B. S. CHAUHAN, J. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the FIR dated 28-5-2003 lodged by the respondent No. 4 in Case Crime No. 3453 of 2003 under Section 395 IPC in Police Station Kotwali, Khalilabad District Sant Kabir Nagar. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the FIR has been lodged as the respondent No. 4-complainant was having grievance against the petitioner and had malicious intention, thus, the same is liable to be quashed. 3. Legal maxim "quando Aliquid Mandatur, Mandatur Et Omne Per Quod Per Venitur Ad Illud"-means if anything is commanded, everything by which it can be accomplished is also commanded. But the inherent power for quashing the criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the extra-ordinary and inherent powers of Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. The same can be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate Courts or where the complainant, at the instance of somebody else wants to settle his score with other party and uses deliberately the machinery of the Court for oblique purpose and the party is likely to be subjected to unnecessary harassment for facing criminal proceedings or where the Court is satisfied that in case the proceedings are not quashed, there will be gross miscarriage of justice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor it can "soft-pedal the course of justice" at a crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. (Vide Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, AIR 1945 PC 18; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 ; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 949; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao. 4. (Vide Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, AIR 1945 PC 18; Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 2229 ; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 949; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao. 4. Angre and others, AIR 1988 SC 709 ; Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, AIR 1993 SC 892 ; Union of India v. W. N. Chadha, AIR 1993 SC 1082; Rupan Deol Bajaj and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another, 1995 (1) JIC 1155 (SC) : (1995)6 SCC 194 ; Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mohammed Habibur Rahman Faizi and others, 1996 (1) JIC 578 (SC) ; (1996)7 SCC 440 ; State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawal, JT 1996 (1) SC 601; Ashim Kumar Roy v. Bipinbhai Vadilal Mehta, (1998)1 SCC 133 ; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and others, (1998)5 SCC 749 ; M. Krishna v. State of Karnataka, JT 1999 (1) SC 540; Rakesh Ranjan Gupta v. State of U. P. and others, (1999)1 SCC 188 ; State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan, 1999 (1) JIC 603 (SC) ; AIR 1999 SC 1044 ; Arun Shanker Shukla v. State of U. P. and others, 1999 (2) JIC 570 (SC) ; (1999)6 SCC 146 ; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Government of N. C. T. of Delhi) and another, 2000 (1) JIC 1 (SC) ; (1999)8 SCC 728 ; Kanti Bhadra Singh and another v. State of West Bengal, 2000 (1) JIC 751 (SC) ; (2000)1 SCC 722 and G. Sagar Suri and another v. State of U. P. and others, 2000 (2) JIC 136 (SC) ; (2000)2 SCC 636 . 5. In State of U. P. v. O. P. Sharma, (1996)7 SCC 705 , the Honble Supreme Court has indicated that the High Court should be loath to interfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercising its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code or under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be, and allow the law to take its own course. Similar view had been taken in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1985 SC 628 . 6. Similar view had been taken in Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and another, AIR 1985 SC 628 . 6. State of Karnataka v. L. Munishwami, AIR 1977 SC 1489 , the apex Court held that "for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against an accused the Court possesses a comparatively wider discretion in the exercise of which it can determine the question whether the material on record, if unrebutted, is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. " 7. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, AIR 1976 SC 1947 , the Honble Supreme Court held as under : " (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) Where the allegations made in the complainant are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. " 8. In L. V. Jadhav v. Shankarao Abasaheb Pawar, AIR 1983 SC 1219 , the apex Court held that Courts power is limited only to examine that the process of law should not be misused to harass a citizen and for that purpose, the High Court has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine the correctness of allegations unless the allegations are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach to such a conclusion and that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but the Court, at that stage, cannot go into the truth or falsity of the allegations. 9. 9. Similar view has been reiterated in The Nagpur Steel and Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. P. Radhakrishna, (1997) SCC (Cri.) 1073. 10. In Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal and others, (1999)8 SCC 686 , the Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Rajesh Bajaj v. State N. C. T. of Delhi, 1999 (1) JIC 722 (SC) ; AIR 1999 SC 1216 , and observed that the inherent power of the High Court should be limited to very extreme exceptions. 11. In M/s Medchl Chemicals and Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Biological E. Ltd. and others, 2000 (2) JIC 13 (SC) ; JT 2000 (2) SC 426, the apex Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, including. 12. In Dr. Sharmas Nursing Home v. Delhi Administration, (1998)8 SCC 745 , and held that a criminal prosecution can be short-circuited in rarest of rare cases, and even in a case of breach of contract, not only civil remedy is attracted but a person can be held responsible for criminal prosecution and under no circumstance civic profile can out-way the criminal out fit. 13. In State of Haryana and others v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, 1990 (2) JIC 997 (SC) ; AIR 1992 SC 604 , the Honble Supreme Court laid down the guidelines for exercising the inherent power as under : " (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out as case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by as police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by as police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. " 14. The issue of mala fides decided by the Honble apex Court in Clause (7) referred to above has to be read with the observations made in the same judgment further where it has been held as under : "at this stage, when there are only allegations and recriminations on no evidence, this Court could not anticipate the result of the investigation and rendered a finding on the question of mala fides on the materials at present available. Therefore, we are unable to see any force in the contentions that the complaint should be thrown over board on the some unsubstantiated plea of mala fides. " 15. In Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 877 , the Honble apex Court while dealing with the issue of mala fides in criminal law observed as under : "it is well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise, justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant. " 16. " 16. Similarly, in State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanna, AIR 1980 SC 329, the apex Court has held as under : "it must, however, be pointed out that if an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, the mala fide of the informant would be of secondary importance if the investigation produced unimpeachable evidence disclosing he offence. " 17. In Sarjudas and another v. State of Gujarat, 1999 (8) SCC 508 , the Honble Supreme Court held that there must be cogent evidence of mala fides or malicious intention of the informant or the complainant for taking note of the allegations of mala fide. The bald statement in this respect is not sufficient. 18. Similar points have been formulated by the apex Court in State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid, AIR 1995 SC 785 . 19. In State of Delhi v. Gyan Devi and others, 2001 (1) JIC 229 (SC) ; AIR 2001 SC 40 , the Honble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of interference in exercise of the poser under Sections 228 and 482, Cr. P. C. for quashing the charges in a matter where no strong reason could be found and held that in the interest of justice and in order to avoid the abuse of process of the Court, the charges needed to be quashed. The apex Court observed as under : "at the stage of charge the Court is to examine the materials only with a view to be satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of offence alleged has made out against the accused persons. It is also well-settled that when the petition is filed by the accused under Section 482 Cr. P. C. seeking for the quashing of charge framed against them the Court should not interfere with the order unless there are strong reasons to hold that in the interest of justice and to avoid abuse of the process of the Court a charge framed against the accused needs to be quashed. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial Court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior Court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Such an order can be passed only in exceptional cases and on rare occasions. It is to be kept in mind that once the trial Court has framed a charge against an accused the trial must proceed without unnecessary interference by a superior Court and the entire evidence from the prosecution side should be placed on record. Any attempt by an accused for quashing of a charge before the entire prosecution evidence has come on record would not be entertained sans exceptional cases. " 20. In Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, 1994 JIC 714 (SC) ; (1994)4 SCC 142 , the Honble apex Court held that once the charge had been framed under Section 240 Cr. P. C. , the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, is not justified in invoking its inherent power to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. Similar view has been reiterated by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. S. B. Johan, (2002)2 SCC 57. 21. In Ram Kumar Laharia v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 2001 SC 556 , the Supreme Court considered the scope of exercise of revisional powers and held that at this stage, the Court is not permitted to weight the evidence. Whatever is permissible in law is that the Court can assess the improbability or absurdity of the statement of witnesses. In case the evidence so collected prima facie suggests direct contact with the accused, the Court cannot interfere with the order of framing the charge. 22. In Smt. Om Wati and another v. State through Delhi Admn. and another, 2001 (2) JIC 195 (SC) ; AIR 2001 SC 1507 , the apex Court held that in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court is not permitted to interfere at initial stage of framing the charges merely on hypothesis, imagination and far- fetched reasons. The Court observed as under : "we would again remind the High Courts of their statutory obligation not to interfere at initial stage of framing the charges merely on hypothesis, imagination and far-fetched reasons which, in law amounts to interdicting the trial against accused persons. The Court observed as under : "we would again remind the High Courts of their statutory obligation not to interfere at initial stage of framing the charges merely on hypothesis, imagination and far-fetched reasons which, in law amounts to interdicting the trial against accused persons. Unscrupulous litigants should be discouraged from protracting the trial and prevent culmination of the criminal cases by having resort to uncalled for and unjustified litigation in the cloak of technicalities of law. " 23. Thus, in view of the above, it is settled legal proposition that the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr. P. C. is not permitted either to weigh the evidence or examine the adequacy of the evidence for framing of the charges and if it comes to the conclusion that there is some prima facie evidence connecting the accused with the crime, the charge cannot be quashed at this stage. However, the Court has to examine that in case the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are absent in the fact and circumstances of the case and the trial was nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court, the Court should not hesitate in quashing the charges. 24. In Sanjay alias Sanjay Singh Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2002)5 SCC 371 , the Honble apex Court quashed the charges for the reason that the appellant therein had been charged of the offence of abatement and after considering the evidence, the apex Court recorded the finding that the ingredients of abetment were totally absent in the facts and circumstances of the case. Similarly, in Ram Ekbak Missir v. Ram Niwash Pandey and others, 2003 (1) JIC 98 (SC) ; (2002)8 SCC 161 , the Honble Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings wherein the cognizance of the offence was taken after twenty-one years of lodging the First Information Report and the case had been dragged for more than two decades without any fault on the part of the accused. Moreso, the apex Court also came to the conclusion that the cognizance had been taken in a mechanical manner. Moreso, the apex Court also came to the conclusion that the cognizance had been taken in a mechanical manner. It has further been observed that neither the victim nor the accused should suffer by the mischief of the investigating agency or the staff of the Court and such a delay was found to be a ground for quashing the charges. 25. Thus in view of the above if the case of the petitioner is examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, it is evident that the FIR clearly makes out a case against the petitioner as it has been alleged by the respondent No. 4 in the FIR that the petitioner alongwith others entered into her house, broke open the lock, searched for the file of litigation and had taken away large number of articles, including the ornaments and cash and caused serious injuries to her husband. The defence taken by the petitioner cannot be taken into consideration at this stage. 26. Thus petition is found to be devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .