Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2003 DIGILAW 1396 (PNJ)

Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab

2003-10-08

JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR

body2003
JUDGMENT J.S. Khehar, J. - Learned counsel for the appellants does not contest the quantum of compensation determined by the Additional District Judge, Faridkot, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The only contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is for higher solatium as envisaged under Section 23(1A)(2) of the Act as amended on 24.9.1984 as well as higher interest in terms of Sections 28 and 34 of the Act as amended on 24.9.1984. 2. The facts noticed in the impugned award reveal that the acquisition was made on the basis of a notification dated 26.12.1977 issued under Section 4 of the Act. The Land Acquisition Collector PWD (Building and Roads Branch), Jullundur, by his award dated 22.10.1979, assessed compensation at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- per acre for Chahi land, Rs. 8000/- per acre for Barani land and Rs. 4800/- per acre for Gair Mumkin Rasta. The Reference Court, upon filing of applications under Section 18 of the Act, assessed the market value of Chahi land at Rs. 36,500/- per acre and Barani land at Rs. 20,000/- per acre and in doing so found the appellants entitled to solatium at the rate of 15% and interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation up to the date of payment. The Additional District Judge, Faridkot, announced the award in response to the applications under Section 18 of the Act on 22.11.1982. 3. The issue of applicability of the amended provisions relating to solatium came to be adjudicated upon by the Apex Court by a Constitution Bench in Union of India and another v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1933 : 1989(1) RRR 552 (SC), wherein the Apex Court recorded that enhanced solatium must be confined to an award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between 30.1.1982 and 24.9.1981 in respect of the pendency of proceedings by way of reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Court observed as under :- "... The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. The Court observed as under :- "... The learned Judges proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the general principle that the appeal is a re-hearing of the original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the respondents points out, that the word or has been used in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to the award made by the Collector or the Court and an order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean that the period 30 April, 1982 to 24 September, 1984 is as much applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be available to an award by the Collector or the Court made between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between the said two dates. The word or is used with reference to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award of the Collector or of the Court made between the aforesaid two dates, if the proceeding has pased to the stage of appeal before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984." 4. But in every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court must have been made between 30 April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984." 4. The applicability of the amendment to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 relating to the introduction of Section 23(2) again came up for consideration before the Apex Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others, AIR 1995 SC 581, wherein the Supreme Court expressed the legal position as under :- "The conflict of decision as to whether Section 23(2) as amended by Section 15(b) of the Amendment Act through Section 30(2) of the transitory provisions would be applicable to the pending appeals in the High Court and the Supreme Court was resolved in the Raghuvir Singhs case, AIR 1989 SC 1933 by the Constitution Bench holding that the award of the Collector or the Court made between April, 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 would alone get attracted to Section 30(2) of the transitory provision. The restricted interpretation would not be understood to mean that Section 23(2) would not apply to the awarded decree of the civil court pending at the time when the Act has come into force or thereafter. In this case, admittedly the award of the civil Court was after the Act has come into force, namely, February 28, 1985. Therefore, if the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation, is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the Court shall direct to pay interest on such excess at the rate of 9% per annum from the date on which the Collector took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into the Court. By operation of the proviso, if such excess or any part thereof is paid into the Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which compensation is taken, interest at the rate of 15% per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into the Court before the date of such expiry. Accordingly, the appellant is entitled to the enhanced interest @ 9% from the date of taking possession, namely, January 15, 1981 and March 11, 1981 respectively for one year @ 9% and thereafter @ 15% till the date of the deposit made by the Collector. Admittedly, the deposit of the enhanced compensation was made on October 20, 1986 and December 3, 1986, therefore, the interest shall be calculated at the enhanced rates for the aforesaid record. 5. Since in the present case the civil Court decided the application moved under Section 18 of the Act on 22.11.1982, it is evident that the appellants- claimants are entitled to the benefit of the amended provision of Section 23(2) of the Act. 6. Insofar as the benefit of Section 23(1-A) of the Act introduced by the same amendment is concerned, the issue was adjudicated upon and determined by the Apex Court in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala and others, JT 1994(6) SC 182, wherein the Court has observed as under :- "... We find no merit in this contention. It was open to Parliament to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) only to awards whether of the Collector or the Court made after the commencement of the amending Act ..... Merely because Parliament has decided to give a limited retrospectivity so as to cover awards that were made by the Collector during the period from April 30, 1982, when the original Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha till the date of the commencement of the amending Act would not result in the said provisions being infected with the vice of arbitrariness. The choice of April 30, 1982, the date on which the original Bill was introduced in Parliament, cannot be said to be arbitrary and confining the ambit of retrospectivity so as to exclude awards made by Collector prior to April 30, 1982, would not render the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional. The question of expanding the field of retrospectivity so as to cover all the awards made by the Collector prior to the commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date when they were made, therefore, does not arise. The question of expanding the field of retrospectivity so as to cover all the awards made by the Collector prior to the commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date when they were made, therefore, does not arise. For the reasons aforementioned it must be concluded that in respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the Amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Section 23(1- A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. Zora Singh (supra) insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the reference court on September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law." 7. Since the Land Acquisition Collectors award dated 22.10.1979 in the instant case precedes April 30, 1982 i.e. the date when the original bill for amending the provision of the Land Acquisition Act so as to introduce Section 23(1-A) of the Act was introduced, the appellants-claimants would not be entitled to the benefit conceived of under Section 23(1-A) of the Act. 8. Insofar as the benefit of Section 28 of the Act, introduced by the same amendment is concerned, the issue was adjudicated upon and determined by the Apex Court in Sunder v. Union of India, AIR 2001 SC 3516, wherein the Apex Court relying on a Division Bench of this Court observed as under :- "We think it useful to quote the reasoning advanced by Chief Justice S.S. Sandhawalia of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in State of Haryana v. Smt. Kailashwati, AIR 1980 Puj. and Har. 117, Para 10 (supra) : "Once it is held as it inevitably must be that the solatium provided for under Section 23(2) of the Act forms an integral and statutory part of the compensation awarded to a landowner, then from the plain terms of Section 28 of the Act, it would be evident that the interest is payable on the compensation awarded and not merely on the market value of the land. Indeed the language of Section 28 does not even remotely refer to market value alone and in terms talks of compensation or the sum equivalent thereto. Indeed the language of Section 28 does not even remotely refer to market value alone and in terms talks of compensation or the sum equivalent thereto. The interest awardable under Section 28 therefore would include within its ambit both the market value and the statutory solatium. It would be thus evident that the provisions of Section 28 in terms warrant and authorise the grant of interest on solatium as well." In our view the aforesaid statement of law is in accord with the sound principle of interpretation. Hence the person entitled to the compensation awarded is also entitled to get interest on the aggregate amount including solatium. The reference is answered accordingly." 9. In view of the declaration of law on the issue in question by the Apex Court extracted above, it is obvious that the appellants having been found entitled to additional benefits under the amended provision of Section 23(2) of the Act would also be entitled to the benefits under Section 28 of the Act. 10. Insofar as the benefit of Section 33 of the Act introduced by the same amendment is concerned, the issue was adjudicated upon and determined by the Apex Court in Sunders case (supra), wherein the Court observed as under :- "The proviso to Section 34 of the Act makes the position further clear. The proviso says that "if such compensation" is not paid within one year from the date of taking possession of the land, interest shall stand escalated to 15% per annum from the date of expiry of the said period of one year "on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry." It is inconceivable that the solatium amount would attract only the escalated rate of interest from the expiry of one year and that there would be no interest on solatium during the preceding period. What the legislature intended was to make the aggregate amount under Section 23 of the Act to reach the hands of the persons as and when the award is passed, at any rate as soon as he is deprived of the possession of his land. Any delay in making payment of the said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. Any delay in making payment of the said sum should enable the party to have interest on the said sum until he receives the payment. Splitting up the compensation into different components for the purpose of payment of interest under Section 34 was not in the contemplation of the legislature when that section was framed or enacted." 11. In view of the declaration of law on the issue in question by the Apex Court extracted above, it is obvious that the appellants having been found entitled to additional benefits under the amended provision of Section 23(2) of the Act would also be entitled to the benefits under section 34 of the Act. In view of the above, the instant appeal is allowed. The appellants-claimants are held entitled to the benefits of the amended provisions of Sections 23(2), 28 and 34 of the Act. Appeal allowed.