KUMAR RAJARATNAM, C. J. ( 1 ) THE factual matrix, the centripodal polemic, the arguments urged, the justification provided, picture frescoes and the lis spiralled being common in all these appeals they were heard analogously and are disposed of by this common order. To appreciate the vital and constitutive issues that arise in these cases it is apt and appropriate to refer to the facts in LPA no. 89/1998 so that the expose of facts would become clear. ( 2 ) THE appellants who were the petitioners in the Writ Petition No. 3236/1997 (hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioners') invoked the inherent and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India putting forth a case that they have been employed as electricians since 1987 as workmen under National Thermal Power corporation (in short 'the Corporation') for maintenance of Korba Super Thermal Power project colonies. The Corporation and its functionaries have not directly employed the petitioners but they have employed them through the contractor, the respondent No. 4 in the writ petition. Prior to the aforesaid engagement they were employed through other contractors. It was urged in the writ petition that their work was supervised by the competent officers of the Corporation. The material for their job was supplied by the said respondent. They worked for the colonies owned and controlled by the respondent No. 1 Corporation and series of contracts have been entered into by the respondent No. 1 with the contractor. The said documents have been brought on record as Annexures P-12 to P-14. The petitioners have also brought on record the copy of the attendance register and certificate issued by the various contractors regarding their engagement. ( 3 ) IT is contended that the Corporation (NTPC) wanted to avoid absorption of contract labour despite their perennial nature of work. To avoid the mandate of the Apex Court they engaged them on the job work basis and the whole endeavour, as pleaded, was to defeat the absorption of the contract labourers. Certain documents have been brought on record to build an edifice that a maladroit attempt has been made by the Corporation to violate the various judgments of the Supreme Court delivered from time to time. Certain documents have been brought on record to build an edifice that a maladroit attempt has been made by the Corporation to violate the various judgments of the Supreme Court delivered from time to time. It was claimed before the learned single Judge that that M. P. Industrial Relations act, 1960 (for brevity 'the 1960 Act') governs the conditions of the employment between the corporation and them. It was further putforth that they are entitled to the same wages as the workmen of the respondent No. 1 and also there can be abolition of the contract labour and absorption of the petitioners as employees under the Corporation on regular basis. It was contended before the learned single Judge that the respondent No. 1 was the real employer as per the 1960 Act and in the alternative they should be treated as employees of the Corporation as per the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'clra Act' ). ( 4 ) TWO returns were filed. It is relevant to state here that one return was filed stating the detailed facts and one controverting the facts precisely. The stance in the return that the respondent No. 1 is a registered establishment under Section 7 of the CLRA Act and it is empowered to engage contract labour from the licensed contractors under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. It was also putforth that the respondent No. 4 was awarded the contract after inviting the tenders and employed the petitioners and there is no relationship of master and servant between the petitioners and the respondent No. 1. It was also canvassed that the petitioners had initiated the conciliation proceedings under the 1996 Act and once they have taken recourse to alternative remedy available to them under the Industrial Law, they cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. ( 5 ) A return was filed by the respondent no. 4 supporting the stand of the respondents 1 to 3. It was putforth in the said return that respondent No. 4 is a partnership firm making job on contract basis in the Thermal Power: corporation and he has full control over the employees as the salaries of the petitioners is being paid by the partnership firm. 4 supporting the stand of the respondents 1 to 3. It was putforth in the said return that respondent No. 4 is a partnership firm making job on contract basis in the Thermal Power: corporation and he has full control over the employees as the salaries of the petitioners is being paid by the partnership firm. It was the former stand of the said respondent that it had secured a licence under Section 12 of the 1970 act and entitled to engage 75 workmen as per the said licence. It was further averred by him that the petitioners are not the permanent employees and their services last during the continuance of the contract and it has come to an end after the term of the contract expired. ( 6 ) BEFORE the learned single Judge it was urged by the petitioners that the provisions of the 1960 Act are applicable to the respondent no. 1 inasmuch as in item No. 10 of the notification dated December 31, 1960 there is mention that the said Act is applicable to electricity generation and distribution in which the Corporation is engaged and covered by all corners of the statute. It was also canvassed before the learned single Judge that the employees were the employees of the principal employer and not that of contractor; and that there is relationship of employee and employer as established under the 1960 Act. ( 7 ) ON behalf of the respondents, per contra, it was contended that the 1960 Act would not govern the field inasmuch as the respondent No. 1 is registered under Section 7 of the 1970 Act and respondent No. 4 holds the necessary licence under the said enactment and further the law made by the Parliament overrides the law made by the local authorities as the CLRA Act was made subsequent to the act of 1960. The respondents placed reliance on the Entry Nos. 22, 23 and 24 of the concurrent list of Schedule VII of the constitution to buttress their contentions that once legislation is passed by the Parliament in respect of any field covered under the concurrent list the same would have prevalence over the State law. The respondents placed reliance on the Entry Nos. 22, 23 and 24 of the concurrent list of Schedule VII of the constitution to buttress their contentions that once legislation is passed by the Parliament in respect of any field covered under the concurrent list the same would have prevalence over the State law. It is relevant to state here that it had also been proposed before the learned single Judge that the definition of the employee and employer under the 1960 Act cannot be applied to the fact of the case at hand inasmuch as by the CLRA Act there was implied repeal of the definition that finds mention in the State law qua contract labour. ( 8 ) THE learned single Judge came to the conclusion that there is hardly any doubt that relationship of employee and the employer is established; that if the CLRA Act is applied the petitioners cannot rely on the provisions of 1960 act for enforcing their claim; that they being contract labour are not the employees of the respondent No. 1 within the meaning o Section 2 (13) (a) read with sub-clause (e) of Section 2 (14) of the Act, 1960 after coming into force of the CLRA Act. It is pertinent to state here that an alternative submission was proposed (sic) by the petitioners that command should be issued to the respondents to absorb the petitioners as its workmen as they are contract lourers. The learned single Judge treated the same to be a vexed question as there was no notification issued by the appropriate government abolishing the contract labour under Section 1 of the CLRA Act and eventually declined to grant the said relief. The learned judge further held that the law laid down in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union and others, AIR 1997 SC 645 : 1997 (9) SCC 377 : 1997-I-LLJ-1113 did not apply to the case of the petitioners. Ultimately the learned single Judge accepted the contentions of the employer that the State law would not be applicable and further the petitioners are not entitled to the absorption under CLRA Act and dismissed the writ petition. ( 9 ) MR. Ultimately the learned single Judge accepted the contentions of the employer that the State law would not be applicable and further the petitioners are not entitled to the absorption under CLRA Act and dismissed the writ petition. ( 9 ) MR. S. K. Gangele, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has raised the following submissions: (A) The entire approach of the learned single judge in holding that the 1960 Act would not be applicable because of the CLRA Act is sensitively susceptible inasmuch as no notification has been issued under Section 10 of the aforesaid Act and in the absence of any notification the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge is bound to founder. (B) The opinion of the learned single Judge that the special law overrides the general law and further the later central law has an overriding effect over the State law as both stem from the same source of power, the concurrent list cannot withstand scrutiny as the enactments are not attracted to the factual exposition in the case at hand and for applicability of the Central Act the issue of a notification by the appropriate government is the sine qua non; (C) The learned single Judge has fallen into error by not extending the benefit of the m. P. I. R. Act, 1960 in respect of the wages claimed by the appellants in as such a claim is permissible to be adjudicated under the said Act as the petitioners were claiming parity and also putting forth a claim for minimum wages that has been fixed by the state Government. (D) The CLRA Act in the absence of notification does not override the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and once the said Act is made applicable the Industrial law in the State would get attracted by virtue of special provisions in the 1960 Act which categorically lays down which class of the dispute would be covered under the industrial Disputes Act and which would be covered under the State law. ( 10 ) MR. N. S. Kale and Mr. ( 10 ) MR. N. S. Kale and Mr. R. K. Gupta, learned senior counsel, sounding a contra note, contended as follows: (I) The order passed by the learned single judge is infallible as the learned single Judge has scanned the anatomy of the provisions of CLRA Act which specially deal with the contract labour and once the provision envisaged therein covers the field no other legislation can entrench therein. (ii) the petitioners cannot claim to be employees of the principal employer and the question of absorption does not arise as the law laid down in the case of Air India statutory Corporation (supra) has been overruled by the Constitution Bench judgment rendered in the case of Steel authority of India Ltd. v. National Union waterfront Workers, 2001 (7) SCC 1 : 2001-II-LLJ-1087. (iii) The petitioners being labourers engaged by the contractor have nothing to do with the respondent Corporation and their tall claim to be regularised or to get the benefit under the State law i. e. 1960 Act is impermissible. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel that the CLRA Act is both regulatory and prohibitory and as far as regulatory part is concerned it is in the realm of adjective law and no substantive right flows in favour of the workmen and in any case if any adjudication has to be done it is to be done within the parameters of the clra Act. ( 11 ) IN essence the contention canvassed is that the prohibitory provisions of the State laws are not attracted and any claim between them under the said statute deserves to be negatived as the Central Legislation applies in proprio vigore. ( 12 ) WE may at this juncture unequivocally state that though the learned counsel for the appellants urged with vehemence that the controversy should be put to rest by this Court but eventually he abandoned the said submission and restricted his arguments to the factum that the finding recorded by the learned single Judge that 1960 Act would not be applicable is incorrect and this Court in intra court appeal should rectify the error and leave appellants to agitate their claims before the industrial forum in accordance with law. It is very fairly submitted by him that under the State law they can be treated to be the employees of the principal employer or the contractor, as the case may be, for granting them rights or privileges in respect of any matter which are more favourable to them than those to which they would be entitled under this Act. " on a reading of the aforesaid Section it is clear as day that though there is a overriding effect yet the beneficial provision of the statute is not extinguished. Quite apart from the above in the aforesaid statute there is no provision for any kind of adjudication in respect of contract labour. We may hasten to add once the notification is issued under Section 10 of the act the matter would be different and the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Steel authority of India Ltd. (supra) would be applicable in full force. In the absence of the notification we have no hesitation in holding that other general relevant law would be applicable. To elaborate the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act would be applicable. The CLRA Act does not destroy the jurisdiction of the Industrial court. The submission of Mr. Gangele is that under the State law certain types of cases have been taken away from the ambit and sweep of the industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the State law would be applicable. To appreciate the aforesaid submission it is seemly to refer to section 110 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act. The said provision reads as under: 110. Gangele is that under the State law certain types of cases have been taken away from the ambit and sweep of the industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the State law would be applicable. To appreciate the aforesaid submission it is seemly to refer to section 110 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act. The said provision reads as under: 110. Saving of certain provisions of the industrial Disputes Act- Except Chapters v-A, V-B and V-C, and other provisions with respect of lay off, retrenchment compensation, Special Provisions relating to lay off, retrenchment and closure in certain establishment and unfair labour practices nothing in the Industrial Disputes act, 1947 (No. XIV of 1947) shall apply to any industry to which this Act is applied: provided that - (A) any settlement arrived at or award made under the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act, 1947 (No. XIV of 1947) (hereinafter in this Section referred to as the Central Act) in respect of any industry to which before the date of application of this Act, the Central Act was applicable shall be deemed to have arrived at or made under the provisions of this Act, unless and until superseded by any settlement or award arrived at or made under this Act; (b) any proceedings pending on the date of application of this Act to an industry to which before such date the Central Act was applicable, shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the central Act. "in view of the aforesaid provision when an employee claims certain reliefs which are not saved they would be covered by the State law. As the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has not been overridden by the CLRA Act, by adopting similar logic it can safely be concluded that the provisions of the 1960 Act are not excluded. At this juncture we may refer with profit to Section 2 (35) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 which defines wages. As the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has not been overridden by the CLRA Act, by adopting similar logic it can safely be concluded that the provisions of the 1960 Act are not excluded. At this juncture we may refer with profit to Section 2 (35) of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 which defines wages. It reads as under:"2 (35) "wages" means remuneration of all kinds capable of being expressed in terms of money and payable to the employee in respect of his employment of work done in such employment and includes - (i) any bonus, allowances (including dearness allowance), reward or additional remuneration; (ii) the value of any house accommodation, light, water, medical attendance or any other amenity or service; (iii) any wages payable for the period of leave; (iv) any compensation payable for lay-off or retrenchment; (v) any contribution by the employer to any social security scheme, pension or provident fund; (vi) any gratuity payable on discharge; (vii) any travelling allowance or value of any travelling concession; (viii) any sum paid or payable to or on behalf of an employee to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; and (ix) any amount payable to an employee under any law for the time being in force for the protection of rights of employees or for regulating their relations with the employers, or under any award, settlement or agreement. "section 31 of the aforesaid Act which occurs in Chapter VI relates to notice of change. Section 51 which occurs in Chapter IX under the heading 'arbitration' reads as under: "57. "section 31 of the aforesaid Act which occurs in Chapter VI relates to notice of change. Section 51 which occurs in Chapter IX under the heading 'arbitration' reads as under: "57. Reference of disputes to Labour Court,industrial Court or Board- (1) Notwith-standing anything contained in this Act the government may, if on a report made by the labour Officer or otherwise it is satisfied that an industrial dispute exists, and- (a) it is not likely to be settled by other means; or (b) by reason of the continuance of the dispute - (i) a serious outbreak of disorder or breach of the public peace is likely to occur; or (ii) serious or prolonged hardship to a large section of the community is likely to be caused; or (iii) the industry concerned is likely to be seriously affected or the prospects and scope of employment therein curtailed; or (c) it is necessary in the public interest to do so; refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute for arbitration to a Labour Court or the industrial Court or a Board: provided that - (i) no reference under this Section shall be made to a Board without referring the matter to the parties and obtaining consent in writing of one of the parties to the dispute; and (ii) no reference shall be made to a Labour court under this Section if the matter, in dispute is included in Schedule I or if the dispute is between employees and employees. (2) A copy of the report sent by Conciliator under sub- section (2) of Section 43 and forwarded by the Chief Conciliator to the state Government under sub-section (3) of the said Section shall also be made available to the Labour Court, or the Industrial Court or the Board, as the case may be, before it proceeds to deal with the reference under sub-section (1 ). "15section 61 deals with the powers of the labour Court. Section 62 deals with commencement of proceedings. We have referred to the aforesaid provisions only to highlight that Mr. Gangele, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has contended before us that a claim for wages would be maintainable before the Labour Court under the state law. "15section 61 deals with the powers of the labour Court. Section 62 deals with commencement of proceedings. We have referred to the aforesaid provisions only to highlight that Mr. Gangele, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has contended before us that a claim for wages would be maintainable before the Labour Court under the state law. It is urged by him that the Corporation has entered into certain agreements with the workmen of the company including probationers and the appellants are entitled for the same. It is putforth by him that in any view of the matter the petitioners cannot be denied the minimum wages. At this juncture we may refer to two decisions cited before us. In the decision rendered in the case of Sheo Narayan choudhary and another v. A. Kanwadikar, member Judge Division Bench referred to the concept of change of mode of payment and wages and eventually came to hold as under: "7. The petitioners' contention is that 'wages including the period and mode of payment' is an item specified in Schedule I (item No. 9 of Schedule I); and that, therefore a reduction in the wages of an employee would be an industrial matter falling under Schedule I and as their wages were reduced by the employer without following the procedure laid down in subsection (1) of Section 31, the reduction in their wages was an illegal change within the meaning of Section 34 for the redress of which they were entitled to approach the labour Court under Section 61 of the Act. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the employer, that is the respondent No. 3, that item No. 9 of the Schedule I relates to wages of employees, as a class and does not cover wages of an individual employee; that the question of the reduction in the petitioners' wages falls under item No. 6 of schedule II, namely, 'employment including (i) reinstatement and recruitment; (ii) unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned'; and that, therefore, if the petitioners were in any way aggrieved by the reduction effected in their wages, they should have approached the Labour Court after making an approach as no such approach, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain their applications. xxx xxxx xxxx xx ( 13 ) THE matters which are of particular interest to individual employees are enumerated in Schedule II, and if a change in respect of any such matter is desired by an employee, then he can approach the labour Court for that purpose after complying with the requirements of the proviso to Section 31 (3 ). Item No. 6 of schedule II refers to Employment including- (i) reinstatement and recruitment; (ii)unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned". The term 'employment' as used in item No. 6 in schedule II is wide enough to include any matter relating to wages of an individual employee. It is not confined only to matters relating to bare state of employment. Section 31 (3) no doubt gives to a representative of employees also the right to move the Labour Court for a change in respect of an industrial matter specified in schedule II. But there may be cases in which the representative employee, and, therefore, the Legislature has expressly conferred a right upon the employee who has a grievance in regard to matters contained in Schedule II to move the Labour court for redress. The matter of reduction in the petitioners' wages clearly fell under item No. 6 of Schedule II. That being so, they could move the Labour Court for a change in respect of that matter only after approaching the employer with a request for a change in accordance with the proviso to section 31 (3 ). In the present case, as admittedly no such approach was made, the labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitioners' applications. The proviso to Section 31 (3) distinctly says that no such application shall lie unless the employee has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for a change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period. In our opinion the industrial Court was right in dismissing the petitioners' applications. " ( 14 ) ANOTHER decision which has been cited before us is in the case of Deen Dayal v. Factory manager, Gwalior, (MR 148/1981 ). In the said case the Division Bench was dealing with the claim of 25 employees in the backdrop that they were praying for rise of wages for a class of employee which had been rejected by the labour Court. In the said case the Division Bench was dealing with the claim of 25 employees in the backdrop that they were praying for rise of wages for a class of employee which had been rejected by the labour Court. It was held by the Labour Court that the case is one of a demand of class falling under item 9 of Schedule I of the M. P. Industrial relations Act, 1960 and hence, item No. 6 of the Schedule II relating to claim for wages by an individual was not attracted. The Labour court further recorded a finding that the remedy of the applicants is to raise a dispute before the Industrial Court under Sections 51 and 52 and obtain an award. The Division bench addressed itself to the controversy and held as under: "3. The argument in support of this petition is that the petitioners are entitled to wages equal to the wages paid to other members working in the establishment and, therefore, it was a case of an illegal change and the matter was within the competence of Labour court. We are unable to accept this contention. It has been found that the petitioners form a class of workers themselves different from others and the claim relates to fixing of wages of a class and does not amount to illegal change. This finding, in our opinion, is correct for the reasons recorded by the labour Court and the Industrial Court and we need not repeat them. ( 15 ) ). The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of this Court in Sheo narayan v. A. W. Kanwadikar ( 1966 MPLJ 1105 ). That case relates to rejection of wages to a particular employee and it was, therefore, held that the case was not governed by Item 9 of Schedule I and the deduction was, therefore, held to be illegal change. We have shown that the Labour court and the Industrial Court have reached a conclusion, and in our opinion rightly, that the present dispute was raised by a certain class of employees for fixing the wages of employees belonging to that class. This decision, therefore, is not in point. " ( 16 ) ON a perusal of both the decisions we are of the considered opinion that there is no conflict between the two. This decision, therefore, is not in point. " ( 16 ) ON a perusal of both the decisions we are of the considered opinion that there is no conflict between the two. In the case of Sheo narayan (supra) the Division Bench was dealing with the controversy relating to rejection of wages of a particular employee and held that the case was not covered by item No. 9 of Schedule I. In the case of Deen Dayal (supra) the Division Bench was dealing with the dispute of a class which falls, as is manifest from the said decision, in item No. 9 of schedule I. At this juncture, we think it condign to refer to item No. 9 of Schedule I. It deals with the wages including the period and mode of payment. Item No. 6 of Schedule II deals with the employment, reinstatement and recruitment and unemployment of persons previously employed in the industrial concern. ( 17 ) IN this regard we may also refer to item No. 1 of Schedule II which deals with the propriety and legality of an order passed or action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders or any rules or regulations governing the conditions of the service of employees. On a reading of the Schedule we find that there is certain distinction. When a dispute arises relating to class wages, rationalisation of other efficiency of work, charges and such other matters they are to be dealt with as per Schedule i and hence they can raise a dispute before the industrial Court under Sections 51 and 52 and obtain an award. As far as Schedule II is concerned it deals with the employment of an individual including reinstatement and recruitment and unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned. In the case of Sheo Narayan (supra) the division Bench understood the term employment used under the Schedule II relating to wages of individual employee. We have already reproduced the definition of wages as defined under Section 2 (35) of the Act. In the case of Sheo Narayan (supra) the division Bench understood the term employment used under the Schedule II relating to wages of individual employee. We have already reproduced the definition of wages as defined under Section 2 (35) of the Act. Hence, we are inclined to think that there can be reconciliation in both the decisions when there is a dispute with regard to the wage structure qua class of employee they have to move labour Court as per the provisions of Sections 51 and 52 of the Act and if it is individual the individual can move the Labour Court under schedule II. Needless to emphasise that any action can be taken after complying the provisions of Section 31 (3) of the Act. We may also hasten to add that as the petitioners have been prosecuting, the remedy in this Court they would be getting the benefit of that period to approach the Labour Court as stated by us earlier on. ( 18 ) BEFORE we part with the case we hereby clarify that we have not expressed any opinion with regard to merits of the case. We have said so as Mr. Kale and Mr. Gupta have submitted, that the finding recorded by the learned single Judge would go a long way to frustrate the contentions putforth by the management. We have decided only with regard to jurisdiction of the forum and as we have not concurred with the finding of the learned single Judge on this score the judgment passed by him has to be set aside and all other findings recorded by him in favour of the employees have also to succumb as there cannot be piece meal lanceting of the order of the learned single Judge in a case of this nature. All contentions except what we have not decided hereinabove are left open. ( 19 ) CONSEQUENTLY the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. However taking note of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. .