ORDER : 1. The 1st respondent, Medical Superintendent, issued tender notice, dated 21-10-2003. Inviting tenders to various works to be carried on in the Government Area Hospital, Godavarikhani. One of the items was sanitation works. The petitioner, 4th respondent and several others submitted their tenders. On a consideration of the tenders, the 2nd respondent, who is the competent authority to accept the tenders, issued proceedings, dated 27-02-2003, accepting the tender of the petitioner for Rs. 15,000/- with 15 man power and utilisation of materials worth of Rs. 5,000/-. The petitioner was required to comply with certain formalities. The contract was for a period of one month from 01-03-2003 to 31-03-2003. 2. Even before the petitioner complied with the required formalities, the 2nd respondent issued proceedings, dated 04-03-2003 cancelling the order of acceptance, dated 27-02-2003. Through the same proceedings, he had awarded contract in favour of toe 4th respondent at the rate of Rs. 20,900/-. The petitioner challenges these proceedings in the present writ petition. 3. Several grounds are urged by the petitioner including the one of non-observance of principles of natural justice. 4. On behalf of the respondents 1 to 3, a counter-affidavit is filed. It is stated therein that though the contract was awarded to the petitioner it was found on subsequent verification that it was not entitled to be awarded the same. It is contended that the rate quoted by the petitioner was so low that it was impracticable for anyone to execute the contract by paying the minimum wages prescribed by the Government. Another contention was raised to the effect that the petitioner did not make deposit of EMD of Rs. 10,000/-. 5. On behalf of the 4th respondent, a counter-affidavit is filed alleging, inter-alia, that it has been awarded the contract for the said work, before the tender notice was issued. It is also stated that the Advisory Committee constituted in G.O.Ms. No. 389 dated 11-10-2001, considered the tenders of various tenders and ultimately on being satisfied about the performance and feasibility had decided to cancel the award of the contract to petitioner and to award the same to the 4th respondent. 6. After filing of the writ petition, the 2nd respondent issued proceedings, dated 18-10-2003, awarding contract to the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 15,000/- per month for a period of five months i.e., from 01-11-2003 to 31-03-2003. 6. After filing of the writ petition, the 2nd respondent issued proceedings, dated 18-10-2003, awarding contract to the petitioner for a sum of Rs. 15,000/- per month for a period of five months i.e., from 01-11-2003 to 31-03-2003. Strictly speaking, with this order, the grievance of the petitioner stands redressed. However, since the learned Counsel for the 4th respondent had advanced argument on various aspects, the same are dealt with. 7. Sri. Aga Reddy, learned counsel for the 4th respondent, submits that cancellation of the tender of the petitioner was on account of non-compliance with several conditions and in view of the opinion formed by the Advisory Committee. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Aligarh Muslim University vs. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 , learned Counsel submits that violation of principles of natural justice by itself does not entail quashing of an order. He further submits that if the quashing of an order, passed in breach of principles of natural justice, is likely to result in revival of another order, which is otherwise illegal, discretion under Article 226 need not be exercised. 8. It is not in dispute that with the acceptance of the tender of the petitioner, a valid right had accrued to it. Such a right can be taken away, only by following the procedure prescribed by law. If the petitioner had committed any irregularity or did not comply with any vital conditions, it was always open to the respondents to have called upon the petitioner to explain as to why the order of acceptance shall not be cancelled. The respondents could not have assumed certain facts to themselves and to proceed on the footing that the petitioner had committed irregularity or did not fulfill the conditions. The very foundation of the age old doctrine of principles of natural justice is that before an authority forms an opinion adverse, to the interests of an individual, such authority has to hear the version of the affected person. The ultimate decision may rest with the authority. However, any amount of care exhibited, while forming an opinion, without putting the effected person on notice would be of no use. The care exhibited by the authority is neither an equivalent to nor a substitute for the version that may be put forwarded by the affected person. 9. The ultimate decision may rest with the authority. However, any amount of care exhibited, while forming an opinion, without putting the effected person on notice would be of no use. The care exhibited by the authority is neither an equivalent to nor a substitute for the version that may be put forwarded by the affected person. 9. Ratio laid down by the Supreme Court is in the context of resurrection of an otherwise illegal order, on account of setting aside of an order impugned in a writ petition on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice. To invoke such principles, the illegality of the order which is likely to emerge should be evident from the record without the necessity of recording any findings by an authority, or the Court. The state of affairs that are brought about on account of quashing the orders challenged in such proceedings should be such that an illegality or a situation contrary to the specific provisions of the relevant law comes to be brought about and that the same is discernable, without any further verification. Such a situation does not exist here. Further, the said principle could have been invoked, had it been a case where the impugned order disclosed such reasons as were incapable of any plausible explanation. When the impugned order does not contain any reasons, the question of assuming or imagining such putative circumstances does not arise. 10. Viewed from any angle, the impugned order cannot be sustained. But for the fact, it is impliedly overruled or set aside on account of the subsequent order, dated 18-10-2003, this Court would have set aside the same. 11. At any rate, the 4th respondent cannot be said to have suffered any prejudice in view of the fact that the contract awarded to it through the impugned order was from 01-01-2003 to 31-03-2003, the period that had expired long back. Through the proceedings, dated 18-10-2003, if at all anything respondents 1 and 2 have undone the damage and injustice done to the petitioner by issuing the proceedings, dated 18-10-2003. 12. Hence, the Writ Petition is allowed and the respondents 1 and 2 are directed to take further steps-in accordance with the proceedings, dated 18-10-2003.