( 1 ) G. NATHMAL, the unsuccessful tenant in both the Courts below filed this revision petition under Section 22 of the A. P. Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter in short referred as the Act for the purpose of convenience ). ( 2 ) SRI D. Niranjana Rao, the original landlord died during the pendency of C. R. P. and through C. M. P. No. 22410/2001 his legal representatives were brought on record. The landlord D. Niranjana Rao filed R. C. No. 839 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Rent control, Hyderabad for the relief of eviction of tenant on the ground of wilful default and also on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The tenant filed a counter and he had specifically denied the ownership of d. Niranjana Rao and also denied that he is the landlord. The learned Rent Controller had recorded the evidence of P. W. 1 and also r. W. 1 and R. W. 2 and marked Exs. P-1 to p-6 and R-1 to R-35 and ultimately came to the conclusion that the denial of the title of the landlord by the tenant is not bona fide and ultimately had ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the tenant preferred r. A. No. 567 of 1995 on the file of the additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes court, Hyderabad, the appellate authority and the appellate authority also after discussing this aspect in detail had confirmed the order of the Rent Controller and aggrieved by the same, the present revision petition is filed under Section 22 of the Act. ( 3 ) SRI P. R. Balarami Reddy, learned counsel representing revision petitioner/ tenant made the following submissions. The learned counsel pointed out the relevant portion of the evidence of P. W. 1, R. W. 1 and r. W. 2 and had contended that the relationship of landlord and tenant had not been specifically denied. The learned counsel also further contended that the denial of title is not a ground at all for eviction of tenant under the pretext that the material available on record would disclose such denial of title. The counsel also pointed out that though ex.
The learned counsel also further contended that the denial of title is not a ground at all for eviction of tenant under the pretext that the material available on record would disclose such denial of title. The counsel also pointed out that though ex. P-l the alleged rental agreement was relied upon on the ground that there is no specific denial, the tenant never expected the same and this aspect was lost sight of by both the Courts below. The learned counsel further pointed out that the conduct of the parties also may have to be taken into consideration and the bona fides of the tenant can be culled out from the fact that he himself filed R. C. praying for permission to deposit the rents and in this background, at any rate it cannot be said that the ground of denial of title not being bona fide cannot be said to have been attracted. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel also placed strong reliance on the decisions in C. Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan and in R. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lap. The learned counsel also made an attempt to explain the scope and ambit of revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. ( 5 ) ON the contrary, Sri P. S. Murthy, learned counsel representing the legal representatives of the original landlord Sri D. Niranjan Rao made the following submissions: The learned counsel in all his fairness submitted that the other grounds of wilful default and bonafide personal requirement have not been discussed at length in view of the fact that the ground of denial of the title had been well established and hence both the Courts below had recorded a concurrent finding in this regard and the said finding being predominantly a finding of fact, the same cannot be disturbed while exercising revisional jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance in Majati subbaraov. Krishna Rao. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to para 3 of the counter filed by the tenant where there is a specific denial. The learned counsel for respondent would maintain that the ground of denial of title may have to be determined from the stand taken by the tenant in his pleadings and subsequent thereto in evidence.
Krishna Rao. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to para 3 of the counter filed by the tenant where there is a specific denial. The learned counsel for respondent would maintain that the ground of denial of title may have to be determined from the stand taken by the tenant in his pleadings and subsequent thereto in evidence. The learned counsel for respondent also had taken me through the evidence of p. W. 1 where specific suggestions were put to P. W. 1 in cross-examination, which are clearly suggestive of the denial of title of the landlord not being bona fide. The learned counsel for respondent has also drawn my attention to the evidence of R. W. 1 and r. W. 2 in this regard and the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and also by the appellate authority. ( 6 ) HEARD both sides and perused the findings recorded by the learned Principal rent Control, Hyderabad and Additional chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, the original as well as the appellate authority, respectively, and also the oral and documentary evidence available on record. ( 7 ) THE landlord had filed R. C. No. 839 of 1991 on the file of Principal Rent Control, hyderabad. It is pleaded in the petition that the respondent is tenant in respect of mulgi bearing No. 8-3-940/3, situated at Ameerpet, hyderabad, on a monthly rent of Rs. 250/- payable on or before 5th of every calender month vide rental agreement dated 16-11-1978, that he authorised his brother, sri D. Narsimha Rao, who is residing near the premises, to collect rents and pass rent receipts on behalf of the petitioner, that the respondent withheld the rents intentionally from September, 1986 onwards, that the respondent filed a petition in R. C. No. 1183/1988 against him to deposit rent and it was allowed on 31-7-1989 without prejudice to the rights of both parties and that after R. C. 1183/88 was allowed, he furnished his bank account on 7-3-1990 and the respondent has not been depositing rents regularly in the bank account furnished by him. He finally, alleged that the respondent committed wilful default in payment of rents from September, 1986 onwards and so, the respondent is liable for eviction.
He finally, alleged that the respondent committed wilful default in payment of rents from September, 1986 onwards and so, the respondent is liable for eviction. He also alleged that he is an Advocate practising in the courts and he desires to establish his office in the mulgi which is in possession of the respondent and that he is not in occupation any other mulgi of his own in twin cities and that his requirement is bona fide. ( 8 ) THE respondent-tenant filed a counter denying the title and taking the stand that he obtained the premises on lease from one d. Narsimha Rao. It was pleaded in the counter that "he obtained the mulgi bearing no. 8-3-940/2, situated at Ameerpet Cross Road from D. Narsimha Rao in August, 1976 for his business purpose and subsequently in November, 1978 he obtained the suit schedule mulgi i. e. 8-3-940/3, from Sri D. Narsimha Rao abutting the mulgi No. 8-3-940/2 as an additional accommodation on a monthly rent of Rs. 250/- and paid Rs. 5,000/- towards deposit to the said narsimha Rao for the suit mulgi. He also stated that after sometime, the said Narsimha Rao requested him to pay rents in respect of the suit mulgi to the petitioner herein as they made a family arrangement to that effect mother of the petitioner or to the brothers of the petitioner. He also stated that the petitioner is put to strict proof of the execution of the rental agreement dated 16-1-1978 and that he is not aware whether the petitioner has au thorised his brother, D. Narsimha rao, to collect rents and pass receipts on behalf of the petitioner. He also stated that he paid rents upto August, 1988 and that as the petitioner as well as his brother, D. Narasimha Rao, on 10-10-1988 requested them to decide between themselves who is entitled to receive rents from him for the suit mulgi, and that the petitioner gave a reply notice without furnishing the bank account, that he remitted the rent for premises no. 8-3-940/3, through M. O. to the petitioner for the month of Dec.
8-3-940/3, through M. O. to the petitioner for the month of Dec. 88 but the petitioner refused to receive the same, that thereafter, he filed a deposit rent petition in R. C. 1183/88 and he deposited rents to the credit of above R. C. upto March, 1990 and that he has been depositing rents in the bank account furnished by the petitioner since April, 1990 and he has not committed any default in payment of rents. He denied that the requirement of thepetitioner isbonafideand that thepetitioner is having other mulgies in twin cities. He also stated that the petitioner is neither the owner nor land lord of the demised premises. " ( 9 ) THE evidence of P. W. 1 and also R. W. 1 and R. W. 2 had been recorded and Ex. P-1 to p-6 and Exs. R-1 to R-35 were marked on their behalf. ( 10 ) ON appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Rent Controller on the ground that the denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is not bona fide, ultimately ordered eviction which was confirmed by the appellate authority as well. As can be seen from the pleadings in the counter itself, there is a specific denial and apart from that, even in the cross-examination of P. W. 1, several suggestions were put stating that the property belongs to Endowments department and also the property belongs to Government. Thus, apart from the specific denial, these suggestions which are specifically denied by P. W. I clearly go to show that the tenant had denied the title of the landlord mala fide. Apart from this aspect of the matter, Ex. P-l dated 16-11-1978 rental agreement was not specifically denied. It is also pertinent to note that R. W. 2 deposed in his cross-examination that the tenant might have executed the said rental agreement. In the light of the same, the Courts below are well justified in placing reliance on Ex. P-l and apart from this, in the light of the evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 and also the specific stand taken in the counter, I am thoroughly satisfied that the denial of title of Niranjana rao by the tenant G. Nathamal is definitely not bona fide.
P-l and apart from this, in the light of the evidence of P. W. 1 and R. W. 1 and also the specific stand taken in the counter, I am thoroughly satisfied that the denial of title of Niranjana rao by the tenant G. Nathamal is definitely not bona fide. It is needless to say that it is a question of fact and both the Courts concurrently recorded finding in this regard which need not be disturbed while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act. ( 11 ) IN Majati Subbarao v. Krishna Rao (3 supra), the Apex Court held:"the finding that the denial of title was not bona fide is essentially a finding of fact and fairly enough no dispute has been raised by learned counsel for the appellant in respect of that finding. It is, however, submitted by him that in order to constitute a ground for eviction the denial of title must be anterior to the filing of the eviction petition and a denial of title in the course of eviction petition would not constitute a ground for eviction. He drew our attention to the provisions of Section 10 of the Andhra pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the A. P. Rent Act" ). The a. P. Rent Act was enacted with a view to consolidate the law relating to regulation of leasing of buildings, control of rent thereof and prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 10 of the A. P. Rent Act deals with eviction of tenants. Sub-section (1) of that section prohibits eviction of tenants except in accordance with the provisions of that section or Sections 12 and 13 of that Act. The relevant part of sub-section (2) of section 10 of the A. P. Rent Act runs as follows: " (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied. (i) to (v) xxxxxxxxx (vi) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide.
If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application is satisfied. (i) to (v) xxxxxxxxx (vi) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide. The Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application. " it was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the ground for eviction must come into existence before the application to the Rent Controller for eviction is made and hence, a denial of title which can be relied upon by the landlord-respondent for eviction must be anterior to the eviction petition. " ( 12 ) IN Dr. Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal (2 supra) the Apex Court held that the question of title to the property not germane and may be examined incidentally but cannot be decided finally in the eviction suit. ( 13 ) IN C. Chandramohan v. Sengottaiyan (1 supra) the Apex Court while dealing with similar petition under T. N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 held that in order to invoke this ground the landlord must establish the twin requirements; (i) denial of title of landlord or claim by tenant of a right of permanent tenancy, and (ii) that such denial or claim was not bona fide. The learned counsel representing the tenant placed strong reliance on certain observations made by the Apex Court in this decision and submitted that in the light of the ratio laid down in the above decisions and in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held that the denial of title is mala fide. Since the stand taken by the tenant is that the premises was let out by one narsimha Rao, it cannot be taken as specific denial. In the light of above facts, I am unable to accept the said contention for the reason that not only Ex. P-1 was executed, but he had himself filed R. C. praying for permission to deposit the rents.
In the light of above facts, I am unable to accept the said contention for the reason that not only Ex. P-1 was executed, but he had himself filed R. C. praying for permission to deposit the rents. In para 3 of the counter the specific stand was taken that Niranjana rao is not the landlord and not satisfied with it, when Niranjana Rao was examined as p. W. 1, repeated suggestions were put to him denying the ownership on the ground that the property belongs to some devotees or Endowment Department or the government. If this conduct does not amount to mala fide denial of title, I do not see any other appropriate case where this Court can arrive at a conclusion that the denial of title is made fide. Hence, I am thoroughly satisfied that this is a fit case where the tenant had denied the title of the landlord mala fide attracting the ground for eviction under section 10 of the Act. ( 14 ) IN the light of concurrent findings recorded by both the Courts below, I am not inclined to disturb the said findings and the same are hereby confirmed. Consequent thereupon, the C. R. P. shall stand dismissed as being devoid of merits with costs. The tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises.