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Andhra High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 1317 (AP)

Chatuban Agarwal v. T. Nagamani

2003-10-27

P.S.NARAYANA

body2003
( 1 ) THESE Civil Revision Petitions are taken up for final disposal at the time of hearing of the vacate stay applications, with the consent of both the counsel. ( 2 ) IN C. R. P. No. 5372 of 2000 on 11-12-2000, this Court made the following order:-"notice before admission returnable in two weeks. Interim stay of eviction for a period of twelve weeks on condition of the petitioner depositing rs. 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand only) within six weeks from today. The learned counsel for the petitioner is also permitted to take out personal notice to be served on the respondent by RPAD and file proof of service into court. Call after two weeks". ( 3 ) SUBSEQUENT thereto, on 6-11-2001 the c. R. P. was admitted and in C. M. P. No. 23850 of 2000, interim stay was granted. ( 4 ) IN C. R. P. No. 5403 of 2000 on 15-11-2000, notice before admission was ordered and interim stay for a period of six weeks had been granted. Subsequent thereto, on 6-11-2001 C. R. P. was admitted and in c. M. P. No. 23945 of 2000. interim stay was granted. It is brought to my notice that the order directing the deposit was not complied with. At that stage, both the matters are taken up for final disposal. ( 5 ) THE petitioner-unsuccessful tenant- aggrieved by the orders made in R. A. No. 303/96 and R. A. No. 304/96 on the file of additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes court, Hyderabad had preferred C. R. P. Nos. 5372/2000 and 5403/2000 respectively. The said appeals were preferred by the unsuccessful tenant on the file of the appellate authority aforesaid aggrieved by the orders made in R. C. No. 215/92 and R. C. No. 138/94 on the file of the Rent Controller, City Civil court, Secunderabad. The appellate authority in R. A. 303/96 had party allowed the appeal setting aside the order of eviction only on the ground of bonafide requirement, but however, it was held that the petitioner- tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of sub-letting. As far as R. A. 304/96 is concerned, the appeal was dismissed confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller on both the grounds. ( 6 ) SRI Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel representing Sri Ghanta Rama Rao appeared on behalf of the revision petitioner-tenant, and, made the following submissions. As far as R. A. 304/96 is concerned, the appeal was dismissed confirming the order of the learned Rent Controller on both the grounds. ( 6 ) SRI Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel representing Sri Ghanta Rama Rao appeared on behalf of the revision petitioner-tenant, and, made the following submissions. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel had maintained that in the light of facts and circumstances, it is clear that there was no denial of title at all and at any rate it should be taken that it is a bonafide denial since the stand taken by the petitioner-tenant is that the landlord is the husband and not the wife. The learned counsel also submitted that confirming the ground of sub-letting cannot be sustained since in the pleading it is not specified to whom it was sublet and the other particulars relating to sub-letting had not been specified in the pleading and hence, the evidence let in, in this regard is of no consequence. The learned counsel also pointed out that even as far as the ground of willful default is concerned, in fact the petitioner-tenant had been depositing the rents in the name of the husband and the wife, the present respondent is taking advantage of the situation to get him evicted. ( 8 ) PER contra Sri Krishna Prabhu, learned counsel representing the respondent- landlady submitted that it is no doubt true that specifically the name of the person to whom it was sublet had not been mentioned, but the documentary evidence, Ex. P-1, ex. P-6 and Ex. P-7, clearly establishes the same. The learned counsel also submitted that all the evidentiary details regarding sub-letting need not be mentioned and it is suffice if the ingredients are proved by letting in necessary evidence. The learned counsel had taken this Court through the relevant findings recorded in this regard. The learned counsel further elaborating the submissions, had contended that the very denial of title of the landlady by the petitioner-tenant, is not bona fide and though he was conscious that this landlady alone is the owner of the property in question, title was denied with an ulterior motive. The learned counsel further elaborating the submissions, had contended that the very denial of title of the landlady by the petitioner-tenant, is not bona fide and though he was conscious that this landlady alone is the owner of the property in question, title was denied with an ulterior motive. The learned counsel also submitted that, as far as other grounds are concerned, concurrent findings had been recorded by both the Courts which need not be disturbed by this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1960 (hereinafter, for short, referred to as "the Act" for the purpose of convenience ). ( 9 ) HEARD both the counsel. ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that the order directing deposit of amount had not been complied with by the petitioner-tenant. As against the common judgment made in (4) appeals by the Appellate Authority- additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes court, Hyderabad as against the orders made in R. A. Nos. 305/96 and 306/96, wherein the relief was negatived to the land lady, the same had not been questioned and they had attained finality. Inasmuch as the petitioner- tenant was unsuccessful in other (2) R. A. Nos. 303/96, and 304/96, these Revision petitions were preferred. It is also made clear that as far as setting aside the or der of eviction on the ground of bona fide personal requirement while partly allowing R. A. No. 303/96 is concerned, the point was not seriously canvassed by the learned counsel representing the respondent-landlady. Hence, this Court is left with other aspects. ( 11 ) IT is no doubt true as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlady that the revisional Court under Section 22 of the Act is expected to be slow in disturbing the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below. Reliance was placed in the case of G. Peddi Reddy v. P. Govinda Rao. The stand taken by the landlady in r. C. No. 215/92-R. A. No. 303/96 is that without her permission, the tenant had sublet the premises to third person and the sub-tenant is carrying on the business, and the tenant is not carrying on any business, and has sought eviction on the ground of sub-letting, inasmuch as the tenant is not entitled to sub-let the premises without prior written consent of the landlady. ( 12 ) NO doubt the other ground was bona fide personal requirement, which was negatived in the appeal. The stand taken by the revision petitioner-tenant is that the land lady is not the owner of the property and the husband of the landlady is the owner of the said property and that he had entered into an agreement of sale for the purpose of selling the entire petition schedule property inclusive of the suit mulgi. It is also stated that the revision petitioner and his daughter filed a suit O. S. No. 320/92 on the file of the iii Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, secunderabad for specific performance of the agreement of sale and the same is pending. No doubt, the other allegations had also been denied. Likewise, the landlady filed r. C. No. 138/94 against the revision petitioner-tenant on the ground that he had committed willful default in paying the rents from 1-3-1993 to 31-5-1994 and is liable for eviction. The ground of denial of title by the revision petitioner-tenant and jural relationship between the landlady and tenant are also raised as grounds to evict the revision petitioner-tenant. Virtually, the same stand has been repeated by the petitioner-tenant. ( 13 ) IN both the R. C. Cs the learned Rent controller ordered eviction on all the grounds and in R. A. 303/96, no doubt it was held that the ground of bona fide personal requirement is not available to the landlady for eviction. The appellate authority atpara 19 had framed the following points for consideration: (1) Whether the tenant sublet the suit schedule premises without permission of the landlady and if so, liable for eviction? (2) Whether the landlady requires the suit premises for her personal requirement? (3) Whether the tenant denied the title of the petitioner bonafidely or mala fidely? (4) Whether the tenant committed willful default in payment of rent from 1-3-1993 to 31-5-1994, november and December, 1992 and january and February, 1993 as claimed by the landlady? ( 14 ) THE appellate authority in fact had taken pains to record the reasons in detail, commencing from paras 20 to 37 and had ultimately arrived at a conclusion that the relief cannot be granted in R. C. No. 1 /93 and r. G. No. 33/93 as against which R. A. Nos. ( 14 ) THE appellate authority in fact had taken pains to record the reasons in detail, commencing from paras 20 to 37 and had ultimately arrived at a conclusion that the relief cannot be granted in R. C. No. 1 /93 and r. G. No. 33/93 as against which R. A. Nos. 305/96 and 306/96 were filed, but however, sustained the orders in other R. C. Cs except a slight modification in R. A. 303/96. ( 15 ) THE evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 and also the documentary evidence Ex. P-1 to P-9 and Ex. R-1 and R-10 had been discussed in detail. ( 16 ) IN P. Rajanna v. Smt. K. Lalitha Reddy, this Court while dealing with the aspect of sub lease or sub-letting held that: "the expression sub-lease like lease goes without any definition in the Act. There is no specific bar in any of the provisions of the Act to operate the relevant provisions of the Transfer of property Act, which are not repugnant or inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or the object and purpose of the act. Particularly when Chapter-V of the Transfer of Property Act deals with leases, it is proper and expedient to borrow the principles therefrom for the proceedings under the Act unless such provisions are repugnant to the object and purpose of the Act and when there is no adequate provision made in the act to meet the requirement arising within such similar expressions to achieve the real purpose and the objectives of the Act. Added to this, there is neither specific bar nor a bar to be drawn with necessary implications from any of the provisions of the Act that the provisions of the Transfer of property Act relating to leases cannot be made applicable to the proceeding under the Act. The High Court is thus of the considered view that there may not be any allergy in law under the Act to take support from the expressions in chapter-V of the Transfer of Property act subject to the limitations stated. Although sub-letting or sub-lease is the subject matter of the ground of eviction, legally it amounts to transfer of the right under the lease by the tenant even according to the opening expressions made in Section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act. Although sub-letting or sub-lease is the subject matter of the ground of eviction, legally it amounts to transfer of the right under the lease by the tenant even according to the opening expressions made in Section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act. Technically speaking sub-lease would bean assignment of the right of tenancy by the tenant or lessee in favour of a person other than the landlord. The expression sub-lease is thus not defined in the Transfer of Property Act. Because sub-lease is an assignment of a lesser term and accordingly there is no privity of contract between the lesser and the sub-lessee. But for a restraint under the rent Control Act on the act of assignment or transfer of lease of on the lessee without written consent of the landlord, a lease can be transferred in law. A lease may be granted by a person who is himself a lessee and such a lease is commonly called as under-lease, sub-lease or derivative-lease but it is still a lease within the Section. A sub-lease in law is held to be a lease within the meaning of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The sub-lease or transfer of lease for the purposeof Section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act should be a lease within the meaning of section 105 of the Transfer of Property act. In other words, a landlord alleging sub-lease as a ground for eviction should prove all the ingredients of the lease under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Rent Controller is bound to examine all such ingredients therein to be satisfied that the ground of sub-letting or transfer of lease without the consent of the landlord has been made out by the landlord in such a petition to draw an exception to the mandatory Rule that a tenant shall not be evicted within the meaning of section 10 (1) of the Act. Neither assumptions nor imaginationswihtout evidence in the case to bring out all such ingredients would be sufficient to pass an order of eviction on such a ground. Patently such ingredients of section 105 of the Transfer of Property act are never examined by the Courts below in the light of the evidence produced by the petitioners". Neither assumptions nor imaginationswihtout evidence in the case to bring out all such ingredients would be sufficient to pass an order of eviction on such a ground. Patently such ingredients of section 105 of the Transfer of Property act are never examined by the Courts below in the light of the evidence produced by the petitioners". ( 17 ) AS can be seen from the material available an record, it is no doubt true that the particulars in detail had not been specified, but clear evidence had been let in with regard to sub-letting and documentary evidence in support thereof had also been produced and clear findings had been recorded at para 21. It was stated by the appellate authority at para 21, which reads as follows: "to substantiate her claim, she placed reliance on the documents covered under Ex. P-1 and also photograph with negative under Exs. P-6 and P-7. It is necessary to look into Ex. P-1 certified copy of the Trade Licence which stands in the name of S. Satyanarayana s/o. Moolchand. This certificate is issued by Cantonment Board. Secunderabad issued under section 210 (1) of the Cantonment Act to run the business. It is a fact that the kirana and General Stores business is being run in the name of third party of name S. Satyanarayana. According to the landlady the third party has been doing business and placed reliance under Exs. P-6 and P-7 which conclusively establishes that the third party doing business in the demised premises. Thus, the oral evidence of p. W. I clubbed with the documentary evidence covered under Exs. P-1, P-6 and P-7 conclusively establishes that the tenant sublet the premises to third party and the entire premises was parted to third party who is doing business in the demised premises. ( 18 ) IN the light of these findings it cannot be said that the Courts below had erred in arriving at a conclusion that the landlady had established the ground of sub- letting. ( 19 ) HENCE, I am not inclined to accept with the contention raised by the petitioner- tenant in this regard. Apart from this aspect of the matter, there is specific denial with regard to title of the landlady. At para 31, the appellate authority in detail had discussed this aspect. ( 19 ) HENCE, I am not inclined to accept with the contention raised by the petitioner- tenant in this regard. Apart from this aspect of the matter, there is specific denial with regard to title of the landlady. At para 31, the appellate authority in detail had discussed this aspect. From the respective pleadings of the parties, it is clear that specific stand had been taken by the petitioner-tenant denying the title of the landlady, but now an explanation is put forth that the denial is bona fide since the stand taken is that the property belongs to the husband and not the wife. I am not inclined to accept the same. ( 20 ) IN M. Subbarao v. P. V. K. Krishna Rao, when a plea was taken in the proceeding for eviction relating to the denial of title of the landlord or landlady, tenant can be evicted on that ground and separate proceeding is not necessary. In Hyderabad Polymers (P) Ltd. v. B. Rajani, this Court had also expressed a similar view. ( 21 ) I had given my anxious consideration to all the findings recorded by both the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority and the findings in fact had been recorded by the appellate authority in detail on appreciation of both the oral and documentary evidence available on record. ( 22 ) IN view of the reasons recorded in detail on the ground of willful default, I do not see any reason to disturb the said findings. ( 23 ) HENCE, I do not see any illegality or legal infirmity warranting interference under section 22 of the Act. The C. R. Ps. are devoid of merits and the same are liable to be dismissed. ( 24 ) ACCORDINGLY, the C. R. Ps. shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs. The tenant is granted a month s time to vacate the premises.