( 1 ) THE petitioners challenge the letter dated 4-4-1998 addressed by the commissioner of Hyderabad, informing them that their land has not been acquired and that no compensation needs to be paid to them. ( 2 ) THE facts, which gave rise to filing of this writ petition, may briefly be stated as under:- the petitioners are the owners of 13,400 sq. yards of land in Sy. No. 137 of Mojal nampally Bagat (at present naray anguda), abutting the University road. According to them, 1500 sq. yards of land, out of the same, has been taken over by the Municipal Corporation of hyderabad, in the year 1974, for the purpose of widening the road and for providing footpaths, without acquiring the same. The petitioners got issued notices and submitted applications in this regard. When there was no response, they filed W. P. No. 6321/1980 seeking a direction to the respondents to initiate proceedings under the Land acquisition Act (for short the Act ) in respect of the land. They have also filed w. P. No. 3165/1985 claiming market value for the land that was unathorisedly occupied by the respondents. Bom the writ petitions were disposed of through a common order dated 28-6-1989. It was observed therein that it is not possible for mis court to direct the respondents to initiate proceedings under the Act, since the writ petitions were filed atavery belated stage-nearly after 19 years. However, it was left open to the petitioners to approach the Mayor of the Corporation for settlement of the matter. ( 3 ) THE pentionersclaim to have submitted a representation to the Mayor. There was no improvement in the matter. Therefore, the petitioners filed W. P. No. 8774/1992 seeking the relief in the form of a direction to the respondents to pay compensation for the land. After taking note of the common order passed by this court in W. P. Nos. 6321/80 and 3156/85, this court refused to admit the writ petition, through orders dated 16-7-1992. It was observed that in view of the steps indicated in the earlier writ petitions, another writ petition cannot be maintained tor the same relief. It was left open to the petitioners to pursue the application made by them on 22-12-1989. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by the refusal of relief in w. P. No. 8774/92, the petitioners preferred w. A. No. 1179/92. It was left open to the petitioners to pursue the application made by them on 22-12-1989. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by the refusal of relief in w. P. No. 8774/92, the petitioners preferred w. A. No. 1179/92. The writ appeal was disposed of through order dated 14-4-1997. The Division Bench recorded the fact that a cheque presented to the appellants, was handed over in the court by the learned counsel for the Corporation to the learned counsel for the appellants. It was further recorded that the payment of the said amount shall be subject to the condition that the petitioners shall make themselves available for negotiations. Beyond this, neither any findings were recorded nor any directions were issued. ( 5 ) NEGOTIATIONS were held by the corporation with the representatives of the petitioners on various dates. Through the impugned letter, the Corporation informed the petitioners that the petitioners have surrendered a strip of 15 feet of land along the road as a condition precedent for change of land use and no compensation needs to be paid to them. ( 6 ) THE respondents filed counter-affidavit. They state that they never utilised the land of the petitioners for the purpose of widening of the road. According to them, the width of the road from the beginning remained the same till it was expanded in the recent past. They state that the petitioners themselves have surrendered a strip of 15 feet of land while seeking change of land use, which was accorded to them under G. O. Ms. No. 284, MA, dated 10-5-1988. So far as payment made at me time of disposal of the writ appeal is concerned, the respondents contend that the said payment was made pursuant to an oral direction issued by the Division Bench, that too, subject to a condition that in the event of the petitioners being held not entitled to be paid any compensation, the same shall be returned. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners submits that the various correspondence that ensued since last two decades disclose that the land of the petitioners was taken over by the Corporation for widening of the road and providing footpaths. He also submits that at a different place also, the land of the petitioners was used for providing a bypass road. He submits that since the Corporation paid an amount of Rs. He also submits that at a different place also, the land of the petitioners was used for providing a bypass road. He submits that since the Corporation paid an amount of Rs. 5,07,000/- towards part payment of compensation,its obligation to pay the balance of compensation came to be established with the observations made by the Division Bench. According to him, the observations made by the Division Bench became final and the respondents are barred by the principle of res judicata from denying its obligation to pay the same. ( 8 ) LEARNED Standing Counsel for the corporation, on the other hand, submits mat the petitioners failed to establish that their land has been acquired or taken possession of by the Corporation at any point of time. According to him, the records disclose that it was the petitioners who have surrendered 15 feetof land while obtaining the concession from the Government in the form of relaxation of land use. He further submits that the application of the principle of res judicata, if at all, is to be against the petitioners. In this regard, he contends that the claim of the petitioners for payment of compensation was rejected in W. P. Nos. 6321/80 and 3156/85 and as long as the order therein was not set aside, the petitioners cannot seek the same relief. He further contends that the order of the Division Bench in w. A. No. 1179/92 neither adjudicated nor recorded any findings. According to him, the order did nothing more than recording the offer made by the Corporation, and that the result of the negotiations is not circumscribed in any manner. ( 9 ) THE petitioners contend that a strip of land, out of Sy. No. 137 belonging to them, has been taken over or utilised by the corporation, for the purpose of widening the University road and providing footpaths, way back in the year 1974. They filed w. P. Nos. 6321/80 and 3156/85 seeking relief in the form of a direction to the respondents to initiate proceedings under the Act and to pay compensation. This court negatived the same. The observation made therein became final. It was left open to the petitioners to approach the Mayor. When there was no substantial progress, the petitioners initiated 2nd round of litigation by filing W. P. No. 8774/92. The said writ petition was not even admitted. This court negatived the same. The observation made therein became final. It was left open to the petitioners to approach the Mayor. When there was no substantial progress, the petitioners initiated 2nd round of litigation by filing W. P. No. 8774/92. The said writ petition was not even admitted. Thereupon, they filed w. A. No. 1179/92. the writ appeal was disposed of by recording the offer by the corporation that it would negotiate with the petitioners. The impugned letter is the result of negotiations. ( 10 ) IN the impugned letter, the respondents have flatly denied the allegation that they have taken over the land of the petitioners. Reference was made to the order passed under Section 8 (4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act on the declaration filed by the petitioners. It is stated that the total extent of land belonging to the petitioners was computed to their holding and that no extent of land was excluded on the ground that it was utilised for widening of the road. Reference is also made to the decree and other documents in a suit to which the petitioners are parties, to buttress the contention that they continued to be in possession of the entire land. It was further observed that the 1st petitioner approached the Government for change of land use in respect of 13400 sq. yards. It is stated that the government issued orders in G. O. Ms. No. 284 dated 10-5-1988 permitting change of land use subject to certain conditions. One of the conditions was that the petitioners shall surrender 15 feet wide strip of land for widening of the existing road to 100 feet and to maintain 15 feet more open space in the front in addition to the portion affected in road widening. The respondents took the stand in the impugned letter that having availed the benefit under the G. O. , the petitioners cannot turn round and demand compensation for the land, which was surrendered by themselves. Reference is made to the master plan of the year 1965, which discloses that the width of the concerned road is 70 feetand it remained the same till it was widened after the petitioners surrendered the strip of 15 feet. The petitioners do not dispute the fact that this court rejected the relief in the earlier round of litigation. Reference is made to the master plan of the year 1965, which discloses that the width of the concerned road is 70 feetand it remained the same till it was widened after the petitioners surrendered the strip of 15 feet. The petitioners do not dispute the fact that this court rejected the relief in the earlier round of litigation. They took exception to the observations in the impugned letter on the ground that once they have volunteered to pay the sum of Rs. 5,07,000/- and undertaken to negotiate, it was not open to them to take a different stand. According to them, the obligation of the Corporation to pay the compensation came to be established with the order passed by the Division Bench. They invoke the principle of res judicata to resist the plea taken by the respondents in the counter-affidavits. Therefore, it needs to be seen as to how far the principle of res judicata gets attracted to the facts of the case. ( 11 ) RES judicata is one of the most widely discussed principles of civil law. It is a principle of public policy, which prohibits the parties to litigation from reagitating the issues, which have been adjudicated between them, on an earlier occasion. In the codified form, it occurs in Section 11 of the Code of civil Procedure. Basically, it is a form of defence permitted to be taken by defendants or respondents. However, its application cannot be confined to any party. Depending on the nature of plea, it can be invoked by either party to the litigation, ( 12 ) THE origins of res judicata as an approved form of defence are to be found in the ancient Indian Legal System. In the treatise written by Katyayana several centuries ago, four types of pleas were recognised to be taken by a defendant. They are- (1) Admission (Satyam); (2) Denial (Mithyam); (3) Special Plea (Pratyavaskandanam); and (4) Former Judgment i. e. , Res Judicata (Purvanyaya ). In the treatise written by Katyayana several centuries ago, four types of pleas were recognised to be taken by a defendant. They are- (1) Admission (Satyam); (2) Denial (Mithyam); (3) Special Plea (Pratyavaskandanam); and (4) Former Judgment i. e. , Res Judicata (Purvanyaya ). The four important ingredients for invoking the plea of res judicata are:- (1) The subject matter of the former and subsequent judicial proceedings was the one and the same; (2) The parties in the subsequent proceedings are the same as in the previous proceedings or claiming through the latter; (3) The court which decided the previous proceedings must have had the competence to decide the issue involved in the subsequent proceedings; and (4) The substantial issue in the subsequent proceedings might have been heard and finally decided by the court in the previous proceedings. Though the emphasis under Section 11 of the code of Civil Procedure is on the suits, through a catena of decisions, the Supreme court held that the principle of res judicata is applicable to the writ proceedings initiated under the Constitution of India, be it under article 226 before the High Courts or under article 32 before the Supreme Court. (See culabchand v. State of Gujara ). ( 13 ) REVERTING to the facts of the case, there is no difficulty as to the parties being the same in the present writ petition as well as those in W. ft . No. ll79/1992. The subject matter is als6 one and the same. Both the proceedings Were initiated in this court only. It only needs to be seen as to whether the 4th condition, viz. , the matter having been heard and decided exists in the present case, ( 14 ) IN every society, irrespective of the nature arid form of Government, several mechanisms exist for resolution of disputes at various levels. While some are under the auspices of the State, other exists in the society, in an unorganised form. What distinguishes the adjudicationby courts from other forms of resolution of disputes is the dispassionate consideration of the matter by hearing both the parties and rendering a judgment by supplying the reasons in support of the conclusions. More than 5000 years ago, Veda Vyasa listed the important attributes of a typical judgment, which he called as jayapatra . What distinguishes the adjudicationby courts from other forms of resolution of disputes is the dispassionate consideration of the matter by hearing both the parties and rendering a judgment by supplying the reasons in support of the conclusions. More than 5000 years ago, Veda Vyasa listed the important attributes of a typical judgment, which he called as jayapatra . According to him, judgment should incorporate - (1) a brief statement of the plaint and the answer; (2) the summary of evidence adduced by the parties; (3) the discussions on the issues involved; (4) the consideration of the arguments advanced by the parties; (5) identification of the law applicable to the case; (6) the opinion of judges; (7) the royal seal. ( 15 ) WE find almost all these attributes in order XX Rule 1 C. P. C. It is true that Rule 3 of Order XLIX exempts Chartered High courts from the rigour of the requirements under Order XX. However, from the point of view of extension of the principle of res judicata to the judgments rendered in writs, the spirit underlying Order XX if not its letter needs to be adhered to. Further, time and again, the Supreme Court emphasised the need of furnishing of reasons by the High courts in support of decisions rendered by them. ( 16 ) APART from the requirements under any provision of law, a judgment, which is sought to be pressed into service to non- suit a party, should be such that it had taken into account the rival contentions, discussed the matter with reference to the relevant principles of law and recorded a finding on such issues. It is then and only then that such a judgment can be said to have resolved the disputes between the parties. Once again, it is only such judgment that can be pressed into service to interdict the parties from agitating an issue. If such adjudication was not undertaken by a court in a proceeding, the outcome of the same cannot be permitted to be pleaded as res judicata. ( 17 ) THE order of the High Court in w. A. No. 1179/92 needs to be examined from this angle. If such adjudication was not undertaken by a court in a proceeding, the outcome of the same cannot be permitted to be pleaded as res judicata. ( 17 ) THE order of the High Court in w. A. No. 1179/92 needs to be examined from this angle. It needs to be emphasised that the attempt here is not to go into the merits or form of the order, but to see as to whether it has the effect of scuttling the respondents from disputing the claim of the petitioners. The order is brief and it is beneficial to extract the same in its entirety:-"heard. A cheque is presented in the name of the 1st writ petitioner payable, of course to the petitioners together, and is handed over in court by the learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation to the learned counsel for the petitioners-appellants. It is, however, urged before us that- the instant proceeding be disposed of on terms that the respondent-Municipal corporation of Hyderabad had paid to the petitioners - appellants compensation in a sum of Rs. 5,07,000 (Rupees Five lakhs: and seven thousand), vide cheque No. 483659 dated 13-3-1997 drawn of State Bank of hyderabad, Municipal Complex (Tank bund) Branch, Hyderabad, on condition that petitioners - appellants shall make themselves available for negotiations to the Commissioner of Municipal corporation or any officer nominated by him for negotiations and settlement of the claim by negotiations in respect of the area of land acquired and/or the value of the land within one week from to-day, on which date, further date of appearance shall be fixed and proceedings by negotiations shall be concluded within one month. Since parties have agreed to the above, we have no reason to keep the proceedings alive. The writ appeal and the writ petition are ordered accordingly. "from a reading of the same, it is evident that the Division Bench did nothing more than recording the factum of handing over of the cheque on behalf of the Corporation to the petitioners herein, that too, on the condition that the petitioners shall make themselves available for negotiations. At the most, it records the agreement to undertake negotiations. By no stretch of imagination, this order can be said to have decided the issue finally. In Subba Rao v, jagannadha Rao, the Supreme Court has held as under:"the compromise decree was not a decision by the court. At the most, it records the agreement to undertake negotiations. By no stretch of imagination, this order can be said to have decided the issue finally. In Subba Rao v, jagannadha Rao, the Supreme Court has held as under:"the compromise decree was not a decision by the court. It was the acceptance by the court of something to which the parties had agreed. It has been said that a compromise decree merely sets the seal of the court on the agreement of the parties. The court did not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the court could be res judicata, whether statutory under s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. "to the same effect is the judgment of the supreme Court in Baldevdas v. Filmistan distributors. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Division Bench of this court has recorded any finding or decided any issue to the effect that the Corporation is under obligation to pay the compensation to the petitioners. Hence, the order in W. A. No. 1179/92 does not operate as res judicata against the respondents in this case. ( 18 ) THE contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners are estopped from claiming compensation in view of the fact that such a claim was rejected by this court in W. P. Nos. 6321/80 and 3156/85 becomes insignificant, in view of the fact that both the parties have agreed to negotiate. Therefore, it has to be seen as to whether the outcome of the negotiations is justiciable and, if so, whether the stand taken by the respondents suffers from any illegality or arbitrariness. ( 19 ) IN rejecting the claim of the petitioners, the respondents have relied on two important factors, viz. , that the width of the road was 70 feet as per the master plan of the year 1965 and it was expanded in the year 1990 to 100 feet by adding 15 feet on both sides. According to them, the petitioners themselves have surrendered a strip of 15 feet as a condition precedent for securing the change of land use, through G. O. Ms. No. 284, ma dated 10-5-1988. According to them, the petitioners themselves have surrendered a strip of 15 feet as a condition precedent for securing the change of land use, through G. O. Ms. No. 284, ma dated 10-5-1988. The 2nd aspect raised by them is that in various proceedings, such as, declarations and orders passed under the urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and a suit to which the petitioners are parties, the entire extent held by them was shown without pointing out any area said to have been occupied by the Corporation. ( 20 ) THESE two aspects are borne out by record. Neither any material is placed before this court nor any endeavour is made on behalf of the petitioners to convince the court to disbelieve these statements. Having availed the benefit ot change of land use, the petitioners cannot turn round and claim compensation for the area, which they have surrendered voluntarily. ( 21 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners has referred to certain communications in the form of letters addressed by the then commissioner in the years 1978 and 1979 to the revenue authorities for fixation of the land rate, etc. Even if it is assumed that the respondents acquired the strip of land of the petitioners for the purpose of widening of the road, the petitioners ceased to have any claim for compensation, once they have agreed to surrender that strip as a condition precedent for obtaining change of land use. ( 22 ) VIEWED from any angle, this court does not find any basis in the claim of the petitioners. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.