B. S. CHAUHAN, J. This special appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, dated 2-6- 2003, by which the writ petition No. 24273 of 2003 against the impugned transfer order dated 20-5- 2003 has been dismissed. 2. The learned Counsel for the appellant has raised large number of issues and made allegations of mala fides submitting that impugned transfer order had been passed at the behest of the BSP leader. The transfer order is against the transfer policy framed by the respondents. The learned Single Judge failed to consider the inconvenience which would be suffered by the petitioner as his wife is heart patient and her treatment is going on at Basti. More so, the transfer order would adversely affect the education of his children. Therefore, the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside and the impugned transfer order is liable to be quashed. 3. The issue of transfer and posting has been considered time and again by the Apex Court and entire law has been settled by catena of decisions. It is entirely upon the competent authority to decide when, where and at what point of time a public servant is to be transferred from his present posting. (Vide Union of India v. S. L. Abbas, AIR 1993 SC 2444 ; Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 532 ; Union of India v. N. P. Thomas, AIR 1991 SC 1605 ; Chief Manager (Tel.) N. E. Telecom Circle v. Rajendra Ch. Bhattacharjee, AIR 1995 SC 813 ; State of U. P. v. Dr. R. N. Prasad, 1995 (Suppl) 2 SCC 151; Union of India and Ors. v. Ganesh Dan Singh, 1995 (Suppl) 3 SCC 214; N. K. Singh v. Union of India and Ors. , (1994) 6 SCC 98 ; and Abani Kante Ray v. State of Orissa, 1995 (Suppl) 4 SCC 169. 4. An employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work on a particular place as the transfer order does not affect any of his legal rights and Court cannot interfere with a transfer/posting which is made in public interest or on administrative exigency. 4. An employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right to work on a particular place as the transfer order does not affect any of his legal rights and Court cannot interfere with a transfer/posting which is made in public interest or on administrative exigency. In Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atma Ram Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 SC 1433 , the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under: "transfer of a Government Servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable posts from one place to the another is an incident of service. No Government servant or employee of public undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. " 5. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in Chief General Manager (Telecom) N. E. Telecom Circle (supra ). 6. In Union of India v. H. N. Kirtania, AIR 1989 SC 1774 , the Honble Apex Court observed as under: "transfer of a public servant made on administrative grounds or in public interest should not be interfered with unless there are strong and pressing grounds rendering the transfer order illegal on the ground of violation of statutory rules or on ground of mala fide. " 7. Learned Counsel for the employee has vehemently argued that the transfer policy issued by the Department is binding on them and they are bound to transfer post the workman and her husband at the same place. 8. In Union of India v. S. L. Abbas, (supra), the Apex Court has observed that the Government instructions on transfer are mere guidelines without any statutory force and the Court or Tribunal cannot interfere with the order of transfer unless the said order is alleged to have been passed by malice or where it is made in violation of the statutory provisions. 9. Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, AIR 1992 SC 519, has observed as under: "there can be no doubt that ordinarily and as far as practicable the husband and wife who are both employed should be posted at the same station even if their employers be different. Desirability of such a course is obvious. Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Bank of India v. Jagjit Singh Mehta, AIR 1992 SC 519, has observed as under: "there can be no doubt that ordinarily and as far as practicable the husband and wife who are both employed should be posted at the same station even if their employers be different. Desirability of such a course is obvious. However, this does not mean that their place of posting should invariably be one of their choices. Even though their preference may be taken into account while making the decision in accordance with administrative needs. In case of All India Service, the hardship resulting from the two being posted at different stations may be unavoidable at times particularly when they belong to different services and one of them cannot be transferred to the place of others posting. While choosing the career and a particular service, the couples have to bear in mind this factor and be prepared to face such a hardship, if the administrative needs and transfer policy do not permit the posting of both at one place without sacrifice of the requirements of the administration and needs of other employees. In such a case, the couples have to make their choice at the threshold between career prospects and family life. After giving preference to the career prospects by accepting such a promotion and any appointment in the All India Services with the incident of transfer to any place in India, subordinating the need of the couple living together at one station, they cannot as of right claim to be relieved of the ordinary incident of All India Service and avoid transfer to a different place on the ground that the spouses thereby would be posted at different places. . . . . . No doubt the guidelines require the two spouses to be posted at one place as far as practicable but that does not enable any spouse to claim such a posting as of right if the departmental authorities do not consider it feasible. The only thing required is that the departmental authorities should consider this aspect along with the exigencies of administration and enable the two spouses to live together at one station if it is possible without any detriment to the administrative needs and claim of other employees. " (Emphasis added ). 10. The only thing required is that the departmental authorities should consider this aspect along with the exigencies of administration and enable the two spouses to live together at one station if it is possible without any detriment to the administrative needs and claim of other employees. " (Emphasis added ). 10. Thus, it is clear that the transfer policy does not create any legal right in favour of the respondent- employee. It is settled law that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint by the employee that there is a breach of the statutory duty on the part of the employer. Therefore, there must be judicially enforceable right for the enforcement of which the writ jurisdiction can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided such person satisfies the Court that he/she has a legal right to Insist on such performance. The existence of the said right is the condition precedent to invoke the writ jurisdiction. (Vide State of Kerala v. K. G. Madhavan Pillai, AIR 1989 SC 49 ; State of Kerala v. Smt. A. Laxmi Kutty, AIR 1987 SC 331 ; Mani Subrat Jain and Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 276 ; Calcutta Gas Company (Propriety Ltd.) v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , AIR 1962 SC 1044 ); Rajendra Singh v. State of M. P. , AIR 1996 SC 2736 ; Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Chand Behari Kapoor and Ors. , (1998) 7 SCC 469 ; Krishan Lal v. State of J and K, (1994) 4 SCC 422 ; State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 ; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi and Ors. , (1999) 2 SCC 193 ; State of Punjab v. Raghubir Chand Sharma and Anr. , (2002) 1 SCC 113 ; and Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr. , (2003) 3 SCC 425. 11. In Shilpi Bose, (supra) the Apex Court has held that order of transfer/posting "issued by the competent authority did not violate any of her legal right. " The employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right for his/her posting at a particular place. 12. Ltd. and Anr. , (2003) 3 SCC 425. 11. In Shilpi Bose, (supra) the Apex Court has held that order of transfer/posting "issued by the competent authority did not violate any of her legal right. " The employee holding a transferable post cannot claim any vested right for his/her posting at a particular place. 12. Thus there is no force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that this Court should interfere as the impugned transfer order is violative of the transfer policy framed by the respondent authorities. 13. The next submission made on behalf of the employee is that the transfer order would cause great hardship to him and she would be forced to have a second establishment at a far distant place. Appellants wife is getting medical treatment at Basti and education of his children would also be adversely affected. It has also been submitted that the grievances raised by the petitioner as mentioned above, if not resolved, he would suffer an irreparable loss and would not be able to manage his affairs and to look after his family. This aspect was also considered by the Apex Court in State of M. P. v. S. S. Kaurav, AIR 1995 SC 1056 , wherein it has been held that it is not permissible for the Court to go into the relative hardship. It is for the administration to consider the facts of a given case and mitigate the real hardship in the interest of good and efficient administration. Thus, the Court is not inclined to consider this submission at all. 14. It has next been submitted that the transfer order had been made under political pressure at the behest of a local BSP leader, and therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have quashed the impugned transfer order. 15. In Dr. Balkrishna Pandey v. State, 1997 ACJ 1038 a Division Bench of this Court has held that if an employee is at a station for a long time and the transfer is made administratively only on that ground, it cannot be a case of mala fide. 16. In Lokesh Kumar v. State, 1998 (1) AWC 27 this Court has held that transfer in colourable exercise of power without administrative exigency only on political consideration is liable to be set aside. 16. In Lokesh Kumar v. State, 1998 (1) AWC 27 this Court has held that transfer in colourable exercise of power without administrative exigency only on political consideration is liable to be set aside. The transfer of an employee must be made considering the administrative exigency and not at the whim of any politician, including the Ministers, for the reason in such a case transfer order may be passed for extraneous consideration as held by this Court in Director v. Nathi Lal, 1995 (2) UPLBEC 1121. 17. In Pratap Narain Srivastava v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1995 (1) Edu. and Service Cases 509; Pradeep Kumar Agrawal v. Director, (1994) 1 UPLBEC 189; Sheo Kumar Sharma and Ors. v. District Shiksha Adhikari, Kanpur Dehat and Ors. , (1991) 1 UPLBEC 690; Smt Gayatri Devi v. State of U. P. , 1997 (2) UPLBEC 925 , Pradip Kumar v. Director Local Bodies, 1994 (1) UPLBEC 156; Pawan Kumar Srivastava v. U. P. State Electricity Board, 1995 (1) UPLBEC 414 ; Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Basic Shiksha Adhikari, 1991 (1) UPLBEC 69; and Goverdhan Lal v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2000 (2) UPLBEC 1356 it has categorically been held that a transfer order passed under political influence cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 18. In Arvind D. Dhande v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , JT 1997 (6) 229 the Honble Apex Court deprecated and disapproved the transfer of Government servants under the political pressure. 19. Thus in view of the above, undoubtedly, it remains settled legal proposition that Government servants should not be transferred on the will of the politician and transfer orders have to be made as per the administrative requirements. 20. However in the instant case, petitioner has not impleaded the politician belonging to the ruling party of the BSP against whom the allegation of mala fide has been made. Allegations of mala fide cannot be entertained in the manner which has been alleged by the petitioner-appellant. 21. Such a writ petition cannot be entertained on the ground of mala fide unless the party against whom allegations are made is impleaded as respondent by name. (Vide J. M. Banawalikar v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors. , AIR 1996 SC 326 ; State of Bihar and Ors. 21. Such a writ petition cannot be entertained on the ground of mala fide unless the party against whom allegations are made is impleaded as respondent by name. (Vide J. M. Banawalikar v. Municipal Corporation, Delhi and Ors. , AIR 1996 SC 326 ; State of Bihar and Ors. v. P. P. Sharma, 1992 (Suppl) 1 SCC 222; I. K. Mishra v. Union of India and Ors. , (1997) 6 SCC 228 ; and All India State Bank Officers Federation and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , JT 1996 (8) SC 550. 22. In Federation of Officers Association v. Union of India and Ors. , 2003 AIR SCW 1764 the Apex Court has held that the allegation of mala fide has to be specifically made and the person against whom such allegations are made has to be impleaded and in his absence such allegations cannot be taken into consideration. 23. Even otherwise, there is merely a bald statement in the appeal that impugned transfer order has been made at the behest of Shri Yogendra Singh, Ex candidate for State Assembly and under the political pressure of Udyan Minister of State. 24. Allegations made by the appellant-petitioner against Mr. Yogendra Singh are of such a nature that it does not warrant any inquiry on the issue for the reason that the same are not specific and fall short for making any inquiry in this regard. The issue of "malus animus" was considered in Tara Chand Khatri v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 567 , wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that the High Court would be justified in refusing to carry on investigation into the allegation of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima faice case are not given in the writ petition and burden of establishing mala fide lies very heavily on the person who alleges it and there must be sufficient material to establish malus animus. 25. Similarly, in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , the Honble Supreme Court observed as under: "secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. . . . . 25. Similarly, in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 , the Honble Supreme Court observed as under: "secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. . . . . The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charges of unworthy condut against ministers and other, not because of any special status. . . . but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. " 26. The Honble Supreme Court, in M/s. Sukhwinder Pal Bipal Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 65 ; and Shivajirao Nilangerkar Patil v. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosain, AIR 1987 SC 294 ; has made similar observations. 27. In M. Shankarnarayana v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 763 , the Honble Supreme Court observed that the Court may "draw a reasonable inference of mala fide from the facts pleaded and established. But such inference must be based on factual matrix and such factual matrix cannot remain in the realm of institution, surmise or conjecture. " 28. In N. K. Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 98 , the Honble Supreme Court has held that "the inference of mala fides should be drawn by reading in between the lines and taking into account the attendant circumstances. " 29. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material. (Vide State of U. P. v. Dr. V. N. Prasad, 1995 (Suppl) 2 SCC 151; Arvind Dattatrayaya Dhande v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , (1997) 6 SCC 169 ; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193 ; Kiran Gupta and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , (2000) 7 SCC 719 ; and Netai Beg and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (2000) 8 SCC 262 ). 30. , (1997) 6 SCC 169 ; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193 ; Kiran Gupta and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , (2000) 7 SCC 719 ; and Netai Beg and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors. , (2000) 8 SCC 262 ). 30. In State of Punjab v. V. K. Khanna and Ors. , (2001) 2 SCC 330 , the Honble Apex Court examined the issue of bias and mala fide, observing as under: "whereas fairness is synonymous with reasonableness- bias stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word `malice which in common acceptation means and implies `spite or `ill will. One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice and is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there was existing a bias or a mala fide move which results in the miscarriage of justice. . . . . . . In almost all legal inquiries, intention as distinguished from motive is the all-important factor and in common parlance a malicious act stands equated with an intentional act without just cause or excuse. " 31. Similar view has been reiterated in Samant and Anr. v. Bombay Stock Exchange and Anr. , (2001) 5 SCC 323 . 32. In First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. v. Nirodhi Prakash Sangoli and Anr. , (2002) 4 SCC 160 ; and Jasvinder Singh and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2003) 2 SCC 132 , the Apex Court held that burden of proving mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough. Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the Court to substantiate the said allegations. 33. Petitioner was supposed to plead and prove the allegations against the said politician in a proper manner. 34. It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. 34. It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181 , the Honble Supreme Court has observed as under: "in our opinion, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or the counter- affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. There is a distinction between a hearing under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, i. e. a plaint or written statement, the facts and not the evidence are required to be pleaded. In a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit, not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. " 35. Similar view has been reiterated in M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , AIR 1998 SC 1608 ; National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and Ors. , AIR 1998 SC 2779 ; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Ors. , (1999) 1 SCC 141 ; Chitra Kumari v. Union of India and Ors. , AIR 2001 SC 1237 ; and State of U. P. and Ors. v. Chandra Prakash Pandey, AIR 2001 SC 1298 . 36. In Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684 , the Honble Apex Court observed as under: "the findings in the absence of necessary pleadings and supporting evidence cannot be sustained in law. " 37. Similar view has been reiterated in Vithal N. Shetti and Anr. v. Prakash N. Rudrakar and Ors. , (2003) 1 SCC 18 . 38. " 37. Similar view has been reiterated in Vithal N. Shetti and Anr. v. Prakash N. Rudrakar and Ors. , (2003) 1 SCC 18 . 38. In the instant case, as the petitioner has not made any pleading in this respect nor the said politician of the Ruling Party has been impleaded by name, pleas of mala fides are not worth entertaining. 39. Thus in view of the above, the person under whose political influence the impugned transfer order has been passed, has not been impleaded as a party, we are not inclined to entertain the allegations in this respect. 40. In view of the above, as learned Counsel for the appellant could not satisfy the Court as how the judgment and order dated 2-6-2003 passed by the learned Single Judge warrants interference, we are unable to entertain the appeal. It lacks merit and thus rejected accordingly. Appeal dismissed. .