P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) RAJENDRA Kumar, the unsuccessful landlord in both the Courts below is the revision petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 22 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, in short referred to as "act" hereinafter. ( 2 ) THE landlord filed R. C. No. 1386 /86 on the file of IV Additional Rent Controller, hyderabad which was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, the landlord filed r. A. No. 159/90 on the file of Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, which was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, the present Civil Revision petition is filed. ( 3 ) SRI P. R. Prasad, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner made the following submissions. The learned Counsel pointed out that there is default in payment of certain amounts and no doubt Section 11 of the Act was not invoked and there is material definitely to show that the procedure was not followed in payment of rents and hence the default shown should be taken as wilful default. The learned Counsel also commented that though the payment of rent is highly irregular, the Courts below had totally erred in arriving at the conclusion that the payments are regular. The learned Counsel further submitted that mere sending of money orders may not be sufficient. The learned Counsel also had elaborately argued about the need or necessity and had contended that even if it is of joint family, the evidence clearly shows that the ground of bonafide personal requirement of the landlord is well established. The learned Counsel made elaborate submissions in relation to the ground of sub-letting. The learned counsel also had placed strong reliance on several decisions. ( 4 ) PER contra Sri Virendra Kumar, the learned Counsel while making elaborate submissions had contended that none of the grounds had been established. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the findings recorded by both the court of first instance and also the appellate Court and had contended that absolutely there are no grounds to interfere with such concurrent findings. The learned Counsel further submitted that the ground of sub-letting may not be available inasmuch as the allegation is that the wife and certain close relatives were sitting in the shop for running the business. The learned Counsel further submitted that the ground of sub-letting may not be available inasmuch as the allegation is that the wife and certain close relatives were sitting in the shop for running the business. The learned counsel also had placed reliance on several decisions to substantiate his contentions. ( 5 ) THE Revision petitioner/landlord pleaded in R. C. No. 1386/86 as hereunder: it was pleaded that respondent is a tenant of the petitioner in premises no. 1-9-1122/5 situated at Vidyanagar, Hyderabad on a monthly rent of Rs. 135/- exclusive of water and electricity charges. The tenancy month is from the first day of the month to the end of the month according to English calendar. It was further pleaded that on 12-11-1979, the petitioner had filed eviction case against the respondent under Transfer of Property Act in respect of suit premises vide O. S. No. 3786 of 1978 on the file of the V Assistant Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad and on 24-9-1982 the said suit had been decreed directing the respondent to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 300/- per month and also to deliver possession of the suit premises to the petitioner and awarded costs of the suit and against the said Judgment the respondent had filed A. S. No. 406/82 on the file of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the same was dismissed on 16-9-1983 with costs. Against the said Judgment, the respondent had filed Second Appeal in the High Court. Since the premises was constructed in 1966, the petitioner could not execute the orders passed in the suits since section 32 (b) of the Act had been struck down and an observation had been made in the said Judgment by the Apex Court in MOTOR GENERAL TRADERS Vs. STATE OF a. P. that orders which have not become final cannot be executed whereby the suit premises is not governed by the Act. During the pendency of the eviction case and Appeals, the respondent had deposited certain amounts and the same were withdrawn by the petitioner without prejudice to his rights to evict the respondent. The amount now shown due is after deducting the amounts received by the petitioner from the Court. ( 6 ) IT was further pleaded that the respondent was highly irregular in payment of rents for the suit premises. The amount now shown due is after deducting the amounts received by the petitioner from the Court. ( 6 ) IT was further pleaded that the respondent was highly irregular in payment of rents for the suit premises. The respondent had failed and neglected to pay the rents for the suit premises from 1-11-1978 and thus committed default in payment of rents. The default committed by the respondent is wilful and the respondent is liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the ground of wilful default in payment of rents. The respondent is now due and payable a sum of Rs. 5341-50 ps. towards arrears of rent upto 30-11-1984 after deducting the amounts received by the petitioner from the Court. ( 7 ) IT was also further pleaded that the respondent had sub-let the suit premises and is liable to be evicted on this ground. It was also further pleaded that the suit premises is required for his own use for running his iron and steel business and therefore, the respondent is liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement. It was also pleaded that the suit premises was constructed during the year 1966 and yet the Court has jurisdiction to try the eviction petition in the light of the Judgment of the apex Court referred (1) supra. Hence the petitioner prayed the Court to allow the petition and direct the respondent to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises bearing No. 1-9-1122/5, situated at Vidyanagar, Hyderabad to the petitioner and to award costs of the petition. ( 8 ) THE respondent/tenant P. V. Krishnam Raju filed a counter as follows: it was pleaded that the petitioner had not given the required particulars specifically and hence reserving the rights to file further counter as and when the particulars are furnished without calling for the particulars, the counter was filed as the case was finally posted for the counter. It was pleaded that the contents of para 3 of the eviction petition are true and correct to the extent that the respondent is the tenant of the suit premises bearing no. 1-9-1122/5, situated at Vidyanagar, Hyderabad presently on a monthly rent of rs. 135/- per month, payable after the month. No specific date was agreed or fixed. It was pleaded that the contents of para 3 of the eviction petition are true and correct to the extent that the respondent is the tenant of the suit premises bearing no. 1-9-1122/5, situated at Vidyanagar, Hyderabad presently on a monthly rent of rs. 135/- per month, payable after the month. No specific date was agreed or fixed. The electricity charges are payable to the Electricity Department directly by the tenant and there is no water supply to the premises. It was specifically denied that the monthly rent excludes any water charges. It was specifically pleaded that no other charges are payable. ( 9 ) IT was further pleaded that the petitioner in order to extract exorbitant rents, under the threat of eviction, had filed a case O. S. No. 3736/78 on the file of V assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for eviction in respect of the premises under the occupation of the respondent. The said suit was contested on a number of grounds, but as no protection was available to the tenant, the same was decreed. Against the said Judgment, the respondent herein had filed a. S. No. 406/82 on the file of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and the same was dismissed on 16-9-1983 with costs. Against the said Judgment, the respondent had filed S. A. No. 670/83 and stay was granted in C. M. P. No. 12110/83 on 15-11-1983. Since Section 32 (b) of the Act had been struck down with an observation that the orders which have not become final cannot be executed, the petitioner had filed this eviction case on false grounds. ( 10 ) IT was further pleaded that during the pendency of the case and upto the judgment in Appeal, all the rents were deposited to the account of the suit which were withdrawn by the petitioner and subsequently the rents were deposited in R. C. No. 297/84 before the I Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad which was filed for depositing rents and as a counter blast to the said case for depositing rents, the present eviction case was filed after receiving notice thereof. But, there are no amounts due to the petitioner as explained above. The respondent/tenant denied that he is a defaulter, muchless a wilful defaulter in payment of rents at any time from 1-11-1978. But, there are no amounts due to the petitioner as explained above. The respondent/tenant denied that he is a defaulter, muchless a wilful defaulter in payment of rents at any time from 1-11-1978. It was also denied that the respondent had neglected to pay the monthly rents of the suit premises from 1-11-1978 and thus committed wilful default. The respondent was diligent in payment of rents throughout the tenancy and after the eviction notice, when the petitioner refused receiving the rents, the rents were sent by money orders which were also were refused and subsequently as stated above, all the rents were deposited in the Court and there are no arrears and it is categorically denied that the respondent is in arrears of any amount, much less Rs. 5331-50 ps. , the details of which are not given by the petitioner and hence the petitioner is called upon to prove them strictly. ( 11 ) THE respondent further denied he had sub-let the premises and that the allegation is only an after thought and imaginary. The respondent denies that the petitioner requires the suit premises for any personal requirement, much less for his iron and steel business, as alleged. The petitioner is a member of a family owning a number of mulgies in Nallakunta, Vidyanagar and Chappal Bazar areas and he is doing business in his own mulgi which is sufficient and hence the petitioner is called upon to prove strictly that he requires the premises for his iron and steel business. It was further pleaded that contents of paras 8 and 9 of the eviction petition are legal and formal which do not call for any specific reply. The relief prayed for cannot be granted as there are no just and sufficient grounds and hence the petition is liable to be dismissed with costs. ( 12 ) BEFORE the learned Rent Controller, PW-1 and PW-2 and RW-1 and RW-2 were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-4 and Exs. R-1 to R-67 were marked. The learned Rent controller, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the aforesaid R. C. C. and aggrieved by the same R. A. No. 159/90 was preferred. ( 12 ) BEFORE the learned Rent Controller, PW-1 and PW-2 and RW-1 and RW-2 were examined and Exs. P-1 to P-4 and Exs. R-1 to R-67 were marked. The learned Rent controller, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the aforesaid R. C. C. and aggrieved by the same R. A. No. 159/90 was preferred. The appellate authority after framing the Points for consideration, had answered in detail Point No. 1 at paras 8 and 9, Point No. 2 at para 10 and Point No. 3 at para 11 and ultimately arrived at the conclusion that absolutely there are no reasons to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and had confirmed the same. Assailing the said orders, the present Civil Revision petition was preferred by the landlord. ( 13 ) THE landlord as PW-1 deposed that the respondent/tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent from 1-11-1978 to 30-11-1984. PW-1 also deposed that he filed O. S. No. 3736/78 on the file of V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad on 12-11-1979 and the landlord also claimed mesne profits in the said suit and the suit was decreed on 25-9-1982 and aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred A. S. No. 406/82 on the file of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad which was dismissed on 16-3-1983 and aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred s. A. No. 670/83 on the file of this Court and had obtained interim stay in c. M. P. No. 11120/83. Subsequent thereto, in view of the changed legal position, ultimately the tenant was successful and as a result the landlord was driven to rent Control proceedings. RW-1 deposed that he had originally obtained the petition schedule mulgi from the father of PW-1 and PW-2 was collecting rents from him. RW-1 also deposed that he had not committed any default in payment of rent during the pendency of the suit. From the material available on record, it is clear that the tenant was tendering rent by money order as evidenced by Exs. R-1 to R-53. The conduct of the landlord is definitely blameworthy since it is shown that inasmuch as the landlord was bent upon throwing the tenant out, he had not received the rents. From the material available on record, it is clear that the tenant was tendering rent by money order as evidenced by Exs. R-1 to R-53. The conduct of the landlord is definitely blameworthy since it is shown that inasmuch as the landlord was bent upon throwing the tenant out, he had not received the rents. Further, the refusal by the landlord was after notice of termination of tenancy and during the pendency of the civil suit referred to supra. No doubt, serious attempt was made to convince this Court that the step by step procedure was not followed as contemplated under Section 8 of the Act and automatically it would amount to wilful default. In E. PALANISAMY Vs. PALANISAMY (DEAD) BY L. RS. AND others while dealing with Sections 8 and 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control ) Act, 1960, the Apex Court held at para 5 :"mr. SAMPATH, the learned Counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i. e. , to deposit rent in Court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal and Anr. Reported in 1996 (1) SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu reported in 1996 (6) SCC 228 . " ( 14 ) IN the commentary on Law of Rent Control in Andhra Pradesh, by me, 5th Edition, at page 181, it is stated :"the term wilful can be understood in contradiction to the words accidental or inadvertant . wilful connotes something which is done without lawful excuse and which is intentional (Rice Vs. Connolly - 1966 (2) All. E. R. 649 ). Wilful is a word of familiar use in every branch of law and although in some branches of law, it may have a special meaning, it generally, as used in courts of law, implies nothing blamable, but merely that the person of whose action or default the expression is used is a free agent and that what has been done arises from the spontaneous action of his will. It amounts to nothing more than this that he knows that he is doing and intends to do what he is doing and is a free agent (In Re Young and Hartson - 31 Ch. D. 174 ). The expression wilfully can be understood in the contest of mental element of a man who refused to make the payment deliberately after considering the facts (Awtar Krishan Vs. State - air 1957 All. 88 ). wilful default is default committed intentionally and wilfully (Gangadhar Sahoo Vs. D. 174 ). The expression wilfully can be understood in the contest of mental element of a man who refused to make the payment deliberately after considering the facts (Awtar Krishan Vs. State - air 1957 All. 88 ). wilful default is default committed intentionally and wilfully (Gangadhar Sahoo Vs. A. R. M. Patro - AIR 1970 Orissa 66 ). wilful default may mean default in payment of rent at the stipulated time without valid reasons (Rajeshwari Vs. Wasoomal - AIR 1983 Madras 97 ). The default can be regarded as wilful where the conductot tenant is such as to lead to the conclusion that his omission was a conscious act of breach of obligation to pay the rent or reckless indifference (Khivraj Vs. Manakal - AIR 1966 Madras 67 ). " ( 15 ) IN S. SUNDARAM Vs. V. R. PATTABHIRAM while dealing with the expression wilful default , the Apex Court held at paras 22 to 25 : "in other words, wilful default would mean a deliberate and intentional default knowing full well the legal consequences thereof. In words and phrases , Volume 11a (Permanent Edition) at page 268 the word default has been defined as the non-performance of a duty, a failure to perform a legal duty or an omission to do something required. In Volume 45 of words and Phrases , the word wilful has been very clearly defined thus : wilful - intentinal; not incidental or involuntary; - done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently; - in common parlance word wilful is used in sense of intentional, as distinguished from accidental or involuntary. P. 296 - "wilful" refers to act consciously and deliberately done and signifies course of conduct marked by exercise of volition rather than which is accidental, negligent or involuntary. ( 16 ) IN Volume III of Webster s Third New International Dictionary at page 2617, the word wilful has been defined thus :"governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed". The word default has been defined in Vol. ( 16 ) IN Volume III of Webster s Third New International Dictionary at page 2617, the word wilful has been defined thus :"governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason; obstinately or perversely self-willed". The word default has been defined in Vol. I of Webster s Third New international Dictionary at page 590 thus:"to fail to fulfil a contract or agreement, to accept a responsibility; to fail to meet a financial obligation" ( 17 ) IN Black s Law Dictionary (4th Edition) at page 1773 the word wilful has been defined thus : "wilfulness" implies an act done intentionally and designedly; a conscious failure to observe care; Conscious; knowing; done with stubborn purpose, but not with malice. The word "reckless" as applied to negligence, is the legal equivalent of "wilful" or "wanton". ( 18 ) THUS, a consensus of the meaning of the words willful default appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other acts referred to above. " ( 19 ) IT may be that the tenant had not followed the procedure step by step. But however, in the light of the meaning of the word "wilful" and in the light of the events which had been narrated in detail supra, at the best, even if the serious contention raised by the Counsel for the landlord is taken into consideration, in the light of the series of events and peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, even if there is some default, the same cannot be styled as "wilful default". Both the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority had discussed the chronology of events and also the deposit of rents made by the tenant and taking into consideration the conduct of the landlord, ultimately had arrived at a conclusion that there is no wilful default on the part of the tenant. Both the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority had discussed the chronology of events and also the deposit of rents made by the tenant and taking into consideration the conduct of the landlord, ultimately had arrived at a conclusion that there is no wilful default on the part of the tenant. In the light of the concurrent findings by both the courts below relating to the ground of wilful default, I do not see any reason to disturb such concurrent findings in the present Revision. The landlord also sought eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting. ( 20 ) AS can be seen from the petition presented by the landlord for eviction, the ground of sub-letting was pleaded by way of an addition only in manuscript. Whatever it may be, this ground also was raised. It is not in dispute that the tenant is working as a Lecturer and his wife, undivided brother and sister-in-law are doing business in the demised premises to the knowledge of the landlord. But however, it is made a ground now for getting the tenant evicted from the premises. In SMT. KRISHNAWATI Vs. SHRI HANS RAJ while dealing with the ground of sub-letting in a case where the wife rented a shop and the shop was being conducted by her husband, under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, the apex Court held :"sub-LETTING like letting, is a particular type of demise of immovable property and is distinct from permissive user like that of a licensee. If two persons live together in a house as husband wife and if one of them who owns the house allows the other to carry on business in a part of it, it will be, in the absence of any other evidence, a rash inference to draw that the owner has let out that part of the premises. Since it was not the case of anybody in the instant case that the appellant wife was the owner of the business carried on and she had let in business carried on and she had let in her husband into possession ostensibly as a partner in the business but really for the purpose of sub-letting, sub-section (4) of Section 14 has no application to the facts of this case. " ( 21 ) IN the present case, no doubt, the plea itself is as vague as vagueness can be and the only allegation is that the wife, undivided brother and sister-in-law are doing business on behalf of the tenant. At any stretch of imagination, this cannot be held to be sub-letting at all and hence the concurrent findings relating to the ground of sub-letting also do not deserve any disturbance in the present Civil Revision Petition. ( 22 ) YET another ground raised by the landlord is bonafide personal requirement. PW-1 deposed that he is doing business in the premises belonging to his brother pw-2 and PW-2 also stated that the premises in which PW-1 is transacting the business belongs to him. PW-2 deposed that there was partition and PW-1 also had asserted the same. But however, the said partition deed was not produced. On the contrary, RW-1 had deposed that these brothers continue to live jointly and they are having several mulgies at Nallakunta, Vidyanagar and Chappal Bazar. In SMT. G. KAUSALYA DEVI Vs. GHANSHYAMDAS it was held :"section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act provides when the landlord requires the building whether residential or non-residential for his own occupation he may apply for eviction of tenant in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise. The expression "to the possession of which he is entitled" would not mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity or having a superior right or under any of the grounds under the Act. Provisions of Section 8 (3) (a) (ii) of the Mysore Act are quite in pari materia with the provisions of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. Therefore, merely because the landlord is already having his business in a leased premises of which he is in possession, it cannot be said that he cannot seek eviction of the tenant. It is not disputed that other conditions of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) are satisfied in favour of the landlord. The Act did not prohibit eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the landlord possessed other non-residential premises. It is not disputed that other conditions of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) are satisfied in favour of the landlord. The Act did not prohibit eviction of the tenant by the landlord if the members of the family of the landlord possessed other non-residential premises. Even though the landlord and his brothers were conducting business on partnership in leased premises yet it was no ground to contend that the requirements of landlord is not bona fide. " ( 23 ) RELIANCE also was placed on M. ARUL JOTHI Vs. LAJJA BAL. In CHILLAMPALLY eshwaraiah (DIED) PER L. RS. Vs. GANGARAM SANGHI it was held :"the joint interest of the landlord in another building in his occupation along with others does not preclude the landlord from evicting the tenant from a building exclusively belonging to him. The premises in question is the only building owned by the landlord and there is no evidence to show that he is having a share in the other building owned by his father. The landlord is therefore not precluded from evicting the tenant. The requirement of the landlord is bona fide as he is entitled to live in the premises exclusively belonging to him and not be driven to the necessity of living along with his mother. " ( 24 ) IN the present case, the landlord had not taken a specific plea about the partition and the demised premises falling to his share. The evidence of RW-1 is clear and categorical in this regard and the evidence of PW-1 discloses that the joint family has several mulgies. In the light of both oral and documentary evidence, on appreciation of the whole evidence available on record in detail, concurrent findings had been recorded by both the courts below and in the light of the reasons recorded, I am of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case where such findings can be disturbed while exercising Revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. Hence, the said findings are hereby confirmed. ( 25 ) VIEWED from any angle, the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same shall stand dismissed. No costs.