ORDER R.K. Merathia, J. 1. Heard Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G. M. Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Learned, counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is a Registered Trade Union and this case relates to the Senior Operative Trainee/Senior Trainee of the first to 35th batch trained between 1970-1988, The reference to the petitioner, in this case will mean the said members of the petitioner. 3. As submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, the main question involved in this writ petition is whether the period of 1 and 1/2 years, during which the petitioner worked as a Senior Trainee, is to be counted and/or considered for the purpose of his seniority/promotion? 4. The stand of the petitioner is that they were appointed as trainee and were governed by the Service Rules, as per the appointment letter issued to them. Though the appointment letter stipulated about the application of the Service Rules but without any basis, the Management started applying the other provisions. The petitioner moved this Court vide CWJC No. 2235 of 1994 (R). The same was disposed of on 8.2.1996 with an observation that the petitioner should approach the authorities, who may consider the grievances in accordance with law. Pursuant to the said order, a representation was made. The same has been rejected by the impugned order dated 22.7.1996 (Annexure 8). The training is an in service training, and is a feeder post. Petitioners were appointed in substantive capacity on completion of the training. The word absorbed in column No. 5 of the office order dated 28.7.1986 issued by the respondents means that the trainees were treated as regular employees. He further submitted that the said period of training was counted and considered practically for all purposes, such as calculation/payment of Provident Fund and/or gratuity, voluntary retirement, allotment of quarters other incentives, allowances, subsidies and benefits. Learned counsel submitted that as per Section 5 of the Provident Fund Scheme, the same is applicable only to the regular employees and gratuity is payable only against qualifying service of a regular employee. Relying on the aforesaid circumstances, he submitted that the training period was treated by the Management as a service period on quasi permanent post. But only for promotion/seniority, the training period is not considered/counted. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on 1994 Suppl. Relying on the aforesaid circumstances, he submitted that the training period was treated by the Management as a service period on quasi permanent post. But only for promotion/seniority, the training period is not considered/counted. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on 1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 71, Kailash Chandra Rajawat v. Union of India and Anr., to show that the period of temporary duty prior to the regularization is to be taken into consideration for the purpose of promotion. He also relied on (1980) 4 SCC 226 , Baleshwar Dass and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., to show that if a person is appointed substantially on a temporary post, he becomes a member of the service. He lastly relied on 1990 (2) Lab IC 1304, to show that once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to Rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. He further submitted that there was a settlement with the Management on 7.6.1974 between the trainees and the management for counting the training period for seniority/promotion. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the dispute is purely contractual in nature. Only because some benefits have been extended to the trainees also, they cannot claim that the training period should be counted for the purpose of seniority/promotion. He pointed out that the trainee was to be paid a consolidated stipend. The letter of appointment clearly shows that the same was a consolidated letter covering the period of training, and thereafter the period of probation etc. The said letter of appointment takes care of a period of about five years including 1 and 1/2 years of training and also the period of probation etc. Therefore, he argued that in these circumstances, it is clear that the Service Rules of a regular employee will not apply to the trainee. Counsel relied on Clause 12 of the Rules Pertaining to Service Condition of Trainee (Annexure C), which provides about seniority and which reads as follows : "12. Seniority Rules.--If absorbed in the Companys establishment as employee, the seniority will be counted in accordance with the date of joining in the grade. Counsel relied on Clause 12 of the Rules Pertaining to Service Condition of Trainee (Annexure C), which provides about seniority and which reads as follows : "12. Seniority Rules.--If absorbed in the Companys establishment as employee, the seniority will be counted in accordance with the date of joining in the grade. If, however, more than one person join the grade on a single day, their inter-seniority will be determined in accordance with the merit ranking at the end of training as stipulated in Clause 11.3 of assessment rules." Counsel submitted that the seniority/ promotion is to be guided by the said rules on the basis of the date of joining in the grade. The trainees were appointed on a consolidated stipend and not on any grade. He further pointed out to the said office order dated 28.7.1986 (Annexure 2) which shows that after completion of the training, the trainees were appointed to the posts, mentioned in the said office order and were put on different grades. He further pointed out that the said office order shows that the trainees were taken on probation for 12 months. The trainees are taken for the purpose of the requirement of the employment. He also pointed out to Clause 7 of the Standing Orders which qualifies the workmen separately, such a permanent/ probationers, temporary, casual, apprentices or trainees. He further submitted that it is wrong to say that the trainees are holding any post/feeder post. Therefore, he submitted that only when a grade is given to a person, he is given a particular status as an employee. The circumstances pointed out by the petitioner does not establish that the training period has to be taken into consideration, as claimed. He placed the materials on record to show that the letter of appointment and other documents, contemplated the situations which may arise for about five years and therefore, the conditions made in those documents are composite and overlapping both for the training period and the probation period. He further submitted that the trainees are a class in themselves and there is no question of any discrimination. He further submitted that Article 311 of the Constitution of India is not applicable as the petitioner is not a Government employee. He further submitted that the trainees are a class in themselves and there is no question of any discrimination. He further submitted that Article 311 of the Constitution of India is not applicable as the petitioner is not a Government employee. The demand of the petitioner is not supported by any statutory contract/standing order/ rule but the same is based on inferences, which is clearly against clear stipulations regarding the training period as already pointed out. He also submitted that the petitioner is attempting to change the position which has remained in force for about 25 years and if the claim of the petitioner is accepted then it will create this location in the industry and will affect a large number of executives and officers which are not parties before the Court. Learned counsel lastly submitted that the said document (Annexure 4) is simply an advise by the Minister and the same is not a settlement, as claimed by the petitioner. In these circumstances, he supported the impugned order rejecting the claim of the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for respondents distinguished the cases relied on by the petitioner. In the case of Kailash Chandra Rajawat, (supra) the appellant before the Supreme Court was appointed as a Trainee Clerk on temporary basis and he was regularized after about five years. In that circumstances, it was held that the said period was required to be taken into consideration. In the case of Baleshwar Dass, (supra), the workman worked for a long indefinite period as an Assistant Engineer by officiating in substantive capacity. As per learned counsel even as per this judgment the post on substantive capacity is to be counted after the probation is approved. In the case of the Direct Recruit etc., (supra) also, the officiating service prior to regularization was to be counted. 7. I find force in the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents. The said decisions are clearly distinguishable, as indicated above, and are not authorities in support of the claim of the petitioner that the training period should be counted for seniority and promotion. 8. The training period was limited to 1 and 1/2 years. A fixed stipend was to be paid during the said period. Thereafter the trainees, if found successful, were to be appointed on probation on certain grades. Thus it is clear that trainees were not given any grade or post, as such. 8. The training period was limited to 1 and 1/2 years. A fixed stipend was to be paid during the said period. Thereafter the trainees, if found successful, were to be appointed on probation on certain grades. Thus it is clear that trainees were not given any grade or post, as such. Only because certain other benefits were extended to them, during the training period, it does not mean that the training period should be counted also for the purpose of promotion and seniority. It is also clear from Annexure 1, the appointment letter the Bond and other documents that stipulations were made therein not only for the training period but also for the subsequent period of probation etc. of about five years. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trainees are to be guided by the Service Rules, as applicable to the regular employees. They are to be guided by the specific rule made for them as noticed above. 9. On the whole, I find no infirmity or illegality calling for any interference with the impugned order (Annexure 8). In the circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.