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P. [1970] 26 STC 171 (All.), it "has been held by the division bench of this Court that "under Clause (ii) of the second explanation to Section 2 (i) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, a deductible discount can be in cash or in kind, provided it is allowed on the sale price. The provision does not require the discount to be paid immediately the price is paid. The provision does not require the discount to be paid immediately the price is paid. The provision also does not concern itself either with the motive which impels a dealer to pay a discount or the manner and method of payment adopted by him. It is thus, immaterial whether a dealer pays something to a customer as an inducement for the prompt payment of the sale price or with a view to push up his own sales or with a view to get the better of his competitors in the trade. The only condition before a payment can be excluded from the turnover is that it should be a payment in cash or kind and that it must be allowed on the price of any sale. " ( 9 ) IN the case of State of Madras v. Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. [1973] 32 STC 649, it is held by the madras High Court, which interpreted similar provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax act, that the benefit of the exemption cannot be denied to a dealer merely because the discount is not given either in cash, or at the time the invoice is prepared. The discount allowable under the act can relate not only to a particular sale but can also be based on the aggregate of the sale price during a particular point of time. In the case of Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. Motor Industries Co. [1983] 53 STC 48, the honourable Supreme Court has held that any concession in price shown in such circumstances by way of an additional incentive with a view to promote ones own trade does qualify for deduction as a discount. Further, in the case of Commissioner, Sales Tax, U. P. v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers co-operative Ltd. [1993] 90 STC 23 (All.), the following observations have been made by honourable Mr. B. P. Jeevan Reddy, the then Chief Justice of this Court : "clause (ii) of explanation II to Section 2 (i) of the. U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 expressly provides that any cash or other discount on the price allowed in respect of any sale shall not be included in the turnover. . . . . . . . . . Discount is given in various shapes and in various manner. U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 expressly provides that any cash or other discount on the price allowed in respect of any sale shall not be included in the turnover. . . . . . . . . . Discount is given in various shapes and in various manner. It is only an incentive given by the seller to the purchaser to boost sales or gain goodwill or for any other such purpose. Discount may be given in any manner, but it ultimately relates to the price of the article sold. " ( 10 ) IN view of the above quoted rulings, specially two of this Court on the U. P. Sales Tax Act, I cannot but hold that the applicants were not liable to be taxed on any turnover whatsoever, and there was no question of remanding the case by the Tribunal on this score to the assessing authority, when especially such discount has already been allowed by the assessing authorities themselves to these assessees in all the subsequent years. ( 11 ) IN Revision Nos. 2 of 1997 and 147 of 1999, the applicants claimed reduction of turnover of rs. 27,268 and Rs. 10,128. 16 respectively, on the ground that they were "refused consignments" in which delivery was not completed, and the goods were returned back to the applicants. Evidence in this regard was filed by the applicants before all the lower authorities including the tribunal, and have also been filed in the revisions. It was contended that Rule 44 (b) of the Rules provides a time-limit of six months in respect of goods returned by the purchaser, but this time-limit would not be applicable in cases where the sale has not been completed and the purchaser has not taken delivery of the goods. There is force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants. Rule 44 (b) is reproduced as under: " (b) subject to the provisions of the Act, all amounts allowed to purchasers in respect of goods returned by them to the dealer within six months from the date of delivery of the goods : provided that the accounts show the dates on which the goods were sold and returned and also the date on which and the amounts for which the refund was made or credit was allowed. " ( 12 ) THE expression "from the date of delivery" in the said Clause (b) are important, and if no delivery took place, there is no question of application of the time-limit of six months in the transaction. The natural interpretation which can only be made of the above provisions, is that the time-limit of six months would run from the date of delivery of the goods to the purchaser, and not before, and in case no delivery of goods took place, then there was no question of starting the time-limit, as the sale could not be completed itself unless the delivery of the goods takes place to the purchaser. The Tribunal, in the case of Deys Medical Stores Ltd. , has remanded the case on this point also to the assessing authority remarking that as the case has been remanded, this point will also be seen by the assessing authority, while in the case of revision No. 147 of 1999 [deys Medical Stores (Mfg.) Ltd. ], the Tribunal has rejected the contention of the applicant on the ground that it was not believable that the goods might have been lying with the transporter for more than six months, though the applicant has filed all the relevant documents showing that delivery of the goods was not taken by the purchaser, although the book version of the applicant had already been accepted even by the assessing authority. On the basis of the facts on record, the finding of the Tribunal is not correct and the applicant is entitled to reduction of these turnovers in each case. ( 13 ) THE last point of law which has been raised by the applicant in revision No. 5 of 1997 is whether the Tribunal was legally competent to hold that the applicant was liable to pay tax on a turnover of Rs. 8,462. 98, when tax on this amount had already been quashed by the first appellate authority and no second appeal was filed by the department against that order. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the first appellate authority by its judgment dated march 31, 1992 in first appeal No. 642 of 1992, contained in annexure No. 21 of the said revision, partly allowed the said appeal and reduced a tax of Rs. 518. 50 on the said turnover of rs. 8,642. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the first appellate authority by its judgment dated march 31, 1992 in first appeal No. 642 of 1992, contained in annexure No. 21 of the said revision, partly allowed the said appeal and reduced a tax of Rs. 518. 50 on the said turnover of rs. 8,642. 98, but inadvertently forgot to give relief of additional tax of Rs. 51. 85, and though this mistake was rectifiable by the first appellate authority under Section 22 of the Act, but the applicant having already filed a second appeal before the Tribunal, did not move application under Section 22 before the first appellate authority in order to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, and thought that in the second appeal he will get this relief, but the Tribunal held that the applicant was liable to pay tax on the said turnover. In this regard, the learned counsel for the applicant argued that though the amount of tax involved is a very paltry amount, but as it is a question of law, hence it has been raised in revision. Specially when the revision has been filed by the applicant on major issue. The learned counsel for the applicant referred to the history of sales tax legislation in U. P. , and argued that originally there were revisions under Section 10 of the Act, and the Judge (Revisions) had been vested with the suo motu powers, which were withdrawn in the year 1956, but later they were resorted in the shape of "on its own motion" which powers were again withdrawn and thus after withdrawal of the said expression, either the judge (Revisions), or the Tribunals constituted under Section 10 of the Act were not vested with the powers to interfere in the impugned orders of their own, unless it is challenged by way of a second appeal, either by an assessee or the Commissioner of Sales/ Trade Tax, and as in the present case no second appeal was filed by the Commissioner of Trade Tax against the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), in which tax on the turnover of Rs. 8,642. 98 was quashed, hence the Tribunal was not legally competent to enter into the question as to whether tax was rightly or wrongly quashed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals ). 8,642. 98 was quashed, hence the Tribunal was not legally competent to enter into the question as to whether tax was rightly or wrongly quashed by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals ). ( 14 ) I have gone through the relevant provisions of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, and there appears much force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants, U. P. Sales Tax Act came into force with effect from April 1, 1948, and under Section 10 it is the revisional authority, i. e. , the Judge (Revisions) who was vested with the powers of deciding revisions under Section 10 of the Act, with suo motu powers to quash or interfere with any orders by the assessing or appellate authorities. Later on, these powers were withdrawn by amending Section 10 with effect from april 1, 1956. Again Section 10 was amended with effect from February 12, 1963, in the following words : "the revising authority or any additional revising authority may, for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order, made by any appellate or assessing authority under this Act, in its discretion, call for and examine, either on its own motion or on the application of the Commissioner of Sales Tax the person aggrieved, the record of such order, and pass such order as it may think fit. " ( 15 ) THEREAFTER, this Section 10 was further amended with effect from October 1, 1971, and the "on its own motion" powers were withdrawn, and with effect from October 3, 1980, the present section 10 conferring the powers of second appeal after the formation of the Trade Tax tribunals, came into existence. My attention has also been invited to the two rulings of this court, in which this point has already been decided. In the case of G. D. Steels and Gases Private limited v. Commissioner of Trade Tax [1999] 115 STC 491 (All.) it has been held that the tribunal has no such powers under the Act. My attention has also been invited to the two rulings of this court, in which this point has already been decided. In the case of G. D. Steels and Gases Private limited v. Commissioner of Trade Tax [1999] 115 STC 491 (All.) it has been held that the tribunal has no such powers under the Act. In another case of Alien Roller Flour Mills v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U. P. [1999] 115 SC 588 (All.) it has been observed that Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act, 1948, does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to order an enhancement on the assessees appeal or on a second appeal by the Commissioner when the matter was not in dispute before the first appellate authority. In view of the above, the enhancement made by the Tribunal in the absence of any second appeal by the Commissioner of trade Tax against the order of the first appellate authority with regard to the quashing of tax on a turnover of Rs. 8,642. 98 is against the provisions of Section 10 of the Act, and the order of tribunal in that regard is liable to be quashed, ( 16 ) ANOTHER submission of the learned counsel for the applicants is that the interest at the rate of 15 per cent may also be allowed on the excess deposits by the applicants, as in revision Nos. 2 and 5 of 1997, stay orders were granted by this Court, and in revision No. 5 of 1997 fifty per cent of the tax due was stayed by this Courts order dated January 6, 1999, which was deposited, in view of the decision of division Bench of this Court in the case of Anuj Bricks v. State of U. P. 2000 UPTC 999, paragraphs 4 and 5 of which are reproduced as under : "4. The grievance of the petitioner is that interest on principal amount must also be paid by the department. We agree with this submission as interest is the normal accretion on capital. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Babu Ram Daya Nand Prakash v. State of U. P. 1997 UPTC 1264 (paras 8 and 9 ). 5. Following the said decision, the petition is allowed. We agree with this submission as interest is the normal accretion on capital. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Babu Ram Daya Nand Prakash v. State of U. P. 1997 UPTC 1264 (paras 8 and 9 ). 5. Following the said decision, the petition is allowed. The department is directed to pay 15 per cent interest per annum from the date of deposit till the date of refund of the principal amount and this interest will be paid within three months of production of certified copy of the order before the authority concerned. " ( 17 ) IN view of this decision of the division Bench of this Court, interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum is liable to be allowed to the applicants. ( 18 ) ACCORDINGLY, all the three revisions are allowed and the questions of law are answered as per observations made in this judgment. The Trade Tax Tribunal concerned is directed to pass orders in each of these three cases under Section 11 (8) of the Act within 2 months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before it. An order was passed by this Court on january 30, 2003 directing the Trade Tax Tribunal not to decide the second appeals pending before it in which identical points were involved. This order is vacated and the Trade Tax tribunal concerned is directed to decide the pending second appeals of the applicants in accordance with the directions contained in this judgment. ( 19 ) THE applicants shall also be allowed interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the excess deposits of tax in each of the years relating to these revisions from the date of excess deposits till the date of their refunds to the applicants by the assessing authority concerned. Within two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order by the applicants. No orders as to the costs. . .