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2003 DIGILAW 135 (BOM)

Vithal K. Shetty & another v. Ritz Hotel & another

2003-02-06

D.B.BHOSALE

body2003
JUDGMENT - BHOSALE D.B., J.:---This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is directed against two Awards passed by the Labour Court in two references being Reference (I.D.A.) No. 987 of 1987 and 988 of 1987, concerning petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. By the impugned Awards, dated 29th November, 1987 the references have been rejected by the Labour Court. The reference was made for adjudication of the dispute between respondent No. 1-M/s. Ritz Hotel (for short "employer" or "Hotel") and petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, who were working as waiter in the hotel since 1977. 2. The principal question raised in the instant writ petition for consideration is that if there is an acquittal on merits by the Criminal Court, as a necessary consequence thereof, the delinquent who has been dismissed much prior to the order of acquittal after holding disciplinary proceedings on identical set of facts, is entitled to reinstatement as if there was no blot on his service. The other question that has been raised for consideration is whether the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse, and lastly, whether the treatment meted out to the petitioners, discriminating them from two other workmen who were similarly placed, suffer from vice of arbitrariness. 3. The factual matrix giving rise to the present writ petition and necessary to answer the aforesaid questions raised by the petitioners, reveal that on 18th September, 1984 at about 11.10 p.m. petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 alongwith one Arthur Santos and Thomas Menzes committed jointly and severally the act of assault in the premises of the hotel on Ram Manohar and Ram Kumar who were working as watchman at the relevant time. The case set up by the employer against the petitioners was that at the relevant time they alongwith two others went to Ram Manohar and Ram Kumar near their cabin from the rear gate of the hotel and questioned them as to why they had collected the bonus and on that count they mercilessly assaulted Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar with fist blows and kicks. It is specifically alleged that petitioner No. 2 Janardhan assaulted both with lathi (stick) resultantly the watchmen received serious injury for which they had been treated in hospital. They also alleged to have threatened the aforesaid watchmen. It is specifically alleged that petitioner No. 2 Janardhan assaulted both with lathi (stick) resultantly the watchmen received serious injury for which they had been treated in hospital. They also alleged to have threatened the aforesaid watchmen. It further reveals that one Ram Naresh, another watchman, informed the alleged incident to the General Manager, who arrived at the scene of incident and informed the police. Some other workmen working in the hotel had also assembled near the scene of incident. During the assault the petitioners also alleged to have intentionally damaged the cabin of watchman. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations the petitioners, Arthur Santos and Thomas Menzes were charged as per Clauses 24(k), 24(l) and 24(q) of the Model Standing Orders applicable to them. The relevant Clauses of Model Standing Orders read thus : "24(k) Drunkenness, riotous, disorderly or indecent behaviour on the premises of the establishment. 24(l) Commission of an act subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment. 24(q) Wilful damage to property of the establishment. 4. The enquiry was conducted during the period commencing from 8th October, 1984 and 15th August, 1986. The Enquiry Officer found all the four workmen guilty of the charges framed against them. During the enquiry, the employer examined three witnesses namely Shri Ram Kumar, Shri Ram Manohar and Shri Ram Naresh. As against this, the petitioners, examined themselves and four other witnesses namely Shri V.M. Deshmukh, Shri Raman Shirke, Shri K.M. Kini and Shri Mohan Singh Rawat, in their defence, who were working in the hotel at the relevant time. 5. The incident of assault has not been disputed by the petitioners. It is also not disputed that in the alleged incident Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar received injuries. However, the case set up by the employer and the petitioner in their defence is distinct. To be more precise, it is alleged that Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar were assaulted by four charge-sheeted workmen at about 11.10 p.m. on 18-9-1984. As against this the defence version is that the alleged incident of assault did occur between the watchman on one hand and one Shri Damodar Marotia and his associates on the other hand. It is the case of the petitioners that they were neither present at the scene of incident nor in any way were involved in the alleged assault. As against this the defence version is that the alleged incident of assault did occur between the watchman on one hand and one Shri Damodar Marotia and his associates on the other hand. It is the case of the petitioners that they were neither present at the scene of incident nor in any way were involved in the alleged assault. It is their case that the watchman sustained injuries on account of assault by Damodar Marotia. The Enquiry Officer after assessing the evidence led by the petitioners as well as the employer and the other material placed before him held all four charge-sheeted workmen guilty of assault on Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar near gate at the night of 18-9-1984 and further that they caused wilful damage to the property of the employer in his report dated 2nd August, 1986. On the basis of the report of the Enquiry Officer the respondent-employer dismissed all four charge-sheeted workmen from service on 7th October, 1986. The petitioners thereafter raised dispute which was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court in 1987. The Labour Court has passed the impugned Awards in independent references on 29th September, 1997. It is in this backdrop of the case the petitioners have approached this Court assailing the impugned Awards passed by the Labour Court. 6. I heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties at length, perused the writ petition and documents annexed thereto and several judgments of the Apex Court as well as of this Court placed reliance upon by learned Counsel for the parties. 7. The argument advanced by Ms. Mehta in the present case is three fold. Firstly, though there is no legal bar on simultaneous criminal and disciplinary proceedings being taken against the delinquest employee, but if the criminal cases as also disciplinary proceedings were based on identical set of facts and whole case of prosecution was thrown out the Criminal Court and the delinquent was acquitted, in such situation it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the departmental proceedings to stand. The delinquent in such a situation deserve to be reinstated with all the consequential benefits. In short, Ms. Mehta submitted that since the domestic enquiry was conducted on identical set of facts, the acquittal order by the Criminal Court is binding on the employer and the order of removal is liable to be set aside. The delinquent in such a situation deserve to be reinstated with all the consequential benefits. In short, Ms. Mehta submitted that since the domestic enquiry was conducted on identical set of facts, the acquittal order by the Criminal Court is binding on the employer and the order of removal is liable to be set aside. Secondly, she submitted that the finding of the Enquiry Officer which are affirmed by the Labour Court are perverse and thirdly, there was no justification in treating the petitioners differently from two other workmen namely Arthur Santos and Thomas Menzes who were similarly placed. She contended that treatment meted out to the petitioners, therefore, suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. In support of her submission on all the three points she placed reliance upon the following judgments of the Apex Court: (Capt. M. Paul Antony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and another)1, 1999(82) F.L.R. 627; (K. Raghuram Babu v. Railway Protection Force)2, 2001(88) F.L.R. 497; (H.P.C.L. v. Habib Bismillah Khan)3, 2001(II) C.L.R. 871; (S.K. Ramju v. Regional Manager A.P.S.R.T.C.)4, 2001(II) C.L.R. 570; (K. Meerabai v. The Chairman T.N.C.S.C. Ltd.)5, 2001(III) C.L.R. 489; (Maheshchandra Sharma v. Commandant, C.I.S.F. Unit 6-T, Visakhapatnam and others)6, 2001(91) F.L.R. 402; (Sengara Singh and others etc. v. The State of Punjab and others)7, 1983(47) F.L.R. 321. 8. In opposition, Mr. Singh, learned Counsel for the employer, at the outset submitted that mere acquittal of the petitioners does not automatically entitle them to reinstatement, unless it is established that the petitioners were acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges. He submitted that in the present case the acquittal of the petitioners was not clear and honourable acquittal. They were given benefit of doubt holding that the charges framed against them have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that it is not correct to state that in the present case the evidence before the Enquiry Officer and the evidence before the Labour Court was one and same though the set of facts was common. He submitted that Ram Naresh, who was an independent witness to the alleged incident, was not examined by the prosecution in the criminal case. He submitted that Ram Naresh, who was an independent witness to the alleged incident, was not examined by the prosecution in the criminal case. He further submitted that out of 11 witnesses who were examined before the Enquiry Officer consisting of four delinquents, three witnesses of the employer and four defence witnesses hardly two witnesses namely Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar were examined before the Criminal Court. In reply, to the submission of Ms. Mehta that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse, he submitted that the Enquiry Officer has assessed the entire material placed before him and after examining the same has recorded his findings against the petitioners. The findings of facts recorded by the Enquiry Officer and affirmed by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. On the point of discrimination he submitted that all four workmen were found guilty by the Enquiry Officer and on the basis of the findings of the Enquiry Officer they were dismissed from the service and in view thereof it cannot be said that the treatment meted out to the petitioners suffers from vice of arbitrariness. Mr. Singh, in support of his submission placed reliance upon the following judgments of the Apex Court and this Court: (Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra)8, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 626; (Union of India v. Bhiari Lal Sidhana)9, 1997(4) S.C.C. 385 , (Food Corporation of India v. George Verghese)10, 1991 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 143; (State of U.P. v. Ajit Singh)11, 1998(8) S.C.C. 346 ; (Govind Das v. State of Bihar)12, 1997(11) S.C.C. 361 ; (Senior Superintendent of Post Offices v. A. Gopalan)13, 1977(11) S.C.C. 239; (State of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Allabakash)14, 2000(10) S.C.C. 177 ; (Satish Ganesh Sapthtarshi v. Kirloskar Oil Engines)15, 2000(III) C.L.R. 900; (Hindustan Petroleum Corporation v. Habib Bismillah Khan), 2001(2) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)421 (Divisional Controller M.S.R.T.C. v. Jagannath Gawande)16, 2002(Supp. 2) Bom.C.R. 233 (Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan)17, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477. 9. It is now well settled principle of law that the proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. 2) Bom.C.R. 233 (Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan)17, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477. 9. It is now well settled principle of law that the proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental proceedings operate in distinct and different jurisdictional areas. Whereas in the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigating, the facts operating in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff, the standard of proof required in those departmental proceedings is also different from that required in a criminal case. While in the departmental proceedings the standard of proof is one of preponderance of the probabilities, in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. It is also well settled proposition of law that the disciplinary proceedings can be legally continued even where the employee is acquitted in a criminal case as the nature and proof required in a criminal case are different from those in the departmental proceedings. The Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case (supra) has reiterated the aforesaid well settled principles of law. 10. Ms. Mehta, learned Counsel for the petitioners placed heavy reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) in support of her contention that the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings, in the present writ petition, were based on identical set of facts and the whole case of prosecution was thrown out and appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, the appellant who has been acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charges levelled against the petitioners are not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the departmental proceedings to stand. In my view it would be advantageous to state the facts of the case in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) to appreciate law laid down by the Apex Court in the report. The Superintendent of Police had raided the residential premises of the appellant and had recovered a mining sponge gold ball weighing 4.5. grams and 1276 grams of 'gold bearing sand'. It was on this basis the criminal case was launched against him. M. Paul Anthony (supra) to appreciate law laid down by the Apex Court in the report. The Superintendent of Police had raided the residential premises of the appellant and had recovered a mining sponge gold ball weighing 4.5. grams and 1276 grams of 'gold bearing sand'. It was on this basis the criminal case was launched against him. On the same set of facts constituting the raid and recovery, departmental proceedings were initiated against the appellant as the "recovery" was treated to be a "misconduct". On the service of the charge-sheet, the appellant raised an objection that the departmental proceedings may be stayed as the basis of those proceedings was "the raid conducted at his residence", which was also the basis for launching criminal case against him. He requested that the decision of the criminal case may be awaited, however, his request for adjournment of the departmental proceedings on that ground was not acceded to and the proceedings continued ex-parte against him. He was ultimately found guilty of the charges and was dismissed from service on 7-6-1986. On 3rd February, 1987, the judgment in the criminal case was pronounced and the appellant was acquitted with the categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to establish its case. The judgment of the Criminal Court was communicated by the delinquent to the respondent-employer in the said case with the request of reinstatement which was rejected on the ground that the delinquent has already been dismissed from the service on completion of Departmental Enquiry which was conducted independently of the criminal case and, therefore, the judgment passed by the Magistrate was of no consequence. In this backdrop the Apex Court in paragraph 32 of the report held thus: "32. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, "the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the Court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex parte departmental proceedings to stand." What is more relevant and required to be noted in the aforesaid paragraph is that the Court on consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. It is, thus, clear that the basis for initiating departmental proceedings against the delinquent, namely the raid conducted by the Superintendent of Police at the residential premises of the delinquent stood falsified before the Criminal Court. It is in this background the Apex Court held that since the facts and evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were same without their being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the case in the report. 11. The reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. Raghuram Babu (supra) wherein the judgment of the Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case was also considered. In the case of K. Raghuram Babu (supra) the petitioner was charge-sheeted for excess delivery of Railway scrap to third party. 11. The reliance was also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K. Raghuram Babu (supra) wherein the judgment of the Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case was also considered. In the case of K. Raghuram Babu (supra) the petitioner was charge-sheeted for excess delivery of Railway scrap to third party. The Labour Court has categorically found that he was not guilty of the charge. The petitioner therein was acquitted by the judicial pronouncement holding that he was not guilty of the charge and it was a clean and honourable acquittal. The criminal case and the departmental proceedings in the report were placed on the same set of facts and evidence. In the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) this Court while dealing with the argument of learned Counsel appearing for the delinquent therein that if the criminal case as well departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, then, if the prosecution case were to be thrown out then the departmental proceedings also should come to an end and that there cannot be any finding contrary to the order of criminal trial. The reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case by the learned Counsel for the delinquent in the report. However, it is clear from the facts of the case that the evidence before the Disciplinary Authority was the confessional statements of the delinquent employees which evidence was not before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. There is categoric finding that the material before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the material before the Disciplinary Authority was different. In the case of S.K. Ramju (supra) Andhra Pradesh High Court after considering the decisions of the Apex Court in M. Paul Anthony's case (supra) has reiterated the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court. That was the case of an accident that allegedly occurred on account of rash and negligent driving resulting in the loss of a valuable life of a cyclist. That was the only basis or charge against the delinquent for proceeding against him in disciplinary proceedings. It is apparent that the material before the Criminal Court and the material placed before the Inquiry Officer was identical. There also the petitioner was acquitted of the charges levelled against him. That was the only basis or charge against the delinquent for proceeding against him in disciplinary proceedings. It is apparent that the material before the Criminal Court and the material placed before the Inquiry Officer was identical. There also the petitioner was acquitted of the charges levelled against him. Yet one more judgment placed reliance upon by the petitioner in K. Meerabai (supra). The Madras High Court after referring to the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) reiterated the principle that where the departmental proceedings and criminal case are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common with there being a variance the delinquent deserve reinstatement in the event of his acquittal by the Criminal Court. It is clear from the finding recorded by the Madras High Court in the report that the order of acquittal and the disciplinary proceedings was on identical set of facts and in view of clear acquittal the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the case of M. Paul Anthony was applied and the benefit was extended to the petitioner therein. 12. Thus, the law is very clear that the departmental proceedings and a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. If the departmental proceedings and a criminal case are based on the identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. However, in Capt. M. Paul Anthony's case (supra) the Apex Court has made it absolutely clear that if the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest. It is also now clear that if the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case where the facts and evidence was same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof would not be applicable. Keeping in view the settled position of law and before proceeding further I would like to note few dates in the present case, to appreciate the grounds of objections. The incident in the present case, which was the basis for initiating action occurred on 18th September, 1984. The petitioners were charge-sheeted on 26th September, 1984. The Inquiry Officer found them guilty on 2nd August, 1986 and the order of dismissal was passed on 7th October, 1986. And the order of acquittal was passed by the Criminal Court on 16-12-1991 i.e. more than five years after the dismissal. 13. In applying the aforestated principle of law, there should be no difficulty where the accused is acquitted and completely exonerated of the charge and the order of dismissal passed was based on same set of facts and evidence. Such dismissal shall have to be set aside. However, the acquittal by the Criminal Court does not automatically give the delinquent a right to be reinstated into the service. The Apex Court in Union of India v. Bihari Lal Sidhana (supra) has taken a view that mere acquittal of the delinquent does not automatically entitle him reinstatement, it would be open to the employer to take decision whether the enquiry into the conduct is required to be done before directing reinstatement or appropriate action should be taken as per law. There is no legal bar in holding enquiry after acquittal. In the case of Food Corporation of India (supra) the Apex Court has observed that even if delinquent employee is dismissed upon initial conviction is reinstated in service after acquittal, it is open to the Disciplinary Authority to issue charge-sheet and initiate a fresh Departmental Enquiry after reinstatement. This principle of law has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ajit Singh (supra). This principle of law has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Ajit Singh (supra). The Apex Court in Govind Das's case (supra) has taken a view that where acquittal is on the ground that the charges are not proved beyond reasonable doubt there is no bar in holding subsequent departmental disciplinary enquiry on the same charges. In Senior Superintendent of Post Offices's case (supra) the Apex Court has reiterated the view expressed in Govind Das's case holding that where the acquittal is based on benefit of doubt there is no bar to hold subsequent disciplinary enquiry on the same charges. In the State of U.P. v. K. Allabakash (supra) once again same principle of law has been reiterated by the Apex Court. In the State of Karnataka and another v. T. Venkataramanappa (supra) the Apex Court has observed that if the nature of criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are different there is no bar to hold enquiry after acquittal. The position of law is thus clear that normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue the Departmental Enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. In other words the delinquent may be entitled for reinstatement where the facts and the evidence was same without there being any iota of difference. However, the acquittal does not automatically give the delinquent a right to be reinstated into the service. The question, whether or not the Departmental Enquiry pending against the employee involved in the criminal case is a matter to be decided after considering the nature of finding given by the Criminal Court. Normally when the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it is not expedient to continue a Departmental Enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. However, merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the Departmental Enquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered. The standard of proof required to prove the charge of misconduct and departmental proceedings is completely different and, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings could be conducted against the delinquent employee even after the acquittal of the criminal case. The standard of proof required to prove the charge of misconduct and departmental proceedings is completely different and, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings could be conducted against the delinquent employee even after the acquittal of the criminal case. The acquittal in the criminal case does not necessarily lead to setting aside the order of dismissal passed on the findings in the disciplinary proceedings. 14. The standard of proof and mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. The findings which are arrived at by the Court in the course of criminal trial are not necessarily conclusive of the charge of the misconduct in the disciplinary enquiry. The Apex Court in the case of Satish Ganesh Saphtarshi (supra) has taken a view that the nature of charges, object of proceedings and standard of proof are completely different in the criminal proceedings and domestic enquiry, hence acquittal during the course of Labour Court proceedings is not conclusive, and the Court has to decide on whether, based on preponderance of probabilities, the charges are proved in enquiry. The same principle of law has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation (supra) wherein the delinquent was honourably acquitted. In Divisional Controller MSRTC (supra) the Apex Court has once again reiterated the aforesaid principle. 15. In the instant case, whether acquittal of the petitioners by the Criminal Court was honourable acquittal and they were completely exonerated of the charges or not and similarly whether evidence and charges were also identical, will have to be examined, keeping in view the scope under Article 226 of the Constitution. I have carefully gone through the judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate in criminal case against four charge-sheeted workmen including the petitioners. What I found from the observations made by the learned Magistrate is that the evidence of P.W. 1 namely Ram Kumar remained intact in the cross-examination. There is a categoric finding recorded by the learned Magistrate to that effect. He further holds that the evidence of P.W. 2 Ram Manohar has corroborated the evidence of P.W. 1 on the point of assault, however, P.W. 2 Ram Manohar has stated that 2nd petitioner assaulted P.W. 1 by stick. What was missing in the evidence of those witnesses was that they could not tell exactly on which part of the body, they were assaulted. What was missing in the evidence of those witnesses was that they could not tell exactly on which part of the body, they were assaulted. The accused assaulted P.W. 1 by stick was not narrated by P.W. 2. The note appears to have been taken of such contradictions in the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 by the learned Magistrate. However, the fact remains that the evidence indicates that the petitioners did assault Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar. Similarly, the learned Magistrate has also given due weightage to the fact that though injury certificates were produced on record, the Medical Officer was not examined which according to him was material lacuna in the case of prosecution. He has also noted some discrepancies in respect of carrying the stick to Police Station. Considering the evidence of Ram Kumar, Ram Manohar, one panch witness and Investigating Officer, the learned Magistrate held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused and hence has acquitted them of charge under section 324 read with 114 of the Indian Penal Code. It is not possible for me to accept the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were acquitted honourably and they were completely exonerated of the charges. As observed earlier the standard of proof is completely different in a criminal case and domestic enquiry. Moreover, the charge against the petitioners, though, was arising from the same incident, it cannot be said to be similar. In the disciplinary proceedings the petitioners were charged as per Clauses 24(k), (l) and (q) of the Model Standing Orders applicable to them. Looking to the nature of charge I am of the considered view, the alleged incident and the role attributed to the petitioners, coupled with the fact of their arrest on the spot, was sufficient to hold them guilty of riotous, disorderly or indecent behaviour on the premises of the establishment which were undoubtedly the acts subversive of discipline or good behaviour. Under the circumstances it would not be possible for me to accept the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners in view of the acquittal in criminal case are entitled for reinstatement. Though the set of facts were similar it cannot be said that the evidence before the Enquiry Officer and the Criminal Court was identical. Under the circumstances it would not be possible for me to accept the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners in view of the acquittal in criminal case are entitled for reinstatement. Though the set of facts were similar it cannot be said that the evidence before the Enquiry Officer and the Criminal Court was identical. One more distinguishing factor needs to be noted that before the Enquiry Officer the employer examined three witnesses consisting of Ram Kumar, Ram Manohar and Ram Naresh. It has come on record that the relationship between the aforesaid three witnesses and the petitioner was not strained and in fact their relation were friendly. Ram Naresh was an independent witness who unfortunately was not examined before the Criminal Court but he was examined by the Enquiry Officer and has placed reliance on his evidence being an independent witness. 16. Before considering the next submission of Ms. Mehta, learned Counsel for the petitioners, it would be more appropriate to bear in mind the well settled position of law, which finds place in the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra). The Apex Court in paragraph 7 of the report held thus: "(7) The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or Tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court of Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the partly affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an Appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the interference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised." 17. Coming to the submission of Ms. Mehta that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse and bias. With her assistance I have gone through enquiry report which runs into about 103 pages consisting of the reproduction of the evidence of almost all the witnesses and the findings recorded on appreciation of the evidence. Ms. Coming to the submission of Ms. Mehta that the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse and bias. With her assistance I have gone through enquiry report which runs into about 103 pages consisting of the reproduction of the evidence of almost all the witnesses and the findings recorded on appreciation of the evidence. Ms. Mehta, learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of her contentions invited my attention to the fact that, though, several workmen were collected near scene of incident as stated by Ram Naresh in his evidence, the Enquiry Officer holds that there was nobody else at the time of assault, except three watchmen and the charge-sheeted workmen. I do not see any perversity in the findings particularly in the light of the evidence of Ram Naresh who has stated that once the assault was started he immediately rushed to General Manager and he came back with the General Manager to the scene of incident and by that time the incident was over and he found some workmen were collected at the scene of incident. This would not be sufficient in my view to establish that the workmen who were collected near the scene of incident, as stated by Ram Naresh had actually witnessed the assault on Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar or they also reached the scene of incident after the assault was over. The incident occurred almost at midnight and it appears to be more probable that the actual assault may not have been witnessed by other workmen. However, the fact remains that police reached the scene of incident and they arrested all charge-sheeted workmen including the petitioners on the spot, and were taken to Police Station. The another circumstance relied upon by Ms. Mehta in support of her contention of perversity of finding is that Ram Manohar in his cross-examination admits that stone throwing took place from outside. In my view this admission of Ram Manohar would not exonerate the petitioners and, therefore, cannot be relied upon to hold the finding of Enquiry Officer perverse. However, this circumstance certainly supports the case of the damage caused to the employer's property. The another circumstance relied upon by Ms. Mehta is non examination of the material witness such as Damodar Marotia, General Manager, Thatte and a workmen who assembled at the scene of incident. However, this circumstance certainly supports the case of the damage caused to the employer's property. The another circumstance relied upon by Ms. Mehta is non examination of the material witness such as Damodar Marotia, General Manager, Thatte and a workmen who assembled at the scene of incident. In so far as Damodar Marotia is concerned Ram Naresh appears to have stated that after wearing uniform he took over the charge from Ram Manohar by taking key from him and observing other formalities of taking charge. In the meantime Damodar Marotia was going out after passing urine. Ms. Mehta placed heavy reliance on the statement of Mr. Ram Naresh in support of the defence theory that there was a fight between Damodar Marotia and watchman. However, over and above the statement of Ram Naresh about Damodar Marotia I did not find any material on record to support the defence that Damodar Marotia assaulted the watchman. Mere presence of Damodar Marotia just before the incident would not be sufficient to hold the findings of the Enquiry Officer perverse. In so far as the defence witnesses are concerned, except Mr. Deshmukh no other witness claimed to have actually seen the incident of assault. Vithal Deshmukh in his examination-in-chief has stated that Ram Kumar and Ram Manohar were drunk which was factually found to be incorrect. He has stated that there was fight between watchman and Damodar Marotia on their personal matter, however, except bare words of Mr. Deshmukh there is absolutely no material on record. The Enquiry Officer has rightly disbelieved Mr. Deshmukh with reasons recorded in the report. Ms. Mehta also placed reliance on one more circumstance reflected in the evidence of Ram Naresh, who has stated, in his evidence that he saw somebody broke telephone line by hitting and kicking it. That "somebody" has not come forward. Merely because the name of that "somebody" has not come forward would not be sufficient to throw the entire report of the Enquiry Officer, whose report, otherwise found to be proper and based on the evidence on record. There are some minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer, however, by and large I found the observations made by the Enquiry Officer in his report are satisfactory, fair and proper. There are some minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence led before the Enquiry Officer, however, by and large I found the observations made by the Enquiry Officer in his report are satisfactory, fair and proper. Looking to the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the assessment made thereof it cannot be said that no reasonable person would have arrived at the findings, recorded by him. I do not find any perversity of finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer. In so far as the case tried to be made out about the victimisation is concerned I found from the record that no material was placed to prove that the petitioners were committee members at the relevant time or they were victimised due to their involvement in the union activities. I am satisfied from the material on record that the petitioners were involved in alleged incident and their involvement was sufficient to prove charges as per Clauses 24(k), (l) and (q) of the Model Standing Orders. In the departmental proceedings, where a charge relating to misconduct is being investigated, the factors operating in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority may be many such as enforcement of discipline or to investigate the level of integrity of the delinquent or the other staff and keeping that in view it cannot be said that the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer were perverse. It is well settled principle of law that in the Departmental Enquiry the standard of proof is one of prepondence of the probabilities and in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 18. In my view the petitioners have miserably failed to make out a case for interference. The evidence of witnesses is undoubtedly sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the role of the petitioners in the alleged incident amounts to riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour on the premises of the establishment and, therefore, this charge is conclusively proved against the petitioners and in view thereof their act were also subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment. In so far as damage to the property is concerned it is an admitted position that the damage was caused to the property, however, according to the petitioners they were not responsible. In so far as damage to the property is concerned it is an admitted position that the damage was caused to the property, however, according to the petitioners they were not responsible. The case set up by the petitioners that they were not present at the scene of incident has already been discarded in the earlier part of the judgment. The last submission of Ms. Mehta that there was no justification in discriminating the petitioners from two other workmen who were similarly placed. She submitted that after the dismissal Arthur Santosh, one of charge-sheeted workmen, was re-employed by the employer and therefore, the treatment meted out to the petitioners suffers from vice of arbitrariness and Article 14 forbids any arbitrary action which would tantamount to denial of equality as guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. At the outset Mr. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that Arthur Santosh was re-employed and was not taken back in the service with continuity of service by giving benefits of his past service. He was re-employed by the employer since he apologised for whatever happened earlier and agreed to work as a fresh employee in the establishment. In my view re-employment of Arthur Santosh cannot be said to be suffering from vice of arbitrariness. It is clear from the record that all four workmen were charge-sheeted, were tried before Enquiry Officer and admittedly all were dismissed from the service. 19. In so far as the submission of Ms. Mehta regarding the powers of the Labour Court to interfere in the cases of dismissal is concerned the clear answer to this arguments finds place in the judgment of (USV Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and another)19, 1998(1) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)604 : 1997(II) C.L.R. 312 wherein this Court in paragraph 11 observe thus: "The power exercisable by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal or the National Tribunal under section 11-A cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner or in a fanciful way or in a colour of cariciousness. If the Disciplinary Authority has awarded the punishment of dismissal or discharge commensurate with the gravity of the offence which has been duly proved in the enquiry and neither the enquiry proceedings are the gravity of the charge suffer from any error and the Award of punishment is commensurate with the gravity of charge, I am afraid the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its power under section 11-A cannot substitute such just punishment by observing that it is unjustified. The exercise of the powers by the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal under section 11-A has to be in the nature of the power that may be exercised by an supervisory authority but not as an appellate authority. The exercise of the power under section 11-A therefore has to be within its framework and should not exceed its power by passing arbitrary or fanciful orders. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court or of the Industrial Tribunal under section 11-A though very wide yet not as wide as the appellate forum, is always circumscribed by the power that may be exercised by supervisory authority. The limitations of the power of the Labour Court or the Industrial Court have been explained by the Apex Court from time to time and some of the decisions which require special reference are Indian Iron and Steel Company (supra) and Christian Medical College Hospital Employees Union (supra). In Indian Iron and Steel Company Ltd., the Apex Court observed that power of Industrial Tribunal to interfere with the cases of dismissal of workmen by the management are not unlimited and the Tribunal does not act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. The parameters within which such interference could be had by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal are the lack of good faith on the part of the employer, victimisation of unfair labour practice of the employer, or where the management has been guilty of basic error of violation of principles of natural justice or where the finding recorded by the Enquiry Officer is completely baseless or perverse on the face of the record before the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. In Christian Medical College Hospital Employees' Union, the Apex Court highlighted that introduction of section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act does not confer an arbitrary power on the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court and the power under section 11-A of the Act has to be exercised judicially. The Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is expected to interfere with the decision of the management under section 11-A only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management was highly disproportionate to the degree of the guilt of the workman concerned. The Industrial Court or the Labour Court, therefore, has to give reasons as to how the punishment imposed by the management is grossly disproportionate to the degree of the guilt." 20. I am satisfied with the findings recorded by the Industrial Court, which has appreciated the material placed before Enquiry Officer and has recorded its finding keeping in view its powers under section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 21. Writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. No orders as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----