( 1 ) THE vacate petitioner-second respondent in the revision filed an application CMP. No. 24309 of 2003 in CM. P. No. 23394 of 2003 in C. R. P. No. 5186 of 2003 praying to vacate the interim order granted in C. M. P. No. 23394 of 2003 in C. R. P. No. 5186 of 2003 dated 17-10-2003. ( 2 ) THE counsel for the first respondent in the vacate application-revision petitioner had addressed elaborate arguments and both the counsel made a request to dispose of the main civil revision petition itself in view of the urgency and that is how the main civil revision petition itself is taken up for final hearing and the same is being disposed of. ( 3 ) THE revision petitioner the third defendant in the suit O. S. No. 13 of 2000 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, parvathipuram and shown as fourth respondent in I. A. No. 318 of 2000 in O. S. No. 13 of 2000 had preferred the present civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as against the order dated 7-3-2002 made in I. A. No. 318 of 2000. ( 4 ) THE facts of the case in short are as hereunder: the defendants 4 to 6 in the suit O. S. No. 13 of 2000 aforesaid filed an application i. A. No. 318 of 2000 praying for the relief of temporary injunction restraining theplaintiff as well as the defendants 1 and 2 and their henchmen from interfering with their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petition schedule property in any manner pending disposal of the suit. The suit is one for partition. The respective contentions of the parties may not be very relevant for the purpose of the disposal of the present civil revision petition. The learned Senior Civil judge, Parvathipuram by order dated 7-3-2002 ultimately had granted temporary injunction in favour of the petitioners- defendants 4 to 6 in the said application LA. 318 of 2000 in O. S. 13 of 2000 restraining the respondents therein from interfering with the petition schedule property in any manner pending disposal of the suit. The third defendant aggrieved by the said order dated 7-3-2002 had preferred the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and obtained interim suspension in c. M. P. No. 23394 of 2003 on 17-10-2003. The third defendant aggrieved by the said order dated 7-3-2002 had preferred the civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and obtained interim suspension in c. M. P. No. 23394 of 2003 on 17-10-2003. The application to vacate the interim order dated 17-10-2003 was moved as specified supra. ( 5 ) SRI K. Somakonda Reddy, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner had submitted that there is no specific prayer in the temporary injunction application praying for any relief as against the revision petitioner. On the contrary the stand taken by the defendants 4 to 6 is that the third defendant was assisting them and hence even the relief of temporary injunction as against such a party without a prayer in this regard is unsustainable. The learned counsel also had pointed out that specific prayer in LA. 318 of 2000 is for temporary injunction against "the plaintiff and his henchmen" only and the court had definitely exceeded the jurisdiction in issuing temporary injunction as against all the respondents in LA. 318 of 2000. The learned counsel also submitted that even otherwise if certain defendants had prayed for temporary injunction, temporary injunction of this nature cannot be granted at the instance of such defendants. In any view of the matter since the jurisdictional error was committed by the court below, while exercising supervisory jurisdiction this court can definitely rectify the same. The learned counsel also had made certain submissions touching the merits and demerits of the matter. It was also pointed out that in fact no notice was served on the third defendant. The learned counsel had placed strong reliance on the decisions in j. Sambamurthy v. CH. Srinivasa Rao D. Rama naidu v. C. Venkatasubbanaidu Suryadev Rai v. Ramachander Rai. ( 6 ) PER contra Smt. M. Bhaskara Lakshmi representing the contesting party made the following submissions. The learned counsel would maintain that this being a suit for partition the defendants can maintain an application for temporary injunction of this nature since such defendants also would be on par with plaintiffs in such an action for partition. The learned counsel also had further pointed out that as can be seen from the dates there is inordinate delay on the part of the revision petitioner in questioning the impugned order. The learned counsel also had further pointed out that as can be seen from the dates there is inordinate delay on the part of the revision petitioner in questioning the impugned order. The learned counsel also had pointed out that there are no extraordinary circumstances which had been pointed out by the revision petitioner for invoking the remedy under Article 227 of the constitution of India especially in the light of the fact that the impugned order is an appealable order under Order 43 Rule 1 c. P. C. The learned counsel also had placed strong reliance on the decisions reported in maneck Custodiji v. Sarafazali Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaquin A. Venkatasubbaiah Naidu v. Chellappan Jyotish Chandra Borbora v. Bura gohain Tea Company Private Limited malati Santra v. Nanda Dulal Banik c. Nagarathnamma v. District Panchayat Officer chittoor. The learned counsel also had submitted that the very conduct of the revision petitioner in questioning the impugned order after a long lapse of about one and a half years may have to be taken into account and he is estopped from questioning the same. It was further explained that in view of the fact that police aid had been granted this civil revision petition was thought of by the revision petitioner who is not at all prejudiced in any way by the impugned order. The learned counsel further pointed out that an application I. A. 95 of 2003 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 was filed to condone the delay in setting aside the exparte order and the same was withdrawn and another application I. A. 248 of 2003 was moved under order 39 Rule 4 C. P. C. to modify the impugned order which was also dismissed on 21-7-2003 and the said order was not questioned till date. The learned counsel also made elaborate submissions relating to the maintainability of the temporary injunction application and virtually what had been granted is only to maintain the status quo ante as on the date of the institution of the suit and nothing more. Reliance was also placed on the decisions reported in Rattu v. Mala Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai Vincet v. Aisumma. ( 7 ) HEARD both the counsel. Reliance was also placed on the decisions reported in Rattu v. Mala Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai Vincet v. Aisumma. ( 7 ) HEARD both the counsel. ( 8 ) AS can be seen from the material available on record, an order of temporary injunction which is impugned in the present civil revision petition was granted in LA. No. 318 of 2000 in O. S. 13 of 2000 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Parvathipuram on 7-3-2002. This court in CM. P. No. 23394 of 2003 inc. R. P. No. 5186of 2003 granted interim suspension of the said order on 17-10-2003. It is clear that the revision petitioner definitely had slept over the matter for sufficiently a long time. It is also pertinent to note that originally it appears the revision petitioner was sailing with the defendants 4 to 6 who moved LA. 318 of 2000 as can be seen from the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the application. It is no doubt true that the relief. prayed for is as against the plaintiff and his henchmen only. But temporary injunction was granted as against the respondents in the aforesaid application. As already referred to supra it is a suit for partition and on appreciation of the all the crucial aspects involved in the matter, the learned Senior Civil Judge Parvathipuram made an order on 7-3-2002. The very fact that the revision petitioner had not questioned the impugned order for sufficiently a long time will go to show that for certain extraneous reasons best known to him, now he had invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The very fact that the revision petitioner had not questioned the impugned order for sufficiently a long time will go to show that for certain extraneous reasons best known to him, now he had invoked the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Order 39 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure dealing with the cases in which temporary injunction may be granted reads as hereunder: order 39 Rule 1: Cases in which temporary injunction may be granted: where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise: (a) that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree or (b) that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors (c) that the defendant threatens to dispossess, the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to theplaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. The specific stand taken by the learned counsel representing the revision petitioner- third defendant is that temporary injunction restraining him from interfering with the possession cannot be granted in favour of the defendants 4 to 6 in the suit though relief of temporary injunction of the nature specified in Order 39 Rule l (a) C. P. C. may be granted in favour of either of the parties. A strong reliance was placed on Sambamurthy case and Rama Naidu Case (1 and 2 supra) to the effect that the defendant also can maintain an application for temporary injunction in certain specified cases covered by Order 39 rule 1 (a) of the C. P. C. Reliance also was placed on Rattu case Vincet case and Sugunda bai case (10, 12, 11 supra ). It is also not in controversy that this order is an appealable order under Order 43 Rule l (r) of the Civil procedure Code. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner moved an application LA. 95 of 2003 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 praying for condonation of delay to set aside the ex parte order and the same was withdrawn on 3-7-2003 and subsequent thereto to modify the impugned order an application No. 248 of 2003 was moved under order 39 Rule 4 C. P. C. which was dismissed on 21-7-2003. In Surya Dev Rai case (3 cited supra) the Apex Court held that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution of India is exercisable for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction and when the subordinate court has assumeda jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the high Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. ( 9 ) IN Waryam Singh v. Amarnath a five judge Bench of the Apex Court held as follows:"the material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces theprovisions of Section 107 of the Government of india Act 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by article also to Tribunals. That the Rent controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are Tribunals cannot and has not been controverted. The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the article. Reference is made to clause (2) of the Article in support of the contention that this Article only confers on the High Court administrative superintendence over the subordinate courts and Tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in clause (1 ). Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in india was that Section 107 which was similar in terms to Section 15 of the high Courts Act 1961, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High court. Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in india was that Section 107 which was similar in terms to Section 15 of the high Courts Act 1961, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High court. In this connection it has to be remembered that Section 107 of the government of India Act, 1915 was reproduced in the Government of India act 1935 as Section 224. Section 224 of the Act 1935 however, introduced subsection (2) which was new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. The idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the decisions of the different high Courts referred to above. Section 224 of the Act 1935 has been reproduced with certain modifications in Article 227 of the Constitution. It is significant to note that sub-section (2) to Section 224 of the Act 1935 has been omitted from Article 227. The significant omission has been regarded by all High Courts in India before whom this question has arisen as having restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence it had under Section 15 of the High courts Act 1861 and Section 107 of the government of India Act, 1915. This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is a pointed out by Harris C. J. in Dalmia Jain Aiways limited v. Sukumar Mukherjee (AIR 1951 cal. 193) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. "in Maneck Gustedji Burjarji (4 cited supra) a three judge Bench of the Apex Court, while dealing with the scope of jurisdiction of the high Court under Article 227 of the constitution of India, held that High Court cannot ordinarily in exercise of its discretion entertain a special leave application when an adequate alternative legal remedy is available to the applicant and hence where an appeal against the decree of the city civil court lay to the High Court, an application under article 227 was misplaced. In Venkataiah subbaiah Naidu case (6 supra) the Apex court held as follows:"now what remains is the question whether the High Court should have entertained the petition under article 227 of the Constitution when the party had two other alternative remedies and though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the constitutional powers of the High Court it is a well recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies one or the other before he resorts to a constitutional remedy. The learned single judge need not have entertained the revision petition at all and the party affected by the interim ex parte order should have been directed to resort to one of the other remedies. Be that as it may, now it is idle to embark on that aspects as the high Court had chosen to entertain the revision petition. " ( 10 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner is having an alternative remedy by way of filing an appeal. It is also not in dispute that the revision petitioner had, in fact made an abortive attempt to get the impugned order modified by moving an application LA. 248 of 2003 before the court below which was dismissed. The conduct of the party in approaching this court after sufficiently a long lapse of time and also in view of the fact that the revision petitioner had been unsuccessful in getting the impugned order modified, whether in the light of this background this court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the constitution of India on the ground that the impugned order needs modification or rectification? The answer cannot be in affirmative. In the derisions (4 to 9) cited supra the Apex Court and different High courts had expressed the view thatnormally when an alternative remedy by way of appeal or any other effective alternative remedy is available such party should be driven to avail the said alternative remedy instead of exercising the power under Article 227 of the constitution of India. In the derisions (4 to 9) cited supra the Apex Court and different High courts had expressed the view thatnormally when an alternative remedy by way of appeal or any other effective alternative remedy is available such party should be driven to avail the said alternative remedy instead of exercising the power under Article 227 of the constitution of India. ( 11 ) IN the light of the above legal position and taking the over all facts and circumstances of the case into consideration and since the revision petitioner is having an effective alternative remedy by way of an appeal as against the impugned order and also taking into consideration the conduct of the revision petitioner I am not inclined to interfere with the impugned order by exercising the power under Article 227 of the constitution of India. It is needless to say that the petitioner is at liberty to invoke alternative remedy if he is so advised. ( 12 ) IN the light of the foregoing discussion the civil revision petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. No order as to costs.