B. S. A. SWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants are the defendants in O. S. No. 82 of 1983 on the file of the Court of Additional District Munsif, rajam. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Court, Rajam, in a. S. No. 10 of 1994 dated 15. 11. 1995, wherein the judgment and decree of the trial Court was reversed and the suit was decreed as prayed for, the appellants preferred this second appeal. ( 2 ) THE parties are referred to as they are arrayed in the plaint. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff filed a suit for the following reliefs:1. declaration of title insofar as it affected by the sham and bogus registered sale deed dated 13-5-1982 executed in favour of the 1st defendant by the other defendants in respect of half portion of the plaint schedule mentioned house and appurtenant site 2. restrain the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule mentioned house in any manner whatsoever by the grant of consequential relief of permanent injunction. 3. as the defendants have erected a thatched shed on the suit site subsequent to the filing of the suit, they may be further ordered to remove the same on their cost and restore the suit site to its original condition by grant of mandatory injunction against them and 4. for costs. ( 4 ) THE case of the plaintiff is that one adapaka Bapinaidu had two sons by name seetharam, Ramakrishna Naidu and a daughter Ramudamma. Seetharam, predeceased his father leaving one daughter and one son by name Satyanarayana and his daughter was given in marriage to the son of Ramudamma by name Meesala Rama murthy. Bapinaidu died in the year 1940. His another son Ramakrishna Naidu had three sons by name Appalanarasa Naidu, the second son s name was not given in genealogy and Bapinaidu is the third son, who is the plaintiff herein. For proper appreciation of the case, the genealogy of adapaka Bapinaidu is given hereunder: adapaka Bapinaidu (died 1940) seetharam (died prior to 1940) Ramakrishna Naidu Ramudamma daughter s Husband Meesala Ramamurthy satyanarayana (died in 1968) wife Vishnukantamm (Vendor Ex. B1 DW2) Son Krishna (Vendor of Ex. For proper appreciation of the case, the genealogy of adapaka Bapinaidu is given hereunder: adapaka Bapinaidu (died 1940) seetharam (died prior to 1940) Ramakrishna Naidu Ramudamma daughter s Husband Meesala Ramamurthy satyanarayana (died in 1968) wife Vishnukantamm (Vendor Ex. B1 DW2) Son Krishna (Vendor of Ex. B1) meesala Rama Murthy (married daughter of Seetharam) Meesala Krishnamurthy (DW3) i I Appalanarasanaidu Son Bapinaidu (plaintiff) ( 5 ) AFTER the death of Ramakrishna naidu, there seemed to be a family partition and the suit schedule house fell to the share of his third son Bapinaidu, who is the plaintiff herein. It is their case that ramakrishna Naidu and his sons are in enjoyment of this house since a long time as there was a partition between late Seetharam and Ramakrishna Naidu way back in 1925. While things stood thus, in 1981, the plaintiff seemed to have worked against one Venkata appalanaidu who was elected as Sarpanch of the village and the 1st defendant and the said Venkata Appalanaidu decided to wreak vengeance against him for working against the said Venkata Appalanaidu. They caught hold of Vishnu Kanthamma, wife of late satyanarayana who died in 1968 who is no other than the only son of Seetharam who died prior to 1940 and her son Krishna and obtained a registered sale deed for half of the portion of the house from them claiming that they are the co-owners of the property along with the plaintiff though they had no title or possession over the suit schedule house, hence, he filed the suit for the reliefs already extracted supra. ( 6 ) 1st defendant i. e. , the purchaser of the property, in his written statement stated that there was a family partition long back and in that family partition, the plaintiff and his brother Seetharam and father got one- third share each in the suit schedule house. It is also his case that Bapinaidu conferred his one third share in the property to meesala Rama Murthy who is no other than the son of his daughter who married late seetharam s daughter. While southern portion of the house fell to the share of the plaintiff and the remaining two-third share of the property wherein temporary sheds were erected, was in enjoyment of his vendors. While southern portion of the house fell to the share of the plaintiff and the remaining two-third share of the property wherein temporary sheds were erected, was in enjoyment of his vendors. It is also his further case that Gram panchayath and Revision Registers of his village clearly establish the division of the suit house into three shares and their enjoyment by the respective parties by paying the house tax to Gram Panchayath individually. On the basis of the above pleadings, the following issues and additional issues were framed by the Trial Court. 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction? 2. Whether the suit is maintainable under law? 3. To what relief. Additional issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff perfected his title by adverse possession? 2. Whether the defendants perfected their title by adverse possession? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for? 4. Whether the vendors of sale deed dated 13-5-1982 has title over the properties? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title over the plaint schedule property? ( 7 ) TO prove their case, while the plaintiff examined himself as P. W. 1 and four more witnesses as P. Ws. 2 to 5 and marked documents Exs. A-1 to A-25, the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 got themselves, examined as D. Ws. 1 to 3 and examined two more witnesses as D. Ws. 4 and 5 and marked the certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 13-5-1982 executed by Defendants 2 and 3 in favour of 1 st defendant, as Ex. B 1. ( 8 ) THE Trial Court having believed the version of the defendants and having disbelieved Ex. A25 dated 10-6-1929 memo of family assignment list executed in favour of the plaintiff, dismissed the suit by stating that the plaintiff failed to prove that there was severance of status between him, Vishnu kanthamma and her son who belonged to the branch of late Seetharam. ( 9 ) AGGRIEVED by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff carried the matter in appeal by filing A. S. No. 10 of 1994. The appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit, by holding that the plaintiff perfected the title by adverse possession, hence, this second appeal. ( 10 ) MR. ( 9 ) AGGRIEVED by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff carried the matter in appeal by filing A. S. No. 10 of 1994. The appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit, by holding that the plaintiff perfected the title by adverse possession, hence, this second appeal. ( 10 ) MR. VISWESHWARA Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, strenuously contended that neither a coparcener nor a co-owner can claim adverse possession against the other co-owner and as such, the appellate Court erred in holding that there is a severance of status between the plaintiffs branch and the defendants branch. In support of his contention, he cited a judgment of Madras High Court reported in Ganapathi Iyer and another v. Sunder Murthy and others, 2000 (2) MLJ 365 , wherein it is held that the possession of the property by one co-owner cannot render his possession adverse to the other co-owners i. e. , the normal law of the land. But, the coowner can establish that there is a severance of status between the two branches and if he can prove that he is in possession of the property uninterruptedly for a long time to the knowledge of all, it can be held that he perfected his title by adverse possession. In fact, this issue is no more res Integra. This issue fell for consideration before this Court in Godi Jayarami Reddy and another v. Siddamurthy Kami Reddy (Deceased) and others, Appeal No. 397 of 1987. This Court having reviewed the entire case law held that "from the above case law it can be seen that a co-owner can also plead ouster of another co-owner and thereby perfect his title by adverse possession. The claim for ouster and its proof should be of highest degree and it should lead to the irresistible conclusion that a co-owner by his conduct gave up his claim. A co-owner by his act and deeds ousted himself from the co- ownership and he perfected his title to the property by adverse possession. At the same time, mere non-participation and sharing of rents and income of the properties do not give raise to the presumption that the co- owner ousted himself from co-ownership. A co-owner by his act and deeds ousted himself from the co- ownership and he perfected his title to the property by adverse possession. At the same time, mere non-participation and sharing of rents and income of the properties do not give raise to the presumption that the co- owner ousted himself from co-ownership. Likewise, any execution of documents by the person in possession of the property without the knowledge of the other co-owner cannot lead to the conclusion that there is an ouster of the other co-owner. Non- participation of the profits of a land for a long period of time effecting to be adverse and under such circumstances that denial could not be proved but could only be inferred". ( 11 ) KEEPING the above proposition, if we look at the facts of the case, the defendants categorically admitted that there was a partition between the members of the family long back and even prior to the death of old Bapinaidu. In that partition, this suit house was divided into three shares. While the southern portion fell to the share of the plaintiff, one-third portion fell to the share of Seetharam s branch. It is their further case that late Bapinaidu conferred one-third share of the house that fell to his share on his daughter s son Meesala Rama murthy, who married late Seetharam s daughter. It is all their case that the Gram panchayath records and revision registers establish the partition of the house and enjoyment of the properties by the respective parties. At the same time, except filing the sale deed, they did not choose to file even a scrap of paper to show their possession over the property. On the other hand, the plaintiff filed certified copies of the revision registers obtained from the Gram panchayath, voters list as well as Ex. A-25, memo showing the properties that fell to the plaintiffs branch way back on 10-6-1929. None of these registers show about the partition of the suit schedule house as contended by the defendants. The Trial court rejected Ex. A-25 saying that it is inadmissible in evidence since it is not registered as required under the Registration act, 1908. A-25, memo showing the properties that fell to the plaintiffs branch way back on 10-6-1929. None of these registers show about the partition of the suit schedule house as contended by the defendants. The Trial court rejected Ex. A-25 saying that it is inadmissible in evidence since it is not registered as required under the Registration act, 1908. But under Section 49 (c) of the registration Act, an unregistered document can be received in evidence for any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument to show any transaction affecting such property as collateral evidence. Admittedly, while the plaintiff pleaded that they are in exclusive possession of the suit schedule house from their father s time, the defendants themselves came forward with the plea of partition and allotment of shares to the three branches and in fact in the sale deed also they mentioned that the property has fallen to their share in the partition. In the absence of any other evidence to show that there is a partition between the parties, Ex. A-25 being the oldest document of more than 60 years, the presumption is that it is a genuine document. This document is filed to show that there is a severance of status between the parties. The plaintiff is not claiming any benefit under that document. Hence, I find that there is no force in the contention of Mr. Visweshwara rao, that this document cannot be looked into since it was not a registered document. Under Section 49 (c) of the Registration Act even an unregistered document conveying immovable property can be looked into as a collateral evidence to prove the plea of the parties. Hence, I hold that Ex. A-25 is admissible in evidence for collateral purpose of proving that there is a severance of status between the parties. The fallacy in the argument of the appellants is evident from the written statement itself. In the written statement the Defendant No. 1 clearly stated that while Defendant Nos. 2 and 3 inherited one third portion of the house from old seetharam, one-third of the suit schedule house was conferred by old Bapinaidu on defendant No. 4, thus Defendants 2 to 4 are in possession of two-thirds portion of the house. But they have chosen to sell only half share in the house. 2 and 3 inherited one third portion of the house from old seetharam, one-third of the suit schedule house was conferred by old Bapinaidu on defendant No. 4, thus Defendants 2 to 4 are in possession of two-thirds portion of the house. But they have chosen to sell only half share in the house. This is another instance to prove the fallacy in the plea of the defendants. If they are in possession of two-thirds share in the house, they would have sold the entire portion, but not half by leaving one-sixth share for their benefit. Further in the long span from 1929 onwards till now, they have not filed even a scrap of paper to show that they ever lived in this house, they are in possession of the house and they are enjoying the property to the knowledge of all the people in the village. Hence, the irresistible conclusion that has to be drawn in this case is that there is a severance of status between the two branches of Seetharam and Ramakrishna Naidu way back in 1929 and since then they were in enjoyment and possession of the property that fell to their shares and we have to believe the version of the plaintiff that the sarpanch of the village by taking advantage of his dominant position in the village pressurized on Defendants 2 and 3 to get a sale deed executed in favour of Defendant no. 1, though the defendants were never in possession of the property. ( 12 ) NEXTLY, Mr Vishweshwar Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants strenuously contended that under proviso 2 of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, if a consequential relief is required for grant of a declaration of title and the same is not sought for, the suit is liable to be dismissed. In this case, his contention is that without seeking the relief of cancellation of the title deed executed by Defendants 2 to 4, the suit as filed by the plaintiff is not maintainable and there cannot be two sale deeds for the self same property. In support of his contention, he cited a judgment of this Court reported in Tummala Srinivas and others v. Municipal Corporation, hyderabad and others, 2000 (2) ALD 47 . In support of his contention, he cited a judgment of this Court reported in Tummala Srinivas and others v. Municipal Corporation, hyderabad and others, 2000 (2) ALD 47 . In this case, the petitioners filed a writ petition seeking a declaration that the Municipal corporation and the police officials resorted to demolish their premises in an illegal manner by colourable exercise of power. The learned Counsel for the petitioners seemed to have submitted the above said contention to declare the action of respondents as illegal and unauthorized and leaves the other relief to be granted by the civil Court in any appropriate proceedings to be initiated by the petitioners. In that context, the learned Judge, observed that the petitioners having given up the relief of claiming possession will not entitle them for any relief under proviso 2 of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The judgment has no bearing on the facts of the case on hand. Admittedly, Defendants 2 to 4 neither had any title over the property nor they were ever in possession of the property, even then they executed a sale deed for the property. When once it is proved that a person who is having no title executes any conveyance deed or transfers any immovable property, it is of no value and it has to be ignored. Since, the Defendants 2 to 4 failed to show even an iota of evidence that they have a right over the property any execution of a document by them will not take away the right of the real owner to enjoy the property. Hence, I feel that proviso 2 of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 will not come into play in this case. ( 13 ) FURTHER, if we see the relief sought for by the plaintiff, he has categorically sought for a declaration of title for the half share of the house, which was conveyed by defendants 2 to 4 under registered deed dated 13-5-1982 by describing the sale deed as sham and bogus one. In other words, to declare the document that was brought into existence by Defendants 2 to 4 who have no right over the property as sham and bogus one. ( 14 ) HENCE, I do not find any merit in this contention of Mr. In other words, to declare the document that was brought into existence by Defendants 2 to 4 who have no right over the property as sham and bogus one. ( 14 ) HENCE, I do not find any merit in this contention of Mr. Vishweshwar Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants and the second appeal has to fail. ( 15 ) ACCORDINGLY, the second appeal is dismissed as devoid of merits confirming the judgment and decree passed by the appellate Court in A. S. No. 10 of 1994 with costs throughout.