JUDGMENT 1. - By this writ petition, petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned order dated 10.12.1999 (Annx. 5) and directing the respondents to reinstate him on the post of Class IV employee. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that vide order dated 4.8.1998 (Annx. 1), petitioner was provided appointment on the post of Class IV employee initially for a period of three months. His service tenure was extended from time to time but ultimately his services were put to an end vide impugned order dated 10.12.1999. Hence this writ petition. 3. Refuting the averments made in the writ petition and justifying their action, a reply has been filed by the respondents. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 5. Petitioner was temporarily appointed on the post of Class IV vide appointment order dated 4.8.1998 (Annx. 1). There is a clear stipulation in the appointment order itself that in case his work and conduct are not found satisfactory then his services were liable to be terminated without any notice. However, his term of appointment was extended from time to time. While extending the term of appointment of the petitioner vide order dated 30.8.99 (Annx. 4), it was clearly mentioned that his term of appointment is extended upto 30.9.1999 with the warning to improve his work otherwise his term shall not be extended and ultimately the impugned order dated 10.12.99 (Annx. 5) was issued putting an end to his services. Since the impugned termination order was passed after warning to improve his work, petitioner, being a temporary employee, does not have any vested right to assail the termination order. 6. The grievance of the petitioner is that since he refused to work at the residence of the respondent No. 3, respondent No. 3 harboured ill-will against the petitioner and warned him to remove from service and ultimately his services were terminated. The petitioner has made allegation of malafide against the respondent No. 3 without impleading him as a party-respondent by name. It is settled proposition of law that when the allegation of malafide is made against a person, he should be impleaded as a party-respondent by name. I am fortified with my view by the judgments given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ishar Singh v. Kuldeep Singh, 1995 (Supp) 1 SCC 179 ; Bhagwati & ors. It is settled proposition of law that when the allegation of malafide is made against a person, he should be impleaded as a party-respondent by name. I am fortified with my view by the judgments given by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ishar Singh v. Kuldeep Singh, 1995 (Supp) 1 SCC 179 ; Bhagwati & ors. v. Subordinate Service Selection Board, Haryana & ors., 1995 (Supp) 2 SCC 663 ; Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam & ors., (1996) 5 SCC 419 : 1996(4) SCT 143 (SC) ; J. Jose Dhanapaul v. S. Thomas & ors., (1996) 3 SCC 587 : 1996(2) SCT 512 (SC) ; Arun Tiwari & ors. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh & ors., AIR 1998 SC 331 : 1998(1) SCT 533 (SC) ; and Azar Hasan & ors. v. District Judge, Saharanpur, (1998)3 SCC 246 . Since the petitioner has not impleaded the respondent No. 3 by name, the allegations of malafide made against respondent No. 3 are not worth consideration. 7. So far as the order impugned dated 30.8.1999 (Annx. 4) is concerned, it is settled legal proposition that a person holding the post temporarily does not have any right to hold the post. 8. In State of U.P. and others v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991(1) SCC 691 : 1991(1) SCT 760 (SC) , the Apex Court has categorically held as under:- "Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service." 9. A temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary servants. In Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1992 SC 496 : 1992(2) SCT 165 (SC) , the Apex Court has categorically held that incumbent to a post who has been given appointment on temporary basis, terminable without notice, has no right to hold the post and he is not entitled for any opportunity of hearing before his services are dispensed with as his termination does not amount to forfeiture of any legal right. 10. 10. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raghuvendra Sheshgiri Rao Kulkarni (1998(1) SCC 460 : 1997(4) SCT 750 (SC)) , the Apex Court explained the difference of a permanent employee and an employee holding the post on probation and held that the services of a probationer cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his service cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause. "This is based on the principle that a substantive appointment to a permanent post in a public service confers substantive right to the post and the person appointed on that post becomes entitled to hold a lien on that post." However, interpreting/enforcing the terms of appointment, which provided for discharge of the said probationer from service at any time during the period of probation or extended period of probation, without any notice or without assigning any cause, the Court held that as his termination was in consonance with the terms and conditions of his appointment letter, he cannot be heard raising grievance. 11. In State of Punjab v. Surendra Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1593 , the Apex Court has held that the court must seek the adherence to the terms and conditions of the appointment and there is no reason why terms and conditions of appointments cannot be inforced in a contract of service. 12. In the instant case, the petitioner was holding temporary post of Class IV employee. Vide order dated 30.8.99 (Annx. 4), his term of appointment was extended with the stipulation that in case he does not improve his working, he shall not be accorded extention. The allegation of malafide against respondent No. 3 have not been substantiated though respondent No. 3 has not been impleaded by name. As such, I find no illegality, irregularity or malafide in passing the impugned termination order.Consequently, the writ petition lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Stay petition also stands dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******