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2003 DIGILAW 1338 (MP)

Ramesh Pratap Singh (Dead) v. Vimla Singh

2003-12-10

S.P.KHARE

body2003
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) against the order by which the application under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the arbitral award has been rejected as barred by limitation. ( 2. ) THE relevant dates are that the arbitral award was made on 18-5-1997. A photocopy of this award was given to the parties on 19-5-1997. It was not "signed" by all the Arbitrators. The applicants asked for "signed copy" of the arbitral award as per Section 31 (5) of the Act. The signed copy was supplied to them on 27-7-1998. The application under Section 34 of the Act was submitted before the Court on 27-8-1998. ( 3. ) SECTION 34 (3) of the Act provides as under:- " (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. " ( 4. ) SECTION 31 (1) of the Act lays down that an arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. Section 31 (5) of the Act further lays down that after the arbitral award is made, a "signed copy" shall be delivered to each party. ( 5. ) THE applicants case is that the photocopy of the award which was supplied to them was not a signed copy within the meaning of Section 31 (5) of the Act. A signed copy was supplied on 27-7-1998 and, therefore, the limitation period of three months given in Section 34 (3) of the Act is to be counted from the date the applicants had received the signed copy of the arbitral award. ( 6. A signed copy was supplied on 27-7-1998 and, therefore, the limitation period of three months given in Section 34 (3) of the Act is to be counted from the date the applicants had received the signed copy of the arbitral award. ( 6. ) THE non-applicants case was that the application for setting aside the award under Section 34 of the Act could be submitted even on the basis of the photocopy of the award which was supplied to the applicants and, therefore, the application under Section 34 of the Act was barred by limitation. ( 7. ) THE Court accepted the plea of the non-applicants and rejected the application under Section 34 of the Act as barred by limitation. ( 8. ) IN this appeal it has been argued on behalf of the appellants that the limitation period of three months provided in Section 34 (3) of the Act should be counted from the date the "signed copy" of the arbitral award was supplied to them as it is a mandatory requirement under Sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Act that a "signed copy shall be delivered to each party". ( 9. ) AFTER hearing the learned Counsel for both the sides this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order is not correct. In terms of Section 31 (5) of the Act, it is mandatory on the part of the Arbitrator to deliver a "signed copy" to each party. The receipt of signed copy of the arbitral award is an important event in the arbitration proceedings. It is from that date the limitation period given in Section 34 (3) of the Act has to be counted. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 , that the limitation period given in Section 34 (3) of the Act can be extended by thirty days as per proviso to that sub-section and there can be no extension of limitation beyond that date. It has also been held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the application under Section 34 (3) of the Act. It has also been held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the application under Section 34 (3) of the Act. Thus the law relating to limitation in this matter is very strict and, therefore, the provision in Section 31 (5) of the Act for delivering a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party should also be construed strictly. In the present case the photocopy which was supplied to the applicants initially on 19-5-1997 was admittedly not bearing the signatures of the Arbitrators. Therefore, it was not a signed copy within the meaning of Section 31 (5) of the Act. ( 10. ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 526 , in which the words "signed copy of award" used in Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 were interpreted. In that case it has been held that signing means writing ones name on some document or paper. Reference has been made to Websters New World Dictionary in which the meaning of the word "sign" has been shown as "to write ones name on, as in acknowledging authorship, authorising action, etc. " It was further held by the Supreme Court that so long as there is the signature of the Arbitrator on the copy of the award filed in Court and it shows that the person signing authenticated the accuracy or correctness of the copy the document would be a signed copy of the award. It would in such circumstances be immaterial whether the Arbitrator or Umpire put down the words "certified to be true copy" before signing the copy of the award. In the present case photocopy does not bear the signatures of the Arbitrators and, therefore, the photocopy in the present case was not certified copy signed by the Arbitrator as was the case before the Supreme Court. The applicants asked for the signed copy as per Section 31 (5) of the Act and it was supplied to them on 27-7-1998 and, therefore, the limitation period should be counted from 27-7-1998. The application under Section 34 of the Act was presented before the Court on 27-8-1998 and, therefore, it was within the period of limitation provided in Section 34 (3) of the Act. ( 11. The application under Section 34 of the Act was presented before the Court on 27-8-1998 and, therefore, it was within the period of limitation provided in Section 34 (3) of the Act. ( 11. ) IN the result this appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside and the Court before which the application under Section 34 of the Act was submitted is directed to decide it on merits. The parties are directed to appear before the District Judge, Rewa on 15-1-2004.