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2003 DIGILAW 1383 (PNJ)

Pawan Kumar v. Pushpa Rani

2003-10-08

N.K.SUD

body2003
Judgment N.K.Sud, J. 1. This is tenants appeal against the order of the Appellate Authority, Kaithal dated 28.7.2003 dismissing their appeal against the order of the Rent Controller dated 24.5.2002 ordering their eviction. 2. The respondents had filed an ejectment petition under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short the Act), seeking eviction of the petitioner-tenants from the shop in dispute situated in the main Bazar, Kaithal. The ejectment was sought on four grounds i.e. (i) arrears of rent; (ii) Sub-letting; (in) material alterations and (iv) personal necessity. Grounds (i) and (ii) were not pressed before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller on appreciation of evidence led before her reached the conclusion that the landlady-Sunita Rani required the shop in dispute for her personal necessity and that the southern portion of the shop in dispute had been sublet to petitioner No. 2 and 3. Consequently, she ordered the eviction of the petitioners on these two grounds. 3. Aggrieved by the said order, the tenants filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, Kaithal which has been dismissed vide the impugned order and the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller have been upheld. 4. Mr. Sanjay Bansal, appearing on behalf of the petitioners had challenged both the findings. He contended that the findings recorded by the authorities below are perverse inasmuch as the relevant material has not been taken note of. According to him, the eviction petition was only a device to get the shop vacated as there was no bonafide necessity proved by the landladies. He contended that the case set up by them was that the shop was required for setting up business of the son of respondent-Sunita Rani. He pointed out that the eviction application had been filed on 14.10.1999 on which day Rahul Garg son of Sunita Rani was only a student of B.A.(Final). Thus, according to him, it could not be said that the shop was required for setting up his business. He further pointed out that Rahul Garg in his statement had deposed that he wanted to start a business of dealing in gems and stones for which purpose he had passed a course in gems and gems identification. The learned counsel pointed out that this was factually incorrect as Rahul Garg had failed in the said Course. He further pointed out that Rahul Garg in his statement had deposed that he wanted to start a business of dealing in gems and stones for which purpose he had passed a course in gems and gems identification. The learned counsel pointed out that this was factually incorrect as Rahul Garg had failed in the said Course. Thus, it was contended that he was not in possession of the requisite experience and knowledge for starting the business of gems and stones. He further submitted that the authorities below have failed to take note of the fact that father of Rahul Garg was already running a jewellery shop and, therefore, he could easily work in that shop and engage himself in that business. Even otherwise, since Rahul was unmarried and living with his father who was already running a jewellery shop, it could not be said that he was not occupying any other shop within the meaning of Section 13(a)(i) of the Act. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.K. Veeraraghava Iyengar v. N.V. Prasad, A.I.R. 1994 Supreme Court 2357, to dispute the findings about the bonafide necessity of the shop of landlady-Sunita Rani. 5. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners and find no merit in the same. Both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that respondent-Sunita Rani had been able to prove her case that the demised shop was required for running the business of her only son Rahul Garg. It has been found that there was no evidence to show that her son was working anywhere else. Further, there was no rebuttal evidence to the claim of Sunita Rani and Rahul Garg that they had no other shop for this purpose nor had they vacated any other shop within the municipal limits of Kaithal. It has also come on record that sufficient capital was available with Sunita Rani with which her son could start the business. It has been rightly pointed out that no adverse interference could be drawn from the fact that Rahul had failed in the examination in the course pertaining to gems and gems identification. Both Sunita Rani and Rahul Garg had deposed that Rahul had attended the Course which was factually correct. Even otherwise, passing of the aforesaid course is not a pre-requisite for starting the business in gems and stones. Both Sunita Rani and Rahul Garg had deposed that Rahul had attended the Course which was factually correct. Even otherwise, passing of the aforesaid course is not a pre-requisite for starting the business in gems and stones. In the present case, it stands proved that Rahul had attended the Course in question and, thus, had even the requisite experience. Further, the fact that even his father was in the same business was a factor in his favour. He would also have the advantage of guidance of his father. 6. Similarly, the suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Rahul Garg could as well join his father who was in the same business, is totally devoid of any merit. It is entirely for Rahul Garg to decide as to whether he wants to start his own business or join his father. The occupation of shop by his father could not possibly be treated as occupation of that shop by Rahul Garg. Counsel for the petitioners has not been able to refer to any provision of law or cite any precedent to support this contention. 7. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Veeraraghawa Iyengar (supra) does not advance the case of the petitioners. The claim of the landlord that the demised shop was required for running a jewellery shop was accepted on the ground that the landlord was in possession of the requisite experience and had the financial capacity to run such a business. The objection of the tenant that the eviction petition had been filed with the oblique motive to get the rate of rent enhanced or that there was some portion of the premises falling vacant during the pendency of the proceedings which could be used by the landlord for the aforesaid purpose did not find favour with the Apex Court. Thus, this authority, in fact, goes against the case set up by the petitioners. In the present case also, it stands proved that Rahul Garg has the requisite experience of running the jewellery shop and also has the necessary finances available for that purpose. Thus, no case for interference has been made out in the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the authorities below that the demised premises is required by the landlady-Sunita Rani for setting up the business of her only son. Thus, no case for interference has been made out in the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the authorities below that the demised premises is required by the landlady-Sunita Rani for setting up the business of her only son. The said finding is based on proper appreciation of evidence on record and cannot be interfered with by this Court. It is trite law that under these circumstances this Court cannot reappraise the evidence to reverse the finding of fact concurrently arrived at by the trial court and the first Appellate Court. In Shiv Lal v. Sat Parkash and Anr., 1993 Supp (2) Supreme Court Cases 345, it has been held by the Apex Court that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the High Court does not act as a regular third appellate court and can interfere only within the scope of the sub-section. The High Court cannot re-examine the evidence on record to reverse the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below. Similarly, in Praveen Kumar and Ors. v. Suresh Chand and Ors., 2001 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4779(2), the Supreme Court has observed that in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can interfere only if the trial court is shown to have committed any jurisdictional error or it is shown that its decision would have resulted into any manifest injustice. No such case has been made out before me. 8. Both the authorities below have also ordered the eviction on the grounds of sub letting of the demised premises. They have referred to the relevant material on record for arriving at this finding. However, since I have already upheld the order of eviction on the ground of personal necessity of the landlady-Sunita Rani, it is not necessary for me to go into the question about sub-letting. 9. In the result, the Civil Revision being devoid of any merit is dismissed in limine.